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7PREFACE
These proceedings collect many of the contributions to the first European
University Institute (EUI) Alumni conference held in Florence at the Badia
Fiesolana on 3/4 October 2003. This volume is also the result of the first
collaborative academic work of EUI alumni as such, and represents the four
disciplines taught at the Institute: economics, political science, law and history.
Since launching the idea of organising an interdisciplinary conference
on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), we have counted on the continuous
support and help from the Alumni Association and its Executive Committee,
especially from Annette Bongardt and Carlo Spagnolo and, since last year,
also from Milica Uvalic and Amy Verdun.
It was quite an ambitious task to organise such a conference on the
occasion of the traditional alumni weekend in Florence. The conference
programme was carefully designed and adapted over almost one year. There
was a conference organiser for each discipline: Amy Verdun (political science),
Chiara Zilioli (law), Hubert Zimmermann (history) and myself (economics).
To look for fellow alumni who might be interested in contributing to the subject
as well as for discussants and chairpersons for the conference was a demanding
job but a rather gratifying one.
Many alumni came and participated in the conference without presenting
and/or discussing a particular paper. Many others could not make it in October
2003 although they had very interesting contributions on the topic. Others were
not prepared to contribute to this particular topic but were very keen on
participating in future alumni conferences. Some others managed to come and
deliver quite interesting presentations but did not find the time to write and/or
revise (edit) their papers. We are grateful to all of them, especially to all those
– listed as contributors – who came to the conference to present or discuss a
paper, and successively undertook revisions of their contributions in the
following months.
The organisation of the conference was possible thanks to grants to the
European University Institute from the European Central Bank and the European
Investment Bank. We are grateful to both institutions and to alumni Chiara
Zilioli and Eric Perée, working at the ECB and the EIB respectively, for having
suggested such a possibility.
We also very much thank Paul De Grauwe who accepted to deliver the
keynote address to our conference and EUI faculty, namely Helen Wallace,
8Colin Crouch, Bruno De Witte, Rick van der Ploeg, Arfon Rees and Mike Artis,
who acted as chair persons, and Stefano Bartolini, also an alumnus, Neil Walker,
Martin Rhodes, Giancarlo Corsetti, David Andrews and Philippe Schmitter,
who agreed to be paper and panel discussants, as well as Jürgen Kröger from
the European Commission, for participating in the conference and in the panel.
For some of these people, this meant making a significant effort to be present
and to participate in the conference activities.
Throughout the entire project we benefited from the institutional support
of the European University Institute and in particular of its president, Yves
Mény, who opened the conference and actively supported this project with
much personal commitment and many excellent suggestions. We also received
invaluable help and advice from the EUI Administration, namely from Andreas
Frijdal, Brigitte Schwab, Kathinka España, Roberto Nocentini, Bobbie Rawle,
Alex Howarth and, last but not least, from Valérie Coppini, who helped us
carry out the entire project with tireless dedication and enthusiasm. We would
also like to acknowledge the help of Jakub Kubicki in transforming many papers
with different styles into a single word document and of Signor Pandolfi, in
Florence, who patiently made the necessary changes to the manuscript via long
telephone calls and took it to press.
Amy Verdun and Hubert Zimmermann were exceptional co-editors.
Thanks to them and their remarkable skills and experience as editors and to all
contributors – that make for the contents of this volume – it was possible to
publish these proceedings and to envisage pursuing this interdisciplinary project
in the near future.
Francisco Torres
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INTRODUCTION
BY
FRANCISCO TORRES, AMY VERDUN AND HUBERT ZIMMERMANN
The Enlarged European Union (EU) is facing challenging times. The
EU is simultaneously expanding its geographical scope and revisiting existing
policies. It has taken on board eight new Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs) and two small Mediterranean countries. It is likely to take on Bulgaria
and Romania in 2007 and later perhaps even Turkey and countries of the Former
Yugoslav Republic. In order to enlarge successfully it needed to rethink its
institutional structure and reformulate a number of important Community
policies, such as agricultural, structural and cohesion policy. The 2001 Treaty
of Nice laid the foundation for the enlarged EU. Subsequently, the 2002-2003
Convention dealt with some of the outstanding issues not settled at Nice and
ventured into others that emerged when rethinking the raison d’être of the EU.
These discussions led to proposing a draft Constitutional Treaty in July 2003,
which was eventually adopted with a few changes at the European Summit in
June 2004. Though many policies were reviewed during the Convention
meetings, one policy area remained almost untouched: Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). The EU’s single currency project which has had a chequered
history, but eventually became an important cornerstone of European integration,
appeared an uncontested area of EU governance. But was it really? Let us first
reflect briefly on its immediate past, and then turn to the main questions that
this book addresses.
Though EMU was already conceptualised in the 1960s and 1970s it
entered into the EU legal framework only with the Treaty on European Union
(TEU), signed at Maastricht in February 1992. When it was first discussed in
the European Community (EC) it was not possible to generate sufficient support,
nor was it the time for economic collaboration on this scale. However, even
though EMU was incorporated into the TEU it was still not at all sure that a
single currency within a decade would be feasible. Though the TEU entered
into force on 1 November 1993, the crisis in the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) in 1992 and 1993 had wrecked havoc with the EMU project. Many
wondered indeed if EMU would materialise at all. However, by the mid-1990s
10
the process regained some momentum. Particularly many of the Southern
Member States managed unexpectedly to consolidate their public finances and
perform well on the ‘convergence criteria’ that set out the criteria for entry.
These criteria referred to performance in the area of exchange rates, interest
rates, inflation rates, public debts and budgetary deficits (with the latter turning
out to be the main stumbling block). Economists pointed out that once Member
States were members of EMU they could more easily free-ride on the ‘good
performance’ of others in the eurozone, so that it might well be necessary to
have clearer rules. As a consequence, all would perform well and unsound
policies would be discouraged.
In November 1995, the German government took the initiative to develop
stricter rules for sound public finances for what was known as ‘stage 3 of EMU’
(that is, once the single currency would have been introduced in financial
markets). The result was the creation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
that stipulates that Member States’ budgets be ‘close to balance or in surplus’
and in any case budget deficits should not exceed three percent of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Otherwise, sanctions could be imposed. The SGP,
agreed to in Amsterdam in June 1997 and firmly embedded in the Treaty on
European Union (articles 99 and 104), consisted of two regulations and a Council
resolution. At this time, macroeconomic collaboration was also further
developed in the form of Broad Economic Policy guidelines and discussions
about the creation of an informal Eurogroup that would discuss coordination
in EMU.
When the euro was introduced in financial markets on 1 January 1999
many acclaimed North American economists predicted that it would never
survive the test of time. Some had even gone as far as to say that the single
currency would bring Europe to the brink of war. However, when euro banknotes
and coins started circulating in the twelve officially participating EU Member
States (and beyond, for instance in Kosovo and Montenegro) on 1 January
2002 no such doomsday scenarios emerged. Indeed, the euro seems to have
fared quite well in the first 4.5 years of its existence. Though it had lost thirty
per cent of its value vis-à-vis the US dollar by late October 2000 (down to 0.83
from 1.17), it was still considered a respectable currency in these first years. In
fact, by the spring of 2002 it started to appreciate steadily so that by the spring
of 2003 it even passed its original introduction rate. At that point, commentators
were arguing that the euro was too expensive! Little more than a year later, in
February 2004, the euro peaked at 1.29 against the US dollar. The fear was that
an expensive euro might impede the weak economic recovery that seemed
Francisco Torres, Amy Verdun and Hubert Zimmermann
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underway in Europe. The success of the euro is not only to be measured by the
market reaction to the euro. Its main guardian, the European Central Bank
(ECB), was perceived as a solid new institution in these first years. Its policies
more or less secured price stability (defined by itself as no more than two per
cent of GDP in the medium term – although it did frequently go above that
target in the short run).
When the Constitutional debates were taking place in 2002-2003, EMU
was deemed to be operating as expected. Many felt it was not the time to embark
on serious discussions on revisions. However, what became more apparent at
this time was that the governments of some Member States, such as Portugal,
Germany and France, were not really aiming at meeting the excessive deficit
criteria as set out in the SGP and the Maastricht Treaty. They had not made the
necessary cuts in spending during the period of economic growth in the late
1990s. Hence, when growth rates declined their deficits mounted, which left
them vulnerable to possible penalties through the provisions of the Stability
and Growth Pact. At this point, many economists voiced their criticism of the
SGP as implementing its rules would require that the culprits pursue
countercyclical policies at a time of economic downturn. Advocates of the SGP
pointed out that governments should have thought about that in the good times.
Yet, at this point it was still unclear how the SGP would be implemented. The
arrangements had both firm language as well as room for manoeuvre. By
November 2003, it became clear that political leeway could and would be used
to buy some Member States more time. At the meeting of the Council of
Ministers of Economic and Financial Affairs of 25 November 2003 a qualified
majority decided not to move to the next step of the provisions of the SGP,
which would have led to sanctions against Germany and France. The media
responded with outrage and disbelief, and those who sympathised with the
course of action of these two countries’ governments argued that the SGP now
clearly was dead. Regardless of one’s position on the value of the SGP many
doubted the Stability Pact was still to be taken seriously. The Commission
eventually decided to challenge the Council decision by taking the case to the
European Court of Justice on 3 May 2004 and ask the judges to decide whether
the Council decision was in line with the Treaty. On 13 July 2004 the Court
annulled the Council decision, and indicated that the Council had the right to
reject the Commission proposals, but needed to wait for a Commission initiative
to propose an alternative recommendation. At the time of writing (summer
2004) it seems that the principles of the SGP are still upheld, but that the exact
contents of the rules may be subject to change in the course of 2005.
INTRODUCTION
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The SGP debacle, the continuing debates over how to govern EMU and
the questions over its institutional design, indicate how intricately linked
economic, political, legal and historical matters are. In addition to the specific
questions regarding policy-making in the area of economic and monetary
matters, scholars discussing EMU have also contributed to the debates on
legitimacy, democracy and accountability in the EU. Scholars have pointed to
the fact that EMU generates important symbols of supranational unity: a single
currency, a new supranational institution (ECB) and the transfer of sovereignty
from the national to the supranational level (monetary policy) as well as
acceptance of rules on other important areas of national sovereignty (budgetary
policies and public finance). Given that we see semi-federalism emerge in this
area of policy-making, one can pose the question whether democratic principles
are sufficiently safeguarded. It is for this reason that proposals for an economic
government (government économique) keep emerging as soon as EMU or its
institutional design are discussed. The question is at what point a counterweight
to the ECB (a political or economic body) might be needed as a democratic
counterbalance. Some argue there will never be a need for such a body. Others
say that economic policy is too political to be left to rules. They argue that the
EU needs a political authority to make decisions in this area. Clearly, these
questions of governance, democratic accountability and legitimacy are part
and parcel of the broader soul searching that is taking place in the EU. Thus,
EMU offers a microcosm in which issues that are debated in the EU at large
can be studied on a smaller scale.
The above short historical overview indicates how the governance of
EMU is firmly embedded in economic, political, legal, and historical
perspectives. Governing EMU encompasses an appreciation of all these facets
of governance. Furthermore, governing EMU in an enlarged Europe, possibly
with a new constitution, will be even more challenging. The current situation
raises all kinds of questions that can only be fully understood within a
multidisciplinary focus. More often than not, a book on EMU will examine the
issues at stake through only one of the disciplinary lenses1. This project has the
ambition to take all four disciplines on board. We seek to examine matters that
relate to the accountability and issues of democracy related to EMU governance
and how it raises overall issues of democratic governance in the EU at large.
What is the role of the state-society relations in EMU, what is the role of the
European Parliament (EP), how does EMU fit with constitutional settings of
Member States? The Stability and Growth Pact itself will be scrutinised: what
are the underlying ideas behind the SGP, where did it come from, what will be
the futures of the SGP, how is one to pursue macroeconomic policies in an
Francisco Torres, Amy Verdun and Hubert Zimmermann
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EMU subject to the SGP? We also seek to place the issues in its historical and
geographical context. How does the euro fare in a world dominated by the
dollar? Will it ever be a major reserve or trading currency? How can institutions
contribute to the success of the euro? What are the best transition strategies
(and timings) from different currency regimes to the euro? What is the role of
standards in financial markets? Finally, the book reflects on the road ahead.
These are important issues. This book is the first collaborative product
by the alumni of the European University Institute in Florence, representing
the four disciplines. We have sought to address the issue from the various
disciplinary perspectives and hope the reader will have a more balanced account
of EMU governance as a result of reading this book.
The first section, “Democracy and Governance in the Euro area”, starts
off by reflecting on the broader democratic governance issues related to EMU.
Oliver Schmidtke’s Chapter 2 raises the question of how EMU connects to
issues of anti-Europeanism, blaming EMU for structural problems in the labour
market and the economy. He concludes, however, that EMU might contribute
to the creation of a more developed sense of citizenship and belonging of the
EU. In Chapter 3 Francisco Torres digs a little deeper into the democratic
characteristics of EMU and its shortcomings. He reviews the literature and the
issues at stake with EMU and its design. He focuses on the role of the EP but
also whether further developments in economic governance might be necessary
to offset any imbalances in democratic governance of EMU. He discusses the
efficiency-legitimacy trade-off but concludes that there is no such trade-off. In
fact he finds that EMU might contribute to enhancing the quality of democracy
in the EU. The fourth chapter, by Anneli Albi, turns to constitutional matters.
She examines how the creation of EMU led to constitutional changes in various
Member States (four in particular). This chapter does not only examine current
members of the eurozone but also reflects on likely changes that might be
needed in Central and Eastern European countries that are to adopt the euro in
the future.
The chapters in section two, “Between Growth and Stability”, examine
various aspects of governing the SGP. Simona Talani (Chapter 5) offers a
provocative analysis of the SGP whereby she examines ‘who wins and who
loses from the ECB’s monetary policy. By looking at trade and speculating
about decisions in the ECB she argues that it is mainly the interest of the largest
Member States which is served by ECB policies. In Chapter 6, Martin Heipertz
and Amy Verdun look at the origins of the SGP and offer an ideational analysis.
They examine the domestic context in which the SGP was put on the
international agenda, the overall dominant paradigm that existed during its
INTRODUCTION
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creation, and what lessons can be drawn from the drafting of the SGP for its
future. They suggest that the future of the SGP depends on the overall support
for the basic principles on which the SGP is based. Chapter 7, by Roberto
Tamborini, provides an analysis of the so-called ‘Brussels consensus’ on
macroeconomic stabilisation policies in EMU. He offers an assessment of core
EMU questions such as whether the policy-mix between monetary policy and
national automatic stabilisers is optimal, and whether discretionary fiscal policies
should be banned or limited. He concludes that rules are important to ensure
stabilisation as one cannot assume good behaviour on the part of governments.
The contribution by Bernhard Winkler (Chapter 8) reviews some of the key
principles of macroeconomic governance in EMU. It discusses the argument
that the notion of stability is a prerequisite for growth. Winkler also concludes
that the basic consensus underpinning the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability
and Growth Pact is still prevalent, although it has received increasing criticism.
He argues that improvements in growth performance should be obtained through
structural reforms rather than through a change in macroeconomic policies. In
the last chapter of this section, Chapter 9, Dario Togati offers a Keynesian
critique of the current EMU design, the macroeconomic theory underpinning
it (in his words: the lack thereof) and the demand problems that EMU might
trigger. Through a critique on the ‘Brussels consensus’ and a review of what a
Keynesian model might bring, Togati offers a few alternative policy solutions.
Section three of the book, “The Euro as a World Currency and as a
European Anchor”, offers a look at the euro’s international dimension. Chapter
10 by Hubert Zimmermann argues that the motive of creating an alternative to
the dollar was, especially in France, but also in other European countries, a
powerful driving force in the push towards EMU. However, when the actual
blueprint of the Euro-zone was drafted (in the early 1990s), this motive played
a minor role due to specific historical circumstances. The eurozone is, as a
consequence, ill-suited to engage in purposeful monetary diplomacy. Pompeo
Della Posta argues in Chapter 11 that the rise and fall of the euro vis-à-vis the
dollar cannot be explained in terms of ‘economic fundamentals’. When the
euro was to be launched the analysis leaned on the euro’s role as an international
currency, whereas when the euro started to drop, analysts tended to argue using
the argument of economic fundamentals. Through a review of the economic
literature, Della Posta concludes that today one is better off reflecting on the
euro as an international currency with an emphasis on expectations rather than
merely focusing on fundamentals. The 12th Chapter, by Maurice Fitzgerald
takes us to the British-Irish relationship. The establishment of European
monetary cooperation with the goal of a common currency prompted Ireland
Francisco Torres, Amy Verdun and Hubert Zimmermann
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to abandon one of its most crucial and long-lived economic policy stances: the
link of the Irish currency to the British pound. The consequences of this step
can hardly be overestimated since it was essential in a radical reorientation of
Irish foreign economic policies towards continental Europe. Renzo Daviddi
and Milica Uvalic’s contribution, Chapter 13, reflects on exchange rate regimes
on the Western Balkans. This area is characterised by a large variety of regimes.
The prospects of these countries joining EMU are still rather remote, since the
variety of macro-economic solutions which is necessary to deal with the
problems of transition precludes a premature attachment to the restrictive policy
mix of the euro-zone. The fourth section of the book on the “Role of Standards
and Legal Tender in EMU” comprises two chapters that examine selected legal
aspects of the euro and EMU. Chapter 14 by Maria Chiara Malaguti looks at
the role of standards in financial markets. Examining the role of soft law and a
few recommendations in this area, her chapter shows how standards are at the
core of  what could be referred to as a ‘new legal order’ and as such are of
paramount importance. In Chapter 15 Péter Munkácsi studies the copyright
protection of the euro and Hungarian national legal tender. His chapter examines
the lack of copyright protection and examines in particular the Hungarian case
for once it joins. He advocates a better copyright protection of the euro banknotes
and coins. Finally, the last piece by Paul De Grauwe (Chapter 16) offers an
insight into the governance of EMU, including an assessment of the SGP. His
analysis is critical of the SGP in its current form since it leads to too restrictive
policies and possibly undesirable outcomes in the long-run if taken literally.
His analysis offers food for thought to all those that are keen to learn more
about the interaction between economic policy, outcomes and institutional
design.
With this book we hope to have provided the reader with a better insight
into the economics, the politics, the law and history of EMU. It is hoped that in
so doing this volume transcends disciplinary boundaries and opens up debate
on the interconnected issues at stake in the further development of EMU in the
years to come.
NOTES
1
  Examples of books on the economics of EMU are De Grauwe (2003), Baimbridge and Whyman (2003)
and Brunila, Buti, and Franco (2001); a political science perspective can be found in Dosenrode (2002) and
in Dyson and Featherstone (1999); a legal text, that focuses mainly on the institutional aspects, is provided
by Smits (1997) whereas a historical account is offered by Unger (1997).
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CHAPTER 2
POLITICISING EMU: THE ‘LEGITIMACY GAP’ AND THE POPULIST
CHALLENGE TO THE EU
BY
OLIVER SCHMIDTKE
Abstract: With the introduction of the Euro and a less benevolent economic
climate over the last years Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has become
increasingly politicised and, as the key project of European integration, subject
to contentious popular claims. This paper investigates the logic and driving
forces behind this process of politicisation on the basis of a theoretical argument:
With the transferral of considerable power to supra-national institutions
fundamental questions are raised about the range and meaning of democratic
rule. EMU sheds light on the growing incongruity between sites of economic
and political power on the one hand and the institutional reach of principles of
democratic accountability and citizens’ involvement in the political decision-
making process on the other hand. Against this background, the paper looks at
the political implications of EMU as they are related to this critical stage of the
European integration process. Firstly, EMU and the European Central Bank
(ECB) are recurrently being blamed for the impending crisis of the economy
and the labour market. The range of populist, anti-European forms of political
mobilisation indicate that with EMU, political conflicts at the European level
have become far more severe and, potentially, damaging for the EU itself.
Secondly, the political repercussions of EMU can be interpreted as a driving
force behind the current concerns for the EU’s democratic deficit and legitimacy
crisis. In this respect EMU, as the most critical arena for supra-national policy
co-ordination, could indirectly contribute to the development of a, albeit thin,
notion of a European citizenship status.
Keywords: EMU, legitimacy, democracy, citizenship, populism, governance,
political community
1. Introduction
If one studies the public debates accompanying the introduction of EMU
in the 1990s it is surprising to see to which degree this monumental step in the
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European integration process was widely and primarily perceived as a procedural
endeavour in the realm of economics. Initially the interest of the wider public
was marginal at best and political deliberation in Europe’s parliaments and
mass media remained strangely remote. Even with the introduction of the Euro
and its immediate impact on the daily lives of citizens, EMU was still widely
perceived as a management issue controlled by the de-politicised world of
bankers, bureaucrats and businessmen. This public perception was echoed by
how Europe’s political elite portrayed the integration of economic and monetary
policies of the member states: They were manifestly eager to justify EMU in
terms of a macro-economic rationale whose necessity was said to be too evident
and too advantageous to be seriously challenged. As with other key projects of
European integration in the past, EMU was highly elitist in how it was launched
and, while depicted as a functional imperative, it was deliberately removed
from controversial public debate.
Yet, at the same time one could detect a remarkable ambivalence in the
discourse of the political elite: On the one hand the issue of EMU was largely
portrayed as a kind of expert agreement, a sheer inevitability, that simply needed
no public deliberation. On the other hand, however, EMU and the new stage of
European integration it launched have often played a key role in the depiction
of the future political identity of member states. Thomas Risse et. al. speak in
this context of Europe as an ‘identity project’, which encapsulates the blueprint
for the path of development that societies are supposed to embark on (Risse et.
al. 1999). In this respect, the Euro can be interpreted and has been rhetorically
employed as the principal symbol of an emerging European (political) identity.
The German case is a striking example in with regards to this point. Although
Germans only reluctantly accepted EMU and in particular the end of their much
appreciated German Mark they were convinced by the argument made
repeatedly by the then Chancellor Helmut Kohl that accepting the Euro means
a rejection of the German militaristic and nationalistic past (Banchoff 1999).
As in many other member states, EMU was justified as a critical step towards
the abandonment of narrow and outdated national interests and thus towards a
better ‘European future’ of the old continent. Beyond the alleged positive
economic impact the last step towards an integrated market in the EU was
portrayed as normatively highly desirable in moving towards the broader goal
of European unity.
The key hypothesis of this paper assumes that EMU is, far from being
simply a matter of economic policy co-ordination at the international level,
intimately linked to the political project of European integration with substantial
Oliver Schmidtke -Politicising EMU: the ‘Legitimacy Gap’ and the Populist Challenge to the EU
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repercussions on structures of governance in Europe. Beyond the repeatedly
discussed issues of the ECB’s far-reaching independence from political
authorities and its technocratic style of decision-making processes removed
from any public or parliamentary scrutiny, this paper seeks to shed light on the
far-reaching political repercussions of EMU. More it looks into how specifically
the consequences of EMU affect the most basic provisions on which modern,
nationally defined citizenship regimes are based. In the way EMU transfers
critical decision making power in the field of economic and monetary policies
to supranational institutions, it fundamentally challenges the rationale of national
communities and the political principles on which they rest. The process of
economic and monetary integration hence raises basic questions regarding
legitimacy, accountability and democracy in terms of its effects on structures
of governance in Europe and the political identity of the European integration
process. It is not by accident that gradually, albeit increasingly notable, EMU’s
challenge to national sovereignty has become a critical reference point of
political conflicts in contemporary Europe. In terms of public perception, EMU
has become associated — accurately or not — with a deep-seated feeling of
uncertainty and the loss of control in managing the economy. The less benevolent
economic climate of the last years has further contributed a series of popular
reactions to EMU and the power that EU institutions hold in monetary and
economic policies (the recent Swedish referendum being a good illustration).
In light of these broad dominant themes in the debate surrounding EMU,
this paper will address the following question: Focusing on more recent events
following the introduction of the Euro, what popular reaction has the ongoing
process of European integration generated? In this regard, the main task is to
spell out the political dimension of EMU in terms of its popular perception and
the debate it has triggered on the status and range of national communities vis-
à-vis the European supranational level of decision making. I will proceed with
two major steps. In the first section, the paper will analyse the political challenges
that EMU poses to nationally organised citizenship regimes. Following T.H,
Marshall’s classical distinction of key rights associated with modern citizenship,
the imminent political quality of EMU and ramification for principal political
questions will be depicted. At the core of this section is an argument about the
changing nature and boundaries of political communities and their mode of
self-organisation in an environment of supranational co-ordination of economic
and monetary policies. Here, dominant issues from public discourse will be
addressed that are related to the endangered European social model and the
democratic deficit of the EU. The second section identifies two politically
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opposing popular reactions to these challenges. While populist anti-European
sentiments and the plea for a more substantiated European citizenship status
have little in common in terms of the political future they envision for the EU,
they both indicate a growing and increasingly controversial political debate on
the ramifications of EMU. Both phenomena —the rising populist opposition
to European integration and the demand for a more full-fledged European
citizenship regime — are critically related to the EMU as the core initiative of
the EU in the last decade. The deficient responses to the ever more apparent
legitimacy gap opens the route to an institutional learning process directed at
far-reaching reforms of governance structures in Europe as well as a fundamental
populist opposition to the EU as a whole.
2. The political challenge of EMU to established citizenship regimes
To better understand the ‘political dimension’ of EMU and the popular
reaction it has sparked recently additional theoretical reflections promise to be
helpful. By referring to T.H. Marshall’s categorisation of civic, social and
political rights this chapter is meant to investigate EMU’s impact on established
citizenship regimes and how it challenges the regulative idea and the institutional
fabric of sovereign nation-states.
EMU and the political right of democratic self-determination
With its transferral of supreme authority in the realm of economic and
monetary policies to the European level the very idea of politics as the collective
self-determination of citizens in a national community is in doubt. The nation-
state as it emerged in Europe in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
became the exclusive spatial and social container of modern democratic politics
(Walker 1993). It has stipulated rules of how membership in the modern form
of political community is to be conceived. A fundamental function of this
nationally defined community was to draw the line between those who were
said to legitimately belong and those who were seen and treated as “foreigners.”
To become the exclusive wielder of the legitimate power of coercion (Max
Weber), and thus to infringe on the freedom of individuals, the state needed a
clear sense of whom its monopoly of power referred to, what the boundaries of
its jurisdiction were, and whose consensus it needed for its legitimisation. The
very institutional framework of modern democracy has historically been based
on the regulative idea of a nation-state demarcating the community of those
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who could legitimately participate in and be affected by the collective decision-
making process.
EMU challenges this basic rationale of a world organised in accordance
with the Westphalian principles of independent and sovereign states. What can
be observed in today’s process of European integration is a growing incongruity
between sites of economic and political power on the one hand and the
institutional range of democratic transparency, legitimisation and accountability
on the other (Greven & Pauly 2000, Rosenau 2000). While forms of authority
outside the realm of national politics shape critical aspects of the lives of citizens,
their democratic rights of participation extend to this level of decision making
only in a very remote way. At the core of the ‘democratic challenge’ is the fact
that states are gradually losing the policy autonomy and capacity necessary for
determining critical aspects of their citizens’ social and political existence. If
democracy has at its core the right of citizens to participate in the decision-
making process over those issues that determine their lives, transferring authority
over economic and monetary issues to supranational institutions requires new
forms of democratic governance. In this respect EMU has rapidly transformed
the structural context and institutional setting in which basic democratic rights
are supposed to be exercised.2
In opposing this reasoning, one could formulate the following two key
arguments that would – albeit with other intentions – echo Schmitter’s (2000a)
provocative question, why we would need to bother about the democratic deficit
at all. The first argument assumes that the decisions of the European bank and
the EU in general are sufficiently legitimated indirectly via national contexts
and, also given the mode in which central banks operate, that there is no need
for extending patterns of democratic accountability to this realm of state activity.
Second, following Weber´s notion of functional legitimacy, the argument could
be made that EMU and its institutional framework of implementation rest on a
form of output legitimacy3. The performance of institutions such as the ECB
should be measured in terms of their effectiveness and success (and the resulting
degree of satisfaction in the population) rather than by standards of democratic
accountability. However, both lines of arguments do not question the poor
account of participatory democratic accountability; they doubt whether its
standards can indeed be applied to these policy fields and institutions at all.
While these hypotheses might have their merits they should not ignore
that the degree of confidence and trust in EU institutions is comparatively low.
The regular surveys conducted by the Eurobarometer give clear evidence of
the irritating gap between the general willingness to support the cause of
24
European integration and the growing mistrust in and alienation from key EU
institutions4. It reflects that the process of European integration and in particular
the move towards a political union has undermined the effectiveness of
democratic governance. While democratic practices in national contexts are
far from ideal, processes of representation, accountability and legitimisation
are still almost exclusively rooted in the institutionalised apparatus of the nation
state (the strengthened role of the European Parliament is not likely to change
this substantially). It is the gap between the lack of such an institutional
arrangement at the European level and the relegation of power in key policy
areas – EMU being the most pertinent one – that is at the core of the democratic
challenge and legitimacy crisis that the EU after Maastricht must face5. As we
will see in the second section, it is this distinct notion of being exposed to a
level of governance and power over which one has little if any control, which
has sparked the process of politicising EMU in controversial terms.
EMU, social rights and the European social model
One of the crucial challenges that the latest stage of European integration
poses to citizenship regimes, is that it weakens the functional and ideological
bases for the distribution of social resources (Barbalet 1989). Here, another
theoretical consideration is helpful. The logic of systems such as the welfare
state has traditionally been based on the principle of an “exclusive universalism,”
with the distinction between members and non-members in terms of entitlements
and rights. Even though the benefits of the welfare state are granted to those
who legally work as non-citizens in a country for an extended period of time,
its provisions are clearly defined by social rights through membership in the
nation-state.
In this respect, social rights are distinct from political rights. Whereas
political rights (voting as the most pertinent example) could be extended to
non-citizens without necessarily jeopardising the integrity of the entire system,
social rights cannot. Welfare states are critically dependent on a clear definition
of entitlements and thus on discriminatory measures that allow them to generate
a stable pattern of social inclusion and exclusion. In this respect national
exclusiveness does not necessarily reflect a morally illegitimate act; rather, it
can be seen as functional with respect to securing a meaningful universalistic
set of entitlements for all citizens. The foundation of the modern welfare state
is also challenged by concerns regarding the political legitimacy of its processes
and results. The production and distribution of scarce goods in a society require
political authority that may legitimately impose taxes and re-distribute wealth
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in a society. Traditionally this legitimisation emerges from the collective will
of the citizens as defined by membership in a nation-state.
Given the nature of the policies involved, EMU fundamentally challenges
the rationale of nationally contained welfare state regimes. The harmonisation
of monetary and, as currently considered by the Commission, taxation policies,
drastically reduces the option that national governments have in terms of
managing the economy and social relations. With the stability pact and its effects
on national sovereignty in the field of economic and monetary policies there is
a declining capacity of the state to provide collective goods and public services.
Its regulatory power and effectiveness in this field ultimately depends on
decisions taken at the EU level. The Keynesian approach to managing the
economy became unfashionable already some time before the introduction of
EMU (also for good economic reasons). Yet the degree to which national
governments now operate within a narrowly defined range of macro-economic
options is a qualitatively new phenomenon.
There is a long and highly controversial discussion as to whether EMU
is to blame for the dismantling of some of Europe’s more advanced welfare
states, the retrenchment in public services and to which degree – if at all – it
has sparked a race to the bottom in terms of restricting the state’s intervention
into the economy (Leibfried & Pierson 1996). This paper does not seek to
engage in this debate. Rather, considering popular reactions to EMU, it seeks
to point out that the image of the EU and the ECB as limiting the options of
national authorities in the realm of managing the economy has found strong
public resonance. Regardless of whether there is indeed a trend of convergence
towards the lowest common denominator EMU has largely been perceived as a
genuine threat to the so-called European ‘social model’ (Kittel 2001). Partly
this is due to the fact that politicians from all major parties have repeatedly
used the EU as the scapegoat for implementing austerity policies at the national
level. At the rhetorical level, EMU has been employed in public discourse as
an agent of globalised markets that can be blamed for the competitive environment
to which national approaches to managing the economy seem to be condemned
to adhere6. The convergence criteria have been employed as an important rhetorical
device in public discourse to overcome domestic opposition to cutting public
expenditures and expensive state welfare programs (Verdun 2000a).
Against this background it will be of decisive weight whether and to
which degree the EU is able to justify fiscal retrenchment and re-distributive
policies at the European level. As stated above, European welfare states are
critically built on a strong sense of inclusiveness and solidarity in national
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communities. The more the EU will determine the margins within which fiscal
spending is conducted, the more it will become vulnerable to accusations of
imposing unjustifiable harsh conditions on state agencies. The critical weakness
and source of vulnerability of the EU, in this respect, is that it has not yet
created a strong sense of commonality and support for the European cause. In
more emphatic terms, this has been described as a lack of a viable European
demos and identity — a sense that Europeans share a community of fate in
which the lives of citizens are inextricably linked. The critical question that the
EU faces in terms of a common economic and monetary policy is whether
there is a strong enough a European identity and commitment to the European
cause to temper conflicts of interests and to extend forms of solidarity beyond
national borders. The more ambitious the goals become in terms of integrating
the established nation-states into a wider political union, the more it becomes
obvious how fragile the legitimating base of this trans-national community is.
It seems unlikely that the image of a ‘market community’ will prove sufficiently
strong to legitimate the re-distribution of social resources at a European level.
Also, the current economic crisis has repeatedly highlighted the thin social and
political consensus on the basis of which the EU has to operate. Here the
legitimacy gap between the efficiency of policy formation and the demand for
democratic accountability again becomes apparent: The agencies that determine
the policy framework for monetary and social policies are only very indirectly
accountable to those whom they affect (thus violating the sacrosanct slogan of
modern democracy “no taxation without representation”, Schmidtke 2001). If
the task to govern the economy can still be considered a key responsibility
assigned to the elected representative in a democratic community EMU
fundamentally challenges the traditional mode of generating accountability and
legitimacy.
EMU and the transformation of the boundaries of political community
At the core of the political challenges imminent in EMU is the way in
which its mode of operation questions the boundaries of established political
communities. While one could argue that it is not likely to prove so difficult to
extend political and social rights to the European level, citizenship and
nationhood are often interpreted to be identical in modern western political
life. As Brubaker states categorically, the nation-state and its delineation of a
political community set the institutional and subjective framework for the very
notion of citizenship and its attendant rights:
Debates about citizenship, in the age of the nation-state, are debates about
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nationhood—about what it means, and what it ought to mean, to belong to a
nation-state. As an institutional and socio-psychological reality, the nation-state
is a distinctive way of organizing and experiencing political and social
membership. (Brubaker 1990: 380)
Still today citizenship has thus been understood almost exclusively in
terms of the nation-state, and as the inclusion into a nation-state. Halfmann,
for instance, argues strongly in favour of associating citizenship with “state
authority over the regulation of membership in nation-states. Membership in a
nation is called citizenship” (Halfmann 1997, 266). He continues his argument
by stating that from the perspective of the citizens themselves “the association
of citizens forms the people who then constitute a nation by constructing a
common denominator” (267). In this perspective, therefore, the nation-state is
the functional prerequisite for politics in modern liberal democracies. Internally,
national citizenship regimes have historically been based on a fragile equilibrium
of duties and rights regulating the relationship between individuals and the
political community. The nation-state guarantees a certain degree of personal
liberty and social well-being for a clearly assigned constituency. The citizens
in return accept nationally defined and democratically controlled politics as
the agency that has the power to generate collectively binding decisions.
Individual rights and entitlements on the one hand, and loyalty to the political
community on the other, are the key elements in generating mutual trust and
continuity.
Beyond this “rational” base for the nation-state there is an additional,
pivotal element that is crucial to the stability and legitimacy of national
citizenship regimes, particularly in the European version of the nation-state.
This is a “pre-political” sense of belonging that is ethnically or culturally defined
and provides a supposedly unquestionable reference point for deciding who
can legitimately claim to be part of the community. The two dimensions,
however, are closely associated. The sense of the “common denominator” can
be seen as the pre-political base on which notions of equality and solidarity are
built and the commitment to the political community as a whole is based. The
underlying rationale of the European nation state has been rooted in both notions,
a functional arrangement for rational administrative practices of the state and a
cultural sense of belonging. The functional and identitarian aspects are closely
intertwined in the historical role of the nation-state. Stipulating the duties and
ensuring the rights of citizens depended on a particular mode of social and
political integration into the community, by a binding collective identity strong
enough to generate political loyalty and conformity with the rules that the
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community stipulated (Donati 1995).
At the centre of discussions on the status of the nation-state in
contemporary politics and its relationship to the EU are concerns about the
viability of this form of delineating the political community (see Bauböck 1994).
Modernising the basis for citizenship would mean generating criteria for
membership other than ethnic or cultural ones. It is possible that such a radical
redefinition of citizenship would jeopardise its very existence. As Hannah Arendt
most articulately said, questioning the idea of the sovereign nation-state as the
basis for citizenship might be a politically risky undertaking:
A citizen is by definition a citizen among citizens of a country among countries.
His rights and duties must be defined and limited, not only by those fellow
citizens, but also by the boundaries of a territory. . . . Politics deals with men,
nationals of many countries and heirs to many pasts; its law are the positively
established fences which hedge in, protect, and limit the space in which freedom
is not a concept, but a living political reality. The establishment of one sovereign
world state . . . would be the end of all citizenship. (Arendt 1970, 81-82)
Europe can be seen as an exemplary case about the dissolution, or at the
very least, the radical redefinition of national borders. Reflecting the reality of
increasingly de-nationalised processes and challenges in all major policy areas,
politics and policy making in the EU transcends national borders by an ever-
expanding degree. With its transformation into a political union the EU has
gradually taken over legislative competence in areas formerly reserved to
sovereign nation states. The sense of who can be considered a member, and an
alien, within one’s own community gradually shifts from the national domain
to the external borders of the European Union. EMU can be seen as the driving
force in promoting this redefinition of the scope and mode of operation of
political community. With its supranational policy co-ordination in one of the
key areas of citizens’ rights and claims, EMU almost inevitably raises questions
about the viability of current (national) governance structures, patterns of socio-
political integration and modes of dealing with political authority. In this respect,
the current stage of European integration and the drive towards economic and
monetary union is politically at a critical stage. While much authority has already
been relegated to EU agencies, institution building in terms of generating a
more substantiated political community at the European level is still in an initial
phase. One could speak of an institutional gap in terms of re-configurating
fundamental rights of European citizens and their sense of political community
in accordance with the emerging supranational policy regime.
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3. Popular perceptions of and reactions to EMU
The somewhat paradoxical result of the successful drive towards EMU
and the transferral of political authority in governing the economy to the
European level is that the democratically sanctioned legitimacy of the EU has
become an increasingly important issue of public concern and a subject of
political controversy. While shedding light of the process of politicising EMU
this section will focus on the politically more pertinent reactions to the integrated
economic and monetary policies at the European level.
Anti-European populism
Given the general appreciation of the idea of European integration
throughout the continent (with the notable exception of Great Britain and some
Scandinavian countries) it is has come as a surprise and a shock to some
supporters of the EU that Ant-European feeling have become a notable force in
politics. My basic hypothesis in tackling this phenomenon is that, beyond
national particularities, there is a common denominator or driving force spurring
the political mobilisation of right-wing populist actors that is related to the
process of European integration. The internationalisation of European societies
both with respect to the integration of national economies into bigger
supranational regional blocks, and the transferral of political authority from
the national to the European level, has caused a level of anxiety and uncertainty
that can easily be exploited by simplistic and populist forms of protest (Sassen
1998). It is against this background that the success of a variety of right-wing,
populist organisations in Europe could occur. The Austrian Freedom Party, the
North Italian Leagues, the Belgium Vlaamse Block, the Norwegian Progress
Party, the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn, the German Republikaner, the Danish
People’s Party or – most established – the French Front National (just to name
the better known cases) have attracted astonishing political support mainly by
employing a nationalistic, anti-immigrant platform.
Increasingly these actors have also discovered Europe and the EU as a
genuine field of directing their populist claims about the alleged vulnerability
of the nation state and national community. In a period in which national
differences and identities seem to evaporate due to the breathtaking pace of
European integration, these organisations have successfully launched campaigns
advocating social closure and nationalist options. The way in which EMU came
into being and in which many EU institutions operate invite for such political
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exploitation by populist and simplistic arguments: The highly limited knowledge
among citizens about the EU, the absence of a thorough public debate on some
of the key projects of European integration, and the lack of transparency in the
decision-making process of EU institutions make the EU and in particular the
ECB — as one of its main representatives — an easy target for those who
claim to speak with the ‘voice of the people’. The popular perception of the EU
as a remote bureaucracy seems to be a perfect fit for populist actors and their
claim to articulate the alleged alienation between the people and its leaders.
The perplexing complexity of issues at stake in questioning the
exclusiveness of national community can, for political purposes, be addressed
by recourse to the allegedly superior and self-evident national community.
National community still provides the most forceful narrative of defining
identities, interests and individual entitlements. Although often oversimplified
and distorted images are employed that contrast the corrupt and immoral world
of EU bureaucrats and the benign realm of the national community, there is a
rational notion to these arguments. They can relate to popular images of EU
institutions as remote and unresponsive entities. The degree of change introduced
by EMU and the unpreparedness to effectively deal with some of its political
implications has generated a climate of uncertainty that is highly conducive to
such populist slogans about the natural superiority of the nation-state. The
complexity of political issues such as unemployment, economic management
or cultural identity in a world of globalisation can be portrayed as the product
of abandoning the nation state in favour of untrustworthy European institutions.
In this respect the growing success of anti-European feelings in politics reflects
the shortcomings of how projects such as the EMU have been launched and
operated.
At the same time it needs to be emphasised that focusing on right-wing,
Anti-European campaigns does not mean that more established parties are
immune from using this populist tool for their own political mobilisation. In
mainstream parties and the media, the issue of the EU as an alleged threat to
the integrity of national community has been employed in a populist fashion
designed to evoke emotional attachment to those defending national interests
and identity. In times of an ever closer resemblance of major catch-all parties,
the issue of Europe has repeatedly been used as an effective political device to
polarise the electorate and to re-instate strong party allegiances. The British
Conservative Party might be an exception in Europe but, in spite of the general
pro-European attitudes of the political elite, there are tendencies pointing in a
similar direction throughout the continent (interestingly on the left and right of
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the political spectrum). Entering into the stage of political integration the EU
can no longer rely on the general, albeit rather unspecific consensus and support
for the European cause. The more concrete and far-reaching the range of policies
under EU jurisdiction become the more its policies are likely to become the
target of political campaigns and controversies. As a result, the process of
Europeanisation (Cowles et al. 2001), far from being unchallenged in political
terms, has at least the potential to spark a more aggressive re-nationalisation of
European politics.
The plea for a Europe of the citizens and a European citizenship regime
To oppose popular reaction to EMU is to agree with its ambitious goals
regarding European integration while demanding a greater say for Europe
citizens in implementing this process. This claim relates to the deficiency
described in the first section of the paper: Until recently, the initiatives of the
EU regarding a European citizenship have been widely restricted to ensuring
economic rights of free movement, establishment and service provision. Political
and social rights are still highly limited and relegated to the national domain;
the whole idea of a substantiated European citizenship status has been alien to
the entire integration process so far. Currently, European citizenship, as
envisioned by the member-states at Maastricht and Amsterdam, is still very
much a project in the making. It is yet unclear whether this European citizenship
is intended to replace the whole array of rights and duties specified in national
contexts, or whether it is to complement national laws (Beyme 2000, Soysal
1994).
The demand for a European citizenship status reacts to and reflects the
widespread unease with the process of European integration as being
exceedingly remote from the life experiences of Europe’s citizens. The critical
question is how the general, albeit rather abstract appreciation for the European
cause can be translated into solid political acceptance of the key policies driving
this process. In order to become politically meaningful in terms of broad popular
support and a cohesive trans-national collective identity, symbolic integration
needs to be embedded in a particular social practice. As long as the value
community is something existing alongside and largely detached from the
functional process of economic and administrative integration, it will remain
relatively alien to the overwhelming part of the population. Extending civic,
social and political rights beyond national borders could be interpreted as the
necessary complement to a market driven co-ordination of economic and
monetary policies at the supra-national level. The ideational common base needs
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to be translated into the concrete political and social practice of individuals if it
is to create the strong bonds on which the popular legitimisation of the European
integration process is dependent. A European identity, which would be able to
create a firm base for political legitimisation and later loyalty, is dependent on
a clear notion of institutionally embedded practices of political participation
and social rights (Habermas 1998, Schmidtke 1998).
Reflecting these concerns there is a growing concern in public debate
that the process of European integration and in particular EMU would be
incomplete and in the long term politically unsustainable unless substantiated
civic, social and political rights are developed at the European level for the
citizens of member states. Although it could be argued that intellectuals and
parts of the political elite have primarily initiated the drive towards a meaningful
form of European citizenship status, this idea has been taken up by a plethora
of social movements, political organisations and parties. Regardless of its actual
outcome and its controversial achievements so far, the public debate on the
Constitution for Europe and the work of the European Convention have been at
least promising what has been fundamentally missing from previous key
decisions in the process of European integration, namely a public deliberation
that is key to democratic self-governance (Eriksen & Fossum 2000, Schmidt
1998).
4. Conclusions
Whilst initially portrayed as a functional imperative of the integrated
European market, EMU has become gradually politicised as a key element in
changing the political landscape in Europe. As the challenges that EMU poses
to traditional and nationally confined modes of decision making concern
fundamental provisions of established citizenship regimes, they raise critical
questions about forms of governance. In this respect, issues such as concerns
over democratically responsive forms of governance and re-distributive justice
are not marginal to the process of economic and monetary integration in Europe.
With the transferral of considerable power to supra-national institutions, EMU
calls into doubt the range and meaning of democratic rule as it is institutionalised
in national contexts. It sheds light on the growing incongruity between sites of
economic and political power on the one hand and the institutional reach of
principles of democratic accountability and citizens’ involvement in the political
decision-making process on the other (Zürn 1999). EMU has transformed
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structures of governance and thus undermined basic patterns of accountability
and legitimacy linking political authority and individual citizens. Transcending
the very logic the Westphalian state model and its core idea of nationally bounded
democratic regimes, EMU moves beyond the principles of state sovereignty
and thus evokes ideas about the inclusion of citizens beyond the criteria of
national belonging. The gradual process of politicising EMU indicates that the
EU and the member states have to react to the structural imbalance between
power relegated to the European level and the lack of democratic accountability
and citizens’ involvement extending to this policy level. The status quo rooted
in the de-coupling of economic and political integration — characteristic for
much of the post-war European integration process — seems to be no longer
sustainable. At the same time, the growing popular awareness of the legitimacy
gap is not yet matched by a drive towards forms of democratic governance that
would suit the peculiar institutional set up of the EU.
Popular reactions to EMU in contemporary Europe mirror these concerns
and fears. What the two modes of politicising EMU identified in this paper
have in common is the doubt that the status-quo can be extended much further
in light of the fragile popular support it can rely on: On the one hand, EMU and
the EU in general are recurrently being blamed for the impending crisis of the
economy and the labour market (the EU and in particular EMU as the scapegoat
for economic reforms and hardship). The range of populist, anti-European forms
of political mobilisation indicate that with EMU political conflicts relating to
key EU policies have become far more severe and, potentially, damaging for
the EU itself. The institutionally weak base for democratic accountability and
the mainly market driven notion of political community and citizenship threatens
to be rhetorically exploited in populist images of “foreign rule” through Brussels.
On the other hand, the political repercussions of EMU can be seen as a driving
force behind the current constitutional debate of the EU and the demand to
generate a more meaningful citizenship regime at the European level. In this
respect EMU, as the most critical arena for supra-national policy co-ordination,
could indirectly (and probably unintentionally) contribute to the development
of an, albeit thin, notion of a European citizenship status.
1
 As this paper is primarily interested in how EMU is related to issues of legitimacy, accountability and
democracy and what effects this relationship has had on the process of European integration in terms of
popular reaction the features of what has to become conceptualised as the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU will
not be discussed in detail. Instead this paper seeks to point out how EMU structurally changes modes of
governance in Europe and thus poses qualitatively new challenges to nationally organised democracies. For
NOTES
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an insightful discussion of the institutional aspect of the EU’s democratic deficit see the special issue CPEE
(Stavridis & Verdun 2001), Chryssochoou (1998) and Verdun (2004).
2
 The discussion on “cosmopolitan democracy” is instructive in this context: Held (1995), Held et. al. (1999)
and Rosenau (2000).
3
 See the discussion by Scharpf (1998, 1999) on these terms in the context of European integration.
4
 The latest data form a survey conducted by the Eurobarometer shows similar results: Most people in this
survey are clearly in favor of the idea of a constitution for the European Union. Yet at the same time a
majority of these people stated that they know little about the work of the Convention and other key European
projects (Eurobarometer 59 - The Spring Standard Eurobarometer).
5
 It is to be seen whether the strengthened role of the European Parliament and its mandate to govern the
ECB will be successful in addressing the democratic deficit that is a structural feature of the emerging form
of multilevel governance at the European level (Marks & Hooghe 2001).
6
 The fact that EMU is embedded in the Single European Market is reflected in the public perception to see
EMU and the ECB as the principal agents of the global market. While the latter is as pervasive as abstract the
ECB provides a clearly identifiable object of political discontent and dispute.
7
 Debate over the European Convention on Human Rights for instance indicates that citizenship as stipulated
in national contexts may not yet be feasible at the European level altogether See the discussion in: Camberale
1997, Eder and Giesen 2000, Schmitter 2000b, and Wiener 1998.
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CHAPTER 3
EMU AND EU GOVERNANCE *
BY
FRANCISCO TORRES
Abstract: This chapter argues that a shift from an intergovernmental form of
governance to a supranational regulation form of governance, as is the case of
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), may not only do away with the
efficiency-legitimacy trade-off but also enhance the democratic quality and
effectiveness of European governance in the monetary sphere. The European
Parliament (EP) plays an important role in this process. It enhances the
democratic accountability of decision-making in supranational regulation
(monetary policy). It also plays an important role as a principal of the European
Central Bank (ECB). That new role of the EP materialised because of the change
in the nature of delegation, i.e. the initial principal (national governments
represented by the European Council and the Council of Ministers) delegated
to an agent (the ECB) in order for the agent to control the former principal’s
behaviour in regard to monetary policy. The EP, a principal in the making, one
may argue, has also allowed for increased participation in and deliberation on
the discussions about the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB, contributing
in this way to greater transparency.
Keywords: Governance, supranational regulation, monetary policy
effectiveness, accountability, delegation, principal-agent relations
1. Introduction
Most authors dealing with the legitimacy problem, the democratic deficit
and the efficiency1 of the decision-making process in the European Union (EU)
defend that the EU would have to opt to be either a federal political union, with
*
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one government and one parliament, or a confederation of sovereign states,
without majority-voting. In most of these analyses, the present role of the
European Parliament (EP) has been somehow neglected. Most of the time, the
EP’s role is only analysed as a potential conventional parliament in a future
federal political union. For a considerable part of this literature and also for
many EU observers and national politicians, the European Parliament has “an
inferior representative quality” and therefore it is argued that a
parliamentarisation of the European Community (EC) system would not improve
its democratic quality.
By the same token (see for instance Scharpf, 2001 and Héritier, 2002),
the so-called Community method of integration is said to face an efficiency-
legitimacy trade-off. It is not possible to increase the legitimacy of the EC
system without decreasing its efficiency and vice versa. In other words, there is
a trade-off between democracy and the European Union’s problem-solving
capacity. Höreth (1999) suggests that the quest for more legitimacy of EU
governance is a zero-sum game. Reinforcing the input legitimacy could well
reduce its efficiency.
On the other hand, from a normative perspective it can be argued that
legitimacy cannot be reduced only to performance. Notwithstanding such
normative objections, some output legitimisation, for example through a
functioning Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), can contribute to and
benefit from input legitimisation.2
Increased input legitimisation – transparency and accountability –
smoothes the processes of agreeing on and implementing common policies,
thus facilitating delivering.3  The two processes are then cumulative in enhancing
the democratic quality and effectiveness of governance in the EU. It is with
that approach to input and output legitimisation that this chapter discusses the
view that there is a trade-off between democracy/legitimacy4 and efficiency in
the European integration process.
1.1. Aim and scope of the chapter and its structure
This chapter analyses how European policy constraints and goals
contribute to increasing the democratic quality and effectiveness of governance
in the European Union. It discusses how processes (i.e. their democratic quality)
and the system’s effectiveness in terms of outcomes (formulation and
implementation of policies) evolve in a political system such as the European
Union. Thus, it looks at how the democratic quality of governance in the EU
may enhance the effectiveness of the European integration process and/or of
the policy-making process in the EU. Its main questions are how do domestic
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and European factors generate durable reforms. In particular, how do the new
challenges posed by EU policy objectives bring about a change in attitude at
the European and the national level? Conversely, how do such challenges, policy
constraints and European and/or national objectives as well as the new modes
of governance contribute to the democratic quality and legitimacy of the
European integration process?
With these objectives in mind the chapter centres on the example of
EMU, the making of its rules and the overseeing of the European Central  Bank’s
(ECB) conduct of monetary policy to examine whether there is indeed a trade-
off between efficiency on the one hand and transparency and accountability
(and participation and deliberation) on the other hand in the process of European
monetary integration.
While this example of supranational regulation may be subject to the
above referred trade-off one has to acknowledge that the building-up of EMU
could well have enhanced different forms of participation, namely by national
parliaments and European citizens. It also represented an accountable and
relatively transparent power delegation of executive authority (from the
European Council and the EU Council of Ministers to the ECB). If that is the
case, and if there is no evidence of decreased efficiency in that process, one has
to look elsewhere for that trade-off.
The chapter also investigates whether some of the characteristics of the
process of European integration can be seen as solutions both for the problems
of increased complexity and individualisation of modern societies and for the
on-going process of globalisation. Monetary policy may well have been beyond
the reach of the democratic political system before centralisation (EMU). If
that was the case, we depart from a non-zero-sum game: abandoning the
intergovernmental mode of governance in that case would not even have been
subjected to the legitimacy-efficiency trade-off.
In that case, “elsewhere” is in the steady-state of supranational regulation
of monetary policy, that is, the system since 1999. In fact, it was in 1999 that
EMU’s third phase began. Consequently, EMU has to be analysed in terms of
its contribution to increased transparency and accountability (and also
participation and deliberation) of the implementation of monetary policy by
the ECB.
An additional but rather central question (subject to efficiency
considerations) that the chapter tries to answer is whether and if so to what
extent the European Parliament is fit to function in a EU polity. Therefore the
chapter investigates the nature of the increasingly important (though usually
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disputed) role of the European Parliament as a principal of the ECB. Thus, it
analyses the European Parliament’s increased involvement in overseeing the
Central Bank’s activities, aiming at understanding whether and how that new
role has significantly affected the above referred trade-off (in the steady-state
of supranational regulation of monetary policy). For that purpose it is necessary
to understand whether the European Parliament can develop its role of principal
(overseeing the activity) of the ECB without putting at risk the credibility (and
consequently, effectiveness) of the European monetary authorities in the
financial markets. Furthermore, the chapter seeks to clarify how the EP diverts
political pressure by various interest groups away from the monetary authorities
towards itself.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section examines the issue
of increased centralisation of policies and of political structures in modern
societies in general and in the EU in particular. Section 3 discusses the
importance of enhanced accountability as a way of improving the quality and
effectiveness of European monetary integration. Section 4 deals with the
question of the qualitative change in the process of continuously evolving
governance in the EU against the background of the growing individualisation
of society and the complexity of issues at stake. Section 5 centres on the example
of EMU from the perspective of being able of bringing into account uncontrolled
forces through a process of multi-level political negotiation capable of creating
credible, long-lasting institutions. Finally, section 6 concludes on how the
interaction between representative institutions at different levels allows for more
participative and transparent modes of governance and how a shift from the
intergovernmental to these modes of governance may enhance the democratic
quality and effectiveness of governance in the EU. It also concludes that in the
case of EMU the democratic accountability of governance in the EU has been
substantially enhanced thanks to the emerging and evolving role of the European
Parliament as a Principal of the ECB.
2. Increased centralisation versus the growing need for democracy in the EU
Modern societies have become more complex in nature. In addition, in
an increasingly individualised society and due to the process of globalisation,
the traditional mechanisms of a parliamentary democracy seem not to be
satisfactory. At the level of the state, but as well at the EU level, the parliamentary
system has to live up to a two-fold challenge. First, it has to be effective in the
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light of the growing intervention needs of the state in complex, permanently
modernising industrial societies. Second, it has to be democratically legitimate,
serving as an instrument in the political decision-making processes.
Bureaucratisation and oligarchisation are then at the centre-stage of the
democracy discussion, due to the concentration of decision-making and power
in the social and political system within ever larger organisational structures.
Neumann (1950, p. 10) suggests that in a given context, any political
system can be analysed in the light of some formal criteria.5 Let us bear in
mind Neumann’s three most relevant criteria: efficiency, transparency and
participation. Efficiency is the relation between benefits and costs (technical-
rational economic performance: higher benefits for the same costs or vice versa);
transparency is the degree of disclosure, important for control and indeed
accountability; and participation refers to participatory observation, counselling
and co-decision.
Concentration of decision-making in some institutions in modern
democracies mirrors situations in which legitimate principals have delegated
power to agents for the sake of efficiency. The process of delegation itself may,
as for instance one can argue for the case of Economic and Monetary Union,
meet transparency and accountability requirements. However, those legitimate
principals expect agents to carry out policies that are consistent with their initial
preferences. Nevertheless, for different reasons6 the agent’s actions may differ
from the principal’s preferences. Transparency, in conjunction with
accountability, is critical to ensure that agents comply as mandated.
2.1 The issues of efficiency, transparency and participation at the EU level
As far as transparency is concerned, monetary reform is already leading
to greater transparency. Such enhanced transparency of European monetary
policy, improves the democratic quality of the European integration process.7
In the case of EMU, compared with the previous situation (with the exception
of Germany), there was already an increased degree of transparency,
accountability and indeed participation. This increase occurred through
referenda on the Maastricht Treaty, through public discussions during national
and European election campaigns and when making of its rules. The EMU
process of delegation met some accountability and transparency requirements.
However, it is possible to improve the democratic quality of monetary
policy decisions by making sure that the agent’s actions do not differ from the
principal’s preferences. It could be improved by means of enhanced transparency
and accountability as well as through deliberative processes among monetary
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policy experts that  have different perspectives on the conduct of monetary
policy.8
To hold agents accountable one needs not only transparency but also
enforcement mechanisms.9 These provisions are particularly relevant for the
relationship between the ECB and the European Parliament. In fact, although
the EP’s oversight of the ECB’s activities lacks enforcement mechanisms – as
it cannot pass any laws which define the goals and tasks of the ECB – it has
been able to develop an informal role in overseeing the ECB. The litmus test
for that capacity – i.e., a serious crisis or conflict – has however not taken place
yet.10
The process of globalisation made the tension between increasing
complexity and the growing perceived need for further developed democratic
mechanisms in modern societies more acute. In fact, with globalisation,
concentrated decision-making and larger organisational structures are well
beyond the sphere of democratic influence of national social and political
systems. Moreover, many of the various problems that modern societies face
cannot be dealt with successfully by national political systems – let us think
of monetary and financial instability, just to stick to our example (EMU).
Governments of different countries can only partly deal with such types
of transnational problems by collaborating. Collaboration comes at a higher
cost because at the intergovernmental level the process of reaching decisions is
more complicated. There are thus (very concrete) additional costs in terms of
efficiency. Examples are the difficulties to reach agreement among governments,
to get then the approval of their respective parliaments, etc. Citizens may feel
even more acutely the need for enhancing democratic mechanisms given the
lack of transparency and/or the insufficient participation in that type of
decisions.11 In fact, one can argue that the inter-governmental level alone, while
necessary for carrying on the European integration process both in terms of
processes and outcomes, is neither an efficient nor a transparent way of
governance in the European Union.
Where regional, national, inter-governmental and federal structures
overlap, the tensions between increasing complexity and the growing felt need
for democracy in modern societies is even more evident than at the national
level. In the EU there is an on-going evolution in terms of sharing sovereignty
that should increase efficiency. Stable forms of political cooperation among
the EU Member States are hence part of the solution as a way of improving
efficiency. At the same time they are also part of the problem in terms of
transparency and accountability as well as participatory and deliberative
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processes. Given that in the EU responsibility is much more diffuse than in
national systems, it becomes even more difficult to make the various institutions
that formulate policies and/or take decisions at different levels accountable.
The question then is how to address the identified democratic deficit in
terms of democratic accountability and transparency in the EU. Gallagher, Laver
and Mair (2001), discuss different ways of making policy-decisions in the EU
more accountable and responsive to European citizens. They identify three
major possibilities: EU-wide referenda; direct elections for the president of the
European Commission; and to operate more in accordance with the subsidiarity
principle. While the latter is already enshrined in the Treaty on European Union
(TEU), the two other solutions may suffer from being a too straightforward
extension to the EU level of different national practices and traditions. More
importantly, the growing complexity of political structures, especially acute in
the case of the EU, sits uneasily with yes/no referenda (as was the case for
Denmark, France and Sweden and it will be the case for the United
Kingdom(UK)) and/or simple extensions of national practices beyond the nation
state.
Following Neumann (1950), the only criterion for the democratic
character of an administration is the full political responsibility (accountability)
of the top of the administration, not towards single interests but to the whole of
the voters, by means of responsible representatives (see Steffani, 1973). The
EP is the only supranational EU body that represents the whole of the voters.
Thus, it would be the European Parliament, or a possible European congress12,
rather than an inter-governmental body such as the European Council and/or
the Council of Ministers of the EU that would act as the sole principal for the
ECB and the European Commission.13 However, one has to bear in mind that
such a change has to go hand-in-hand with both the principle of subsidiarity
that also reflects proximity to the citizens and the democratic legitimacy of the
EU vis-à-vis the different national governments.14
One of the most important forms of political action in a democracy is
the free election of the representatives. ‘Free’ election presupposes that social
structures (such as unions or parties) remain independent from the state, are
open and accessible to pressures from below and that voters can get together to
solve spontaneously problems when they arise. At the EU level, there are no
political parties (yet) capable of fulfilling that role. However, the collaboration
of national organisations, such as non-governmental organisations and even
national parliaments, with European institutions, may partially fulfil that
function. In this context let us consider whether the European Parliament could
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be a principal, along the lines of responsible representation.
2.2. A role of principal for the European Parliament
The European Parliament is the European institution that comes closest
to fulfilling the functions of responsible representation and that of principal for
different other EU-supranational bodies. It is the only representative institution
at the EU level that is directly chosen by the people. The European Parliament
can be seen as an alternative (though from a particular perspective,
complementary to national parliaments) for democratic accountability, one can
argue, not only in the case of EU-supranational bodies’ decisions but also in
the case of qualified majority voting (QMV). In the case of the latter national
governments may be outvoted in the Council and therefore cannot be held
accountable to national parliaments.15 By its very nature, the EP is also relatively
open and accessible to pressures from below allowing for instance for citizens’
petitions and questioning; it also facilitates the development of other emerging
social structures, such as European parties or party families, independent from
the national states, the Commission and the European Council.16
Moreover, as a representative institution, the European Parliament has a
unique role in the overlapping EU political structure: it increasingly interacts
with the various national parliaments17, bridging the gap between national and
European representation; it is more open and accessible than any other European
institution to pressures from below, allowing for an increased participation of
European citizens in the Community’s life; and it provides more transparency
to the process of decision-making in the EU, which enhances the accountability
of other European institutions, such as the European Commission and the
European Central Bank.
In the case of monetary policies, this chapter departs from the perspective,
explained below and shared by other authors (see De Grauwe et al., 1998), that
too informal an accountability may not guarantee lasting institutions. Moreover,
as argued by De Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998), the trade-off between
central bank independence and accountability does not exist in the longer run.
A central bank that continuously conducts policies that lack broad political
support will sooner or later be overridden. As discussed in section 3, politicians
will put the blame for the crisis onto the institutions that escape their control.
Therefore, it was not only necessary to assure a broad and long discussion
about the objectives of EMU and the aims of the ECB prior to the launching of
its third phase but also to assure the proper oversight of the ECB by an institution
that is representative of the European population. Public opinion cannot play
such a role because it lacks democratic legitimacy and lacks institutional
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structures. Other institutions such as the European Council and/or the Council
of Ministers of the European Union have deliberately chosen not to control the
ECB to avoid any misperceptions and/or any temptation of conflicting views
over the implementation of monetary policy.
In the case of monetary policy the European Parliament may well increase
the efficiency of governance at the European level by smoothing out various
resistances to the acceptance of some common policies. But it increases
efficiency as a consequence of more transparency and participation and not at
the cost of driving political decision-making further away from citizens. This
role of the European Parliament has been neglected in the literature. Most authors
dealing with the legitimacy problem, the democratic deficit and the effectiveness
problem of the European Union, defend that it would have to opt to be either a
federal political union, with one government and one parliament, or a
confederation of sovereign states, without majority-voting. Kohler-Koch (1999:
17) argues that the European Parliament has “an inferior representative quality”
and claims that there is a broad consensus in the scientific community that a
parliamentarisation of the European Community (EC) system would not improve
its democratic quality.18
Without entering into more normative type of arguments, one can argue,
that the representative quality of the European Parliament is also evolving. As
will be argued in more detail in the next section the European Parliament has
been assigned new roles in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties and European
public opinion has picked up on that change.19
3. Enhanced accountability as a way of improving the democratic quality
and effectiveness of monetary policy
Let us consider why is it important to enhance the role of a representative
institution as principal of other institutions in the EU. It is important to enhance
the role of a representative institution because the full political responsibility
of the top of the administration is an important criterion for its democratic
character. The European Parliament rather than an inter-governmental body
such as the European Council and/or the Council of Ministers of the European
Union should act as principal for EU-wide institutions, such as the European
Central Bank and the European Commission. The EP may be particularly suited,
and still enjoy the legitimacy to oversee the activities of the ECB. The European
Parliament might indeed provide a good balance between, on the one hand, the
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“tying of its own hands” by the European Council (national governments),
extended to the EU Council of Ministers, and, on the other hand, the need to
assure and enhance if not the proper at least some accountability and
transparency of procedures of the ECB’s administration.
Bradbury (1996: 1) sees accountability as “the requirement for
representatives to answer to the represented on the disposal of their powers and
duties, act upon criticisms or requirements made of them, and accept (some)
responsibility for failure, incompetence or deceit”. The concept thus requires
sanctions or enforcement mechanisms as already mentioned above and discussed
below for the case of the lacking ex-ante specifications (working rules) of EMU.
Note that there are other notions of accountability that do not necessarily require
democratic accountability. An agency can be accountable to the markets
(investors), to a dictator, or to specific groups. Keohane and Nye (2003)
distinguish between several categories of accountability: electoral, hierarchical,
legal, reputational and market accountability. Zilioli (2003) defends that an
economic rather  than a “formalistic” notion of accountability should be applied
to independent central banks.
3.1. Credibility and political constraints
Accountability is necessary for achieving agreement on the design and
establishment of lasting institutions. If institutions are not accountable one could
solve short-term problems of creating independent institutions but not the longer-
term problem of their sustainability. Elected politicians will only defend
independent institutions, such as the ECB, in the case of crisis, if they can
oversee their functioning. Paul De Grauwe (De Grauwe et al., 1998) goes even
further in saying that “politicians will be willing to defend the independence of
the central bank only if they know that they have the ultimate power to control
the central bank”. If that is not the case a disruption might well occur because
“ultimately politics rules”.
Even in the very special case of Germany – where the monetary authorities
enjoyed broad support – one can argue that the Bundesbank could not follow
its way at very (indeed the most) important occasions of post-war German
monetary history (see the examples provided by the European Monetary System,
German Monetary Unification and EMU). Politicians will tend to put the blame
for the crisis onto the institutions that escape their control and these will have
to resist the pressures for a change of their policy stance. Only by becoming
accountable, independent central bankers will ensure the political support that
they will need for their long-term survival.
Francisco Torres - EMU and EU Governance
45
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE EURO AREA
Based on the theory of economic policy that became popular in the late
1980s / early 1990s (Torres, 1992) one needs to make a distinction between
two types of constraints faced by policy-makers: credibility constraints and
political constraints. Credibility constraints concern the temptation of policy-
makers to deviate from their initial plans, without any disagreements over the
ultimate goals of policy. Political constraints regard conflicts of interest over
those goals.20
Governments face explicit credibility and political constraints. As a result,
policies are the outcome of the government’s optimization problem: the
maximization of a well-specified objective subject to those binding constraints.
This approach translates, in the literature, into a number of positive models of
economic policy in alternative institutional settings. These different
environments vary from monetary and/or fiscal regimes and reforms to changes
in government colour and organization and determine the credibility and political
constraints that policy-makers face. In the case of monetary policy the European
Union already deals with the credibility constraints that national and European
policy-makers face by “tying their hands”.21 Therefore, the functioning of
European monetary institutions should be free of political interference in the
sense that they should be granted autonomy, as is the case of the ECB. That is
however only a way of dealing with credibility constraints and not with political
constraints.
Given that political constraints regard conflicts of interest over the
ultimate goals of policy, the creation of European institutions should also take
into account those possibilities of disagreement. As was argued, above in the
EU discussions already took place during the creation of EMU and the ECB,
through nation-wide referenda, several national and European elections and
public debates. The process of making the rules of EMU was subject to
democratic accountability.
Now that the difference between credibility and political constraints is
clarified one can better understand the importance of enhancing the
accountability of the European institutions, in particular that of the ECB. The
European Council wanted to “tie its hands” and make Europe’s central bank
independent from any political influences. Independence was a way of dealing
with credibility constraints and the problem of time-consistency (see Torres,
1989b).
However, avoiding excessive politicisation of agencies removes them
from direct political control (Caporaso, 2003: 13; Gustavsson, 2002). To ensure
central bank accountability De Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998), put
46
forward three dimensions: decisions about the ultimate objectives of monetary
policy; transparency of actual monetary policy; and who bears final
responsibility with respect to monetary policy.
How is one to improve the ECB’s accountability without undermining
its credibility in the financial markets? The answer developed below is that the
European Parliament should have an enhanced role as principal of the ECB.
Similarly, an enhanced role of the European Parliament in the formulation of
policy decisions and/or at the EU legislative process may well improve the
efficiency of common EU policies and the democratic quality of the process of
European integration. Again, democratic quality here refers to the degree of
accountability and the level of transparency and participation at different levels
of government in the decision-making process.
3.2. The emerging role of the European Parliament
With the creation of the ECB, the heads of state and government delegated
power to a new supranational institution. Yet, as put by De Haan et al. (1998),
this one-time act of legitimisation cannot replace mechanisms of democratic
accountability. From a normative viewpoint, such a delegation of powers to
unelected officials may only be acceptable in a democratic society if central
banks are in one way or another accountable to democratically elected
institutions. Moreover, the EP lies somewhat ambiguously along the chain of
delegation between the European Council and the ECB. The EP may act as a
principal under implicit delegation from popular sovereignty. Yet, it is possible
to argue that the Member States have not only intentionally chosen to give
autonomy to the monetary authorities but also have delegated authority to the
European Parliament to act on their behalf as principal in relation to the European
Central Bank.
In fact, the Treaty of Maastricht gave the European Parliament significant
competencies. According to Article 113 (3) of the Amsterdam Treaty – ex-
Article 109-B (3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) –
the ECB’s president has to present the annual report to the European Parliament.
Moreover, the EP is entitled to hold a general debate on that basis and the ECB
Executive Board can be requested (and/or take the initiative) to be heard by the
competent committees. Finally, the EP has to be consulted by the European
Council upon the nomination of the entire Executive Board (TEC, Article
112(2b)).
The intention of delegating power to an independent central bank in the
EU went hand-in-hand with the very idea of assigning to the European
Parliament a new role. The delegation of power to unelected officials (central
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bankers) by an act of Parliament (by a treaty ratified by national parliaments in
the case of the ECB) does not by itself lack democratic legitimacy. Therefore,
the idea that the European Parliament was assigned a new role regarding the
overseeing of the ECB goes without contesting the legitimacy of the European
Council (and the fact that it can act on behalf of popular sovereignty). Without
contesting the proximity of the European Council as the initial principal of the
ECB, it is possible to indicate ways of improving democracy and efficiency in
the EU that are already partly taking place.
Let us follow what might have been the reasoning of the builders of
EMU. One can then say that in order to deal with the credibility constraints
faced by monetary authorities that do not enjoy yet a solid reputation of sticking
to their announced goals, the principal (the European Council together with
the EU Council of Ministers) delegated to an agent (the new European monetary
authority) control over its behaviour in regard to monetary policy. Such a change
in the nature of delegation – a principal tying its own hands – implied a new
role for the EP, which in fact implied a change in the assignment of agents and
principals. From a normative point of view, it would have been undemocratic if
the agent (the ECB) had remained in control of the behaviour of future principals
(the European Council and/or the EU Council of Ministers).22 That is why
leading politicians and national governments in the EU have defended an
economic government as a counterweight to the ECB.23
The initial principal (the European Council) did delegate to an agent but
also established new (potential) mechanisms of democratic ex post control,
namely monitoring and oversight, which can raise the quality of the democratic
process in the EU without affecting the credibility of monetary policy in the
financial markets and among economic agents in general. The initial principal
tied its own hands and that of the Council of Ministers but assigned a new role
to a new principal: the European Parliament.24
It is in this perspective without a clear ex ante specification of the rules
of the game –namely without any enforcement mechanism – that the European
Parliament may well oversee the activity of the ECB.25 Furthermore, EMU can
indeed work more effectively if political pressure from the various interest
groups is directed away from the European Central Bank (ECB) towards an
institution that represents the entire European population. As defended in Torres
(1996), the easiest way to secure that goal while preserving the ECB’s
independence seems to be to recognise and enhance the role of the European
Parliament in overseeing the ECB’s activity.
In fact, an institution that is representative of the European population
and attaches more weight to long-term objectives safeguarding the well-being
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of all Europeans could better fulfil the role of a principal on whose behalf the
ECB should conduct its policies than the European Council that is also driven
by short-term (electoral cycle) considerations. In fact, the European Parliament
cannot be so directly influenced by the electoral concerns of one or two
governments in the EU. The opposition to those governments is also represented
in the EP and may well have different views on the issue under discussion.26
The role of principal of such an institution as the EP is consistent with a
principal-centred perspective (principal drift) of principal-agent problems (Elgie
and Jones, 2000) that is indeed particularly adequate to analyse situations that
involve credibility constraints or time-consistency problems as in the case of
monetary policy. It is also consistent with an approach that takes into account
the possibility of a simultaneous drift by the agency (the ECB) and the initial
principal (the European Council). The EP, as it does not necessarily share the
potentially drifting views of the initial principal, the European Council, is
particularly suited to oversee the activities of the ECB. The increased
involvement of the EP in the oversight of the ECB’s activities has already been
quite substantial. Besides having managed to obtain the ECB’s Board of
Director’s agreement on the presence of its President four times a year in the
appropriate committee (the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs),
the EP also holds meetings both with members of the relevant committees of
the national parliaments and with experts to prepare those hearings.27
Elgie (2000) finds evidence that the EP has managed to “encourage” the
ECB to not focus exclusively on its primary objective, price stability, but also
pay more attention to its secondary objective: to support the objectives of the
EU as stipulated in the Treaties (Article 2 of the TEU and of the TEC), namely
sustainable development and employment (i.e. growth).28
4. The on-going qualitative change in the nature of governance in the EU
Evolving political co-operation has been increasingly subject to a multi-
level political negotiation process in the EU. That process comprises, among
others, co-decision and all ensuing EU directives and legislation in general, the
discussion and approval of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)
(an increasingly important tool of soft policy coordination in EMU, supporting
a more deliberative way of governance), the new open method of coordination
(OMC), the new European Council Spring meetings, all sorts of European and
national recommendations and parliament resolutions, the adoption of summit
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agendas and conclusions and of European strategies and white papers and,
quite importantly, the domestic and European debate that takes place.
Since the Amsterdam Treaty even intergovernmental conferences (IGCs),
convened to revise the treaties, are increasingly characterised by multi-level
political negotiations. These intergovernmental conferences include
representatives of the EP regularly briefed by the negotiators who can give
their views on all issues under discussion. The EP’s views on the IGCs are
increasingly important in shaping the European public opinion on these matters
and therefore the inter-governmental negotiation process.
National parliaments, too, participate in that process. Not least, they retain
the ultimate power of ratifying the treaties. Moreover, they also participate in
the process through regular hearings with national (and other) IGC negotiators,
through bilateral and multilateral meetings with the European Parliament’s
Constitutional Committee and through internal and open discussions
(increasingly with representatives of the Civil Society) and resolutions. The
European Convention of 2002/03 was the maximum exponent of the (multi-
level) involvement/participation of many parties in such a process. It is through
such a process that those EU policy constraints transform into European and
national political objectives.
Such a multi-level political negotiation process in the EU allows for a
continuous discussion of processes and outcomes. That permanent discussion
in turn permits increased transparency of and participation in the entire process
of European integration. Moreover, that multi-level political negotiation process
has also repeatedly allowed for the creation of a national and European consensus
for reform at the EU level.
In this context, one might argue (Torres, 1994, Jones, Frieden and Torres,
1998, Verdun, 2000a) that the objective of the realisation of EMU was
instrumental for creating the necessary consensus to overcome specific interests
in the pursuit of social welfare. This objective was not just economic orthodoxy
(as Cox, 1997 claims); it was the result of politicians (such as Delors, Kohl,
Mitterrand and Gonzalez) pushing for it. EMU was an institution-building
response to the challenges of globalisation (Verdun, 2000a).
In fact, it is possible to say that the EMU process has not only increased
the economic sustainability of the European integration process, by avoiding
the undesirable consequences of uncoordinated macroeconomic policies, but
has also raised the quality of its democracy – not only in terms of efficiency but
as well transparency and even participation and, one might add, effectiveness,
to the extent that new challenges were brought under more democratic control.29
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This is because it has allowed for some new forms of political negotiation in
establishing new goals and it is bringing into account a new common institution,
the ECB.
Previously, when monetary policy was basically set out by the German
Central Bank for the entire European Monetary System (EMS) zone, national
monetary authorities could not be held accountable for the implementation of
monetary policy, devised and implemented in the system’s anchor country,
Germany. National governments (with the exception of Germany) could only
be held accountable for having taken the decision (and sticking to it) of joining
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS.
The challenge of EMU may have started as the importing of “bottom-up
pressures”, meaning the ideas of some elites, epistemic communities, reflected
by the European Commission, central bankers and monetary economists
embraced only by a leading fraction but without the participation of most of
the national populations.30 However, having involved a prolonged period of
multi-level political negotiation, the design and implementation of EMU allowed
for increased participation of the European population.
Furthermore, the EU is in a process of transition towards a wider political
union in Europe together with an increasingly important role of representative
institutions. European institution-building, with more efficient and transparent
bodies and even transnational political parties, may be a way of reinforcing the
democratic quality of the European integration process, namely the link between
participation and “responsible representation” of the voters and the guarantee
that the existing social structures remain open and accessible to pressures from
below.
EMU is a good example of a process of a continuous multi-level
negotiation during the discussion of its very rules inscribed in the Maastricht
treaty, its convergence phase and current follow up arrangements. The process
includes the implementation of the various national convergence programmes,
the adoption and implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and
other changes in domestic policy throughout several national, local and European
elections. These arrangements require a permanent discussion and a negotiation
at different levels of government. One can also argue that the different referenda
that have been held on that subject have also triggered wide-spread political
discussions. Yet, EMU was a clear case in point of extending the democratic
reach to areas so far beyond the national control by bringing into account at the
EU level policies so far uncontrolled (exchange rate and monetary, and indeed
macroeconomic, policies) at the national level (arguably less so in the case of
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Germany). In most EU countries European integration challenges such as EMU
have worked not only as mechanisms for economic stabilisation but also as
pre-requisites for structural reform and long-term development.
The responses to European integration challenges provide good examples
of evolving governance in the EU because they go together with the more clearly
perceived need for democratic control of its new institutions. In addition, they
also allow for an increased participation of representative institutions and the
civil society in the discussions that take place before the approval of treaty
changes and their ratification about the goals of the envisaged reforms, i.e. on
the type of model of society envisaged.
Despite the fact that Europe does neither have (yet) a constitution nor a
government and that it suffers the impact of globalisation on national political
systems one may argue that such conditions may also be leading to an
improvement of the democratic quality of EU governance. The EU has been
experiencing re-drafting of its treaties, necessary to accommodate important
institutional changes (such as the Internal Market, EMU, Schengen and the
communitarisation of other matters of justice and internal affairs) that involve
an explicit transfer of national sovereignty to the Union level. When
constitutional changes are discussed the question of democratic mechanisms
are discussed both Europe-wide and at the level of each Member State.
Moreover, with on the one hand a growing individualisation of society and the
resulting loss in terms of the aggregation of interests and on the other hand the
increased complexity of issues at stake, multi-level political negotiation
involving many different actors is a rather important mechanism for democracy
which referenda cannot deliver.31
In fact, apparently nation- and/or union-wide referenda provide an
opportunity for citizens’ increased participation and even transparency in the
process of decision-making. However, the necessarily simple nature of the
questions, generally yes or no questions, does not really allow for more
participation when complex issues are at stake. Referenda may give citizens
the last word on some issue but per se they do not guarantee the quality of their
increased participation and obviously they may affect negatively the efficiency
(outcomes) of the process. On the contrary, a continuous process of negotiation
at different levels of government might allow for a permanent discussion even
through various national and European elections. However, clear-cut decisions
over clear-cut issues may be decided very efficiently through a referendum.
The same does not hold for more complex issues that cut across national
interests: the probability of a continuous deadlock would be very high. Again,
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a multi-level political negotiation process may render policy-making more
efficient by allowing for a continuous confrontation of positions at various
levels of government, making it possible and easier to converge to an acceptable
common position.
It follows that national parliaments, the European Parliament and
European citizens in general may have all become more aware of the need for
more democratic control of new European institutions but also of the need of
regaining democratic control over national governments and institutions that
have become more unaccountable through the process of globalisation.
Therefore, despite the inexistence of a European constitution (as yet) and a
European government, EU governance may not be hindering European
democracy but rather extending it bringing in some new important features,
such as new forms of participation, through the interaction of different
institutions and citizens in that multi-level political negotiation process. The
role of national and European representative (parliamentarian) institutions and
also their interaction further enhances the transparency and effectiveness of
EU governance.
5. Bringing into account previously uncontrolled forces
The case of EMU illustrates how EU policy constraints, to which a
Member State could normally adapt rather slowly, may gradually be
transforming into political objectives. The adoption of national convergence
programmes was indeed a way of transforming EU policy constraints into
common European and national objectives. This process obviously increases
policy effectiveness but it also allows for increased participation of national
citizens in a European common project that internalises at the European level
some externalities that arose from uncoordinated (and probably not perceived
as such before the discussion of new common objectives) national policies.
5.1 Adopting a credible monetary constitution
Joining a monetary union based on institutions that deliver price stability32
is, as stressed by the modern political economy literature, probably the best
way to implement a solid strategy of sustained economic development. The
reason is that this option, besides precluding many of the transition costs
(economically speaking, the output losses of a disinflation strategy) of such a
regime change, is also more transparent in terms of policy objectives. Actually,
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fixed exchange rates, unlike other policy targets, are easily observable by the
public but also easily implemented by the authorities (see Torres, 1990). In
such a regime, the authorities raise the political costs of inflation because the
public can constantly monitor their anti-inflation commitment. Any different
behaviour would imply a loss of competitiveness for the tradables sector.
In fact, a small open economy tends to lose less (gain more) than a larger
closed economy by giving up its monetary autonomy and joining in a monetary
union with its trading partners. Foreign exchange transaction costs and exchange
rate uncertainty tend to affect mainly small open economies. This effect results
from the fact that a relatively important fraction of their trade is done with
other countries and therefore they face large (and potentially unstable) foreign
exchange markets. As the degree of openness increases, the benefits of adopting
a common currency increase and the costs of relinquishing control over an
autonomous exchange rate policy diminish; a devaluation has a much stronger
impact on the price level of a relatively open economy than on the price level
of a relatively closed economy.
In the case of the EU, such a project was also a way of insulating all of
the European economies that had embarked on the EMU project from foreign
exchange speculation, exchange rate volatility and serious currency
misalignments. Those could not only affect the macroeconomic stability of
weaker currency countries and the competitiveness of stronger currency
countries, thereby giving rise to protectionist claims and/or retaliations, but
also put at stake the functioning of the Internal Market and indeed the entire
European integration project.
That argument was not trivial even for Germany since it hinged exactly
on the idea of protecting the internal market from currency misalignments.
Thygesen (1996) further develops that idea claiming that protectionist demands,
arising from a fragmented currency system, would include industrial subsidies
in the strong-currency countries.
Furthermore, high inflation countries tend to gain more than low inflation
countries from sharing their monetary autonomy in a common monetary
institution. Eliminating inflation through the sharing of monetary sovereignty
in a common credible institution such as the ECB and the abolition of different
currencies, does away with the need to waste resources on hedging against
exchange risks. A common monetary institution that delivers price stability is
therefore a two-fold welfare improving mechanism.33
Adopting a credible monetary constitution was also a means of cancelling
out the primacy of monetary policy over other more important concerns facing
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society, which was in particular the case in countries with less developed fiscal
and monetary institutions like Greece, Portugal, Spain and even Italy (and in
the future all new EU members). In those cases, EMU was a means of getting
rid of national currencies and, consequently, the typical excuses that technocrats
find to cling to power and implement all kinds of mercantilist policies in the
name of short-term real convergence.34
Not surprisingly, in the case of some EU (laggard) countries, those very
policies, which have been pursued until now35, implied a sharp deterioration of
social cohesion and the quality of life, undermining the long-term (sustainable)
real convergence with the most developed regions of Europe. In other words,
what at the first glance could have been seen as top-down (EU Commission
and “statesmanship”) pressures were indeed a way through which some Member
States regained some political control over monetary policy at the European
level. In fact, in that way, those EU countries were able to bring into account at
the EU level uncontrolled transnational forces, such as the permanent threat of
speculation against weaker currencies within the EU, avoiding serious currency
misalignments that would endanger the entire European project. On the other
hand, European citizens in those Member States got rid of many ills associated
with political short-term considerations that implied a sacrifice in terms of
social welfare.
5.2 From EU-level constraints to national (and common) political objectives
During the entire convergence period, however, few people presented
EMU as a desirable political reform instead of an external constraint. For a
long time, most politicians, bureaucrats and even economists just referred to it,
initially, as an objective rather unlikely to be realised and, later on, as an
unavoidable development within the European Union. EMU could have been
easily blamed for all the policy errors made by national governments, monetary
authorities and other national or European institutions. In many instances, the
EMU project was regarded as an unavoidable external constraint that went
together with an exogenous political objective to which their political leaders
had converged. Good examples of that perspective can be found in the reactions
of some policy-makers, politicians and economists (such as the Group of 155)
in Germany expressing their reluctance concerning the Bundesbank’s integration
into “less solid” European monetary institutions or the cross-party political
resistance in Portugal, on the basis of the defence of national sovereignty,
regarding the proposal to enshrine the objective of price stability in the
Portuguese Constitution.36
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The root of one of the chief misunderstandings about the entire process
of monetary unification was in fact that many people tended to see it as a
technocratic obsession and/or an ideological defence of the market. At the same
time, some of the forceful opponents of EMU happened to be technocrats
(sometimes diplomats, central bank employees and even Eurocrats) or
ideological free-marketeers (as for example some economic advisers,
conservatives in some countries (e.g., the UK), Keynesian-leftist in others (for
instance France and Portugal) and independent economists in Germany as well
as in other European countries. Instead, one can defend the idea that adopting
a credible monetary constitution is a means to do away with the primacy of
monetary policy over more important concerns to society. However, in the event
few people did present EMU as a desirable political reform instead of an external
constraint.
The decisive argument turned out to be of economic nature (by definition
less relevant for countries such as Denmark, the UK and Sweden). It was that,
in a multi-speed EMU, it would have been more difficult for the catching-up
countries to converge. By being left out of EMU’s third phase they risked
becoming more exposed to international financial markets.37 It was also
perceived that it was important to qualify for accession to EMU from the outset
since it was possible that core members could become reluctant to enlarging
the initial club both in the monetary sphere and in other domains of European
integration.
With EMU, the new European co-decision process, the forthcoming
enlargement process and the prospect of a closer political union for a limited
number of countries within the EU, it became more difficult for EU countries
in general, and cohesion countries in particular, to follow the old rule of asking
for derogations on EU directives and/or for postponing any decisions concerning
the future of common European institutions and policies.
Experience suggests that the European integration process – and in
particular the need to perform sufficiently well to be part of the inner political
core, especially at the time of each country’s presidency - provides member
countries with a good incentive to leap forward and embark on a more proactive
policy stance. This holds especially true for countries in which European
integration is at the core of their development strategy. It is illustrative that it
was during the Portuguese presidency of the EU in 1992 that the national
currency, the escudo, joined the ERM of the EMS and that domestic capital
controls were completely liberalised. The same had happened in the case of the
Spanish presidency of the EU in 1989, when the peseta joined the ERM just a
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few days before the European Council of Madrid accepted the Delors Report
on EMU.
Very few people had expected that Portugal and Spain, not to mention
Italy, could meet the Maastricht convergence criteria on time to join EMU
from its very inception.38 One, if not the main, reason for this disbelief had to
do with the so-called systemic deficiencies of their political and administrative
institutions. Those deficiencies were partly overcome thanks to the importance
of the challenge that the European integration process, in particular the objective
of EMU, constituted for “catching-up” member countries and to which their
policies had to live up.
What the example of EMU demonstrates is that EU challenges and
governance at the EU level, by transforming into national political objectives,
make reform possible and more effective. At the same time the process in which
such challenges are raised to national political objectives becomes more
transparent, allowing for increased participation of citizens, non-governmental
organisations and other actors.
European integration challenges such as EMU condition the process of
EU governance because they foster a clearer perception of the need for democratic
control of its new institutions. They allow for a new role of representative
(parliamentary) institutions and the civil society in the discussions that take place
before the approval of treaty changes and their ratification about the goals of the
model of society envisaged at both the European and the national levels.
6. Concluding remarks
The challenges posed by the European integration process determine a
continuously evolving governance in the EU because of the more clearly
perceived need for democratic control of its new institutions and of the way in
which policies are formulated. However, the effectiveness of EU policies and
the quality of democracy in the process of European integration can be enhanced
if the intergovernmental mode of governance gives way to the interaction of
representative institutions at different levels and with the civil society.
As shown in the chapter, using the example of EMU (the making of its
rules and the overseeing of the ECB’s conduct of monetary policy), that
interaction can allow for more participated and transparent modes of governance.
Besides the intergovernmental mode of governance and in addition to
supranational regulation, these new modes of governance include: joint decision-
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making, as is the case in the Single Market, and policy coordination, as is the
case of the open method of coordination of economic affairs (BEPG) or
employment policy (EES).
Since the Lisbon European Council of 2000 that gave rise to the open
method of coordination there has been an increasing interest in this new mode
of governance which aimed at improving the problem-solving capability of the
EU through policy coordination without binding rules. For some authors, for
instance Scharpf (2001), the development of these new instruments of policy
coordination such as the OMC are a pragmatic but credible alternative to the
Community method of integration (see also Héritier, 2002) that does not face
any efficiency-legitimacy trade-off.
This chapter did not elaborate on these new policy instruments. Rather,
it explored issues related to the democratic deficit and challenged the common
wisdom on this matter and on the efficiency-legitimacy trade-off in EU
governance. It tried to show that even a shift from an intergovernmental form
of governance to supranational regulation (EMU) form of governance not only
does away with such a trade-off but rather enhances the democratic quality and
effectiveness of European governance. This finding is mainly due to the yet
very much neglected phenomenon of the interaction between representative
institutions at different levels in the European Union and participatory and
deliberative processes (in this case the building-up of EMU) that have
characterised supranational regulation.
The emerging role of the EP in enhancing the democratic accountability
of the decision-making in supranational regulation (monetary policy) has proved
quite powerful at avoiding such a trade-off and indeed at improving efficiency
(allowing for the internalisation at the Union level of different externalities)
and democracy (transparency and accountability) in European governance. The
democratic accountability of governance in the EU increased very much as the
direct result of the making of EMU (democratic delegation of executive powers
by the European Council and the EU Council of Ministers to the ECB). That
democratic accountability has however been also substantially enhanced thanks
to the emerging (and still evolving) role of the European Parliament as a principal
in regard to the European Central Bank.
The new role of the EP materialised because of the change in nature of
delegation, i.e. the initial principal (the Council) delegated to an agent (the
ECB) control over its behaviour  in regard to monetary policy. The new principal
in the making (the EP) has also allowed for increased participation in and
deliberation on the discussions about the conduct of monetary policy by the
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ECB, contributing in this way to its greater transparency. These discussions
have involved monetary policy experts and economists with different
perspectives as well as national parliaments. National MPs can in turn better
understand and discuss the appropriate policy mix in their own countries, with
both national central bank governors and members of the national government
that is accountable to them.
The interest of looking at the European model lies in the fact that it is
reinventing itself continuously as the process of European integration deepens.
It is why it is possible to enhance the democratic quality of governance through
the evolving process of multi-level political negotiation that has emerged in
the EU. The European integration process is responding to the globalisation
process and to the growing individualisation and complexity of society through
the development of these new multi-level negotiation mechanisms, namely the
interaction of the different national European parliaments with each other and
with the European Parliament, the respective governments, the European
Commission and other European institutions and civil society. In fact,
representative institutions (parliaments) might be unable to control international
governance but they may be in the process of regaining some control over
European governance.39
Representative institutions, in particular the EP, are instrumental in for
making institutions such as the ECB more accountable and the process of policy-
making more transparent and participated, while guaranteeing a balance between
processes and outcomes. The EP is best placed to fulfil the role of a principal
that the European Council and/or the Council of Ministers, as intergovernmental
bodies, can exercise only with much difficulty.
The EP’s overseeing of EU institutions, such as the ECB, contributes to
an increased transparency and accountability of the system. Moreover, the
interaction and collaboration between the EP and national parliaments in the
EU is a way of allowing for increased participation and of enhancing its
representative quality. By enhancing the accountability of EU institutions,
common policies, (monetary policy), become more effective in the long run.
An increased participation of representative institutions in the formulation of
other common policies, such as environmental policies, national vested interests
can be more easily overcome and a common position (internalising some
externalities) has a better chance to be reached in the EU.
The process of integration and decision-making in the European Union
is probably the only case of sovereignty-sharing that has proceeded steadily up
to a point where some multi-level governance can be already regarded as a
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polity. The on-going qualitative change of governance in the EU, i.e. the
building-up of new European institutions and the development of new policy
instruments devised at the European level, can be seen as a way of extending
and enhancing democracy beyond the nation state.
1
 Throughout the chapter the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness are used in an almost interchangeable
way but the former refers more to the processes that create institutions and the latter to the institutions that
deliver policies.
2
 The transformation of EU challenges into national political objectives, as in the case of EMU, are also
supported on some input legitimisation that involve, through a mandate and/or national representatives,
transparency and accountability and deliberation (public argument and reasoning).
3
 To that extent the way in which the term effectiveness is used is somehow more demanding than just the
relation between input and output of a given existing system.
4
 The concepts of democracy and legitimacy are generally used in an interchangeable way without a proper
distinction and/or as communicating vessels, as put by Gustavsson (2002). Good examples are the official
Nice and Laeken Summit declarations, the first talking about “the need to improve and to monitor the
democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union” and the other saying that “The EU derives its legitimacy
from the democratic values it projects” (see Gustavsson 2002). Yet we know that a process can be democratic
but not legitimate and vice versa. This chapter recognises the importance of legitimacy insofar as delegations
of power are concerned but it focuses on democracy – how transparent and accountable governance is in the
EU.
5
 These criteria are obviously to be analysed in a multi-dimensional perspective.
6
 For a brief review of these reasons, see Elgie (2000).
7
 This aspect is specifically dealt with in sub-section 5.2.
8
 See Schürz (2002) for a discussion of the issue of democratic legitimacy with deliberative institutions for
the case of the ECB.
9
 See Keohane and Nye (2003) for a discussion of these issues. As discussed in Torres (1996a) and in section
3 (3.2) the ex-ante specification of the rules of the game (EMU) was not part of the Treaty of Maastricht that
focused on entry requirement rather than on working rules.
10
 See below and also Elgie (2000). Regarding some EU common policies, such as environmental policy,
there is already a much more important level of participation than in the case of monetary policy and also an
increasing level of transparency due to the European co-decision procedure, see Torres (2003).
11
 For instance, for Kohler-Koch (1999) majority voting, although increasing the effectiveness of decisions
in the EU at the intergovernmental level, infringes the sovereign right of the Member States to ultimately
decide what is and what is not acceptable to their national constituencies, therefore upsetting the balance
among the three Neumann criteria. Note that this presupposes  that the state still had de facto sovereignty. By
pooling sovereignty in the EU some Member States might at least influence some decisions that they could
not affect before.
12
 Habermas (2001: 99) sees a European congress, representative of both the European population and the
EU member states, as a necessity: “...in a European Federation the second chamber of government
representatives would have to hold a stronger position than the directly elected parliament of popular
representatives, because the elements of negotiation and multilateral agreements (...) cannot disappear (...)
even for a Union under a political constitution.” Also the Economist’s proposal for a constitution for the
NOTES
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European Union of October 28th, 2000, provides for a new chamber of representatives of national parliaments,
the Council of Nations.
13
 In fact, an economic government, defended by several politicians, could interfere with the statutory
independence of the ECB and it would not by itself add more legitimacy to the EU institutions in the eyes of
the European citizens precisely because of its intergovernmental character. This is not to say, however, that
more democratic bodies could not engage in power politics.
14
 Primacy of democratic decision-making in the conduct of global governance at the EU level may also
provide the conditions for the development of other forms of democratic innovations put forward by different
authors. See for instance Saward (2001) for some examples of new forms of democracy: cosmopolitan,
deliberative, politics of “presence” and “difference”, ecological redefinitions, associative and party-based
direct models.
15
 Europeans trust the EP more than other EU institutions and agencies (see Eurobarometer, 56 and 57);
exceptions are Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg where the
Court of Justice and/or the ECB tend to score higher.  The EP is also the best known EU institution
(Eurobarometer 56, fig. 7.10) and it is perceived to play the most important role in the EU (Eurobarometer
56, fig. 3.6).
16
 Different MEPs and staff tend to listen and receive all kinds of different experts and organised and non-
organised interests as a way of negotiating and advancing their own proposals and reports. They are also
open to citizens, the media, and researchers, regarding their political and policy options.
17
 The EP holds regular meetings with members of the relevant national parliaments’ committees on a wide
range of issues such as EMU and hearings of the ECB’s President, the BEPG, the IGCs, EU enlargement and
the European constitutional matters.
18
 This “inferior representative quality” of the European Parliament is in general attributed on the basis of the
“inferior quality” of European elections (disputed not on European but on domestic political grounds and
with very low turnouts and different national voting rules and party lists) and of the lack of clear political and
ideological cleavages (MEPs remain rather technocratic).
19
 Regarding knowledge about the EP, how it is perceived to play the most important role in EU life and how
it is the institution which on average people tend to trust most in the EU (Eurobarometer, 56).
20
 The idea of binding political constraints stems from the political business cycle literature, where governments
have opportunistic incentives to adopt certain policies (for instance, in order to be re-elected), and from the
theory of public choice, where there are conflicting policy preferences among different interest groups (because
politicians and bureaucrats maximise their welfare rather than pursuing public interest) and/or the so-called
agency and/or principal drift in principal-agent problems (Elgie and Jones, 2000).
21
 For the classical example of tying hands as a solution to the time-consistency problem, see Homer’s
Odyssey: Ulysses asking to be tied to the ship’s mast in order to be able to listen to the sirens while resisting
to the temptation to try to join them. See Elster (1984) and Torres (1987, 1989b).
22
 This claim parallels the normative claim referred to by Elgie and Jones (2000) that the preferences of both
the principal and the agent should remain in line. The positive claim, that is also underlying to agency
drifting, that their preferences are bound to diverge stresses the need for some form of oversight.
23
 The sub-optimality of the ECB’s accountability has been recognised by several authors; see for instance
Torres (1996b: 76/77), De Haan et al. (1998), De Grauwe et al. (1998), Verdun (1998) and Harrison (2001).
This latter author concludes however that, because of the relatively high degree of transparency of the ECB
and the strength of its commitment technology, that sub-optimality should not impact on “its effective
framework for success”.
24
 Clear ex-ante specification of the rules of Economic and Monetary Union was not part of the Treaty of
Maastricht and/or Amsterdam. See Torres (1996) for a discussion of possible ex-ante specifications of EMU
rules concerning, among other things, enforcement mechanisms.
25
 As put by Elgie (2000), in the case of the ECB, any renegotiation of the set of ex-ante controls is unrealistic
and even if the Treaty could be reformed that would undermine its very credibility.
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26
 Hix (2001) concluded that for the first year of the 1999-2004 European Parliament transnational party
group affiliation was more important than national affiliation for determining how MEPs vote. It follows
that it is not to be expected that say the German or Portuguese opposition would come to rescue their
respective countries from an early warning concerning the excessive deficit procedure.
27
 The first of those meetings – proposed by a national Member of Parliament and a Member of the European
Parliament at the May 1998 London COSAC, one of the bi-annual meetings of the Conference of European
Affairs Committees of the EU National Parliaments and the European Parliament – took place in Brussels
on November 3, 1998.
28
 In the terminology of Farrell and Héritier (2002), this fact supports the importance of the effects of an
informal institution on the interaction between the EP and the ECB. While these authors refer to empirical
evidence indicating that such informal institutions have an important effect on interactions between the
European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, I focus here on the importance
of the effects of such informal institutions on interactions between the European Parliament and the European
Central Bank (see Elgie, 2000, for evidence).
29
 See Erik Jones (2002) for a similar conclusion in regard to efficiency and transparency.
30
 Jones (2000), points out that such influences reflected epistemological rather than distributive considerations.
31
 As Ulrich Beck (1992, p. 36) put it: poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic. In other words, as in a
modern (risk) society social differences are more relative, there is a loss in terms of aggregation of interests.
32
 By institutions that deliver price stability it is meant here not only the European Central Bank but also the
monetary constitution of the EU (the ECB’s status) and other macroeconomic rules, such as the Stability and
Growth Pact, etc., its ordnungspolitische Grundsätze, one may say. In that sense and according to Douglass
North (1990: 3), “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction”.
33
 The reason is that it internalises both the costs of excessive inflation and exchange rate instability (see
Torres 1996). Eichengreen and Ghironi (1996) provide other arguments for the case of low inflation countries
in the context of EMU.
34
 What, at a first glance, could be branded as a mere “new constitutionalism” approach in the interpretation
of Hewson and Sinclair (1999) – that is ring-fencing central banks from political interference with mandates
to combat inflation – goes much further than that in the case of a common European monetary institution. In
fact, the new monetary constitution of Europe, EMU, may be a way of avoiding the ring-fencing of many
national authorities on monetary and financial external constraints and of creating the necessity – and the
conditions – for increased transparency and accountability.
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 For instance, cohesion countries, namely Greece, Portugal and Spain, and also the UK and Ireland, tend to
opt for derogations on matters such as energy costs (giving wrong economic incentives through lower energy
costs to pollute more) in the name of short-term competitiveness.
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 In 1997, all political parties refused, on the grounds of national sovereignty, to enshrine in the Portuguese
Constitution the objectives of EMU in the article concerning the central bank. At the same time, however
(mind the contradiction!), they accepted to comply with whatever international rules (external constraints)
Portugal would accept in the future.
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 Note, however, that this reasoning already implicitly enshrines the idea of bringing into account previously
uncontrolled economic forces such as speculation against weaker currencies within the EU.
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 Greece also managed to join EMU in 2001 two years after the beginning of its third phase but still one year
before the replacement of all national currencies by euro coins and bills.
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 Take the case of the reluctant but inevitable and quite predictable acceptance by governments and political
parties alike of the model of the convention of 2002/03, already used before for drafting the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. That may also reflect the fact that the European co-decision procedure is in practice
reinforcing the role of national parliaments and indeed democracy in the EU.
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CHAPTER 4
COMMON CURRENCY AND NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS *
BY
ANNELI ALBI
Abstract: The power to emit national currency has traditionally formed a core
area of a state’s sovereignty, and it is regulated to some extent in most
constitutions. In the European Union, twelve Member States have substituted
their national currencies with a common currency. The purpose of this paper is
to examine how the Member States have legitimised this move. It focuses in
particular on the constitutional amendments pertaining to Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), and on the decisions of constitutional courts where
challenges to monetary integration have been addressed. The paper will also
look at the debates concerning the amendment of monetary provisions in Central
and Eastern European accession countries. It concludes by advocating the
constitutional solutions of France, Germany, Portugal and Greece because these
provide higher legitimacy to the transfer of monetary sovereignty, as well as
meeting better the rationale of national constitutions.
Keywords: National constitutions; Sovereignty; Legitimacy; Constitutional
courts; Referendums; Enlargement; Accession countries
1. Introduction
The power to issue national currency has traditionally been regarded as
a core part of a state’s sovereignty. Therefore, national constitutions, establishing
the pouvoir constituant’s pact on how sovereign powers are exercised in a
country, often lay down the basic principles governing the national currency
and the role of national central banks. Since the creation of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), the Member States of the European Union (EU) have
restricted the role of their national central banks in favour of the European
Central Bank (ECB) and, in an unprecedented move in January 2002, twelve
of them substituted their national currencies with a common currency. The
ß
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purpose of this paper is to examine how this far-reaching step of transferring
monetary powers has been legitimised at the national level, with a particular
focus on constitutional amendments. While the discussion on the governance
of EMU has predominantly focused on the EU level (see eg Beaumont and
Walker (1999), Zilioli and Selmayr (2001), and contributions to the current
volume), it is important to complement this with a consideration of legitimacy
of the delegation at national level, as national constitutions remain key building
blocks in the multi-level governance in the EU.
The paper starts with the Maastricht Decision of the French Constitutional
Council, where monetary integration was held to go against the ‘essential
conditions of the exercise of national sovereignty’ and therefore led to amending
the French Constitution with regard to EMU as well as other aspects of EU
membership. It then studies the constitutional amendments pertaining to EMU
in Germany, France, Portugal and Greece, and amendments of a more general
nature in other countries, as well as briefly looking at national referendums.
The third section studies two cases pertaining to the constitutionality of EMU
which arose in Germany regardless of prior constitutional amendments. The
fourth section takes a look at the prospects in the Central and Eastern European
countries, as several of them have undergone constitutional debates pertaining
to amendment of provisions where the their national banks’ exclusive right to
issue national currency is established. The paper concludes with an assessment
of how the constitutional regulation concerning the delegation of monetary
sovereignty relates to the rationale of the national constitutions - to determine
the distribution and exercise of state competences - in view of gradual but
consistent transfer of powers from national to European level.
2. EMU and the ‘essential conditions of exercise of sovereignty’
Control over national currency, which has been closely associated with
a state’s authority and and national identity, the control over national currency
has traditionally formed a core area of sovereignty. It is ‘a qualifying element
of a state’s sovereignty’ and has been described as a sovereign state’s
‘ambassador in international markets’ (Chirico, 2003:139). In some countries,
the name of the currency derives from the state’s name, such as franc (France),
lita (Lithuania), lat (Latvia), or from a state’s central symbol such as krona
(Scandinavian countries). The principle of monetary sovereignty has also been
recognised by the Permanent International of Court Justice, according to whom
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it is ‘a generally accepted principle that a State is entitled to regulate its
currency’.1
Since the Delors report in 1988, the Community has been moving towards
a common monetary policy. This process led to the establishing of the European
Monetary Union by the Treaty of Maastricht and the creation of the European
Central Bank - the exceptional case of a central bank without a State (Zilioli,
Selmayr, 1999:643, cited in Chirico, 2003:141), culminating in the introduction
of a common currency in twelve Member States in January 2002. The creation
of Monetary Union is based on a realisation, yet in another field, that states are
more successful in performing their functions together rather than individually
in the contemporary globalising world. Common monetary policy serves the
objective of enhancing economic growth, by factors such as mass-scale savings
in cross-border exchanges and transactions, securing stable prices and low
inflation, stimulation of investments, stimulating competition and transparency
of prices, strengthening of the single market, as well as facilitation of the
movement of people. At the same time, the creation of Monetary Union also
has a clear political goal - it is aimed to strengthen European identity, to
intertwine more closely the Member States’ policies, and thus foster a move
towards a political union. Indeed, the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
has portrayed the introduction of the common currency as an act of sovereignty,
and thus primarily a political rather than an economic issue (Fischer, 1999,
cited in Chirico, 2003:175). Furthermore, in words of Francis Snyder, ‘EMU
… is a metaphor for the European Union. It represents the culmination of a
process set in train by the founding Treaties, consolidated in the Maastricht
Treaty, and left virtually untouched by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The debate
about EMU thus is a debate about the future of the EU as a polity, the European
social model, and the nature of European identity’ (Snyder, 1998:4).
Besides touching a core field of a state’s functions, the entrance into
Monetary Union is of significance to sovereignty also for the reason that it
means a complete, albeit progressive, surrender of monetary competences, by
contrast to many other policy areas where only some prerogatives have been
delegated from the Member States to the EU (Bonnie, 1998:527). This results
not just in a transfer of powers, but in a true loss of competences over money
by the nation states, and their acquisition by the EU (Chirico, 2003:144). The
complete denationalisation of monetary policy is, in words of Chiara Zilioli
and Martin Selmayr, a well-known feature of EMU and, since 1 January 1999,
it has been practically undisputed in legal doctrine (Zilioli and Selmayr,
2001:13). As a consequence, common currency has been likened to ‘a textbook
66
example’ on challenging sovereignty (Bonnie, 1998:527); it has been
commented that ‘…Euro has probably represented the most profound limitation
of sovereignty which has ever been accepted by sovereign states’ (Ronzitti,
1999: 373 – 394, cited in Chirico, 2003:144).
Because of such a tangible effect on sovereignty, compared to prior
piecemeal delegation of competences, Monetary Union became one of the main
reasons for national constitutional challenges to the Treaty of Maastricht. The
French Conseil Constitutionnel was the first to clearly spell out, in its Maastricht
decision of 9 April 1992,2 that EMU harms the ‘essential conditions of exercise
of national sovereignty’ and therefore necessitates a constitutional amendment
prior to ratifying the Treaty.3 The Treaty was referred to the Constitutional
Council by the President Mitterrand, under art 54 of the Constitution which
subjects treaties to a preliminary constitutional review. The Conseil
Constitutionnel examined the Treaty in the light of various constitutional
provisions, including art 3 of the 1958 Constitution which provides that ‘the
national sovereignty belongs to the people who exercise it through their
representatives and by way of referendum’, and the Preamble of the 1946
Constitution which states that France complies with the rules of public
international law and that ‘under the condition of reciprocity, France consents
to the limitations of sovereignty necessary for the organisation and defence of
peace’. Besides these provisions, the Constitutional Council invoked the concept
of ‘essential conditions of the exercise of national sovereignty’, which according
to its earlier jurisprudence include the state’s institutional structure,
independence of the nation, territorial integrity, and fundamental rights and
liberties of nationals.4 While establishing that the respect for the principle of
sovereignty does not prevent France from undertaking international
commitments or transferring competences, the Constitutional Council made it
clear that the authorization for ratification of a treaty must be preceded by a
constitutional revision in case the treaty involves obligations contrary to the
Constitution or affects the ‘essential conditions of the national sovereignty’.
These ‘essential conditions’ were indeed found to be encroached upon
by the transfer of monetary competences. Amongst individual provisions, the
Constitutional Council pointed out art B of the TEU which established the
Economic and Monetary Union with the objective of leading to a common
currency, and art G of the TEU and some other provisions which amend arts 2,
3a and 4a of the EC Treaty, which add the completion of the EMU to the list of
the Community’s missions, provide for the irrevocable fixation of the exchange
rates and create the European system of Central Banks and the European Central
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Bank. Further, the ‘essential conditions of sovereignty’ were found to be
challenged by the conditions for the Second Phase of completing EMU, such
as the prohibition of restrictions of movement of capital and payments,
prohibition of funding the state’s budget by public deficit, the loss of a privileged
access to credits of financial institutions by authorities and public enterprises,
and the transfer of the exchange policy to EU level. Moreover, the entrance
into force of the Third Phase means, according to the Conseil Consitutionnel,
that the countries will put into effect a single monetary policy and a single
exchange policy, while the European Central Bank will be the only institution
to authorise the emission of banknotes in the Community (art 105A).
Under these provisions, the Constitutional Council concluded that the
completion of EMU means that ‘a Member State finds itself deprived of its
competences in a field which affects the essential conditions of exercise of
national sovereignty’.5  It reached the same conclusion also in respect of those
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty which establish the common visa policy
and voting rights of EU citizens in local elections. Therefore, this judgement
led to supplementing the French Constitution with a new chapter on the EU,
which will be discussed in more detail in next section.
3. Adaptation of national constitutions
National constitutions, as a rule, set forth the general principle of
sovereignty, and establish the framework rules of governance, including those
pertaining to the main aspects of monetary control within a state. As we saw in
the previous section, the entrance into Monetary Union was found to go against
these constitutional rules in France and therefore led to a constitutional
amendment. Germany, Portugal and Greece too found the membership in
Monetary Union to require a constitutional authorization. Other countries have
accommodated the transfer of monetary powers under broader provisions on
the participation in the EU or international organisations, and some have held
referendums. We will subsequently take a closer look on the developments in
individual countries with regard to their constitutional adaptations for monetary
integration.
In France, the above-discussed decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel,
where EMU was found to affect the ‘essential conditions of national
sovereignty’, led to a constitutional amendment in June 1992 in order to ratify
the Maastricht Treaty. The new art 88-2 expressly provides that: ‘Under the
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condition of reciprocity and according to the modalities provided in the Treaty
on European Union …, France consents to the transfers of competences
necessary for the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union’. This
article formed part of a new Title XV on European Union, which was introduced
into the Constitution and included a general clause on transferring powers for
their common exercise in the European Union, as well as authorizing other
aspects of integration, such as common visa policy and electoral rights of citizens
of other Member States. The new EMU-article sets into a new light art 34 of
the Constitution, which reserved to the Parliament’s legislative prerogative the
regime of emitting national currency. The Maastricht Treaty underwent a
referendum on 20 September 1992, which was won by a narrow majority of
51% against 48.9%.
In Germany, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was likewise
preceded by an amendment of the constitutional provisions which reserved to
the Federation the exclusive power to legislate in matters of currency, money
and coinage (art 73), and to establish ‘a note-issuing and currency bank’ (art
88). The amended art 88 provides as follows: ‘[The Bundesbank’s] … tasks
and powers can, in the context of the European Union, be transferred to the
European Central Bank which is independent and primarily bound by the
purpose of securing the stability of prices’. While the government’s initial project
of constitutional revision was limited to a provision which would open the
possibility of transferring the Bundesbank’s competences to the ECB, the
parliamentary deputies added the obligation for the European Bank to be
independent and give priority to price stability (Classen, 1997:16). Besides the
amendment of monetary provisions, Germany also introduced a general clause
on participation in a unified Europe, and on the delegation of state competences
in this respect (art 23), as well as a number of amendments concerning various
specific aspects of EU membership. However, regardless of this prior
constitutional authorization, the membership of Monetary Union brought about
two challenges in the Constitutional Court, to which we will come in the next
section.
The Portuguese Constitution similarly reserved to the Bank of Portugal
the exclusive right to issue currency, and to define the main goals of the financial
and monetary system. In order to join EMU, art 105 on the Bank of Portugal
was amended in 1992, providing that: ‘[t]he Bank of Portugal, in its capacity
as a central bank, collaborates in the definition and execution of the monetary
and financial policy and issues the currency, under the conditions provided by
law’.6  However, this provision was not found to meet the conditions for
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participating in EMU and, therefore, the amendment was again brought onto
the agenda in 1997.7 Parliamentary deputy Francisco Torres raised the issue
that this article should be reworded so as to establish the price stability as the
objective of the Central Bank,8 directly or indirectly through the European
System of Central Banks. At first, the two major parties (PS and PSD) refused
to reopen the discussion because this article had already been amended with
relation to the Maastricht Treaty and, on grounds of national sovereignty, further
EU-induced changes were objected. However, the risk of excluding Portugal
from EMU led to a somewhat contradictory compromise in that the parties
accepted the introduction of a reference to ‘international rules’ – thus any
potential external constraints.9 As a consequence, the Parliament decided in
1997 to amend art 102, which now provides as follows: ‘The Bank of Portugal,
in its capacity as a central bank, shall carry out its functions in accordance with
the law and with the international rules to which the Portuguese State is bound’.10
In addition, it is interesting to note that art 9 of the Portuguese Constitution
mentions the promotion of Portugal’s ‘international currency’ amongst the basic
responsibilities of the State. Besides monetary amendments, the Portuguese
Constitution also provides for the transfer of powers for their common exercise
in the European Union (art 7.6), as well as containing further amendments
pertaining to specific aspects of EU membership.
In Greece, the Constitution was amended with a view to EU membership
in 2001. The package of amendments included an ‘interpretative clause’ on
participation in the EU (art 28), and revision of art 80, para 2 of which provides
that the law regulates the regime of emission of currency. The amendment
provides that this paragraph does not obstruct the participation of Greece in
European Economic and Monetary Union, in the framework of art 28 of the
Constitution.
In Austria, Finland and Ireland, the membership in the Monetary Union
is accommodated in the constitutions under more general provisions on the
participation in intergovernmental or international organisations, which were
introduced at the time of the Maastricht Treaty (Ireland introduced a special
reference to this Treaty). Since Ireland held a referendum on the Maastricht
Treaty and the Austrian and Finnish referendums on joining the EU took place
at the time when the Maastricht Treaty was on the agenda, these referendums
could partly be regarded as referendums on EMU because it formed a focal
element of the Treaty.
The remaining EMU-countries have not undertaken specific steps to
legitimise their membership in Monetary Union. Instead, monetary integration
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was accommodated, as with other steps of integration, under existing broader
provisions on delegation or transfer of powers to international organisations.
In fact, some of them still contain only minimal or even no references to any
aspects of EU membership. These constitutions appear to share a common trait
of not regulating monetary affairs, or leaving a wider room for interpretation.
For instance, in Belgium, where art 112 provides that the ‘King may mint money,
in keeping with the law’, the participation in EMU takes place under art 34
(formerly 25bis), which states that ‘the exercise of delimited powers can be
attributed … to institutions of public international law’. Belgium, however, has
a longstanding experience in pooling monetary sovereignty, due to its monetary
union with Luxembourg since 1921. In the Netherlands, art 106 provides in a
general mode that the law regulates the monetary system. Although some authors
have found the attribution of monetary competences to the Community
institutions to contravene this constitutional article, the Government and the
Parliament approved the Maastricht Treaty by an ordinary procedure. According
to their interpretation, this article was meant to reserve the legislative power in
monetary affairs with regard to internal division of competences, whereas it
did not prohibit attribution of powers to an international institution (reported
in De Witte, 1997:368). The Italian Constitution contains a provision providing
that the Republic “shall encourage and safeguard savings in all forms; it shall
regulate, coordinate and control the provision of credit” (art 47.1), which
according to Italian scholars implicitly makes a reference to the Bank of Italy.11
The transfer of monetary competences to the EU in Italy is accommodated
under broader article 11, which declares that ‘Italy may consent, on equal terms
with other states, to limitations of sovereignty’.
The three non-participating countries - Denmark, Sweden and UK - have
stayed out of EMU partly due to the very question of constitutional
legitimisation, which accentuates the controversial character of referendums
in this process.12 In Denmark, the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992
ended with a rejection of the Treaty. This led to a special arrangement at the
Edinburgh Summit, where Protocol No 12 was annexed to the Maastricht Treaty,
providing that ‘the Constitution of Denmark contains provisions which may
make it necessary to hold a referendum before the country engages to the Third
phase of the European Monetary Union’ (De Berranger, 1997:108). The entrance
into the Third Phase was put to referendum on 28 September 2000, and was
rejected by the Danes by 53.1 per cent of ‘no’-votes. All Danish political parties
have committed themselves not to revoke the exemptions without consulting
the people via a referendum (Roberts-Thomson, 2001:117). Sweden’s
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referendum on joining the Monetary Union held on 14 September 2003 equally
resulted in a rejection.13 Should Sweden decide to join in future, a government
bill on constitutional changes provides that the Constitution needs adaptation.14
This is because art 12 of Chapter 9 of the Government Act, forming part of the
Swedish Constitution together with three other acts, provides that ‘[t]he
Riksbank is the central bank of the Realm [and]…. is responsible for monetary
policy. No public authority may determine how the Riksbank shall decide in
matters of monetary policy’. In addition, art 13 provides that ‘[t]he Riksbank
alone shall have the right to issue coinage and banknotes’. Although the third
non-participating country, United Kingdom, is the only one not to have a written
constitution and thus no overt constitutional conflicts to deal with, it has
nevertheless repeatedly announced that the question of membership in Monetary
Union will be decided in a referendum.
The above account indicates that special provisions relating to Monetary
Union were introduced in the countries where the monetary sovereignty was
expressly regulated in the constitutions (France, Portugal, Germany and Greece).
Interestingly, these countries also introduced a more general provision on
transfer of powers to the EU, as well as making other amendments concerning
EU membership. This appears to reflect the constitutional culture in individual
countries, in that whether preference is given to adapting the constitutions by
explicit amendments or by means of interpretation (implicit amendments). This,
in turn, may be influenced by an interesting correlation that the countries where
the constitutions still in 2004 merely make a general reference to participation
in international organisations or even do not mention any aspects of EU
membership at all, tend to have more difficult amendment procedures. For
instance, the amendment of the constitutions involves a dissolution of the
parliament in Belgium, Luxemburg and, in case of fundamental provisions, in
Spain, where also a referendum is required. The approval by two successive
parliament memberships is required in the Netherlands, Finland and Greece
(the relatively late stage (2001) of Greek amendments is notable in this respect).
The Danish Constitution requires a referendum or an extremely high
parliamentary consensus. Finally, the constitutional regulation of EU
membership may also depend on the existence of a constitutional court in the
country. As pointed out by Alex Stone Sweet, the so-called Kompetenz-
Kompetenz problem has arisen only in those Member States which have a
constitutional court - such as Germany and France (Stone, 1998:325). This
finding could perhaps be extended to the situation concerning the constitutions:
it is likely that in those countries where the treaties are likely to find challenges
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in constitutional courts, the parliaments have a stronger motivation for ensuring
the compatibility of the constitutions with the treaty obligations.
4. Challenges to the Euro in the German Constitutional Court
Notwithstanding the prior constitutional amendments pertaining to
membership in the EU and EMU in Germany, the Constitutional Court was
asked on two occasions to review whether the participation in Monetary Union
was in compliance with the German Constitution. In 1993, accession to EMU
was contested in the less known part of the famous Maastricht-decision; in
1998, the entrance into the Third Phase of the EMU led to another constitutional
challenge. In the Maastricht case, the complainant argued that the entry into
the Maastricht Treaty would set under threat the ‘existence of the Federal
Republic of Germany as an independent sovereign State, something which under
Article 79(3) of the Constitution … cannot be subject to constitutional
amendment’. In this respect, the complainant argued that Monetary Union would
create forms of factual compulsion, which in practical terms would render the
journey towards a European federal state irreversible.15
The German Constitutional Court, finding that the extent of delegation
was not such as to threaten sovereignty, affirmed that ‘Germany is maintaining
its status as a sovereign State in its own right’.16  This was mainly because the
powers delegated by the Maastricht Treaty were defined in a sufficiently clear
and foreseeable manner and, as the Member States continue to be the ‘Masters
of the Treaties’, each new delegation would be subject to a national approval
and ratification. As concerns specifically Monetary Union, the Court highlighted
three additional reasons to demonstrate the absence of a threat to Germany’s
sovereignty.
Firstly, it emphasised the conditional nature of monetary integration:
‘[g]iven the conditional nature of the content of the Treaty and the factual
convergences it presupposes, the time for the commencement of the third stage
of economic and monetary union must … be understood as a target rather than
as a legally enforceable date’.17 The target date is aimed to encourage and
accelerate the progress, rather than to complete it automatically within the time
limit. Secondly, the German Parliament retains the right to carry out its own
parliamentary control regarding the transition into the Third Phase. The Court
stated that by ratifying the Treaty, Germany ‘…is not subjecting itself to an
“automatic” progress to a monetary union, which is unsupervisable and the
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momentum of which puts it beyond control; the Treaty opens the way to a
further integration … by stages, which at every further step is subject either to
conditions which are already foreseeable so far as the legislature is concerned
or to a further assent from the Federal Government which may be influenced
by parliamentary means.’ 18 Thirdly, the Court made it clear that Monetary
Union will not automatically result in a political union. This requires a new
political decision and an amendment of the treaty, which could not happen
without a decision of the institutions of the nation state, including the German
Parliament.19
However, the Court did acknowledge that the participation in the
Monetary Union affects the principle of democracy:
‘The possibilities for influence by the Bundestag, and therefore by the
electorate, have no doubt been taken away almost completely in so far as the
European Central Bank has been made independent as regards the European
Community and the Member States ... An essential political area, in which
individual freedom is supported through maintenance of the value of the currency
and, through the money supply, the state of public finances and the political
spheres dependent thereon are determined, has been excluded from the powers
of state authorities to give instructions and … from parliamentary supervision
... Placing most of the tasks of monetary policy on an autonomous basis in the
hands of an independent central bank releases the exercise of sovereign powers
of the state from direct national or supra-national control in order to withdraw
monetary matters from the reach of interest groups and holders of political
office concerned about re-election’.20
At the same time, the Court found this modification of the principle of
democracy justified for the reason that monetary stability can be better achieved
at a supranational than state level. It stated that ‘[t]his restriction of the
democratic legitimation which proceeds from the voters in the member-Sates
affects the principle of democracy but, as a modification of that principle
provided for in Article 88, second sentence of the Constitution, is compatible
with Article 79(3)’.21
Ahead of the entry into the Third Phase, the participation in Monetary
Union underwent another challenge by the so-called ‘gang of four professors’.22
The group claimed a breach of their rights under art 38(1) of the Constitution
which establishes the principles of electoral law, arguing that their rights as
voters to partake in an open European political process have been infringed. In
addition, they also claimed a breach of the right to property under art 14(1),
and of the right to a stable currency. The Bundesverfassungsgericht rejected
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the claim by referring to its earlier Maastricht-Decision, where it had found
that Germany’s participation in the Monetary Union is, in principle, permitted
under art-s 23 and 88(2) of the Constitution. The Maastricht Treaty lays down
the standard and the procedure for the entry into the Third Phase, which,
according to the Court, opens up room for economic evaluation and prognosis,
where the Government and the Parliament have room of discretion concerning
the safeguarding of financial property.
Thus, regardless of constitutional amendments whereby Germany’s
accession to EMU was legitimised, the Constitutional Court was compelled to
further justify the compatibility of various aspects of monetary integration with
the fundamental principles of the German Constitution. Demonstrating the
importance of constitutional amendments in a country where delegation of
powers may face the prospect of constitutional court’s scrutiny, these decisions
implicitly elicit questions about the legitimacy of the transfer of monetary
sovereignty in countries where European integration is still accommodated under
a general constitutional provision on participation in international organisations.
5. EMU and the constitutions of the Central-Eastern accession countries
The question whether monetary integration should be preceded by a
constitutional authorization has also arisen in the Central and Eastern European
accession countries. Although the transition to the common currency will not
take place immediately, their participation in EMU is obligatory as of the date
of accession and no opt-outs are available.23  Therefore, the debates on amending
the constitutions for EU accession included (unsuccessful) proposals to carry
out amendments pertaining to the Monetary Union, albeit to no avail. This
would have avoided the repetition of the arduous procedure of constitutional
amendment in near future, as well as providing higher legitimacy to
harmonisation of obligations under the monetary acquis which the Candidate
Countries had to take over into their national legislation. The constitutional
conflict with monetary acquis primarily lie in the exclusive right of the national
central banks to emit the national currency, which is expressly established in
the constitutions of Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. In addition, several
constitutions charge their country’s national central banks with the task of
safeguarding the stability of currency, as opposed to the ECB’s objective of
safeguarding price stability.
To take a look at the individual countries, Poland faced calls for amending
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art 227(1) (Wojtowicz, 2001:42). This article provides that the National Bank
of Poland is the central bank of the State, it has ‘the exclusive right to issue
money as well as to formulate and implement monetary policy’ and is
‘responsible for the value of Polish currency’. In Lithuania, art 125 provides
that ‘[t]he Bank of Lithuania shall have the exclusive right to issue bank notes’.
Some foreign experts have pointed out that even though the delegation of
monetary sovereignty could be accommodated under a general provision on
delegation of powers, this article may need an amendment with a view to
transparency. On the other hand, the Rapporteur of Lithuania’s Working Group
on the constitutional amendments has interpreted art 125 as not being
incompatible with the acquis. This is because EU accession does not mean
automatic participation in the third stage of EMU and, in addition, the expression
‘to issue bank notes’ could be interpreted as meaning the Lithuanian national
currency Lita, thus not necessarily contradicting the powers of the European
Central Bank to issue a single European currency (Vadapalas, 2001:358).
In Estonia, art 111 provides that the Bank of Estonia ‘has the sole right
to issue Estonian currency’; it shall ‘regulate currency circulation’ and ‘uphold
the stability of the national currency’. The Constitutional Amendment Expert
Commission deemed it necessary to amend art 111 in its 1998 Report (Võimalik
liitumine Euroopa Liiduga..., 1998). This opinion was also supported by several
foreign experts,25  the Legal Chancellor26 and the President of the Bank of
Estonia.27 On the other hand, it has been commented that the tasks of the ECB
and the Bank of Estonia are different: the former has to maintain price stability,
whereas the latter is to secure the stability of the currency. Since these tasks are
mutually exclusive, the tasks of the Bank of Estonia cannot be delegated to the
ECB, which is why a rewording of this article has been advocated instead, so
as to abolish the responsibility of the Bank of Estonia to safeguard the fixed
exchange rate.28
Similar problem with a move from currency stability to price stability
may arise in the Czech Republic, Hungary and as we saw above, with the
Polish article 227. The Czech Constitution provides that the Czech National
Bank ‘is the central bank of the State. Its activities are primarily oriented towards
currency stability; it is possible to interfere with its activities exclusively on the
basis of law’ (art 98.1). In Hungary, art 32D(1) of the Constitution provides
that ‘[t]he National Bank of Hungary is responsible for issuing legal tender,
protecting the stability of the national currency and regulating the circulation
of money, in such manner as provided for by a separate statute’.
The margin of interpretation appears to be wider in Slovenia, Slovakia
76
and Latvia, where the participation in EMU is likely to be accommodated under
a general provision on EU membership. In Slovenia, art 152(1) provides that:
‘Slovenia shall have a Central Bank which shall be independent in its operations
and accountable to the National Assembly’. In Slovakia, art 56 provides that
‘[t]he Slovak Republic establishes a bank of issue’. In both countries, further
conditions are to be determined by law. Latvia’s laconic Constitution, which is
an amended version of the 1922 Constitution, does not regulate monetary issues.
It is interesting to note that the most detailed regulation of national currency is
incorporated in the Constitution of Romania, a country expected to join the EU
at a later stage, where it is specified that the national currency is the leu, with
its subdivision, the Ban (art 136.2).
Notwithstanding the calls for amendment, the issue of constitutional
revision in respect of Monetary Union has been postponed to the post-accession
period, as part of a general trend to keep the amendments minimal. With the
exception of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, the countries opted
for substantively or/and procedurally minimal amendments, so as to avoid the
sensitive question of sovereignty becoming a risk for membership in the
accession referendums (see in more detail Albi, 2003a). However, it is likely
that the question of amending these provisions will resurge ahead of the eventual
adoption of the Euro.
6. An assessment in the light of the rationale of a constitution
New stages in European integration bring about the question to what
extent need successive delegations of competences be reflected in the
constitutions of the Member States? Monetary integration exemplifies well
this dilemma: widely acknowledged as one of the most tangible interferences
to sovereign governance, it has nevertheless found express authorization only
in four constitutions - French, German, Portuguese and Greek, albeit others
have broader provisions on delegation of powers to the EU or international
organisations. In fact, half of the Member States’ constitutions in 2004 still
make minimal references to the EU or even do not mention it at all. As discussed
above, this has partly been dependent on factors such as the level of precision
of the current regulation of monetary affairs in individual constitutions, as well
as of the difficulty of the amendment procedures and of the existence of a
constitutional court. In addition, one must recognise the role of implicit
amendments, interpretation and the political costs of amending the constitutions.
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However, this increasingly leads us to a fundamental question about the
role of the national constitutions in the process of European integration. The
constitutions have been likened to social contracts by which the pouvoir
constituant agrees on what are legitimate ways of exercising power in a state.
The rationale of the constitutions - their purpose, essence and justification - is
to determine the distribution and exercise of power competences. Internal
changes in the distribution of powers between the domestic institutions of
governance have usually led to constitutional amendments, whereas this has
been considerably less so with changes caused by a move of powers to external,
international institutions. . More than half of the Member States’ legislation
derives today in a varying degree from EU institutions, including some core
areas of sovereign statehood, such as foreign and defence policy and internal
security. EC law is supreme and directly applicable. There is EU citizenship,
and democratic legitimacy is partly exercised by the elections of the European
Parliament. And, importantly to the line of argument of this paper, twelve
Member States have adopted the common currency. As these substantial shifts
in exercising powers have found reflection only in few constitutions, they have
been rightly caracterised as suffering from a ‘European deficit’ (De Witte,
2001:73), for being obsolete with regard to the actual distribution of powers.
In order to increase the legitimacy of delegating powers to European
level, as well as to uphold the rationale of the constitutions, the surrender of
national currency seems to justify a call for a revision of national constitutions
in a wider range of countries, following the model of France, Germany, Portugal
and Greece. An adequate reflection of the level of EU integration in the
constitutions would also be desirable from the point of view of constitutional
courts, who have often be left with an a posteriori task of stretching the ‘gum’
constitutional norms to legitimise the fundamental shift of powers, which for
the sake of legitimacy should rather be decided by the parliaments. Furthermore,
references to the EU’s role in the national exercise of powers would certainly
contribute to transparency and clarity, thus reducing the democratic gap between
the EU and the citizens.
In the case of the countries of Central and Eastern European (CEE)
accession countries, there are additional arguments in favour of introducing
express references to EMU, once their transition to common currency will take
place. As we saw above, several CEE constitutions expressly limit emission of
national currency to the national central bank or declare the stability of currency
as opposed to stability of prices to form the goal of their central banks.
Furthermore, these constitutions are distinctly more protective of sovereignty
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compared to the constitutions of the ‘old’ Member States (Albi, 2003b). In
addition, adequate EU-amendments would contribute towards keeping their
new constitutions as clear, up-to-date and directly applicable legal documents,
considering their fifty-year experience with the declaratory Soviet constitutions,
in which the mechanisms for exercising power and guarantees against state
intervention remained but illusory. In fact, some CEE constitutional courts have
expressly stated that based on the principles of sovereignty, legitimacy and
rule of law, the constitutions may only be amended by the prescribed procedure
and not in a disguised way by ratifying foreign treaties.29
Besides constitutional amendments, the Monetary Union further
strengthens the case for a revision of the traditional concept of sovereignty.
The calls for a new understanding of the concept of sovereignty gained
particularly momentum in the wake of the Maastricht-Decision of the German
Constitutional Court, which was criticised for using antiquated constitutional
concepts to assess the EU, a novel multi-faceted entity (eg MacCormick, 1999;
Walker, 2003; Habermas, 1999; De Witte, 1998; Hobe, 1994, 127ff). Instead,
pointing out that the concept of sovereignty has transformed many times during
its history, this line of literature argues that the processes of globalisation and
European integration have brought about the case for another such adaptation.
However, the consensus still has to emerge on how the new concept of
sovereignty might be understood.
7. Conclusions
This paper examined the legitimisation of the transfer of monetary
sovereignty to the EU in the national constitutions of the Member States and in
the accession countries. While the French Constitutional Council found that
this move goes against ‘the essential conditions of exercise of national
sovereignty’ and therefore requires a constitutional amendment, only three other
countries - Germany, Portugal and Greece - deemed it necessary to amend
their constitutions with regard to Monetary Union. The remaining countries
accommodated this move under broader constitutional provisions on
participation in the EU or international organisations. The reasons for this
include the level of precision in their constitutional regulation of monetary
powers, difficulty of the amendment procedures and constitutional traditions.
Although diverse solutions can be found in the experience of the ‘old’ Member
States, the paper recommends the model of France, Germany, Portugal and
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Greece to the accession countries once they are ready to join the common
currency. The reasons for this include higher legitimacy for delegation of powers,
upholding of the rationale of the constitutions, as well as some characteristics
specific to the constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries.
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COMMENT
BY
 STEFANO BARTOLINI
The chapters by Oliver Schmidtke and Francisco Torres share the greatest
merit discussion papers can have: without much hesitation, they articulate clear-
cut theses that are, in many ways, unconventional and therefore serve as a
perfect staring point for the debate. Schmidtke paper discusses the extent to
which the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has come 1) to be or to be
perceived as a challenge to the nationally bounded social citizenships, and 2)
has become the focus for growing ‘politicisation’ and ‘populist’ protest. The
paper by Francisco Torres investigates the hypothesis that EMU and the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) could 1) be submitted to the
overseeing of the European Parliament (EP) considering the latter as a potential
‘principal’, and 2) eventually contribute to enhance EU accountability and
transparency in macro-economic policy.
These theses are ‘unconventional’, as I said, in many respects. Oliver
Schmidtke’s thesis is most of the time expressed blaming different institutions
and policies. The ‘erosion’ of national citizenship rights resulting form the
European integration process does not immediately point to the responsibility
of the EMU. The liberalising, de-monopolising, free circulation elements of
the European Economic Community (EEC), the various principles of direct
effect, supremacy, etc. of European law over the national one, and the case law
activities of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are often regarded as an
historically antecedent and a more fundamental challenge to the national social
citizenship than EMU itself. Even the popular resentment against the EU, to
which Schmidtke refers in the paper, is infrequently attributed directly to the
Euro and to the mechanisms of its central administration, but to more mundane
and directly perceptible ‘intrusion’ of the distant Brussels bureaucracy. One of
the reasons for this is that ordinary citizens have hardly the necessary
competence and information to perceive the potential and indirect constraining
effect of the common monetary policy over national social policy decisions.
Also the central thesis by Francisco Torres is unconventional in the same
sense as above. Looking for the ‘principal’ of the European Central Bank (ECB)
and for a body able to oversee its activities, most observer would point to the
Council or to some sort of special European Executive Committee or High
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Commissioner for the monetary policies, rather than to the EP. After all, even
at the domestic level when a direct political subordination of the Central Bank
is or was foreseen, this was always subordination to the national executives,
not to the national parliaments. And the main reason for this executive role was
exactly one of the central points discussed in Torres’ paper: how can one oversee
and politically direct the role of the (national or for that matter European) Central
Bank without jeopardizing its financial market credibility.
In many ways, therefore, the interest of the papers is exactly that they
look into questions that one would not normally regard as the normal ones. Yet,
this does not means that the arguments are wholly convincing. Leaving aside
for space and time considerations the thorny and complicated question of
‘democracy’ in the EU, the less convincing parts of the papers have to do with
two key concepts largely used by both of them: the concept of ‘accountability’
and that of ‘governance’.
Torres’ paper acknowledged that ‘accountability’ has many meanings
but fails to clearly indicate in which way the ECB  - which has a single Treaty
defined goal (price stability) and has operationalised it in full autonomy (price
stability = no more than 2% inflation) – could be ‘accountable’ to the EP. To be
more precise, it is unclear which ‘sanctions’ in the hands of the EP could or
should qualify such accountability, admitting that –as the author does –
accountability requires sanctions to be real. If sanctions for deviant or disliked
behaviour cannot be identified, then we should use a different term than
‘accountability’. In many ways I have ha the impression that the term meant by
Torres is more ‘responsiveness’ than ‘accountability’. In fact, many mechanisms
of a formal and informal nature can achieve a certain degree of ‘responsiveness’
- that is of responding sympathetically - even without direct accountability,
that is without direct sanctions.
Finally, even the resort to the concept of ‘governance’ in relation to the
EMU and its predefined goals would require some clarification. Governance is
an ambiguous term. A minimalist but generally accepted definition considers it
as a form of decision making inherently different, if not opposed, to
‘government’, that is to binding decisions monopolised by a relatively centralised
and monopolistic body. If this so, then the concept of ‘accountability’ and
‘governance’ are indeed at odds. No governance can, strictu sensu, be
accountable for the very reason that it does not allow a clear cut identification
of whom is to be regarded as accountable and whom should be sanctioned in
case this was deemed necessary.
Finally, to include EMU and the ECB within the system of European
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‘governance’ is indeed improper in my view. One may regard the system of
decision-making concerning the European currency as the more
‘governmental’ process of the EU. For monetary policy, the transfer of power
to the ‘federal’ level is full. The cohesion of the common currency system
and of the bank system is so high and strong to coincide with an absolute
‘unity’. The central Bank position is characterised specific and exclusive
powers to reach operational tools at its disposal. The other bodies of the EU
have policies equally defined by the constitutional or treaty norms (cohesion,
occupation, etc.), but do not have operational tools under the complete control
of those who decide because complex procedures that involve other subjects
are necessary. In the many policy areas of the EU, there are less clear
definitions of the objectives and a less direct and immediately available use
of operational means and operational as it is the case in monetary policy. In
fact, in the monetary policy, the instruments of action find immediate and
full coincidence in the juridical structure and in the operational structure for
which the currency has an immediate impact in the individual spheres of
action.
In the community system the lack of a centralised power capable to
materially exercise coercion towards the member states (or toward citizens)
makes the difference with a real ‘federal’ structure. But in the case of currency
there is no need of a coercion power. The power given to the ECB and to the
ESCB is directly operational and without intermediation for what concerns the
currency (emission and printing, the rates). The direct implication and operability
of the decisions concretises the perfect identity between the juridical and the
economic orders. In the currency domain the direct relationship between citizens
and federal state (fundamental characteristic of the federal system) is guaranteed
by the function of the currency itself.
EMU, in my opinion, is the most unitary, centralised, monopolistic, and
direct effect  - and therefore the more ‘governmental’ - system of the EU
decision-making. It should therefore be regarded as a federal sub-system in a
non-federal system.  Paradoxically this makes it also the most accountable in
principle, because one knows clearly which decisions are taken and by whom
and in what capacity.
I conclude these remarks by arguing, somehow paradoxically, that  EMU
could become ‘accountable’ exactly because it is the less ‘governance’ and the
more ‘government’ sub-system of the EU. It remains an interesting but open
question whether this unified ‘agent’ can find its ‘principal’ in the fragmented
structure of the EU bodies and decision making, and whether this principal
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could the EP – which indeed rests on unitary principle of representation –
rather than the intergovernmental Council.
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COMMENT
BY
SVETLOZAR ANDREEV
The chapters by Francisco Torres and Oliver Schmidtke are two well-
written papers with clear research questions and interesting investigation puzzles
to debate. Although they deal with seemingly distant topics: Francisco Torres –
with the role of the European Parliament (EP) as a possible ‘principal’ overseeing
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and Oliver Schmidtke – with the alleged
democratic deficit and legitimacy problems, created by the introduction of the
Euro, and the latter’s impact on the evolving concept of citizenship in Europe,
they have a common set of concerns: how to improve the democratic
accountability of EMU and how to prevent the further deligitimation of EU on
the basis of the highly technocratic and distant-from-the-public supranational
monetary arrangement in Europe.
In a broader sense, these two papers discuss the political and social effects
of the introduction of EMU in the late 1990s, and the possibility of controlling
and steering a series of fiscal mechanisms by local and regional actors. What is
laudable in both publications is that they talk about processes rather than
products related to EMU. Moreover, and implicitly, they do not perceive the
evolution of EMU as a unilinear process, leading to a certain set of (mostly
positive) economic, social and political results, but they try to offer a constructive
critique, which sees European monetary integration as a reversible process. As
has the practice in this field taught us during the 1970s and 1980s, EMU could
often and quite rapidly experience setbacks. Thus, it is highly instructive to
explore the potential political and social causes and results of this, as well as to
try to strengthen the legitimacy of this fiscal arrangement among domestic and
supranational constituencies. Finally, both papers are complementary as they
analyse both top-down (EP as a ‘principal’) and bottom-up (strengthening
European citizenship) approaches to the accountability and legitimacy problems
spurred by EMU.
Any academic debate about the political and social effects of one or
another kind of fiscal arrangement usually engenders two things: the necessity
for (a) a functional autonomy of the decision-making bodies, and (b) a degree
of control by the representatives of the population. As has been proven during
the transition to and consolidation of democracy in many countries of Southern
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Europe, Latin America and post-communist Eastern Europe and Asia, the almost
complete independence of national central banks from the executive and the
legislature has been key to the successful economic transformation and ability
to attract foreign investment. This policy of central bank autonomy has also
been actively promoted and fully supported by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). At the same time, however, there have been at least
three arguments put forward against such an arrangement: (1) the lack of
transparency and rigidity of rules associated with virtually fully-independent
central banks, (2) the possibility that autocratic rules may install loyal people
at key positions in the central bank before and during the transition to democracy
(the example of Chile during the 1980s and 90s is telling in this respect), and
(3) the limited scope of control by popularly elected bodies, although their
performance might seriously be affected by what the central bank does or fails
to do. It is also necessary to clarify that the introduction of a supranational
monetary policy and its related institutions, and a regional/international central
bank in particular, leads to further complications of the above-mentioned
problems. The complexity of managing EMU, via the setting-up and controlling
the European Central Bank (ECB), is expressed by the dynamic interplay
between national and supranational levels of authorities in the EU, on the one
hand, and between them and an independent ECB, on the other. The specific
political, economic, fiscal and social interests of these centres of authority are
often overlapping and superimposing (from where the notion of “multi-level
and polycentric governance in the EU”), while the institutions and accompanying
rules of EMU are still in a process of partial transition and maturation – that is
why it is easy to witness and predict conflicts of interests and a potential for
instability in this kind of setting.
Another important point that both papers make is about the impossibility
(or, better, the limited possibility) of legitimating EMU – and, hence, the EU –
only on the basis of performance, as opposed to rules and the direct political
contribution of the citizens and their popularly elected institutions. As numerous
publications on the democratic/legitimacy deficit in Europe have indicated,
there are four principal modes of legitimating the EU governance system:
1) Output legitimacy: Efficiency and effectiveness of European problem-solving
ability and capability; government for the people;
2) Input legitimacy: Direct democratic legitimation of European politics through
the elected European Parliament; transparency; citizen participation and
consultation; government by the people;
Comment by Svetlozar Andreev
87
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE EURO AREA
3) “Borrowed” legitimacy through Member States: Indirect democratic
legitimation of European politics and their already legitimated authorities
(member state governments, national parliaments, civil servants and
nominated experts); government of the people
4) “Formal”/Constitutional legitimacy: Legitimation through constitution, the
law and direct effect; government by the rule of law
It is easy to empirically testify from the more than half-a-century life of
the supranational institutions that they have traditionally relied on the first and
third types of legitimisation. Both the citizenship and constitutional dimensions
of legitimising the European integration have largely been ignored until the
mid-1990s. Nowadays, however, they are seen as main, if still not fully exploited,
ways of legitimating the EU governance directly.
Oliver Schmidtke’s paper elegantly links the problems, associated with
the introduction of the Euro, with the evolution of supranational citizenship.
He even concludes that “EMU could indirectly (and probably unintentionally)
contribute to the development of an, albeit thin, notion of European citizenship
status.” This, according to the author, is/ would be achieved through the gradual
redrawing of “community boundaries” and the reinterpretation of the “European
social model.” However, as already stated, this cannot be achieved using
‘traditional’ forms of legitimation – based on output and redistribution. The
stress put particularly by the EMU policy is on coordination and oversight by
the popularly elected institutions, such as the national and European parliaments,
as well as the exponents of civil society. A similar hunch is expressed in
Francisco Torres’ paper, in which the author (rather counterintuitively) proposes
the EP to serve as the ultimate body to keep the EMU under scrutiny. What
might be said in terms of critique in relation to Schmidke’s  paper is that it uses
the notion of European citizenship in a very limited sense, i.e. of only “social
citizenship,” without specifying (and operationalising) what is meant by the
latter concept. The reader is left with the impression that a common European
model of a ‘social citizenship’ already exist, while EMU is seen as somehow
intervening with this model, without making clear the concrete mechanisms
and loci of ‘subversive’ activity. Finally, related to the ‘populist reaction’ to
EMU at the national and supranational levels, one is tempted point out that
political and social reactions spurred by the introduction of the Euro are not
fully and logically linked to the evolution of EMU as a policy area. Thus, it is
necessary to make a clear conceptual distinction between money and a monetary
mechanism, and to clarify their possible effects on society.
In his paper, Francisco Torres makes the interesting case for the role of
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the EP as a ‘principal’ controlling EMU. However, one should recall that,
although being the only supranational institution directly elected by the
European people, it nevertheless (a) is with limited, albeit slowly growing,
decision-making powers, and (b) represents only a small part of the EU
population (e.g. also excluding the immigrants and legal residents), and tends
to reproduce mostly national and hardly any European cleavages. The question
in Torres’ paper is rightly put to highlight the potential improved legitimacy-
efficiency trade-off (in favour of the first) and the quality of democracy, ensuing
from an increased EP participation in fiscal matters. However, the results of
this research have to be better spelled out and put in a context. Both the EP and
EMU have rapidly evolving roles in the European governance. Thus, it is difficult
to explain how the first might exactly influence the latter in the short and
medium-term future. This problem does not, however, diminish the relative
scientific merits and highly innovative nature of this paper. Finally, I tend to
agree with the other commentator, Prof. Stefano Bartolini, that, because being
less ‘governance’ and more ‘government’ (or governmental), EMU has a chance
to become more ‘accountable’ compared to other supranational policy fields,
provided that the major ‘stakeholders’ (i.e. the governments), stick to their
initial promises of fiscal discipline and manage to ‘auto-supervise’ themselves,
thus maintaining the international and domestic credibility in and legitimacy
of EMU.
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COMMENT
BY
 ALESSANDRA CHIRICO
Anneli Albi’s contribution touches a very interesting topic related to the
establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) - namely the modalities
through which Member States have legitimised the adoption of the common
currency -, and developes a thorough analysis of the major national constitutional
amendments and constitutional court cases where monetary integration has
been challenged.
The main aim of the present comment will be, instead, an attempt to
investigate the process of legitimisation, not from the national level, but adopting
the different perspective of the European Union (EU) level, trying to make
sense of the theoretical and institutional transformation occurred within and
around the EU with the establishment of EMU, assuming that such an
institutional transformation has had far-reaching implications for the nature of
the newly emerging European polity as such. Particular attention has to be paid
to those implications affecting the traditional categories characterising the
consolidated way of structuring the institutional background against which the
relationship between money and state sovereignty has been built and developed,
in consideration of the fact that the transfer of national monetary sovereignty
to the European Central Bank has fundamentally changed the economic and
monetary constitution under which both European and national economic
policies are conducted.
The basic focus on the institutional changes occurred with the building-
up of EMU is due to the fact that they represent a new, highly meaningful stage
in the development of public international law, most notably if one takes into
account the complex issues related to the set up of the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB) within the body of EMU seen as a “metaphor” for the
EU. Undoubtedly, since the beginning of its first steps, EMU has challenged
consolidated assumptions about national sovereignty and the “essential
conditions of its exercise”, legitimacy and national identity, since it has always
been perceived as bolder, riskier, and more controversial than the single
European market, as a meaningful stage toward economic integration. In fact,
although the Maastricht Treaty falls short of the original and ambitious
expectations in the field of politics, it certainly fulfils the intentions laid down
in the preamble with respect to monetary union. The introduction of the single
currency lies, in a sense, in the interstices between the economy and the state
in that it combines functional economic elements with institutional political
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ones. The single currency does away once and for all with internal exchange
rate fluctuations, completes the Single Market and, with a single money for
almost three hundred million people, increases the efficiency of currency use
in an unprecedented manner. The transfer of national monetary sovereignty to
the ECB represents thus a partial surrender of political sovereignty, which is
rightly perceived by citizens as marking a deep change in the way in which
nations consider themselves. As a result, the monetary order established by the
Maastricht Treaty - together with the detailed Statute of the ESCB and of the
ECB -, “by itself represents a crucial building block for the development of a
European statehood”.1 The success of the ECB’s monetary policy and the
stability of the euro constitute a test case for European integration above and
beyond monetary and currency issues.
As a very first remark, it has to be said that the very existence of the
ECB and of the Eurosystem was indeed the result of a democratic and highly
political process (as well highlighted in Albi’s paper).2 The Treaty provisions,
and with them, the same mandate of the Governing Council of the ECB to
maintain price stability and its high degree of independence, were formulated
by the political system itself. In fact, it has to be recalled that the national
parliaments of each of the EU Member States approved these provisions and
the principles, tasks, objectives and institutional set-up of the Eurosystem, and,
in some countries, also the constitutional courts expressed themselves in order
to specify the precise contents of the constitutional authorisation by their
Member States.
More generally, it is worth underlining the fact that the introduction of
the euro as such and the establishment of the ECB constitute a new, significant
step in the process of European integration which has now been under way for
more than half a century. This process was and is still based on the political
view that an integrated Europe is in the interest of stability, security and
prosperity. The European integration process can thus be seen primarily as a
political process with, of course, important economic aspects and benefits, which
cannot be disregarded.
Having pointed out all that, one can even move further arguing that the
whole process related to the institutional configuration of the Eurosystem has
been a matter of finding the best balance between the reasons of political primacy
(mainly characterised by an intergovernmental component) and those of the
emerging economic/monetary power (a truly supranational one), in terms of
democratic and political control,3 on the one hand, and monetary policy
effectiveness, on the other.4 In a society based on democratic and market
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principles, both these requirements are crucial. However, as they are partially
conflicting, clear definitions and an appropriate balance in their implementation
need to be found.5
In particular, it should be borne in mind that the policy decisions of the
Governing Council of the ECB affect the lives and welfare of the almost 300
million people living in the euro area. This is why the transfer of such substantial
power into the hands of independent, non-elected central bankers can only be
legitimate if effective democratic control (ex ante) and accountability (ex post)
are in place.
As a matter of fact, democracy based on representation assumes a
symmetrical relationship between legitimated power and accountability. In fact,
when public power is implemented someone must be firstly legitimised to
exercise it and then be able to be held accountable for it. In principle, such a
reasoning should be applied also to the ECB as bearer of monetary sovereignty
(a new, still controversial form of public power) within the EU. Still, such a
“sovereign” power is used by the ECB without or outside the traditional forms
of political control which otherwise should follow automatically. This can be
partially justified by taking into account that the Eurosystem – following the
logic of central banking - has to be in a position to effectively carry out its
tasks, i.e. to actually safeguard the currency and deliver price stability, a
prerequisite which may set conditions, and even a limit, to the way in which
democratic control is exercised. In particular, the forward-looking character of
monetary policy, the long time lags with which monetary policy works, the
sensitivity of relevant information and the powerful market reaction to policy
announcements, all have to be seriously evaluated in designing the methods of
democratic control and accountability that are appropriate for the central bank.
Some remarks on the notions of legitimacy and accountability in EMU
Thus in order to well develop the analysis of the notion of accountability
within the context of the ECB, it is good to start from the basic constitutional
ideas to be applied to the European Union as such, namely that in a democracy
citizens delegate power to politicians. The politicians exert this power until
they face the electorate again. As a result, the delegation of power to the
politicians has two stages. The first one starts when the politicians are vested
with power. During this stage they exert this power independently from the
electorate. The second stage is the accountability stage, when the electorate
evaluates and sanctions the record and the performance of the politicians.
Much of what politicians do is to further delegate power to specialised
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institutions. This secondary delegation must have the same two stages. In the
first stage, the politicians delegate power to the institution in the form of a
contract in which the objectives and the means to achieve the objectives are
specified.6 In the second stage the politicians evaluate the performance of the
institution. The first stage can be called the stage in which some form of
independence is granted, the second one is the stage in which control is exerted
(accountability). These two phases are inextricably linked. The politicians, who
are accountable to the electorate, cannot afford to delegate power to an institution
(making it independent) except if they can also exert a sort of control over that
institution.7 Applying in such a case the theory of principal vs. agent, it seems
evident that “the core sense of accountability is clearly grounded in the general
purpose of making agents or subordinates act in accordance with the wishes of
their superiors”.8
The more the politicians delegate power, the better the control must be
organised about how this power is used. If there is little delegation, there is
little need for control. Thus, applying these principles to the case of central
banks, if the government decides about the interest rate then there is no need
for having explicit accountability of the central bank. If, on the contrary, the
government delegates a lot of power to the central bank, there is a corresponding
need to have a high degree of accountability. The reason is that the government
maintains its full accountability towards the electorate, and therefore cannot
afford to delegate power without maintaining control over the use of this power.
As a consequence, independence and accountability are part of the same process
of delegation.
Moreover, it has to be said that delegation of power implies the
consensus of both parties involved in the process on an agreement in which
the objectives to be pursued are specified, together with the method to achieve
these objectives.
A crucial issue is thus the precision with which the objectives are
described. If objectives are left vague, it will be difficult to monitor the behaviour
of the central bank. Accountability will be weak. In fact, the more precise the
objectives are defined, the easier will be the monitoring.
Having established the basic ex post character of the ECB’s
accountability,9 two further questions need to be addressed in order to make
this concept meaningful for the present investigation: should the ECB be
“accountable for what? accountable to whom?”10
With the aim to find an answer to the first question, it has to be recalled
that the Eurosystem should be held accountable simply for the fulfilment of its
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mandate. In this context, the maintenance of price stability, and hence the
formulation and implementation of the single monetary policy, is at the centre
of attention. The Treaty itself provides a yardstick, the maintenance of price
stability, against which the Eurosystem’s actions should be measured.11 In any
case, beyond being accountable with reference to its success in fulfilling its
primary objective, the Eurosystem is supposed to be held accountable also in
relation to its other tasks. Not least in the dialogue with the European Parliament
(EP), it happened that the ECB was called upon to explain its actions and
decisions, inter alia, relating to payment systems, euro banknote design and
production, etc.12
Second point to be discussed is: accountable to whom? As the currency
is one of the most pervasive components of the social system, and given that
price stability is a public good, it should be clear that the Eurosystem is, in the
broadest sense, accountable to the European citizens at large.13 The fact that
the European citizens place their trust in the Eurosystem to safeguard the
currency and to defend their savings makes them the ultimate addressee of the
Eurosystem’s accountability.14
In the political order of the EU, the only institution that directly derives
its role and legitimacy from the citizens is the EP. Irrespective of the county
and constituency where he or she was voted, each member of the EP has been
elected to pursue the European public interest, just as parliamentarians of
Member States are entrusted with the national interest. The EP  is the institution
of Europe’s democratically elected representatives, which represents the interests
of the peoples of Europe. This is why accountability quite appropriately relates,
first and foremost, to the EP and the dialogue between the ECB and the EP
represents the principal means to exercise accountability.15 Beyond that,
complying with its reporting requirements, the ECB is engaged in a dialogue
with all the bodies that play a role in the European political process: the Council
of Ministers and the European Commission in the first place, but also the
Economic and Social Committee.16 The ECB participates in meetings of the
Eurogroup, the Ecofin Council. In return, the President of the Ecofin Council
and a member of the European Commission have the right to attend the meetings
of the ECB Governing Council. The Eurosystem also reaches out to other
relevant groups in society, such as the social partners, by joining, for example,
the discussions of the Macroeconomic Dialogue. These contacts allow the ECB
to explain its decisions, to share its analysis and to receive political feedback
and thus be connected to the European political process. At the national level,
the national central banks also relate to their national parliaments and entertain
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links of communication with their governments.17
Having said that, it can be concluded that it is quite encouraging to observe
a growing recognition and appreciation for the Eurosystem’s distinct method
of accountability, which derives not only from the specificity of its institutional
profile, but also from the environment in which it is embedded. It should be
clear, in fact, that the Eurosystem neither operates in an institutional vacuum,
nor is it supposed to do so. Being held accountable should not a burden for the
Eurosystem, on the very contrary it should be seen as a safeguard. “It is through
discharging its accountability tasks, through exchanges of views and opinions
within the European public sphere, including open criticism and controversy,
that the Eurosystem can earn its in«dependence every day, and grow in stature”.18
1
 See O. Issing, (2000).
2
 For a further elaboration on this point see O. Schmidtke in this volume.
3
 It is interesting to note that during the debate in the European Parliament on Democratic accountability in
stage three of EMU, the French, Italian and Portuguese versions of the draft report initially used the term
contròle démocratique, controllo democratico and controllo democratico, respectively, while the Spanish
version referred instead to responsabilidad democratica. Such an element testifies the significance of the
issue at stake here in the institutional construction and configuration of the ECB as bearer of monetary
sovereignty.
On this point see the illuminating paper written by L. Bini-Smaghi and D. Gros, (2001), where the authors,
reflecting on the idea of democratic control, identify three constraints on the exercise of government: (a) ex
ante control, which defines the rules, standards and principles laid down in advance by a democratically
elected body, to be followed by the accountable body in the exercise of its functions; (b) accountability as
such, viewed as the act of listening to criticism and responding to questions about the past and future behaviour
that may be put forward by a democratically elected body; (c) popular mandate, which refers to the attribution
of power through democratic procedures. However, it should be said that the above criteria cannot fully be
applied to central banks. The third criterion, in particular, is not relevant in that independent central banks do
not receive mandates nor they choose their own policy objectives. “This would imply that the central bank
had become a new separate branch of democratic power”, which is not the case (Ibidem, p. 2. Emphasis
added).
4
 As pointed out by F. Torres in this volume, there is an efficiency-legitimacy trade-off, by virtue of which “it
is not possibile to increase the legitimacy of the EC system without decreasing its efficiency and vice versa”.
According to the author the emerging role of the European Parliament in enhancing the democratic
accountability of decision-making in monetary policy’s matters may prove quite powerful with respect to
avoiding such a trade-off and indeed improving efficiency, transparency and accountability in European
governance.
5
 As rightly observed by B. Dutzler (2003), “the task is to reconcile democratic organisational principles and
central bank independence, or its compatibility with the axiom that every exercise of public authority must
be democratically legitimised”. All this appear to be a real challenge and represents a truly controversial
issue in the academic debate. In principle, if the democratic principle can operate at the European level, the
Europeanisation of monetary policy cannot constitute per se a challenge to it. Nonetheless, the specific
NOTES
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institutional framework adopted for this purpose in the Maastricht Treaty still does. The Treaty assigns to the
ECB full responsibility for the conduct of the single monetary policy and an extremely high degree of
independence from the other Community institutions, as well from the governments of the Member States.
In other words, it grants to a group of appointed officials full decision-making powers for a key aspect of
macroeconomic policy. It can be concluded – together with C. Hadjiemmanuil, (2001), – that “the
establishment by means of constitutional rules of depoliticised, non-majoritarian central banking arrangements,
would appear to constitute, at the supranational as much as at the national level, a direct and gross violation
of the democratic principle”.
6
 It has to be borne in mind that the more clearly and precisely this mandate is defined, the easier it will be to
monitor the performance of the central bank. Moreover, “the more clearly and narrowly the mandate is
defined, the easier it will be in a democracy to justify the delegation of powers to an unelected body, since
value judgements and trade-offs concerning several unranked objectives should naturally remain the preserve
of democratically elective representatives” (O. Issing, 1999).
7
 A partially different reconstruction of this process is provided by A. Cukierman (1992), notably at p. 350.
The author argues that “the conveyance of authority to the CB by political authorities can be viewed as an act
of partial commitment. By delegating some of their authority to a relatively apolitical institution, politicians
accept certain restrictions on their future freedom of action. The main motive for such delegation is usually
the preservation of price stability” (…) “By delegating some of their authority to the CB, political authorities
try to reduce the set of circumstances under which price stability is sacrificed in order to achieve other
objectives. The higher the independence of the CB, the stronger will be the commitment”.
8
 A. Mulgan (2000), at p. 563. The author further argues that “the ever-present threat of being called to
account, the potential implicit in accountability, will serve as a sufficient device to secure a satisfactory
degree of compliance with political preferences (Ibidem, p. 567). On the same line of reasoning see F.
Torres, op. cit., who observes that “the process of delegation itself may” (…) “meet transparency and
accountability requirements. However, those legitimate principals expect agents to carry out policies that are
consistent with their initial preferences. Nevertheless the agent’s actions may differ from the principal’s
preferences. For that reason, transparency, in conjunction with accountability, is critical to ensure that agents
comply as mandated”.
9
 In the theorical reconstruction of B. Dutzler (2003) p. 110, the ex post accountability comprises different
components, namely (i) reporting requirements, (ii) regular statutory hearings of central bank representatives
before political bodies, (iii) the power of political bodies to demand appearances, (iv) and inquiries into
policy matters. All this applies to the ECB.
10
 These are the fundamental questions examined by C. Wyplosz (2000), pp. 275  and ff.
11
 As a general rule, central bank performance can be assessed by observing the concrete results of its
policies, with a specific look at the inflation statistics. Given the time lag between the setting of monetary
policy and its actual effect on price levels, however, observation of the latter enables the observer to assess
actions taken about two years earlier. This, of course, is of little interest to market participants and the public
at large. Moreover, as pointed out by L. Bini-Smaghi and D. Gros, (2001) other further elements complicate
the exercise of accountability. It should be recalled, in fact, that inflation is a “monetary phenomenon in the
long run, but not at each and every point in time. In the short run inflation is dominated by a number of other
variables, such as labour costs, import prices and taxes, which are beyond the control of the central bank and
are difficult to forecast”. As a result, “the central bank can thus not be held accountable for temporary
deviations from price stability, which are not due to its own behaviour”. The underlined element has to be
taken into account, but it has to be – at the same time – counterbalanced by the consideration that not always
market participants know if such deviations are temporary or not, and whether they are due to monetary
factors or to some other causes.
12
 In any case, it should be stressed that, despite the general principle highlighted in the text, given the
vagueness of the Treaty about the other objectives besides price stability, the ECB has the tendency to
interpret this to mean that it has to pursue only price stability. All reference to other objectives has been
basically dropped, if and where possible. As a result, the ECB has drastically restricted the domain of
responsibilities about which it can be called accountable. If the ECB’s interpretation of the Treaty is left
unchallenged, the ECB will be able to claim that its only responsibility is inflation, and that it cannot be
made responsible for business cycle developments and movements in employment. This strategy, if successful,
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will make the ECB accountable only for its perfomance in the area of inflation. The contrast with other
central banks is huge. The Fed, for instance, has been made responsible by law for movements in employment.
There is no way it could decide on its own that the employment objective is out of its responsibility, the way
the ECB has done. As a consequence, the area of responsibilities about which the Fed is accountable is much
broader than the ECB’s.
13
 According to W. Duisenberg, (2000): “in a democratic society, the public and its elected representatives
should have the opportunity to scrutinise the design and implementation of important public policies by
independent bodies. In the context of monetary policy, central bank accountability is therefore an essential
element in a democratic society”.
14
 On this point the German Constitutional Court held: “it is part of the unassailable content of the democratic
principle that the carrying-out of state functions and the exercise of state powers is derived from the people
of the state and the persons doing so are fundamentally answerable to the people” (BverGE 89, 155, translation
in CML Rev, 1994, 255) Similarly it can be rightly argued that “by virtue of the democratic principle, the
holding and exercise of political authority – power of people over people – is not justifiable in itself, but
authority must be derived from the people, who are the ultimate bearer of this authority. The performance of
public tasks, therefore, needs to be legitimised by the people itself” (B. Dutzler, (2003)).
15
 It should be added that all European institutions are supposed to be accountable for their action. There is
an interesting article by V. Mehde, (2003), where the two above-mentioned concepts of responsibility and
accountability are accurately analysed. With specific regard to the position of the European Commission,
the author quotes an illuminating excerpt taken from the First Report on Allegations of Fraud, Mismanagement
and Nepotism in the European Commission, written by the Committee of Independent Experts on 15 March
1999, where it is argued that “the responsibility of individual Commissioners, or of the Commission as a
body, cannot be a vague idea, a concept which in practice proves unrealistic. It must go hand in hand with an
ongoing process designed to increase awareness of that responsibility. Each individual must feel accountable
for the measures he or she manages” (…) “The tempatation to deprive the concept of responsibility of all
substance is a dangerous one. That concept is the ultimate manifestation of democracy” (Ibidem, p. 429).
16
 Despite such a plurality of parties involved in the “accountability’s game of the ECB”, it has to be borne in
mind that there is a significant difference between the situation characterising the Community level and the
national level. In fact, monetary policy viewed in the traditional, national sense includes balancing the
parliament and the government on the one hand and the central bank on the other. On the contrary, in the
European Union the ECB has no equivalent counterpart. The independence of the ECB is further strengthened
by the fact that it does not interact with just one, but with several national governments which also means
that political pressure remains weaker than in a national environment.
On this point see P. Leino, (2001), according to whom the ECB, having to deal with several partners - such
as the European Parliament and the Ecofin Council which both represent national interests, and the European
Commission, which represents “a vaguely defined Community interest” -, is in a much stronger position,
given that all these counterparts cannot properly mobilise an influent political pressure. It is as if the dialogue
between the ECB and its interlocutors were fragmented and, as a consequence, becomes less authoritative in
terms of accountability.
17
 In addition to the direct communication with the political decision-making bodies, all the statements and
publications of the ECB form a natural additional information channel to the politicians. For instance, the
Monthly Bulletin, and its editorial, can be considered very important for the whole euro area. Beyond that,
the NCBs produce their own statements and publications for their national audiences which complement the
euro area-level information.
18
 Id., op. cit., p. 7. Such a target can be achieved by greater transparency. Given its high degree of independence,
the ECB should in fact be more transparent than other central banks. On this point, namely the importance of
empowering transparency and communication, see A. Blinder, C. Goodhart, P. Hildebrand, D. Lipton and C.
Wyplosz, (2001).
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A COMMENT
BY
PHILIPPE SCHMITTER
WILL EMU MAKE IT EASIER OR MORE DIFFICULT TO DEMOCRATIZE THE
EU?
If nothing else, the complex of institutions that we now call the European
Union (EU) is the product of voluntary choices by actors representing national
states. These states expect to retain their independent existence and the distinctive
institutions at the same time as they agree to pursue common policies by peaceful
means. Whatever its effects upon both the established ‘domestic’ democracies
of its member states and the eventual democratization of the EU itself, EMU
will be the outcome of a similar process, i.e. protracted negotiation and
compromise among “consenting adult-states” that will retain both their entry
and exit options. Provided a country is willing to pay the economic, social and/
or political costs of “non-membership,” no one is going to force it to join and
no country is going to be prevented from leaving EMU.
The Democratization of a Supra-national Europe?
There is no a priori reason why the institutions of the EU have to be
made more democratic – least of all, in the near future. In retrospect, virtually
all Europeans would agree that transforming their initially autocratic national
polities into liberal representative democracies was a good thing, even if there
was little consensus (and, in many cases, a great deal of violent resistance) at
the time this was accomplished. In prospect, however, the case for
democratization is much less compelling at the supra-national level.  Not only
are there serious impediments of size and scope involved in creating such an
accountable Euro-polity, but there is also very little evidence that individual
citizens of Europe presently want such a thing. They still identify overwhelming
more with their national (or, in some case, sub-national) units and place much
greater confidence in the capacity of their “co-nationals” to respect their
freedoms and govern them in a legitimate fashion. Even those who are most
insistent in decrying the “democracy deficit” of the EU do not necessarily draw
the conclusion that the answer lies primarily in changing its institutions. It is at
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least as plausible to conclude that what is needed are major reforms in the way
that national institutions process the decisions made in Brussels and make them
transparent and responsive to individual citizens and their representative
institutions.
In short, even if it could be demonstrated EMU will make the
democratization of the EU less, rather than more likely, this might not be a
valid argument against merging one’s national currency with the euro and
accepting the authority of the European Central Bank (ECB) Those who argue
that their “domestic” political institutions and practices will remain for the
foreseeable future much better at protecting their rights (and, especially, their
entitlements) as citizens than any conceivable set of supra-national ones, might
very well welcome EMU – if they were convinced that it would postpone or
even make impossible the creation of an eventual Euro-democracy.
In a book entitled How to Democratize the European Union … and Why
Bother? I have argued that there are two good reasons why it may be timely to
begin this experiment with supra-national democracy sooner rather than later:
(1)There is considerable evidence that rules and practices of democracy at the
national level have become increasingly contested by citizens. This has not
(yet) taken the form of rebellious or even “unconventional” behaviour, but
of what Gramsci once called  “symptoms of morbidity” such as greater
electoral abstention, decline in party identification, more frequent turnover
in office and rejection of the party in power, lower prestige of politicians
and higher unpopularity of chief executives, increased tax evasion and higher
rates of litigation against authorities, skyrocketing accusations of official
corruption and, most generally, a widespread impression that contemporary
European democracies are simply not working well to protect their citizens.
It would be overly dramatic to label this “a general crisis of legitimacy,” but
something isn’t going well — and most national politicians know it.
(2)There is even more compelling evidence that individuals and groups within
the European Union have become aware of how much its regulations and
directives are affecting their daily lives, and that they consider these decisions
to have been taken in a remote, secretive, unintelligible and unaccountable
fashion.  Whatever comfort it may have given them in the past that
“unwarranted interference” by the Eurocrats in Brussels could have been
vetoed by their respective sovereign national governments, this has been
dissipated by the advent of qualified majority voting. Europeans feel
themselves, rightly or wrongly, at the mercy of a process of integration that
they do not understand and certainly do not control – however much they
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may enjoy its material benefits. Again, it would be over-dramatizing the
issue to call this “a crisis of legitimacy” but the “permissive consensus” of
that accompanied European integration in the past is much less reliable –
and supranational officials know it.
These two trends are probably related causally – and together they create
a potentially serious “double bind” for the future of democracy in Europe. If
the shift of functions to and the increase in supra-national authority of the EU
have been contributing to decline in the legitimacy of “domestic democracy”
by calling into question whether national officials are still capable of responding
to the demands of their citizenry, and if the institutions of the EU have yet to
acquire a reputation for accountability to these very same citizens when
aggregated at the supra-national level, then, democracy as such in this part of
the world could be in jeopardy.
From a Functional to a Political Logic
Although EMU has been called  “the Mother of all Spill-Overs,” I am
not convinced that it will re-kindle the neo-functionalist logic and provide the
integration process with a renewal of the momentum it so obviously lost since
the difficult ratification of the Maastricht treaty and the disappointing results
of the subsequent Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. The reason for this is that
citizens are now far more aware of how widely and deeply their lives are being
affected by the EU. The politicization of these issues has become both the
cause and the consequence of partisan mobilization for and against further
extensions of the scope and level of EU authority. While, in my opinion, this is
a healthy (and long overdue) development, it does pose some serious difficulties
for the immediate future. Switching from the deliberately “apolitical” strategy
that predominated during the early years of the integration process to an overtly
“political” one based on democratization might help to regain momentum, but
it is a much riskier entreprise. Euro-democratization, especially under such
unprecedented circumstances and for such a large-scale polity, is bound to
activate unexpected linkages, to involve less predicable publics and to generate
less limited expectations.
What is needed is an entirely new strategy that adopts a much longer
timeframe and seeks deliberately to involve special interests and mass publics
at various stages of the process. Only by deliberately politicizing the issues
involved at the level of Europe as a whole and by gradually building up
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expectations concerning a more definitive set of rules with regard to citizenship,
representation and decision-making can one imagine a successful
democratization of the EU.
As we shall now see, this is where monetary unification may enter the
picture since it is likely to provide one of the issues around which different
expectations will focus. Controversies revolving around the distribution of its
costs and benefits across and within countries could provide the raw material
that will determine, not only whether the eventual Euro-polity will become a
state, but also whether its regime will be democratic.
Introducing EMU as a Possible Motive for Urgency
Monetary integration is one possible motive for having to deal with Euro-
democracy sooner rather than later. Unfortunately, for our analytical purposes,
it is not the only factor that is likely to affect the choice of decision-making
rules in the immediate future. The enlargement of EU membership to include
ten new countries is much more salient. For example, the agenda of the
Convention that drafted a “Constitutional Treaty” for the EU was much more
driven by worries about the impact of these small, over-represented and under-
developed countries on existing balances between member states in both
procedures (voting weights and seats) and policies (agricultural subsidies and
regional funds) than by anticipations of how these countries are going to react
to EMU – if and when they ever get into it. So far, the potential conflicts
generated by a common exchange policy and interest rate have been successfully
confined to the virtually invisible machinations of a highly specialized and
secretive group of decision-makers within the ECB or to the even less transparent
deliberations of the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN).
Whatever visibility the common monetary policy attains now that the
citizens of the twelve member states that joined EMU, have its bills in their
wallets and its transparency of wages and prices in their minds, I am convinced
that policy area will not provide the integration process with a renewed dynamic
of spill-over into functionally related matters. EMU institutions are much more
“segmented” in their operation than was the case for trade negotiations, the
Common Agricultural Policy, Structural and Regional Funds, Competition
Policy or any of the other policies pursued by the EU.   By design, the ECB’s
decision-making process is kept behind closed doors and thus seem to lack
transparency. Instead of producing decisions that are readily observable,
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discretely distributed and temporally specific – such as a price level for mutton,
a permit to merge with another firm, or a definition of what a cucumber is –
those of the ECB are more difficult to measure in terms of their economic
effect, diffuse in their social impact, and take a much longer time to register on
political institutions.  And, even when they registered by the affected groups,
their differential effects will be much more difficult to translate into demands
for compensation or expansion in related domains. This is often the case with
decisions by central banks, but the ECB is less keen to share how it came to
take its decisions, than, for example, the Bank of England.
So, my suspicion is that monetary unification alone will not produce
much further integration via functional spill-over. It is much more likely to
generate diffuse reactions within large clusters of public opinion than focused
responses by circumscribed groups of beneficiaries and victims. The latter
furnishes raw material to interest associations, especially those representing
class, sectoral and professional categories; the former typically has provided
the fodder for “catch-all” political parties and “broad-band” social movements.
The latter has proven useful for furthering integration, despite the sharp
controversies they sometimes provoked; the former triggers a politicization of
issues that is much less predictable and could just as well increase as decrease
resistance to further devolution of authority to EU institutions.
Which brings us to the likely political consequences of monetary
unification, since that is increasingly the terrain upon which its longer-term
contribution to European integration is going to be experienced.
Let us begin by distinguishing two broad categories of political effects:
(1) those directly involving the differential responses to the policies set by the
ECB; (2) those indirectly affecting the probability of the eventual political
integration of Europe. Both could contribute to making the eventual
democratization of the EU more or less difficult.
Tracking the Direct Effects
The direct effects are a bit easier to predict – even if they remain difficult
to sort out from other challenges and controversies that are bound to assail the
EU in the coming months and years.
First and foremost is the expectation that a common exchange and
interest rate policy will have a differential impact across the participating
member states and across the sub-national units within these member states.
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How this will be distributed will depend on initial factor endowments and the
extent to which national institutions are capable of adjusting to the loss of
autonomy in these policy areas. The usual assumption (often illustrated
historically by reference to post-Risorgimento Italy) is that the gap between
rich and poor countries/regions will widen and, therefore, demands for
redistributive policy measures will increase. To the extent that the losers are
becoming increasingly capable of forging alliances across national borders,
this raises the spectre of a polarization into pro- and anti-integration clusters of
public opinion that may not correspond to long-standing lines of domestic
cleavage. It goes without saying that those who are negatively affected will be
more vociferous in their opposition than will be those who are benefited in
their support. In the worst scenario, this could be sufficient to fragment national
party systems without providing enough fodder for their transposition into a
viable European party system. To paraphrase Marx & Engels, the old (national)
order will have been destroyed before the new (European) one is ready to
emerge! More optimistically, one could imagine that EMU will produce such a
strong net balance of winners over losers that the inevitable complaints of the
latter can be encapsulated within insignificant fringe parties of the extreme
right or left whose Europe-wide expression will be marginal (and, in all
likelihood, undermined by fierce nationalistic disputes).
As plausible as this “polarization” hypothesis seems, it is confounded
by a simple empirical observation: support for EMU (as far as we can judge it
from surveys of mass public opinion) seems to be significantly stronger in the
less-developed “Southern” member states than in the more-developed
“Northern” ones. Those who are supposed to be initially disadvantaged and
who have had to make the greatest changes in national policies and institutions
to meet the convergence criteria for EMU are the most favourable! Those who
have been practising “sound monetary economics” in their respective national
compartments for some time are more sceptical about doing the same thing at
the level of Europe as a whole. Of course, this distribution of opinion could
reverse itself as the effects of EMU begin to accumulate, but it should give us
some pause.
 A second direct impact is likely to come from the sheer visibility of
differentials in income and prices across the member states. It is one thing to
“know” that Germans are better paid than Portuguese, or that French wine can
be cheaper in Spain; it is another thing to have this expressed in the same units
of currency on an everyday basis. My hunch is that this transparency is going
to generate new forms of interaction among occupational and, especially,
consumer groups. In addition to the obvious competitive pressure this will put
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on firms, it will also mean a quantum leap in political collective action across
national borders – much of which is probably going to focus on demands for
national-level responses to disparities in taxation, monopolistic or oligopolistic
pricing, wage setting mechanisms, levels of collective bargaining and systems
of welfare provision – but some of which is going to find its way into the
corridors of Brussels. Tax harmonization is one obvious issue that will become
more salient. Trade unions may find it increasingly difficult to explain to their
members why salaries and benefits are so much less than in a neighbouring
country, and it will become easier to envisage Europe-wide collective bargaining,
at least for certain relatively privileged and more mobile professions. One is
tempted to predict a diminution in the more corporatist forms of national interest
concertation, especially at the macro-level, and a greater tendency for more
flexible and specialized, i.e. pluralistic, modes of pressure politics, if it were
not for the factor of individual country’s having to meet the strict fiscal and
budgetary constraints contained in the Stability and Growth Pact. As I have
argued elsewhere, this has proven to be a powerful incentive for the revival of
macro-corporatist practices in several member countries.
And this new transparency in prices, wages and benefits is closely
connected to the third direct effect that is likely to emerge – namely, the growing
disparity in political influence between capital and labour. Any form of
liberalization within a market economy will tend to enhance the relative value
of that factor of production that is most mobile and, hence, capable of reacting
to the enlarged opportunities with the lowest adjustment costs. Globalization,
in the sense of a lowering of barriers to the flow of capital, technology and
managerial skills across national borders, has already had a quite considerable
effect on this “balance of class forces” and will continue to do with or without
EMU. Most workers and many employees simply do not have the “cosmopolitan
skills” in language and life style that allow them to move easily across these
borders. Moreover, their mobility is further restricted by a variety of non-
transferable entitlements to national systems of unemployment insurance,
welfare payments, public housing, retirement, education, etc.
Monetary unification exaggerates this intrinsic disparity and adds to it
an even greater burden – namely, the loss of two national policy instruments
that helped this very large segment of the population adjust to exogenous shocks
or shifts in relative productivity: currency devaluation and deficit spending.
Once EMU and its “Stability and Growth Pact” are in place, all that is left at
the national level are policies that are aimed at improving competitiveness by
lowering the cost of labour. The accepted slogan for this effort is “flexibility,”
although that can include an absolute as well as relative decline in various
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social entitlements.
In defence of EMU, one should observe that this shift in the burden of
adjustment will take place in any case (and, liberal economists argue, should
have taken place long ago). The existence of the euro and the EU policy
mechanisms surrounding it do open up the possibility for negotiating collective
agreements that could “Europeanize” certain measures of social policy and
protect some particularly exposed groups from the even more brutal and
disruptive impact that unrestricted globalization could produce. They also
provide a compelling argument that national politicians can use to introduce
changes in welfare systems and collective bargaining that their economies can
no longer afford – at, at the same time, allows them to pass on the political
responsibility for these measures to those remote and faceless bureaucrats in
Brussels and, now, Frankfurt.
A final direct effect is the probability that the authorities of the ECB
will be overzealous in their efforts to promote price stability in order to enhance
their originally weak credibility and, thereby, generate more austerity and less
growth than would otherwise have been the case. Again, according to this
scenario of “over-austerity,” those members that had been more inflation-prone
in the past will find themselves much worse off in relative, if not absolute,
terms. We have seen periodic conflict over interest rates and the ECB has quite
publicly resisted following the momentary demands of even its most powerful
member, Germany, for their reduction. What we have not seen (yet) is the
translation of these demands for different policies into a clear set of national
(or sub-national) winners and losers. One can always claim that, thanks to
certain accidents of timing, Europe has been able to avoid such a zero-sum
conflict, but this may be waning thanks to the appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis
the dollar. To the surprise of most observers, the previous decline in its relative
value did not produced a marked rise in the intensity of conflict between EMU
member states – least of all, a polarized confrontation between those that
previously had “hard” and “soft” currencies – but its rise may prove more
controversial.
Groping for the Indirect Effects
The indirect political effects of EMU are even more difficult to pin
down. They are going to be “contaminated” by a host of other simultaneous
developments at both the supra- and the national levels and who knows how
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long their “incubation period” will be. Nevertheless, there is one notion that
permeates almost all thinking about the secondary consequences of EMU:
namely, the proposition that it will transform European integration from an
economic into a political process. One frequently encounters the assumption
(usually by economists) that, since the EU does not presently constitute an
“optimum currency area,” it will have to acquire the characteristics of one – or
it will fail. From this follows the notion that the participants will have to adopt
a series of “flanking policies” in order to promote the mobility of factors of
production and symmetry of reaction to external shocks that such an optimal
area is said to require. Since these policies, especially harmonization of fiscal
policies and elimination of barriers to the flexible deployment of labour, are
bound to be controversial, the EU will have to come up with a continuously
revised set of rules for making binding political decisions that will permit it to
overcome the resistance of individual member states and affected social groups.
Driven by these “functional imperatives,” all that would remain to make the
EU into a full-fledged federal state would be the drafting and ratifying of an
eventual constitution.
Above, I have suggested several reasons why EMU may not have such a
strong “spill-over effect” – least of all, one that would be powerful enough to
produce both a state and a regime at the level of Europe as a whole. I can
imagine a number of “policy equilibria” that would fall far short of both for the
indefinite future. Mostly, these solutions involve allegedly “technical”
corrections in related areas that would be presented to the general public (ex
post) as inevitable and in their own interest. If and when “asymmetric” pressures
do assert themselves upon the member states, there will most certainly be a
great deal of controversy surrounding their political resolution.  However, I
suspect that the EU institutional response will be both “flexible” and “forgiving”
leaving a range of options for individual countries to “opt-in” and “opt-out.”
Economists (and political scientists who think like economists) seem to have
forgotten that common currency areas such as the Scandinavian Monetary Union
and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union have lasted for some time
without generating any appreciable momentum for political unification. One
could even consider the pre-World War One Gold Standard as an analogous
trans-national arrangement and it was insufficient to prevent war between its
members, much less to entice them into closer political cooperation! The “trick”
has been to so segment and de-politicize the setting of exchange and interest
rates as to convince the population that politically targeted intervention was
either technically unfeasible or potentially counter-productive.
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The De-democratization of National States
Elsewhere, I have argued that European integration has already shown
signs of producing significant changes in “domestic democracy” through its
mechanisms of differential empowerment:
1. It has increased the relative power of executive over legislative institutions.
2. It has increased the relative power of national (i.e. central) territorial authority
over that of sub-national units.
3. It has increased the relative power of national judiciaries to the extent that
they have been able to use the supremacy and direct effect of EU law to
enhance their power of constitutional review.
4. It has promoted the influence of economic and monetary authorities at the
expense of ministries and para-state organizations dealing with social,
cultural and other matters.
5. It has increased the relative influence of interest associations over that of
political parties.
6. It has increased the relative influence of business and professional
associations at the expense of trade unions and social organizations.
7. It has increased the influence of more specialized “sectoral” forms of
associability at the expense of broader, “inter-sectoral” or class-based ones.
None of these changes have been conclusively proven – least of all, across
all member countries.  They remain, however, “plausible working hypotheses”
for research.
If I were to venture a guess about the probable impact of EMU, I would
say that it will strengthen all of the above trends – with some subtle variations.
For example, not only will those public institutions dealing with economic and
monetary affairs gain even more influence at the expense of other ministries,
but central bankers aggregated at the level of Europe as a whole will find it
easier to assert their monetarist priorities at the expense of those national officials
more concerned with economic expansion and employment levels.  Political
parties and social movements will find themselves more excluded from critical
aspects of decision-making (and forced to adjust their programs accordingly),
but even those specialized units of organized interest that had previously gained
such privileged access to EU comitologie will find themselves more and more
on the outside looking in on the hermetically sealed operations of the ECB.
National executives, of course, will have lost one of their major instruments of
power, i.e. the ability to print more money and loan it to themselves and their
friends, but they may be able to use this “transposition” to the level of Europe
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as a convenient excuse not to make decisions (and to pass on the responsibility
to those in Frankfurt and Brussels).
Trying to Reach a Conclusion
All of these trends pose a serious challenge to “domestic democracy”
and do nothing (yet) to promote “supra-national democracy.” I am still convinced
that the democratization of the European Union is a desirable objective and
that EMU makes it all the more urgent. I am also convinced that its member
states are better off within the embrace of the ECB, rather than outside it. Some
countries may be temporarily comforted by the illusion that they can continue
practicing “domestic democracy” as before with all its national peculiarities,
but they will soon discover that their elected representatives will be less and
less capable to monitoring and intervening effectively in the process of making
decisions for Europe as a whole. If they decide to leave EMU or not to join it in
the first place, they will discover even more quickly that these politicians cannot
deliver what their citizens want and need purely on a national scale. And,
whatever they choose to do, they will continue to suffer the consequences of
decisions made by those who do participate in its complex and obscure
processes.
So, I am convinced that EMU makes Euro-democracy more necessary,
but does it make it easier? There, I confess, my response is much more
ambiguous. Many features of this policy area make it unusually difficult for
citizens and their political parties, interest associations, and social movements
to grasp its impact and to mobilize citizens to demand that rulers pay more
attention to their interests and passions. One can virtually forget about the
prospects for ensuring ex ante consent given the necessary secrecy and the
technical nature of the issues involved. The best one can expect is some modicum
of ex post accountability – and even that has not proven easy to accomplish at
the national level. For central banks and central bankers (along with general
staffs and generals) belong to a species of institution that democratic theory
and practice has tended to ignore. These agencies act as “guardians” or
“custodians” providing certain public goods that are necessary for a democracy
to function well, but they cannot themselves be organized democratically or
even controlled democratically – or, they would fail to perform adequately.
Theorists of democracy do not like to admit that such non-democratic agents
are necessary. They are even less likely to concede that the role of some of
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these guardians/custodians has increased considerably in recent decades,
precisely because of the expanded agenda of regulation that is demanded by a
more mobilized citizenry trying to cope with more liberalized markets and
interdependent polities.
Fortunately, however, monetary unification is not the only new
policy area on the horizon of the European Union. It is only when one combines
the uneven effects its decisions are bound to have upon member states with
different endowments and social groups with different capacities to respond to
the opportunities and threats of globalization/Europeanization with other issues
such as enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
enhanced cooperation in internal security affairs and the formation of a common
external security policy that the prospect for Euro-democratization begins to
look more promising – and imperative.
1
 Schmitter (2000a).
2
 Presumably, something like this double bind is what Fritz Scharpf had in mind when he wrote: “Since
…Europe is part of the problem (of democratic legitimacy), European policies can also help alleviate it.”
Scharpf (no date).
3
 For a particularly clear and convincing exposition of the reasons why the making of monetary policy in the
EU will be different from the usual “network” mode of governance, see Dyson (1999).
4
 Schmitter and Grote (1999).
5
 Schmitter (1999).
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A COMMENT
BY
MICHAEL ARTIS
THE GOVERNANCE OF EMU
It is a relatively new fashion, but not overdue, to stress the relevance of
the policy framework when appraising a monetary union and, especially when
considering the case for new adherents to join. This is a complement to the
usual traditional optimum currency area criteria and has been around a long
time in the attenuated form of a privilege for central bank autonomy. The new
fashion is to insist on a panoply of factors – central bank independence, certainly,
but complemented by a coherent fiscal policy framework and by clarity and
transparency in the objectives set for both arms of policy. At the same time,
there is a background of democratic accountability which gives validity to these
features. Experience in EMU is also teaching us that there are other types of
policy – “supply-side” policies and wages policies – that have a bearing on the
governance issue. In fact one of the problems is to know where it is reasonable
to draw the line.
Fiscal policy is the first thing that most people think of in this context
and rightly so. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is (or was?) a major
achievement in international economic policy diplomacy, on a level with the
creation of the Bretton Woods system which served the world well for nearly
three decades. A central feature of both the Bretton Woods system and the SGP
is the combination of rules and individual country discretion mediated through
a system of peer review. In Bretton Woods, countries agreed to stick by agreed
exchange rates, which could be changed only in defined conditions; the clash
between sticking to the pre-agreed exchange rates and the evolution of economic
conditions was, importantly, mediated through the operations of OECD Working
Party 3. Meetings of WP 3 could illuminate likely tensions and by this means
help to avoid their realization in a violation of the rules. Yet there was no co-
ordination as such. In much the same way the SGP obliges countries to stick to
some rules of fiscal behaviour and the European Commission, in reviewing
member country programmes and through its advice to ECOFIN, helps to
illuminate when those rules are likely to be broken. In both systems, the outcome
is a form of Rules-based Coordination. This is in itself an optimal result, avoiding
the prohibitive cost of real time co-ordination and the more practical dangers
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of episodes of cooperation. The coordination shields the European Central Bank
from undue pressures. All of this needs to be preserved in a revival of the SGP,
the chief problem of which is in the precise form and numerical magnitude of
the deficit rule that was chosen. If, instead, a deficit rule could be chosen which
incorporates a feed back on debt and on the cycle, then the formal issue of
sanctions (the immediate reason for the problem with the SGP) could probably
be forgotten.
Supply-side and wages policies in EMU are, though there is not much
that is explicit about the assignment, left to the national governments and it is
difficult to imagine at the moment that it could be otherwise. Yet, if there are
externalities and important spillovers, it might seem that this would not be the
best assignment. As matters stand mutual awareness of national policies in
these areas becomes available through meetings of ECOFIN and routine
Commission reporting. But when eurozone (or EU-) wide objectives are
proclaimed, as those embraced in the Lisbon process, it is immediately clear
that there are no corresponding Union-level instruments available for achieving
them. As for wages policies, in the fullness of time there might appear a
Eurozone-wide labour market, which will force a corresponding policy
development, but at present there is not really such a market, rather a series of
national markets.
Accountability. The Eurozone’s governance arrangements controversially
include a degree of independence of the European Central Bank which is neither
complete nor perhaps sufficiently modest. It can be argued that this reflects the
immaturity of the Eurozone as a monetary union and as an entity. That the
independence is not complete is reflected in numerous ways – most recently
perhaps in the failure to consider a response to the potential enlargement of the
Eurozone that could have taken the form of the replacement of the Governing
Council by a Monetary Policy Committee (committee of experts): instead, a
convoluted method of rotating representation based on size (itself a convoluted
measure designed to enhance the power of the status quo countries) was invented
to keep the number of voting members within bounds. At the same time the
independence of the Bank is jealously asserted in its dealings with others and
especially in its pronunciations on the Stability and Growth Pact. It is implicit
in these compromises that the Eurozone is too immature to accept that the
ECB’s conduct of monetary policy should be assigned to experts. And, at the
same time, that the Bank can usefully assert its independence by criticizing the
conduct of nations in undermining the SGP, when its own policies arguably
have contributed to the very pressure on the SGP that has brought about its
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difficulties. In the long run some more acceptable balance must emerge.
EMU governance is an awkward, but evolving, thing. The compromises
that it displays are a reflection of the fact that the EU and the Eurozone are
evolving entities, displaying all the tensions between the desire to keep the
nations in charge and the contrary one to delegate national authority to Union-
level institutions that can be seen in day-to-day political developments.
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CHAPTER 5
GOVERNING EMU:
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK BETWEEN GROWTH AND STABILITY
BY
SIMONA TALANI *
Abstract: This contribution tries to show how, in the first years of implementing
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), politicians, scholars, public opinion,
and indeed also central bankers shifted their attention from the performance of
the inflation rates to growth and employment. The lack of transparency in the
implementation of monetary policy by the  European Central Bank (ECB) de
facto helped the monetary authority to include in its policy making also
considerations about the performance of the real economy. The chapter attempts
to identify who benefited the most from this policy and thus addresses the
question: Who wins and who loses from the implementation of monetary policy
by the ECB? The answer to this question will be sought by identifying which
economic sectors in which member states gained the most from the monetary
performance of the ECB in its first years of activity. The result suggests an
intergovernmentalist explanation of ECB monetary policy making
Keywords: European Central Bank, European Monetary Union, European
monetary policy, the political economy of EMU
1. Introduction
The European Central Bank (ECB) is the most independent of all Central
Banks.1 Indeed, its independence was guaranteed by its statute in order to ensure,
as its exclusive goal, the achievement of monetary stability, defined as a level of
inflation below two percent. Whilst independence from political constraints, both
national and supra-national, created preoccupations over the democratic deficit
of the European institutional setting, it allowed central bankers to concentrate, at
least in theory, solely on monetary variables, and to ignore the performance of
the real economic indicators, namely growth and employment rates.
*
 I am very grateful to Prof. Bernard Casey for his essential help in revising the paper.
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However, as the analysis of the decisions of the ECB demonstrates,
monetary policy has not been conducted entirely without regard to the
performance of the real economy. This led experts to identify a number of
puzzling questions in the performance of the ECB. These questions are:
What is the importance attributed by the ECB to output performance in the
euro area relative to inflation?
Do considerations about single member states matter, or is it the outlook of
the euro-zone as a whole that definMMes the Bank’s choices?
What is the attitude of the highest European monetary authority towards
exchange rates?
This contribution shows how in the first years of implementation of the
Economic and Monetary Union, politicians, academics, public opinion, but
also central bankers, shifted their attention from the performance of inflation
rates, to growth and employment. It also attempts to identify who benefited the
most from this.
In particular, the chapter will address the question:
Who wins and who loses from the implementation of monetary policy by the
ECB?
The answer to this question will be sought by identifying which economic
sectors in which member states gained the most from the monetary performance
of the ECB in its first years of activity. This analysis is carried out with reference
to Frieden’s model on the exchange rate preferences of economic sectors.2  The
model identifies economic sectors’ preferences vis-à-vis the two interrelated
dimensions of exchange rate regimes (fixed or flexible) and levels (appreciated
or depreciated). With respect to the second dimension of the model, namely
groups’ preferences vis-à-vis the level of the exchange rates, Frieden notes that
export oriented traditional manufacturers and primary producers of non-
agricultural products have a vested interest in supporting the devaluation of the
currency. On this basis, it is also plausible to presume that countries more heavily
relying on the exports of manufacturing goods outside the EU would gain most
from the devaluation of the Euro. In other words, these countries are the ones
benefiting most from the adoption of a policy of “benign neglect” of the
depreciation of the single currency by the ECB.
This suggests an intergovernmentalist explanation for some of the puzzles
about the ECB monetary policymaking. The intergovernmentalist approach to
European economic integration has its intellectual origins in realist theories of
international relations. It postulates that nation states dominate EC politics and
that outcomes directly reflect the interests and relative power of the member
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states. It seeks to analyse the process of European economic integration as the
result of strategies pursued by rational governments acting on the basis of their
preferences and power, assuming that national preferences in foreign economic
policies are dictated by specific economic interests. The latest versions of the
approach introduce explicit theories of domestic politics, like the Frieden’s
model, to account for the set of economic interests states choose to pursue in
international arena. As applied to the working of the ECB, intergovernmentalists
would predict that the interests of the most powerful member states prevail
over the ones of smaller states in the monetary decision making process. More
explicitly, in the Euro-area, the interests of Germany France and Italy should
define the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB. In turn, these three countries
should also be the ones getting the most out of a shift of emphasis in the ECB
monetary policy making from the performance of monetary aggregates, to
growth and employment, through the adoption of a policy of laissez faire vis-à-
vis the devaluation of the Euro.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section reviews the
outlook of the European economy at the beginning of EMU. It highlights the
shift of emphasis from price stability to employment and growth. The second
section addresses the analysis of European monetary policy in the light of the
developments of the real economy. It points out the contradictions characterising
the implementation of monetary policy by the ECB. The final section elaborates
on the national and economic sectors’ preferences in terms of monetary policy.
It identifies the actual winners and losers from the ECB monetary policy and
concludes that an intergovernmentalist explanation helps accounting for the
puzzles arising from its implementation.
2. Economic background at the beginning of EMU
On the 1st of January 1999, the day the euro was born, the international
economic environment was characterised by the persistence of unusually high
levels of growth in the US and by the growing concerns for the Asian financial
crisis. The euro-area was experiencing the highest aggregate unemployment
rate since the 1930s together with a marked slowing of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).
The situation was particularly worrying in Italy, where unemployment
was around 12% and GDP growth had fallen to only 0.8% in 1999; in Germany,
where unemployment was over 9% and a GDP growth fell from 2% in 1998 to
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Figure 1: Euro-area GDP % changes 1998-1999
Figure 2: GDP growth and unemployment in the euro-area 1998-1999
Source: Eurostat
Note: Greece is not included in the table because in the year 1999 it was not yet part of the Euro-area.
Source: ECB
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Belgium 9.5 9 2.9 1.7 1.7
Finland 11.4 10 5.6 3.4 3.3
France 11.7 11 3.4 2.4 2.1
Germany 9.4 9.1 2 0.6 0.6
Ireland 7.8 6.7 8.9
Italy 11.9 11.4 1.3 0.8 0.8
Netherlands 4 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1
Spain 18.8 15.6 4 3.2 3.6
Portugal 5.1 4.8 3.5
Simona Talani - Governing Emu: The European Central Bank Between Growth And Stability
121
THE ECB BETWEEN GROWTH AND STABILITY
0.6% in 1999; and in France, where unemployment was around 11% and the
GDP growth slowed from 3.4 in 1998 to 2.1 in the second quarter of 1999.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that academics and political
commentators were focusing on the pro-cyclical effects of the monetary
constraints imposed by both the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth
Pact while the European institutions sought to devise an appropriate employment
strategy (or, at least in rhetoric) (Talani, 2004). This was reinforced by the fact
that the level of inflation, i.e., the main statutory concern of the ECB, was very
low. It recorded an unprecedented 0.8% in 1999 and made some worry about
the possibility of negative inflation.
Figure 3: HICP in euro-area (% changes) 1998-1999
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How did the ECB react to the growing concern over the performance of
real economy variables?
3. The performance of  the ECB from its establishment: flexibility vs
transparency
Given the unprecedented nature of its tasks as the body responsible for
the implementation of a European common monetary policy and for the
management of a European common currency, there were many worries
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concerning the performance of the ECB at the eve of its establishment. These
ranged from the lack of credibility of the ECB’s monetary stance, to the lack of
flexibility of its statute, and from the need to increase its democratic
accountability, to the need of ensuring its independence from the governments
of the Member States.
According to the Favero et al. (2000a), the ECB displayed, from its
inception, more flexibility than expected in tackling asymmetries within the
euro-zone. This result was possible thanks to the adoption of a so-called “two
pillar” monetary strategy, but it was achieved at the expense of transparency.
Given the goal of price stability, defined as HIPC inflation between zero and
two percent, the first pillar of monetary policy was represented by the setting
of a money growth reference target, defined as an increase of the monetary
aggregate M3 below 4.5%. The first pillar was, in the declarations of the
members of the ECB, the basis of monetary policy decisions and it implied the
belief that, by following the performance of monetary aggregates and reacting
accordingly with appropriate changes in the level of the interest rates, it was
possible to keep inflation under control. In short, the basic assumption was that
the interest rate tool would be used only to affect monetary variables and would
not affect the real economy – the standard monetarist assumption. The second
pillar of the strategy was the monitoring of a number of unspecified indicators
including the exchange rate and asset prices. That meant that the ECB would
have to take into consideration the inflationary consequences of an undervalued
currency. In a period when central banks were abandoning monetary targeting,
replacing it with more transparent and accountable (expected) inflation targeting,
this strategy has been judged rather obscure3.
One might argue that in the trade-off between transparency and flexibility,
the balance will not necessarily be in favour of the former. In case the ECB
would publish regularly its (expected) inflation targets, this might weaken its
credibility vis-à-vis financial markets, if the target could not be reached. It
would then leave less scope of manoeuvre to harmonise monetary policy with
the performance of the Euro-area in real terms. However, the issue is far from
being uncontroversial. Critics underline that the reduction of transparency
resulting from the multiplication of targets and indicators leads to surprises
that unsettle financial markets, and this uncertainty might result in higher
borrowing costs (CEPR, 2000).
Leaving the debate over the trade-off between transparency and flexibility
to the experts4, and turning to the concrete monetary policy performance of the
ECB during its first years of activity, the picture is not much clearer.
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The first issue to address is the importance attributed by the ECB to
output growth in the Euro-area (and in some member countries in particular)
relative to inflation.  After the establishment of EMU, in 1999, there has been
a marked slow-down in all Organisation of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries for the first time since the 1970s. Whereas the
Japanese economy was already in a recession, in 2001 the US economy
experienced the first substantial slowdown in a decade. Also the euro-zone,
with a lag of some months with respect to the US, slowed significantly in the
year 2001.
Figure 4: Real GDP % changes 1999-2001
Source: OECD
Figure 5: Output gaps in Italy, Germany, France-1999-2002*
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Here is not the place to analyse the causes of such a global decline5,
although it is important to notice that this had a major impact especially on the
most important European economies, namely Italy, France and Germany (see
Fig. 5).
Theoretically, and as underlined in many speeches and documents6, the
ECB should pay little attention to short-run output developments. This is meant
to avoid the threat of losing credibility with the markets with regard to in its
anti-inflationary stance. Despite this, it is easy to note that the 30 basis point
cut of interest rates to 3% on 1 January 1999 was associated with deflationary
risks in the wake of the Asian crisis. Furthermore, the April 1999 cut to 2.50%
coincided with declining output in important euro-land members (notably
Germany). Lastly, the cut of the 17 September 2001 in the minimum bid rate
on the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operation by 50 points to 3.75 matches a
similar decision taken by the US Federal Reserve in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of the 11 September and their potentially recessive consequences. More
sophisticated analyses show that the ECB monetary policy, and, in particular,
the timing and frequency of interest rate changes, reflect the aim of stabilising
output and not only of controlling prices, although leading Central Bank
personalities deny this (CEPR, 2000).
If the output level was never officially recognised as a point of reference
in the making of monetary policy, but was, nevertheless, taken into consideration,
the opposite was the case with respect to monetary targets. Indeed, the “two
pillar” strategy rests on the prominence of the target for M3 growth as the main
official indicator for ECB monetary policy decisions. However, on many of the
occasions when the target has been overshot, the ECB has not reacted
accordingly. For example, despite the fact that the target had been set at 4.5%
for 1999, no measures were taken by the ECB when it became clear that the
target would be missed by the end of the year. On the contrary, the ECB cut the
interest rates and engaged in sophisticated explanations for why the departure
from the reference M3 growth rate did not represent any rupture with its “two
pillar” strategy.
When, by the end of 1999, projections for inflation suggested it would
be rising, the ECB intervened promptly and increased the interest rate by 50
base points. Of course, given the parallel increase in the M3 growth, this seemed
to be consistent with the monetary strategy declared by the ECB. Equally, the
final divorce between the ECB changes in the interest rates and the M3 growth
rate appears justified by the necessity to keep the HICP within the 2% limit.
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Figure 6: Adjusted M3 percentage changes per month in relation to the 4.5% target -
1999
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However, the suspicion that the M3 target was never really given the
importance implicit in the adoption of the “two pillar strategy”, and that it was
often subordinated to pragmatic considerations about the level of output, was
never abandoned by the experts. Indeed, reacting to the many criticisms
regarding the first pillar, the ECB made some modifications of the M3 series,
first by removing non-resident holdings of money market funds from the
definition of euro zone M3 and then by removing non-resident holdings of
liquid money, market paper and securities.
Figure 7: M3, HICP and ECB main refinancing rate % changes 1999-2002
Source: ECB
M3,HICP, and ECBMRR 1999-2003
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Jan
-99
Ma
r-9
9
Ma
y-9
9
Jul
-99
Se
p-9
9
No
v-9
9
Jan
-00
Ma
r-0
0
Ma
y-0
0
Jul
-00
Se
p-0
0
No
v-0
0
Jan
-01
Ma
r-0
1
Ma
y-0
1
Jul
-01
Se
p-0
1
No
v-0
1
Jan
-02
Ma
r-0
2
Ma
y-0
2
Jul
-02
Se
p-0
2
No
v-0
2
Jan
-03
Ma
r-0
3
Months
%
 c
ha
ng
es M3%changes
HICP
ECBMRR
126
This adjustment is no more than a cosmetic change and does not improve
the reliability of the monetary pillar. If anything, the figure below shows that
M3 percentage changes and interest rate decisions by the ECB have gone in
opposite directions (See Fig. 7). All this undermines the transparency and
credibility of the ECB monetary policy-making.
Even more obscure is the role attributed by the ECB to the exchange
rates within the second pillar of the two-pillar monetary strategy (Favero et al.,
2000a). Indeed, the second pillar of the strategy makes explicit reference to a
series of indicators influencing the ECB monetary decisions among which the
euro exchange rates have a critical position. In particular, a steady and marked
depreciation of the currency should increase inflationary pressures and prompt
the reaction of the ECB, in the form either of an increase in interest rates or of
direct interventions in the currency markets.
Looking at the performance of the newly born currency in the first months
of its existence, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the Bank had adopted
an attitude of “benign neglect” vis-à-vis the exchange rate of the euro.
Figure 8: USD/Euro exchange rates 1999-2003
Source: ECB
The euro lost around fifteen percent of its value relative to the dollar
between August 1999 and August 2000 – parity itself being lost as early as
January 2000. Also the effective nominal and real exchange rate of the euro
experienced a marked decrease between August 1999 and August 2000 – by
11.3% and 10.1%  respectively).
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Despite this parlous performance, the ECB did not intervene in the
exchange rate markets. (See Fig. 9). Obviously there is no formal obligation to
do so, given the fact that the international exchange rate regime is a floating
one. However, this demonstrates clearly an attitude of “benign neglect”.
Figure 9: ECB official reserves compared to the performance of the real effective
exchange rate of the euro
Source ECB
NB: The declining trend of the ECB official reserves is the consequence of the devaluation of the dollar,
being the majority of reserves constituted by dollars.
Of course, the ECB always argued that the performance of a currency
had to be assessed “in the long run”. And indeed in the long run the Euro/
Dollar exchange rate has witnessed a reversal of its pervious performance with
a marked appreciation of the euro - although it would be better to talk about a
strong fall of the dollar rather than a strong rise of the euro. Nevertheless, the
substantial lack of concerns on the fall of the euro in the first year provoked
further doubts about the real scope of the two-pillar strategy8. In the last section,
attention is focused on the distributional effects of such a monetary policy to
investigate on the political economy dimension of the ECB interventions.
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4. National interests and economic sectors’ exchange rate preferences: Who
wins and who loses from the devaluation of the Euro?
In trying to frame the analysis of the ECB monetary and exchange rate
stances within a typical intergovernmentalist framework, it is worth recalling
some of the institutional characteristics of the decision-making bodies of the
ECB.
Although, as already mentioned, the ECB is independent of governments
of the euro-area member countries, and the “no-bail out clause” eliminates any
possibility for the ECB to intervene to support the fiscal position of any
individual member state, some of its institutional characteristics retain
intergovernmentalist elements. In particular, the composition of the Governing
Council, which includes the governors of the national central banks and the
members of the Executive Board, strongly reflect national differences (Artis,
2003).
This does not mean that the ECB monetary policy is geared towards the
interest of the biggest countries because decisions are made on a formal
intergovernmentalist basis. It does, however, allow for the legitimate suspicion
that national central bankers express national expectations and demands in the
formal meetings of the Governing Council. Moreover, the fact that the minutes
of the discussions taking place in the meetings of the Governing Council and
of the Executive Board are not published adds to the difficulty in identifying
the extent to which these national interests count.9
With respect to national preferences formation, and, therefore, to the
identification of the set of national interests that are more likely to reverberate
on the ECB policy-making, it is worth recalling Frieden’s model on the
preferences of economic sectors vis-à-vis the exchange rate level and regime.
It is true that preferences cannot be expressed any more with respect to national
currencies, but it is not implausible to hypothesise that national economic sectors
have a vested interest in the performance and international status of the Euro.
In particular, following Frieden, it is possible to claim that the export
oriented manufacturing sectors would gain the most from a devalued currency.
Therefore, the countries heavily relying on the performance of the extra EU
export oriented manufacturing sector, such as Italy, Germany and France, are
likely to have a vested interest in adopting a policy of “benign neglect” with
respect to the depreciation of the Euro10.
To begin with, it is worth clarifying to what extent Germany, Italy and
France are relying on a strong export oriented manufacturing sector. To show
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this, the following indicators are used: ratio of exports of manufactured goods
over total exports of goods; extra EU trade balance of goods over GDP.
Regarding the first indicator, the figure below show that 99% of German
exports of goods was composed by manufacturing in 1999. This percentage
remained constant in 2000 and 2001 (See OECD, www.oecd.com).
Figure 10: Composition of exports of goods in Germany-1999
Source: OECD
In the case of France, manufacturing weight on total exports of goods
was 95% in 1999 (see Figure 11), and 96% in 2000 and 2001.
Figure 11: Composition of exports of goods in France-1999
Source:OECD
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Finally, in Italy manufacturing constituted 87% of total exports of goods
in 1999 (Fig.12), 88% in 2000 and 87% in 2001.
Figure 12: Composition of exports of goods in Italy-1999
Source: OECD
Moving to the analysis of the second indicator, the table below shows
how the balance of trade in goods with the US contributes to the national GDP
of some Euro-area countries.
It is worth noting that the balance of trade in goods with the US constituted
up to 1.2% to the national GDP in Italy, and up to 1.5% of the German GDP in
the period between 1998 and 2001. Relating these figures to the ones presented
above about the composition of exports, it is possible to conclude that the export
of manufacturing goods to the US does indeed contribute substantially to the
national GDP of Italy and Germany and, to a more limited extent, France.
The table above also allows drawing conclusions about the impact of the
devaluation of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar in the same period. Looking at how
the balance of trade in goods with the US changed between 1995 and 2001 in
some members of the euro-area, the countries recording the highest increase in
absolute terms of their trade balances with the US were Italy, France and
Germany. (The figures about Ireland are very high but have to be related to the
overall incredible improvement of the country’s economic performance in the
same period.)
Analysing the Italian case in more detail, it is possible to note that Italy’s
balance of trade in manufactured goods with the US shows a positive trend
until 2002 when the euro started appreciating again.
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Table 1: International trade in goods balance with the US (Millions ECU/EUR and %
of GDP)
M i l l i ons of s 1995 1998 2001
AUSTRIA
GDPat current prices
Millions of  h 163427.6 179644.8 201138.8
Balace of trade with
US Millions of h -700 200 800
Balance of trade with
US as a % of GDP -0.4 0.1 0.39
FINLAND
GDPat current prices
Millions of h 85499 103100 120944
Balace of trade with
US Millions of h 600 100 3400
Balance of trade with
US as a % of GDP 0.7 0.09 2.8
FRANCE
GDPat current prices
Millions of h 1095157 1197107 1358915
Balace of trade with
US Millions of h -3600 5100 7500
Balance of trade with
US as a % of GDP -0.3 0.4 0.55
GERMANY
GDPat current prices
Millions of h 1690400 1810250 1925060
Balace of trade with
US Millions of h 10100 18300 28300
Balance of trade with
US as a % of GDP 0.6 1 1.5
GREECE
GDPat current prices
Millions of h 73858 96750 118940
Balace of trade with
US Millions of h -500 -1100 -1200
Balance of trade with
US as a % of GDP -0.7 -1.1 -1
IRELAND
GDPat current prices
Millions h 47104 70049 102911
Balace of trade with
US Millions of h 700 400 6700
Balance of trade with
US as a % of GDP 1.5 0.6 6.5
ITALY
GDPat current prices
Millions of h 868637.7 997660.1 1140830.5
Balace of trade with
US Millions of h 6300 2900 13800
Balance of trade with
US as a % of GDP 0.7 0.3 1.2
NETHERLANDS
GDPat current prices
Millions of h 281464 325762 393440
Balace of trade with
US Millions of h -5000 -8900 -11200
Balance of trade with
US as a % of GDP -1.776426115 -2.732055918 -2.846685645
PORTUGAL
GDPat current prices
Millions of h 73979.9 91721.4 111687.4
Balace of trade with
US Millions of h 0 100 0
Balance of trade with
US as a % of GDP 0 0.1 0
SPAIN
GDPat current prices
Millions of h 422351 500018 617517
Balace of trade with
US Millions of h -2500 -1400 -500
Balance of trade with
US as a % of GDP -0.6 -0.3 -0.08
Source: Elaboration of the author on OECD and Eurostat data
132
-8.0  
-6.0  
-4.0  
-2.0  
0.0  
2.0  
4.0  
6.0  
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
Ita
ly
Un
ite
d
K
in
gd
om
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
countries
%
 c
ha
ng
es
1999  
2000  
2001  
2002  
Project ions 2003
Project ions 2004
Equally, German export performance was at its apex in the year 2001,
when the euro was very weak vis-à-vis the dollar, whereas its outlook for the
years 2003 and 2004 was fairly bleak. The situation is very similar in the case
of Italy and France, while exactly the opposite happens for the export
performance of the UK and the US.
Figure 13: Italian manufactured goods trade with US-1999-2003, Kg
Source: Istat
Figure 14: Export performance in selected OECD countries
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Note: Export performance is the ratio between export volumes and export markets for total goods. The
export volume concept employed is the sum of the exports of non-manufactured goods and manufactures.
The calculation of export markets is based on a weighted average of import volumes in each exporting
country’s markets, with weights based on trade flows in 1995.   The export markets for total goods facing
each country is calculated as the weighted sum of the individual export markets for non-manufactured goods
and manufactures, where the weights correspond to the commodity export structure of the exporting country
in 1995.
Source: OECD
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Summing up, it is difficult to deny that the weakness of the euro
favourably influenced the performance of the export oriented manufacturing
sector, particularly in the large euro-area countries.
What remains to be ascertained is whether the groups representing the
interests of this sector did actively intervene in the debate over the making of
European monetary and exchange rate policy.
Although the subject would require a much more thorough analysis then
what is possible to effect in this context, it may be claimed that, right from the
onset, the Italian Association of Industry (Confindustria) was opposed to the
adoption of a strict monetary stance by the ECB, while tended to favour a
policy of “benign neglect” towards the depreciation of the euro13.
For example, when in November 1999, the ECB decided to increase the
interest rates from 2.5% to 3% to counter mounting inflationary pressures, the
then President of Confindustria, Giorgio Fossa, did not conceal his worries for
the impact of such a move on Italian industry. He claimed that the increase of
the interest rate would be “a heavy weight more on our shoulders”14. On the
other hand, the weak performance of the euro was widely recognised by
Confindustria analysts as the main drive of the strong increase in Italian industrial
production in the last two months of 199915.
Moreover, in February 2000, the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT)
published the figures relating to industrial production from the beginning of
2000. These showed a record increase in Italian industrial production, whose
value grew by 21.5% with respect to February 2000. In the words of Guidalberto
Guidi, head of the study division of Confindustria, there was no doubt that
such an increase “was driven by the competitive euro devaluation”16.
In Germany, Gerhard Schröder, the Chancellor, addressing an audience
of eastern German businessmen in September 2000, called the weakness of the
euro “a cause of satisfaction, not concern”. The press was adamant that the
statement was mainly meant to reassure the industrial community, especially
in East Germany, which was very keen on the devaluation of the euro.
5. Conclusions
It is not an easy task to assess the effectiveness of the ECB monetary
policy making or even to identify clearly its strategy. Indeed, many questions
remain open.
This contribution tried to answer some of these questions suggesting an
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intergovernmental interpretation of the first years of the ECB monetary policy.
The institutional independence of the ECB, and the lack of publicity of its
meetings’ minutes, makes it difficult to draw any conclusions on the
intergovernmental nature of its formal decision making process. However, the
consequences of the monetary policy actions, or non-actions, of the ECB on
some leading member states and, within them, on their most relevant economic
sectors, suggest the existence of some relation between the interests of the
biggest nation states and the preferences of their leading economic sectors and
the policy choices of central bankers.
In particular, the emphasis on the performance of the monetary aggregates
(M3) as the first pillar of the ECB monetary strategy, seems to conceal the
desire by the Central Bank to trade-off some of the transparency that the adoption
of an alternative monetary strategy would imply (such as targeting the inflation
rate), in exchange for more flexibility. In turn, this flexibility was used to pursue
output objectives that would not, prima facie, have been acceptable within the
strict anti-inflationary mandate of the ECB.18
Similarly, the attitude of the ECB towards the performance of the
exchange rate, particularly in the first two years of its activity, an attitude that
the economists fail to fully understand (Artis, 2003), acquires a completely
different meaning when the performance of manufacturing exports is analysed.
Why the smaller states should subscribe to the adoption of monetary policy
decisions favouring the bigger member states remains an open question. The
answer might be obtained by deepening the intergovernmentalist analysis to
look at the kind of side-payments the less powerful states are able to obtain in
return for consent to the policy approach that is adopted. Although it is not
possible to access the relevant documents to verify the existence of the
bargaining that, no doubt, does take place in the governing council of the ECB,
it might be possible to underline how the interests of the smaller members of
the euro-area do often coincide with those of the bigger ones.
Lastly, as the analysis of the latest developments of the euro/US dollar
exchange rate demonstrates, when the international situation changes, in the
absence of an international monetary agreement, euro-area member states, and
the ECB for that matter, have no influence over international monetary and
exchange rate dynamics. Perhaps it is the economic interests of an even bigger
state, the US, that are what, eventually, really matter.
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CHAPTER 6
THE DOG THAT WOULD NEVER BITE?
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE ORIGINS OF THE STABILITY AND
GROWTH PACT
BY
MARTIN HEIPERTZ AND AMY VERDUN *
Abstract: This article analyses the creation of the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP). It examines the economic and political factors behind it, including the
role of economic ideas, experts, politicians, institutional arrangements in the
Maastricht Treaty, domestic politics, and the exceptional position of Germany
in the realm of monetary integration. It concludes that a set of commonly held
beliefs together with a corresponding power-political constellation explain the
creation of the SGP. As these parameters change, they inform our understanding
of the current crisis.
Keywords: budgetary discipline, Economic and Monetary Union, Germany,
rules, Stability and Growth Pact, monetary integration
1. Introduction
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) consists of two Council regulations
and a resolution of the European Council1. It specifies the deficit limit of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC 104). In the second half
of 2002, its excessive deficit procedure (EDP) was initiated in the cases of
Portugal, Germany, and France. Formally, when the Council decides that an
excessive deficit exists, the country concerned is obliged to reduce its deficit
ß
 Earlier versions of this article were also presented at a conference at the NYU in London, at a seminar of
the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG) in Cologne, at the Oberseminar of the Jean
Monnet Chair, of Wolfgang Wessels, University of Cologne, at the 19th IPSA World Congress, Durban South
Africa and at the University of Leiden. The authors wish to thank participants in the 1st EUI Alumni conference,
especially the discussant of this chapter, Martin Rhodes, and in all the above-mentioned conferences and
seminars for their useful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to Patrick Crowley, Bernhard
Ebbinghaus, David Howarth, Kathleen R. McNamara, Britta Rehder, Armin Schäfer, Fritz W. Scharpf. The
authors thank the MPIfG in Cologne and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Canada
(Grant 410-2002-0522 held by Amy Verdun) for financial support. This article is based in part on interviews
with 35 key informants, all of whom were close to the actual creation and/or the current politics of the SGP.
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below three per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or ultimately face
financial sanctions. Metaphorically speaking, the ‘dozing watchdog’ has thus
turned out rather snappish. However, on 25 November 2003 the Council of the
European Union for Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin) suspended the
EDP for France and Germany, which has plunged the Eurozone into an
institutional crisis.
The present situation is not detached from the factors that led to the
creation of the SGP but has to be seen in their context. From this broad
perspective, the article poses the following questions: (1) Why and how was
the SGP created? (2) What underlying conditions supported its creation? (3)
Have they changed since? (4) How do they inform our understanding of the
current situation? This article analyses the origins, process and outcome of the
SGP negotiations and thereby aims to provide some background and clarification
to the ongoing debate. We argue that the SGP was possible due to a convergence
in basic ideas about the relationship between monetary and fiscal policies held
by experts in Ministries of Finance, central banks, the Commission as well as
in academia and international organisations. Yet there was no precise idea of a
specific arrangement beyond the Maastricht Treaty. Ideational convergence
provided the basis for a political compromise. Expert consensus on principles
was a necessary though not sufficient condition for the intergovernmental
agreement. The complete analysis has to include power-political factors which
relate to the prominent position of Germany in the creation of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU).
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section
examines why the SGP was considered necessary. The third section describes
the actual story of its creation. The fourth section examines the ideational context
from which the SGP originated and provides an analysis of the achievement of
the political compromise. The final section concludes and assesses the current
situation.
2. Why might an SGP be necessary? – Lessons from economics and politics
2.1. The Economics of the SGP
The Maastricht Treaty has provided the monetary constitution for EMU.
However, its specifications for the future fiscal regime are incomplete and
ambivalent2. It only contains rather loose stipulations on the EDP and budgetary
coordination. From the viewpoint of economics, several arguments speak in
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favour of complementing the fiscal arrangements of the Treaty (for a detailed
discussion see Heipertz, 2003). The most prominent reasons behind more
stringent rules are (1) a need for consolidation, (2) concerns about externalities,
(3) the credibility of ECB independence and (4) the need for a more coherent
framework of economic policy coordination.
A general need for consolidation results from the expansionary fiscal
stance in most of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries since the ‘golden age’ of Keynesianism and welfare-state
expansion. Soaring interest rates, which were the result of high inflation rates
of the time, have reduced investment and contributed to weak growth and
underemployment. Government revenues flow into debt servicing at the same
time as ageing populations require a fundamental reallocation of public
spending.
Second, there was a fear of externality problems related specifically to
EMU3. The most prominent concern regarded the negative effects of fiscal spill-
overs on increasingly interdependent participating economies. A bond-financed
increase in government spending would cause the money supply in the Eurozone
to rise, thereby fuelling inflationary pressures. In response the ECB would be
forced to increase interest rates, depressing investment and consumption.
Furthermore, the higher interest rate would cause the common currency to
appreciate and the trade balance to deteriorate.4  Another externality effect results
from abandoning national exchange rates. The effect of depreciation due to
fiscal profligacy now affects the whole currency zone, thereby reducing the
impact on the individual ‘sinner’ while increasing it for everybody else. This
reduced disciplinary effect on national authorities aggravates an existing deficit
bias of public finance (Beetsma 1999). Member States were feared to free-ride
on each other by overspending on their budgets.5 Thus strict rules on budgetary
deficits were deemed necessary. It is noteworthy that the need for limits on
budgets had already been mentioned in the original EMU blueprint laid out in
the ‘Delors Report’ (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union
1989).
A third concern is that excessive deficits could undermine central bank
independence. Actors at the time were worried that ECB independence and
specifically the ‘no bail-out’ clause6 would be endangered by unsustainable
fiscal paths of certain Member States. Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) model of
debt monetisation supports this view. Their study shows that an unsustainable
fiscal path eventually forces the central bank to buy government bonds. The
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) argues in a similar direction (Leeper
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1991; Woodford 1994). Grossly simplified, the FTPL states that inflation control
by the central bank through the interest rate is jeopardised by an excessive
fiscal stance that disturbs household expectations and unsettles private sector
budget constraints. Public demand substitutes private demand and artificially
expands aggregate demand, eventually causing the price level to rise. Hence,
monetary independence and the effectiveness and credibility of monetary policy
need to be supported through the fiscal regime. The SGP appeared desirable as
a way of ‘safeguarding the credibility of ECB independence’ (Artis and Winkler
1999).
Fourth, in a monetary union the role of economic policy coordination
becomes pertinent (Begg 2002), aiming at an appropriate policy-mix between
monetary and fiscal policy. The fact that the ‘one-size-fits-all’ monetary policy
of the ECB destabilises countries with an inflation rate significantly off the
Eurozone average has increased the need for strategic and coordinated fiscal
policy, potentially even going beyond the automatic stabilisers. The coordination
issue grows in importance with the likelihood of asymmetric shocks and
increasing divergence between the participating economies. Weak economic
growth in the Eurozone is due to structural rigidities but gets amplified by
cyclical swings. Governments would be ill-advised to implement pro-cyclical
policies of cutting (investment) expenditures and increasing (tax) revenues
during a downturn. Some economists have misinterpreted the SGP in this way
and strongly criticised it for hindering countercyclical moves (Eichengreen
1996, Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998). This view is exaggerated but the SGP
is still not a suitable framework for a coordinated and strategic response to the
cyclical component of Europe’s weakness. Coordination à la SGP complements
the European Union (EU) economic coordination framework centred on the
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG)7 but remains rudimentary and
improvised, only asking Member States to ‘keep their house in order’ (Issing
2002). A more effective solution for economic policy in Europe could be a
positive outcome of the current crisis.
2.2. The Politics of the SGP
The Maastricht Treaty is an incomplete contract as far as rules on EMU
are concerned. Theoretically there were two options. The first would be the
status quo, relying essentially on voluntary arrangements. The Member States
would all agree to continue to meet the convergence criteria also after EMU
had started. The second option was to impose explicit rules that would elaborate
on and even go beyond the Treaty stipulations. This issue was left open precisely
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because it was highly contentious and exposed fundamentally different views
on economic policy.8 Voluntary arrangements had been the implicit road that
was chosen in the Maastricht Treaty. However, particularly the Germans and
the Dutch favoured a more explicit, rule-based system that would restrict
budgetary deficits once EMU was fully operational. This concern seemed
especially relevant with respect to a number of (Mediterranean) countries that
were making strenuous efforts to be part of the first wave – against all odds at
the outset.9 The larger the future membership of EMU was appearing to become
and the less likely a postponement, the more urgent grew the need for Germany
to reinforce at least the deficit criterion. This situation has been described as an
‘endgame’ for the transition towards stage III (Crowley 2002).
The political background of the SGP can be traced back to German
domestic politics. It was used to comfort public opinion and to appease the
Bundesbank. The German public needed reassurance on EMU as it had become
extremely anxious about giving up the well-proven Deutschmark in favour of a
new single currency that would include traditionally weak economies which
lacked a stability culture. Politically, there was a risk that the opposition and
even Waigel’s own party in Bavaria under Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber
would capitalise on this sentiment and run on an anti-EMU platform.
More subtle forces were also at work. Of importance was the gradual
nature of economic and monetary integration, especially the experience with
the European Monetary System (EMS). Cooperation in the context of the EMS
had implied that most monetary authorities had contributed to factual
convergence in monetary policy with the de facto fixing of exchange rates as
its result. What had been happening over the 1980s was a ‘shadowing’ of
Bundesbank policies. The resulting convergence meant that monetary authorities
had learnt lessons about economic and monetary governance (Verdun 2000a).
Experts feared that national governments would become more ‘relaxed’ and
return to old practices once EMU would be fully operational. They were keen
to perpetuate the stability-orientation of economic policy in Europe.
3. Negotiating the pact
How did the SGP come about? The idea of some sort of ‘stability treaty’
was in the air in early 1995. The Maastricht Treaty had already stipulated the
need for further legislation (see above). Since the beginning of stage two of
EMU in 1994, the Monetary Committee (MC) had deliberations on this matter.
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Officials in the German Ministry of Finance were also discussing this topic
amongst themselves. The Sachverständigenrat, an advisory board to the federal
government, had demanded already in its 1992 annual report to make the
sanctions more precise and apply them strictly (Sachverständigenrat 1992: 433).
It became the subject of public debate after Wolfgang Grüger, President of the
German association of cooperative banks, proposed an intergovernmental
stability treaty among the future EMU states (Handelsblatt 9 May 1995). This
request was engineered by Bundesbank President Hans Tietmeyer who did not
want to be publicly associated with a new initiative on hardening the EMU
regime and hence suggested that Grüger, perceived as a neutral player from the
private sector, should make the move.10 The debate picked up during autumn
1995. The Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) in Kiel published a discussion paper
on how to make the Maastricht stipulations workable (Lehment and Scheide
1995). The IfW proposal suggested automatic, interest-free deposits with the
ECB for countries exceeding three per cent that should be paid back as soon as
the excessive deficit was removed. The paper was prominently discussed in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ, 12 October 1995) and was seconded by
positive comments of the Bundesbank (FAZ, 15 October 1995). The arguments
re-appeared as demands for a ‘budgetary pact’ in the 1995 report of the
Sachverständigenrat (Sachverständigenrat 1995: 446).
Waigel and Kohl were now under severe political pressure. As was briefly
eluded to above, public opinion was turning very negative on EMU. The SPD
opposition party was making populist remarks on the dangers to stability
stemming from the EMU project and demanding stricter rules, thereby literally
mirroring Bundesbank statements (e.g. Scharping 1995). In September 1995,
Waigel had been informally talking to his colleagues about his desire to formalise
the rules on budgetary policy in EMU (Milesi 1998: 95-6, Stark 2001: 89 and
interviews with German Ministry of Finance officials, June 2003). The IfW
paper was used as a direct input for drafting a proposal in the ministry under
time pressure. On the same day that it was presented to the public (FAZ, 12
October 1995), the authors received a call from the ministry, asking for the
paper to be faxed immediately.11 Four weeks later (7 and 10 November 1995),
Waigel announced his version of a ‘Stability Pact’ (Bundesministerium der
Finanzen 1995) to the public during the second reading of the 1996 budget
(Waigel 1995a, 1995b). Parallel to that, Waigel commissioned an official at
very short notice to write up an English draft for his European colleagues.
These responded with reserved support.
The idea that the Maastricht Treaty could be subject to renegotiations
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was out of the question. Yet, an intergovernmental agreement in the form of a
new treaty à la Schengen, as originally envisaged by Waigel and his state
secretary, Jürgen Stark, was unacceptable to the other countries. The
Commission also realised the dangers of an intergovernmental solution because
it would imply the marginalisation of Community institutions and procedures.
The Council therefore prompted the Commission to propose a solution within
the Community framework. Its proposal, released in October 1996 (COM (1996)
496), was closer to the Maastricht Treaty than to the Waigel paper. It developed
the ‘surveillance arm’ of the SGP as a rudimentary device for economic policy
coordination. However, it did not include automatic fines but reduced the
sanctions to a discretionary measure of the Ecofin Council. The fact that Ecofin
ministers have to judge each other poses an obvious incentive problem.
The Stability Pact dossier was discussed in the Monetary Committee
(MC), the Ecofin Council, the European Council and at Franco-German
meetings. The bulk of work was completed in the MC. Only very few open
issues had to be referred to Ecofin. The major controversy was that Germany’s
partners agreed on the principle of mutual surveillance and reinforced dissuasion
of excessive deficits, but did not accept automatic sanctions. The focal point of
dissent became the clause that stipulates the exemptions from sanctions, since
here lays the lever for political discretion. Waigel was completely isolated in
requiring nothing less than an ‘exceptional’ GDP contraction of two per cent or
worse as a qualification for an exemption. The compromise reached in Dublin
during the morning hours of Friday, 13 December 1996 in parallel sessions of
Ecofin and the European Council runs that a recession of less than 0.75 per
cent ‘as a rule’ does not qualify as exceptional, whereas a recession of over two
per cent automatically does. If the size of the recession is between 0.75 and 2.0
per cent, Ecofin determines whether or not it is deemed ‘exceptional’.12 Once
the sanctioning procedure (TEC 104 IX) has started, only EMU Member States
have a vote, excluding the country in question. A voting alliance against the
SGP then becomes even more concrete and likely, as eventually occurred on
25 November 2003.
The SGP has delivered some ‘added value’. It has shortened the timeline
of the sanctions mechanism, defined the distribution of the fines (among the
‘virtuous’ Member States), clarified the notion of ‘exceptional’ and ‘temporary’
deficits as exemptions from sanctions, introduced an urgency procedure, enabled
the suspension of the EDP, and improved the juridical procedures of the steps
involved. Yet, due to the politicised nature of the EDP, the essence of the pact is
not a mechanism of ‘quasi-automatic sanctions’ but the institutionalisation of a
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political pledge to aim for low deficits. It is presently unclear whether the
procedures can be enforced by legal means. The Commission has tabled an
appeal for annulment (TEC 230) with respect to the Ecofin decision that has
effectively suspended the EDP.
4. Analysing the Birth of the Stability and Growth Pact
For the analysis of the birth of the SGP we combine an ideational approach
with an actor-centred, institutionalist perspective. First, we focus on how ideas
came to shape the preferences of actors and, second, on how their constellation
and interaction produced the outcome. Following (Scharpf 1997), ‘actors’ are
defined as individual or corporate strategic agents (mostly administrative bodies
such as ministries and the Commission). They are capable of intentional action,
are internally organised along hierarchical lines, and are characterised by
preference orientations as well as action resources. Furthermore, they are
embedded in an institutional context, which we use as explanatory shorthand
for structural factors and external influences on the actors themselves, such as
the influential role of financial markets at certain stages in the negotiation
process. We define the executive agents of the negotiating ministries, of the
Commission and of central banks as ‘experts’. They are in contact with ‘non-
actor experts’ who shape ideas but not decisions, such as academics, journalists
and institutions like the OECD or the IMF. On the highest levels of deliberations,
we introduce ‘non-expert actors’, holding the final and democratically
legitimated decision-making competence – ‘politicians’. The orientations of
experts are defined by specific converging ‘ideas’ about economic policy,
influenced indirectly by non-actor experts. The orientations of politicians are
crucially influenced by experts. A graphical illustration summarises how experts
(‘actors’ as well as ‘non-actors’) and ideas came to shape politics, thereby
converging on the compromise that enabled the conclusion of the Stability and
Growth Pact.
4.1. Ideational convergence
From an ideational perspective the creation of EMU can be seen as the
result of policy learning and policy convergence, based on convergence in ideas
about monetary policy-making. When EMU was first conceived in the late
1960s and early 1970s, ideas differed widely, i.e. on the question whether to
converge policies first or whether to proceed with monetary integration and
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assume that convergence would result. Concepts varied on the policy objectives
and on the institutional design of EMU. The 1970 Werner Plan on EMU reflected
a time when governments were frequently pursuing Keynesian policies
(Committee on the Realization by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union
1970).
Though the actual institutional design of EMU as envisaged by the Delors
Committee in 1989 did not differ much from its 1970 design, a number of
important developments occurred in the years between the two plans. First,
economic and monetary integration had achieved a higher level of integration
in both the areas: the process of completing the internal market was underway,
financial markets had become further integrated and the EMS had been in place
for a decade. Second, policy learning had taken place. Monetary policies were
only successful if they were in line with that of the dominant Member State,
namely Germany. Third, ideas regarding monetary policy-making had changed
(see inter alia McNamara 1998 and Marcussen 2000). Whereas in the 1960s
and 1970s Keynesian principles still lay at the heart of national government
economic policies, by the late 1980s monetarist policies dominated. The change
in belief was that there was no long-term trade-off between inflation and
unemployment and that sound money was a precondition for growth.
In their effort to proceed with monetary integration, the governments of
Member States were aided by a so-called ‘epistemic community’. Members of
central banks, ministries of finance and academics held similar views about the
main aim of economic and monetary policy-making. There were a few important
venues where experts shared ideas and socialisation occurred. This took place
above all in the Monetary Committee (MC) – now called the Economic and
Financial Committee – which consists of representatives of central banks and
Ministries of Finance of the EU Member States (Verdun 2000b), as well as in
other influential EC committees (Rosenthal 1975, Verdun 1999) and
international fora. The members of the MC meet Haas’ four principles that define
the existence of an epistemic community (Haas 1992: 3). First, they shared beliefs
for a value-based rationale of social action. Second, they shared causal beliefs,
which are derived from their analyses of problems which then serve as the basis
for understanding the linkages between policy actions and desired outcomes.
Third, they have shared notions of validity – that is intersubjective understandings
that help them weigh ideas within their area of competence. Fourth, they have a
common policy enterprise and common practices associated with a set of problems
to which competence is directed. It is no surprise that the Member States’ Heads
of States or Governments relied on the MC for proposals and suggestions for
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action. The literature on epistemic communities indeed suggests that a group of
experts is often called upon when national governments are divided on
intergovernmental collaboration. The MC was an ideal group to ask for advice as
its members can wear double hats. They can act as independent experts yet they
are fully aware of the political issues at stake.13 It was crucial that the actors had
learnt certain lessons and held certain common beliefs. But those ideas alone
were insufficient to produce the concrete SGP.
4.2. Negotiated compromise
The figure below presents an overview of the most important actors,
grouped according to their resources and orientations.
It shows initial orientations in November 1995 (when Waigel issued his
proposal) and the orientations in June 1997 which by then had converged. The
horizontal axis depicts the actors’ politico-ideologically shaped preferences
for or against strict rules for fiscal discipline. The vertical dimension shows
their power resources and decision-making capabilities. We distinguish between
a ‘political’ and an ‘expert’ sphere.  Our distinction highlights the fact that
politicians – not experts – settle the most controversial issues. The stylised
process is that the whole negotiation dossier is split up into a set of issues
(timeline, exemptions from sanctions, distribution of fines etc.) which are
discussed at the expert level. Experts receive their instructions from politicians
but are free to reach agreement within these bounds. Politicians will in most
cases simply tick off the agreements reached among the experts. Only issues
on which there is no consensus are deliberated on at the political level. The
decision-making process is hence conceived in a bottom-up manner. Experts
are in a strong position to influence politicians since they possess intimate
knowledge of the relevant issues and have detailed information on the bargaining
positions of the others. They can indicate potential solutions and hence possibly
prevent the discussion from being deadlocked. We will now briefly discuss
each actor in turn.
Actors at the level with the highest resource capabilities are Member
State governments. Their decisive position in the deliberation process
corresponds to the concept of ‘power politics’ (Garrett 1994). They are the
legislative body. The role of other actors is only indirect via the influence they
have on the orientation of the governmental actors. The state actors are either
Ministers in the Ecofin Council or Heads of State or Government in the European
Council. The preference points on this level initially cover the entire range
between pro and contra Waigel’s proposal – Germany being on the right end,
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closely followed by the Netherlands, whereas France and other Mediterranean
states initially found themselves on the other side.14 The German Bundesbank
(BBK) figures as a special actor with the resources of an informal veto. The
figure displays only the two most important national treasuries, those of France
and Germany. Each Ministry and each central bank plus the Commission had
two representatives in the Monetary Committee (MC), which was crucial in
preparing the ground for the compromises found in the political sphere. Its
crucial role is best interpreted by the notion of an ‘epistemic community’ as
was mentioned above. In terms of power resources, it lies below national
ministries and the political level, but its importance relates to the fact that it
was the actual forum in which the compromise was found. The Commission is
placed low in terms of decision-making power but successfully achieved a
solution within the Treaty framework, and thus prevented an international
agreement à la Schengen. Another success for the Commission was the inclusion
of the surveillance procedure in the SGP. It nevertheless had to depart quite
considerably from its initial preference, which had been more to the left of the
negotiated outcome. The European Parliament, with a rather negative stance
towards a strict pact, was unable to bring substantial influence to bear on the
Figure 15: Initial preferences and subsequent convergence
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deliberations and is therefore placed on the lowest level. Finally, a set of ‘non-
actor’ experts was able to make its influence felt through informal and
professional contacts, communication and the gradual shaping of ideas that
underpinned the slow process of ideational convergence: the European Monetary
Institute (EMI), precursor to the ECB, and the central banking community with
a close affinity to the Bundesbank position, should be explicitly mentioned as
well as institutions such as the OECD, academic think-tanks, private-sector
researchers, academics etc. Their influence on the decision-making process
was not direct but shaped the orientations of the actors.
Initially, actor preferences were widely dispersed. The Commission, once
it had adapted its view and supported the design of a pact, was entitled to make
its preference the base for the deliberations in the MC. Of course, it had to
propose a pact that was still acceptable to Germany, albeit less strict and without
automatic sanctions. In the MC a surprisingly rapid convergence emerged that
was situated slightly more towards the right side of the preference scale, i.e.
the ‘German’ end. One explanation of the emergence of this convergence is
that a ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) already pre-
existed in the MC, the members of which had already been in favour of a
stability-oriented, rule-based model. In other words, the particular equilibrium
solution was not yet determined, but the solution space and hence the type of
arrangement that the solution would look like was already visible.
The final result reflects Germany’s asymmetric bargaining power. The
reasons for this privileged position were fourfold. First, Germany gave up the
anchor-currency of the preceding regime, the EMS. Unlike the other countries,
it had to accept the opportunity cost of losing monetary discretion and was able
to ask for a higher price – a fact all too well known from the Maastricht
negotiations (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). Second, the German position
resembles Putnam’s two-level game-constellation with the Bundesbank as an
informal veto player (Putnam 1988). Due to its reputation and popularity, the
Bundesbank had a strong influence on German public opinion towards EMU.
If it were to oppose publicly the entry of a large ‘wave’ of countries into stage
III, it would make it politically extremely costly for the Kohl government to
press ahead. The creation of the SGP was a strategy to reduce public resentment
by appeasing the Bundesbank. Thus the German preference set was narrowed
through the informal (declaratory) veto exercised in Frankfurt, which forced
others to realise that a solution would have to lie close to the German preference
point.15 Third, Germany could credibly threaten to exit the EMU process. In
fact, this implicit threat has repeatedly been used by German officials in the
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MC.16 Fourth, the second-worst threat-scenario was if Germany opposed
membership of the ‘Club Med’ countries, Italy in particular. These countries
had an incentive to agree to the pact so that Germany might be more acceptant
of their membership. But even though the outcome is situated towards the
German preference point, the German government had to give in as well, most
importantly on the issue of automatic sanctions. Turning to the institutional
context, we find that three parallel processes were crucial in shaping and
facilitating the agreement.
First, the Franco-German ‘axis’ represents a subset of the negotiations
on the European scene. Its most important function is a radical reduction of the
number of negotiators involved which increases the likelihood of finding a
compromise solution. These summits are important as France and Germany
often represent different perspectives on these issues and thereby different groups
of countries. As happens in other types of bargaining, it is as if France and
Germany are ‘delegated’ to negotiate a settlement.17 The actual solution was
often not reached during Franco-German summits or economic consultations,
but the subsequent meetings on the European scene benefited from the prior
exchange of views and signals.
Second, the Ecofin negotiations were seconded by a parallel political
process of summit meetings in the form of European Councils. The Heads of
State or Government did not confine to providing merely the initial political
impetus. Instead, they punctuated and guided the negotiations throughout the
process, thereby removing important obstacles to compromise, most notably
in the case of the lower end of the definition of a severe recession that would
constitute an exemption from the imposition of sanctions. The European Council
did not only issue strategic political aims but rather defined operative solutions
in surprising detail and delegated their attainment and the legal framing to the
Ministers of Finance as well as to the Commission. The experience of the SGP
negotiations should be seen as an important step in the institutionalisation of
the European Council.
Third, financial markets were influential in forcing the negotiators to
agree on highly contentious issues. The fact that the Deutschmark rocketed
against all other currencies involved whenever a deadlock seemed to jeopardise
the course towards Stage III of EMU imposed a substantial cost of failure on
all negotiating partners. This disciplining factor contributed to the pressure to
reach consensus. Actors would rather give in on issues, which were credibly
posed as conditiones sine quibus non by their counterparts, than leave the
negotiation room empty-handed. Summarising, this section has sought to explain
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how ideational convergence, facilitated by asymmetric bargaining power and
the institutional context, enabled the political compromise.
5. Conclusion
The watchdog has begun to bark. Will it break loose and bite or will it be
forced to tug its tail and whine? We started off by asking why the Stability and
Growth Pact was created, what purpose it was to serve and what underlying
conditions supported its creation. The Economics literature at the time stressed
the importance of consolidation, externality problems in EMU, central bank
independence and coordination of monetary and fiscal policies. Political factors
range from the incomplete nature of the TEC to German domestic politics and
policy learning Ideas on the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy
and the role of monetary policy in society more generally had changed over
time and enabled a broad consensus in favour of fiscal discipline. The case
study indicates that the genesis of the concrete outcome lay in Germany and
that its creation was due to an asymmetric power constellation. These two factors,
ideas and power, together explain the origins of the SGP.
Designing rules is one thing, applying them another. A number of
countries no longer act as if the SGP budgetary ceilings are to be taken seriously.
In part it may be that politicians are opportunistic and underrate the repercussions
of rising budgetary deficits as they pursue other domestic objectives. At the
same time, it should be stressed that EMU and the SGP are likely only to have
a positive effect on the economy if structural reforms are implemented. Some
governments seem to have ignored the fact that without these reforms, budgets
deficits may rise anew. They now wonder if the SGP can be seen as a watchdog
that barks but is on a chain. Some have argued that the SGP may not be the
right pact to enforce fiscal discipline. We have stressed that even though that
may be the case its very effect on credibility depends on how it is treated when
Member States encounter fiscal difficulties.
The introduction asked what has changed since 1995-97 and what lessons
can be drawn from that negotiation period for the future of the SGP. Our analysis
suggests that what matters for the SGP are bargaining power and ideas.
Regarding the former, some changes have occurred. First, Germany has lost
some of its bargaining power due to the start of Stage III of EMU in 1999.
Germany no longer has the same possibility to threaten not to join EMU or to
create barriers to keep countries out. Second, Germany itself is no longer the
Martin Heipertz and Amy Verdun - The Dog that Would Never Bite? What We Can Learn from the ...
151
THE ECB BETWEEN GROWTH AND STABILITY
exemplary Member State it once was regarding budgetary discipline. As a result,
partly because of the continued financial effects of reunification, partly because
of changing political preferences, Germany no longer backs the SGP. It is mainly
the Dutch government, aided by Austria, who now play that role but are endowed
with less bargaining power than Germany before. A similar change can be
observed regarding the role of ideas. The consensus among politicians on the
importance of fiscal discipline may seem to be fading away under the effects of
the recession or lack of considerable economic growth. However, we argue
that there is still strong support for the regime among the main actors on the
expert level. The SGP was created to build credibility. Irrespective of whether
it is a ‘smart’ or ‘stupid’ pact (to use Commission President Romano Prodi’s
words) it will only be able to do its job if Member State governments do not
mess too much with it – at least in the short run. It is likely that experts will
influence the thinking in governments. They will also be the ones who shape
the Commission’s proposals for reforming the system. It is now up to the
European Court of Justice to tip the balance between experts and politicians.
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 A third option would be to have a new economic authority make decisions about these matters (Verdun
1998). This idea was first raised in the Werner Report (Committee on the Realization by Stages of Economic
and Monetary Union 1970). It referred to this organ as a “Centre of Decision for Economic Policy”. In the
late 1980s, the French produced a similar idea when they called for a ‘gouvernement économique’ (Verdun
2003b). The creation of such a body has thus far not taken off due to the fear that that it might undermine the
independence of the ECB.
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13
 One participant described their role as that of ‘financial diplomats’ (interview with the authors, 4 July
2003).
14
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details such as automatic sanctions.
15
 According to Milesi (1998: 137), Waigel stated in the Ecofin:  “ Si le pacte n’est pas assez rigoureux, la
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 Interviews, 4 July 2003.
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 Milesi (1998: 145) quotes a delegation member of the Dublin summit: “C’est un problème franco-allemand
(…) Mettez-vous d’accord entre vous et nous accepterons votre solution.”
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CHAPTER 7
THE “BRUSSELS CONSENSUS” ON MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
POLICIES IN THE EMU. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT *
BY
ROBERTO TAMBORINI
Abstract: The paper sketches what may be called the “Brussels consensus” on
macroeconomic stabilization policies in Economic and MonetaryUnion (EMU),
and then questions whether these policy guidelines are safe means to
macroeconomic stability for well-behaving governments. With the help of a
standard macroeconomic model largely used in the EMU literature, the following
main issues are discussed:
• Is the policy-mix between common monetary policy and national automatic
stabilizers optimal?
• Should national discretionary fiscal policies be banned or limited?
The main conclusion is that well-behaving governments cannot take it for
granted that complying with rules will deliver optimal stabilization.
Keywords: Economic and Monetary Union, Stability and Growth Pact,
macroeconomic stabilization policies.
1. Introduction
It is nowadays generally believed that “stability promotes growth”. In
the design of the economic policy institutions of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) great emphasis has been laid on this guideline (Winkler, this
volume). From the point of view of macroeconomic stabilization policies,
however, the institutional setup of EMU displays the striking feature of
asymmetry between one single monetary authority (MA) with no fiscal
counterpart and many independent national fiscal authorities (FAs). This is a
unicum in modern history, since monetary unifications have generally been
built up vis-à-vis the centralization, to variable extent, of fiscal competences as
well.
* 
 This paper summarizes a line of research developed especially with Francesco Farina, whom I thank for his
co-operation and co-authorship in some published and forthcoming papers. I also wish to thank Elisabetta
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This institutional mismatch between monetary and fiscal authorities has
caused much concern among scholars and politicians (Feldstein (1997)).
Concern arises from the traditional theory of optimal currency areas. In fact, in
addition to reliquinshing control over monetary policy and exchange-rate
determination, member countries have also constrained their fiscal policy within
the limits set by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), whereas the optimal
currency areas theory stresses that national fiscal policy should have more, not
less, room for manoeuvre in coping with domestic shocks (see e.g. Goodhart
and Smith (1993), Kenen (1995), Hughes Hallet and McAdam (1999)). Under
EMU fiscal constraints, exposure to asymmetric shocks or structural
asymmetries across countries may exacerbate local macroeconomic fluctuations
and trigger divergent cycles.
This concern is by no means universally shared, however. After almost
two decades of lively theoretical and political debates in preparation for the
epoch-making creation of the single currency in Europe, an almost settled and
self-contained view has materialized with regard to “well-behaved” economic
policy conduct in EMU. The thrust of this “Brussels consensus” is that a
‘monetary giant’ surrounded by ‘fiscal dwarfs’ is a better guarantee of the
independence of the central bank, of monetary and financial stability, of
restricted growth of the public sector, and of fiscal discipline. Thus the EMU
institutional design does not create a trade-off between “rigour and flexibility”,
but is inducive to stability and growth (see e.g. Artis and Winkler, 1999, Winkler,
this volume).
The Brussels consensus on the European economy, like the “Washington
consensus” on the world economy as a whole, is a successful mix of various
ingredients: an orthodox theoretical background, some commonly shared
statements about the economy, a collection of reccomendations and prescriptions
(some of which enforced by institutional agencies).
Its theoretical background can be summarized as follows. 1) Output and
employment fluctuate in response to unexpected shocks in the determinants of
aggregate demand and supply around a long-period trend of output (“potential
output”) corresponding to full use of factors up to “structural unemployment”.
2) The economic system responds to shocks with variations in quantities in the
short run because of imperfections in the organization of markets, in the
transmission of information, or because of disincentives by economic agents
against price changes. 3) Neither fiscal nor monetary interventions on aggregate
demand are able to alter the level of potential output and the structural rate of
unemployment permanently; their only effect would be to raise the average
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level of inflation above “core inflation”.
The other ingredients, in particular the core of the policy
recommendations and prescriptions for EMU member-countries examined by
this paper, apparently follow from the foregoing framework. 1) Policy makers
should respond to an objective function such that (or they must be constrained
so that) fluctuations around potential output and core inflation are minimized,
without tampering with the “market” combination of potential output and core
inflation. 2) European governments have shown a historical tendency towards
“fiscal indiscipline”, namely a tendency i) to violate the previous general
principle, ii) to fail to correct fiscal imbalances during expansions, iii) to
accumulate large public debts that threaten monetary stability. 3) The creation
of a common single currency has thus required a specially tailored  institutional
setup based on two pillars: i) a single and constitutionally independent MA
vis-à-vis national fiscal FAs, ii) the constitutional constraints on national public
budgets envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty and enforced by the SGP. 4) These
constraints do not impair, indeed they are conducive to, macroeconomic
stabilization at the national level because i) symmetric shocks are tackled by
centralized monetary policy; ii) asymmetric shocks can be adequately managed
by “letting the automatic stabilizers work”; iii) historical evidence suggests
that the existing stabilizers in EMU countries enable them to manage most of
the shocks within the budget limits set by the SGP, provided that the budget is
on average “close to balance or in surplus”.1
My aim is to assess this EMU Weltanschaaung. In particular, since
macroeconomic stability figures prominently on the Brussels agenda, I will
examine whether its policy guidelines can indeed ensure macroeconomic
stability for well-behaving governments. Though a number of empirical
questions are involved, I will focus mainly on theoretical foundations with the
help of a macroeconomic model, put forward in section 2, which reproduces
the essential features of the Brussels consensus recalled above.  Subsequently,
in sections 3 and 4 I will address two key questions among the Brussels policy
guidelines:
• Is the policy-mix between common monetary policy and national automatic
stabilizers optimal?
• Should national discretionary fiscal policies be banned or constrained?
Section 5 concludes the paper with my main contention, namely that
well-behaving governments cannot take it for granted that complying with rules
will deliver optimal stabilization. The euro-area institutional apparatus may
well be the right shelter against fiscally irresponsible governments - a point
which is not discussed here - yet the Brussels consensus underestimates its
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costs vis-à-vis its alleged benefits.
2. The background model
2.1. Economic structures
The macroeconomic stabilization issues in the EMU will be discussed
by means of a model of the so-called AD-LM-AS type2. The EMU consists of
two representative countries (i = 1, 2). The two countries have the following
common characteristics:
• each produces a single good – partly consumed, partly exported. The two
goods are differentiated and each may be exported within the EMU or to
the rest of the world (ROW)
•  perfect capital mobility
•  no labour mobility, and structural unemployment (NAIRU > 0) in each
country, with a degree of stickiness of nominal wage adjustment after
unexpected inflation changes
•  a common currency and monetary authority (MA) and a common money
market, but independent fiscal authorities (FA).
The ROW is not specified except for the following characteristics in relation
to the EMU:
•  mobility of commodities and capital;
•  absence of labour mobility;
•  free floating currency regime;
•  uncovered interest parity.
The model is fully specified in the Appendix, whereas only the essential
elements for the analysis that follows are set out in the main text.  All the
variables are defined as log-linear stochastic deviations from long-period
equilibrium values due to demand (δ) or supply (ε) random shocks3. The model
encompasses six equilibrium conditions: for output and money in each country,
for money in the EMU as a whole, and uncovered interest parity with the ROW.
Therefore, six endogenous variables can be determined:
• output (zi) and inflation (πi) short-run fluctuations (“gaps” for short) for
each country
•  the interest rate (r) and euro rate (x) fluctuations for the EMU as a whole
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2.2. Institutions
Experts in this field may note that assessment of economic policy and
institution design in EMU has thus far focused mostly on the assumption that
policy-makers are not “naturally” disciplined, and that the EMU institutional
design must therefore be assessed in its capacity to prevent the distortions that
may be created by “undisciplined” policy makers. In particular, the MA and
the FAs may have conflicting preferences and/or targets in the inflation-
employment dilemma. The FAs are typically portrayed as being less (or not)
inflation-averse and more (or totally) unemployment-averse relative to the MA,
and/or as having an output (employment) target greater than the equilibrium
potential output (employment). Assuming that policy makers pursue their goals
by means of aggregate demand instruments, policy games may result in
macroeconomic equilibria which are sub-optimal for the economy.5 Only
recently has research started to investigate how EMU might perform under the
stabilization profile once all policy makers have indeed been “disciplined”:
examples are the papers by De Grauwe (2000b), Dixit and Lambertini (2001),
Buti et al. (2001).
This new approach is important for various reasons. Firstly, EMU is,
hopefully, an enduring institution, and in the long run actors’ preferences may
evolve under the effect of a given set of rules. If it is true that an insititution like
the SGP supports macroeconomic equilibria that are Pareto superior to those
that would emerge under undisciplined policy makers, one may expect that in
the long run the democratic process will eliminate them from the system. Will
that same institution then still ensure optimal macroeconomic equilibria?6
Secondly, and more informally, the Brussels consensus is a collection of practical
recommendations aimed at reassuring governments that the EMU rules are not
in conflict with – and indeed are a precondition for – successful macroeconomic
stabilization. As emerges quite clearly from a recent paper by Buti et al. (2003),
these recommendations are, roughly speaking, part of a “stick and carrot”
pedagogical strategy towards governments. Hence, public opinion is rightly
interested in seeing whether, after the stick, the carrot will in fact be delivered.
Therefore the model further characterizes the EMU system with two
stylized institutional features. First, it is assumed that all policy-makers operate
in a pure stabilization regime. That is, they agree upon the levels of potential
output and core inflation, and they only pursue stabilization of relative output
and inflation gaps (they are free from “inflation bias”), though they may differ
as to the relative weight of the two targets (Dixit and Lambertini (2001) call
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this regime “monetary-fiscal symbiosis”). Second, government budgets in each
country are structurally balanced and only temporary deviations are allowed
within the limits set by the SGP.
As regards the central MA, we simply assume a standard  quadratic loss
function
(2.1) LM =  π2 + βz2
where π = Σπi/2 and z = Σzi are the inflation and output gaps in EMU as a
whole, and  β measures the weight of output instability relative to the weight of
price instability normalized to 1. Hence 1/β measures inflation aversion.
The MA controls the EMU money market, the equilibrium condition of
which requires equality between changes in aggregate money demand, Σmdi =
Σ(πi + mzzi - mrr) and money supply. The latter is the change in the stock of
outside money m net of the aggregate supply of bonds, which is given by
government budget imbalances gi (gi > 0 denotes a surplus). Hence, monetary
requilibrium requires (see Appendix)
(2.2) Σ(πi + mzzi - mrr) = m + Σgi
The MA can either control m or control r directly by means of the official
discount rate. Here this level of detail is not necessary, and I shall treat r as the
control variable. In turn, r affects aggregate demand through two channels: the
interest-sensitive component of domestic demand and the euro-sensitive
component of extra-EMU exports.
As regards national FAs, these have two instruments that can be activated
in response to shocks: “automatic stabilizers” and “discretionary” budget
policies. The automatic stabilizers are such that the budget has an elasticity g
z
relative to fluctuations in economic activity zi. Discretionary policies are simply
specific post-shock budget measures denoted with g’. Therefore, deviations of
each country’s government budget from structural balance can be written as:
(2.3) gi = g’ + gzzi
and added one to one to aggregate demand. The FAs share the same loss function
as the MA up to a possible difference in the relative weight of the two targets,
i.e.
(2.4) LF =  π2 + φz2
Finally, a convenient property of the pure stabilization regime is that,
whatever the policy-makers preferences, the rational expectation of future values
of  output and inflation coincide with their “committed” long-run values.
Consequently, under the above assumption, the rational expectation of inflation
gaps in EMU is zero.
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2.3. The core equations
After a shock, the markets for output in each country equate (shifts of)
aggregate demand and supply and determine the ensuing (unanticipated)
inflation and output gaps, πi and zi which are given by the following equations
(i = 1, 2; j ≠ i)
(2.5) zi = -Θ1g’i - Θ2g’j  - Θ3 r +  Θ1δi + Θ2δj + Θ4εi
(2.6) πi = -Θ1g’i - Θ2g’j  - Θ3 r +  Θ1δi + Θ2δj - Θ5εi
where Θ1 is the domestic demand multiplier, Θ2 is the foreign demand spillover,
Θ3 is the interest-rate elasticity of output, Θ4 is the domestic-supply output
multiplier, Θ5  is the domestic-supply price multiplier7, and are all positive.
 Therefore, in case of demand shocks,
•  the output gap in each country has the same sign as the shock
•  the inflation gap in each country is equal to the output gap
•  a shock in one country is transmitted to the other through the foreign demand
spillover Θ2; thus, even a shock in one single country (δi = 0, δj ≠ 0) has
effects on both.
In the case of supply shocks,
• the output and inflation gaps in each country move in opposite directions
on impact of the domestic shock
The above equations include unspecified changes in each government’s
discretionary budget, g’i, and in the EMU interest rate, r. These variables are
left to further analysis of stabilization policies.
3. Is the policy-mix between common monetary policy and national
automatic stabilizers optimal?8
The recommended policy mix by the Brussels consensus hinges on two
well-known claims. 1) The ECB will cope with symmetric shocks leaving the
task of coping with domestic asymmetric shocks to national governments. 2)
National governments will have sufficient scope for fiscal stabilization within
the SGP limits if they “set sufficiently ambitious budget targets and let the
automatic stabilizers work” (Buti et al. (1998), Buti and Sapir (1998), Artis
and Buti (2001))9.
The strong preference for automatic stabilizers has been clearly spelt
out in a recent paper by Brunila et al. (2002). The theory of macroeconomic
policy of the last two decades challenges the traditional prescriptions of optimal
currency areas, vigorously stressing the need to enforce fiscal discipline by
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means of constitutional constraints and rule-based policy schemes. Moreover,
a number of influential - though controversial - studies have tried to show that
the alleged “Keynesian” stabilization effects of fiscal macro-policies are almost
non-existent in the short run and are negative in the long run. In a monetary
union, it has been added, a budget deficit in one member country exerts negative
spillovers in all the others also in the short run, because it forces the common
interest rate to rise. The Maastricht Treaty and the SGP are patently debtors to
this intellectual climate, and the recommendation to rely on automatic stabilizers
for domestic stabilization purposes is presented as a sort of compromise which
keeps counter-cyclical fiscal policy within the boundaries of rule-based policy
schemes.
The Brussels recipe has, surprisingly, been subject to scant theoretical
investigation. Confidence that it will work mainly rests upon empirical
arguments put forward, first, by various studies reassessing the stabilizing
capacity of fiscal endogenous mechanisms (which have, however, produced
controversial results: see e.g. Wyplosz (1999), Mélitz (2002), Brunila et al.
(2002)), and second, by the so-called “counterfactual” studies showing that,
had the SGP rules been in place in the past decades, the present members of the
EMU would have found no major difficulty in stabilizing their economies in
most of the observed recessions (e.g. Buti et al. (1997), Buti and Sapir (1998),
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998)). At any rate, it is added, in case of unusual
recessions escape clauses have been devised in the SGP.
Despite its apparent appeal, this practical approach to the problem has
several pitfalls. The most serious one is that it projects the past experience of
the EMU countries into a completely different institutional setup and
macroeconomic structure. To say the least, in the past these countries have
been able to rely on fiscal policy as well as on independent monetary policy
and exchange-rate fluctuations or realignments. Moreover, their fiscal systems
were more pervasive than they are now and will be in the future. Hence, a
country’s fiscal stabilization capacity that proved adequate in the past may no
longer be such in EMU. Secondly, a mere quantitative measure of stabilization
capacity is of little interest if it is not assessed against the policy-makers’
objectives, and this reqiures a more careful theoretical investigation of the
problem. Finally, the above-mentioned studies focus on domestic stabilization
alone, whereas participation in an economic and currency union adds
minimization, after shocks, of the dispersion of national incomes around the
EMU average. Since this typical task of federal fiscal systems - “cohesion” in
the Brussels jargon - seems to be left unattended in EMU, prevention of
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divergence among the EMU economies may be lacking.10 In the subsequent
part of the paper I will substantiate these weaknesses by means of the macro-
model presented previously.
3.1. Asymmetric shocks and national automatic stabilizers
A crucial issue in currency-areas analysis is the extent of  dissimilarity
in economic structures across countries. Two main dimensions of comparison
are relevant: the first is the degree of asymmetry in exposure to shocks, the
second is asymmetric transmission mechanisms of shocks or  policy variables.
Here I will focus on the first aspect only11, so that the two countries are assumed
to be structurally identical though subject to shocks that may differ in amplitude.
Most of the literature considers two polar cases: the same shock in all countries
(“symmetric shock”) or one shock in one country (“asymmetric shock”). More
recent works (e.g. De Grauwe (2000b), Cooper and Kempf (2001), Dixit and
Lambertini (2001)), allow for a more general representation of shocks
distribution across the EMU by introducing the degree of correlation of shocks.
If var(ωi), ωi = δi , εi, is the variance of demand or supply shocks in country i,
and cov(ωiωj) is the covariance of the same shocks in two countries, then if we
observe ω1 in country 1, we may expect, up to some random error, to observe
also
E(ω2) = ρω1
in country 212. Consequently, shocks may be
• symmetric: ωi ≠ 0,  ρ = 1
• asymmetric: ωi ≠ 0, -1 < ρ < 1
• unilateral:  ωi ≠ 0,  ρ = 0
To begin with, let us focus on automatic stabilizers alone as prescribed
by the Brussels recipe (g’i = 0). As can be checked in the Appendix, automatic
stabilizers operate through their elasticity g
z
 to output fluctuations in the shock
multipliers, with different effects on output and inflation in the case of demand
or supply shocks. A larger g
z
 dampens the effect of a demand shock on both
output and inflation, whereas it dampens the effect of a supply shock on output
at the cost of amplifying the effect on inflation. It is worth noting that automatic
stabilizers respond to changes in output, employment and incomes and not to
the shocks themselves. Hence they may smooth output fluctations once they
are in progress, but they cannot counteract the shocks that give rise to
fluctuations.13
As argued above, the quantitative degree of stabilization per se yields
little information if it is not assessed against the policy-makers’ objective
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functions. The central MA’s objectives are represented by the loss function
(2.1). On the other hand, automatic stabilizers exclude discretionary fiscal policy
by definition, so that it is pointless to assume an explicit loss function for national
governments.  Yet it would be misleading to proceed as if any degree of
stabilization would be fine. To grasp this critical point, let us consider the
following thought experiment.
Let us assume that, for stabilization purposes, the existing automatic
stabilizers in each member country, as measured by the parameter g
z
, reflect
the historical institutional equilibrium between the FA and its respective national
MA. Also, let the latter’s objective function be equal across countries and no
less inflation-averse than the central MA. Thus, the only relevant difference in
the transition to the EMU is the exchange of the national for the common central
bank (the stabilization tool kit still being automatic stabilizers and monetary
policy). Hence, given equations (2.5)-(2.6), we can take as the stabilization
benchmark for each country the (Nash) optimal interest-rate policy that would
be obtained by minimizing the following loss function
(3.1) Li M =  πi2 + βizi2
where βi = β.
As far as demand shocks are concerned, the optimal stabilization of output
and inflation in the two countries would be
(3.2) z*1 = π*1 = 0
(3.3) z*2 = π*2 = 0
which implies the following interest rate adjustments:
(3.4)
(3.5)
That is, in case of a correlated demand fall in the two countries (δ1 < 0, ρ
> 0), each would choose to cut the interest rate proportionally to the domestic
and the imported shock.
Turning to supply shocks, the optimal stabilization in the two countries
would be:
(3.6)
(3.7)
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with the following interest-rate adjustments:
(3.8)
(3.9)
Hence in the case of a correlated negative supply shock, both countries
would choose to raise the interest rate proportionally to the domestic shock
trading off the fall in output with the rise in inflation according to the parameter
β.
These results clarify the point made in the previous paragraph. The degree
of stabilization induced by the automatic stabilizers, no matter whether it is
“high” or “low”, should be regarded as one component of the optimal
stabilization process, which would require the joint activation of national
monetary policy. Comparison of the resulting values of z*i and π*i with those
obtained with automatic stabilizers alone (equations (2.5)-(2.6)) measures the
extent to which the latter are sub-optimal. We therefore reach our first conclusion,
namely that automatic stabilizers cannot by themselves optimally stabilize either
output or inflation at the country level, under both types of shocks and for any
degree of cross-country correlation of shocks.
In other words, this conclusion extends the central claim of optimal
currency areas to automatic stabilizers: if a country is deprived of the monetary
policy-instrument it cannot stabilize optimally in the face of asymmetric shocks,
unless an appropriate fiscal instrument is activated. Contrary to the Brussels
consensus, this instrument does not consist in automatic stabilizers alone.
3.2. Common monetary policy and optimal stabilization
Closer inspection of the model reveals that it is unlikely that national
governments are left alone even in the face of unilateral shocks. This, notice,
fortunately contradicts the Brussels view that there should be a clear-cut division
of tasks between the ECB and national governments. It is true that the ECB has
the statutory mandate to abstain from country-specific interventions, but, as
pointed out in paragraph 3.1, cross-country spillovers spread shocks throughout
the euro-area, even those originating in one single country. This phenomenon
can easily be seen by computing EMU aggregate values of output and inflation
gaps from equations (2.5)-(2.6). Since z = Σzi and π = Σπi/2, we obtain, in the
case of demand shocks
r * ( )1
4 5
3
11
=
−
+

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4 5
3
11
=
−
+




β
β ρε
Θ Θ
Θ
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(3.10) z =  -2Θ3 r +  (Θ1 + Θ2)(1 + ρ)δ1
(3.11) π = -Θ3 r +  (Θ1 + Θ2) 1 2
+ ρ δ1
and in the case of supply shocks
(3.12) z = -2Θ3r +  Θ4(1 + ρ)ε1
(3.13) π = -Θ3r - Θ5 1 2
+ ρ ε1
Consequently, the EMU-wide impact of asymmetric shocks (ρ < 1) is
never nil, not even in the case of a unilateral shock (ρ = 0). Of course, the
impact is highest in the case of symmetric shocks (ρ = 1)14. Therefore, we
should expect the ECB to intervene even within its statutory mandate.
Miminization of the relevant loss function yields, in the case of demand shocks,
(3.14) z* = π* = 0
(3.15) r* ( )= − +


+Θ Θ
Θ
1 2
3
1
1
2
ρ δ
and in the case of supply shocks,
(3.16) z* =
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The result of the central MA’s intervention is twofold. On the one hand,
it supplements national automatic stabilizers. Consider the simple case of a
demand fall in country 1 (δ1 < 0, ρ = 0) in equation (2.5). Domestic automatic
stabilizers smooth the impact of δ1 by downsizing the relevant parameter Θ1.
Then, the MA also reduces r* according to equation (3.15). This reduction of
r* sustains z1 as shown by equation (2.5). On the other hand, from country 1’s
viewpoint stabilization is still sub-optimal. In fact, substituting r* in equation
(2.5) yields z1 = (Θ1 - Θ2)δ1 < 0. The reason can be seen by comparing r* in
equation (3.15) with r*1 in equation (3.4): the interest-rate cut which is optimal
for the EMU is too small for country 1. Not surprisingly, the opposite occurs in
country 2.
The reader can easily check that this pattern can be extended to supply
shocks and to any degree of asymmetry up to perfect symmetry (ρ = 1), when
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the MA’s optimal stabilization coincides with those of each single country. We
thus obtain a second important conclusion. In the event of asymmetric shocks
of any degree, cross-country spillovers elicit monetary stabilization of EMU
variables with positive feedback on domestic variables; yet the joint operation
of common monetary policy and national automatic stabilizers is still insufficient
to stabilize each single country optimally.
Also this conclusion can be traced back to the optimal currency areas
debate as an instance of the problem known as “one-size policy may not fit
all”. We have seen that this problem is important for EMU too (see also
Dornbusch et al., 1998, and De Grauwe, 2000b). Common monetary policy is
able to offer some relief to the economies under asymmetric shock but not up
to the optimal extent. How harmful the deviation from optimality may be is
largely a country-specific empirical matter. Thus, in practice, the Brussels
optimism about stabilization capacity in the EMU might be rescued, albeit in
an unintended way that circumvents the alleged division of tasks between ECB
and national governments. However, the model shows that the more asymmetric
the shock (the smaller is ρ), the weaker the signal received by the ECB at the
EMU level, and hence the weaker its response. Hence smaller, idiosyncratic
countries are more likely to be left alone in the face of asymmetric shocks, in
which case the conclusion of paragraph 3.1 applies.
3.3. The “cohesion” problem
Little attention has been paid in the literature to the fact that sub-optimality
of stabilization at country level is undesireable not only for the countries involved
but also for the EMU as a whole. One implication of the result presented above
is that output gaps tend to be divergent across countries over the cycle threatening
“cohesion” acroos the union.
Farina and Tamborini (2004), presents a statistical estimate of the degree
of “cohesion” provided by the existing fiscal systems of EMU member countries.
We have followed the methodology developed by the literature on fiscal
stabilization in multi-level fiscal systems (see e.g. Von Hagen (1992), Goodhart
and Smith (1993), Bayoumi and Masson (1995)). In our case, we have regressed
the per-capita national disposable income in each country relative to the average
of per-capita income on the same ratio computed with gross income. The
estimated coefficient yields the statistical correlation between the two variables:
high correlation indicates the “after-state-intervention” persistence of a shock
to the initial relative income position of each country; low correlation indicates
that the initial shock is absorbed by national fiscal stabilization vis-à-vis all
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other countries. We have employed different econometric techniques and
different specifications of fiscal stabilization on a sample of euro and non-euro
EU countries over the last thirty years.
If we consider the estimated coefficients associated with overall fiscal
interventions (taxes + social contributions - transfers), we cannot reject the
hypothesis that for the large majority of EU countries - with the exception of
Sweden, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom - the coefficient is
statistically equal to, or greater than, unity. Hence, in these countries, the overall
impact of fiscal stabilization preserves negligible cohesion over the cycle or
may even magnify, rather than reduce, post-shock per-capita income divergence
vis-à-vis the EU average. This finding warns that the extension of past “do-it-
yourself” fiscal stabilization in EMU without a proper cross-country stabilizing
system may yield insuffcient “cohesion” of relative incomes over the cycle.
4. Should discretionary national fiscal policies be banned or limited?15
The flimsiness of the anti-cyclical shield provided by automatic stabilizers
has revived scientific interest in, and the dignity of, “discretionary” fiscal policies
for EMU members16. This change of attitude has also been favoured by empirical
studies, already mentioned in previous parts of the paper, which have eroded
the premises of the Brussels consensus by showing that i) there is no strong
evidence of systematic pro-cyclical mismanagement of public budgets, nor of
a persistent tendency for monetary-fiscal policies to conflict, ii) the so-called
“non-Keynesian” effects of active fiscal policies cannot be generalized, iii) the
stabilization capacity of automatic stabilizers alone is limited. It should be
added that, while the distinction between automatic stabilizers and
“discretionary” interventions is clear in theory, in practice it is not so easy to
detect,17 so that it seems more sensible to assess overall anti-cyclical fiscal
measures as related to governments’ budget choices. Of course, the traditional
technical limits attributed to this kind of policies (long and variable lags, etc.)
should not be overlooked. However, these limits on the grounds of efficacy are
different in nature from the objections raised in principle against discretionary
fiscal policies in the EMU literature. The latter are my aim in this section.
Since the problem of optimal stabilization at the country level arises for
asymmetric shocks, I will focus on this case only.
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The theoretical benchmark is now offered by the above-mentioned works
by Dixit and Lambertini, who have set the conditions whereby discretionary
fiscal policy is consistent with optimal global-local stabilization in a monetary
union. They show that the essential point is agreement between the central
bank and the national governments on “ideal output and inflation”, even though
they may disagree on the relative weight of the two objectives (Dixit and
Lambertini (2001, p.977)). Analogous conclusion has been reached by Buti et
al. (2001). Relative to the Brussels consensus, this result has a twofold
implication. On the one hand, it (conditionally) re-habilitates national
discretionary fiscal policies as an optimal stabilization instrument in a monetary
union. On the other, it restores confidence in the stabilization capacity built
into the present EMU institutional design. I will discuss these two points in
turn.
4.1. Optimal discretionary national fiscal policies
In the first place, let us re-examine the issue of optimality of stabilization
in this new setup where the discretionary part of the public budget (g’i) can be
activated. The main difference with respect to only automatic stabilizers is that
the national FAs can now choose the optimal budget g*i in relation to the
observed shock, which will thus consist of the endogenous part g
z
zi and the
discretionary part g’i. For simplicity we can drop the former part and treat the
whole optimal budget as subject to government’s choice. Consequently, we
should now introduce the FA’s objective function (2.4).
Let us consider the post-shock equations (2.5)-(2.6). As long as the central
bank does not intervene, the common interest rate r is affected endogenously
by the aggregate budget imbalances, Σgi (see equation (2.2)). Upon endogenizing
r, equations (2.5)-(2.6) are as follows:
(4.1) zi = -∆1gi - ∆2gj  + ∆3 g +  ∆1δi + ∆2δj + ∆4εi
(4.2) pi = -∆1gi - ∆2gj  + ∆3 g +  ∆1δi + ∆2δj - ∆5εi
where g = Σgi, and all parameters are positive.
Now the overall effect, internal and external, of a budget imbalance
depends on two crucial factors: i) a demand effect (∆1 internally and ∆2
externally), ii) a financial effect via common interest rate (∆3 both internally
and externally), inclusive of a composition effect due to the other country’s
fiscal stance.18
After substituting the expressions of zi and πi for each type of shock into
the loss function, minimization of this function with respect to gi yields the
vector of national optimal budgets g*i. In the case of demand shocks, we obtain
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(4.3) z*1 = π*1 = 0
(4.4) z*2 = π*2 = 0
(4.5) g m y
m y
r rq
r rq
*
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2 1
2
=
− −
−
ρ
δ
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( )2 1
2 1
2
=
+ −
−
ρ ρ
δ
where m
r
 is the interest elasticity of money demand and y
rq = yr + yq(1 - α) is the
crowding-out coefficient that determines the financial effect of budget
imbalances (see fn. 18).
This result proves that, with no central-bank intervention, the optimal
stabilization problem has a simultaneous (Nash) solution for all countries, for
any kind of shock and any degree of correlation of shocks.
First, if m
r
 > y
rq , a condition which is likely to occur in a currency union
(see again fn. 18), then “Keynesian” policies are the optimal choice in both
countries - i.e. policies such that a negative schock calls for a budget deficit.
Second, the extent of optimal fiscal imbalances in turn depends on the magnitude
of ρ, with the absolute value of g*i increasing with r in both countries. This
means that highly correlated negative demand shocks across countries require
larger deficits in all countries. Third, if any one government faces a budget
constraint, the other is damaged by the excess demand shock transmitted by
the former and is forced to have a larger deficit in order to counteract it. Note,
therefore, that the pro-SGP argument that deficit ceilings are beneficial to all
because they limit negative fiscal spillovers cannot be accepted a priopri.19
4.2. Common monetary policy vs national fiscal policies
The foregoing considerations can, mutatis mutandi, be extended to supply
shocks. However, under these events, an interesting additional question is
whether the aggregate outcome of optimal discretionary fiscal policies is also
optimal for the central MA. In the case of demand shocks just examined the
answer is yes, as the MA would also choose z = 0, π = 0. Yet one may wonder
whether this holds true also when supply shocks raise the output-inflation trade-
off. Repeating the previous exercise for supply shocks, the aggregate values of
the output and inflation gaps after national fiscal stabilization are:
(4.7) zF =
+




+1
1
1
2 1φ
ρ
ε , π
φ
φ
ρ
εF = −
+




+
1
1
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Two observations are in order.
The first is that these values are identical to those obtained by the central
MA provided that the relative weight of the two targets is equal in the respective
objective functions (compare with equations (3.16)). This is at variance with
Dixit-Lambertini’s claim that the relative weight is irrelevant. However, what
kind of conflict would then arise between national FAs and central MA?
Comparison of equations (3.16) and (4.7) shows that, were the weights φ and β
different, the sole discrepancy would be in the relative variability of output and
inflation, with no long-lasting effects on core inflation and potential output.20
The problem therefore concerns not the determination of core inflation but
what Taylor (1998) calls the output-inflation variability trade-off. According
to Taylor, economic policies should first and foremost be ranked for their ability
to minimize core inflation and miximize potential output21, and secondly for
their location along the best variability trade-off curve. Hence, if the focus falls
on long-run levels of output and inflation, it is indeed correct to conclude that
no distortion, in Taylor’s sense, would arise from discretionary national fiscal
polices in a pure stabilization EMU regime.
Is the remaining potential conflict about variability important? Since the
alternative is between two non-distortionary policies as regards core inflation
and potential output, the question has no uncontroversial answer, nor are there
solid grounds for restraining national governments. In principle, the Brussels
recipe (with the more general principle of subsidiarity enshrined in the
Maastricht Treaty) cuts the knot: the ECB should refrain from intervening in
asymmetric shocks, hence governments’ preferences about domestic output-
inflation variability would prevail. Yet I have argued above that this is an abstract
principle which may not be followed in practice. If the ECB dislikes the
variability of aggregate output and inflation generated by national fiscal policies,
it may be induced, and legitimated, to intervene. The consequence of all policy-
makers trying to optimize simultaneously can be examined by solving the system
(4.8)
The  unpleasant result of the model is that there is no solution. Suppose
φ>β; then, if the ECB does not intervene,  πF > πM, that is, national fiscal policies
create excess variability of EMU inflation according to the ECB. As is intuitive,
the latter reacts by raising the interest rate. This, in turn, induces governments
to counter-act by expanding fiscal deficits. The result of the model means that
this process does not converge, with the common interest rate and national
min z
min z
g i i
r
i
  
    
π φ
π β
2 2
2 2
+
+
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fiscal deficits being under unbounded pressure.
From this point of view, insisting on solipsistic and single-minded central
bankers may be unwise (Blinder (1996)). Likewise, the presence of many
national FAs, to the extent that they have different preferences regarding
variability, makes the search for the EMU bliss point harder. On the other hand,
one may hope that Taylor (1998) is right in arguing that conflicts about the
output-inflation variability trade-off may, in practice, not be dramatically
important, since world-wide historical evidence suggests that policy-makers’
preferences in developed countries are quite close and lead, in the long-run, to
balanced patterns of output and inflation variability.
5. Conclusions
Let me simply summarize the main points of this chapter as answers to
the questions put forward in the introduction.
1)  The “division of labour” between the ECB coping with symmetric
shocks and national governments relying on fiscal automatic stabilizers to handle
asymmetric shocks may well have many virtues, but it cannot be recommended
as an effective stabilization policy mix. In fact:
• in the event of any kind of shock with any degree of correlation among
countries, automatic stabilizers alone cannot guarantee optimal stabilization
at the country level
• even the joint operation of central monetary stabilization and national
automatic stabilizers delivers optimal stabilization to each economy only if
a symmetric shock occurs
• in all other cases, national inflation and output gaps remain sub-optimal,
and may tend to be divergent in sign, threatening EMU “cohesion” over the
cycle.
2) As an alternative, I have examined the stabilization problem under
asymmetric shocks if allowance is made for discretionary national fiscal policies.
In principle, if national governments share the same objective function with
the ECB, and if they are free to optimize their budget choices after a shock is
observed, all countries will be able to achieve optimal stabilization for any
kind of shock and degree of correlation of shocks, with no need for ECB
intervention and policy co-ordination. Any budget constraint imposed onto
governments would lead to sub-optimal outcomes either locally or globally.
3) My answer to the question whether complying with the stick of
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recommended policy guidelines will earn the carrot of optimal stabilization is
that, theoretically, it will not. Confidence that in practice the whole system
may operate reasonably well has so far been based on highly questionable,
backward looking, empirical arguments. The first serious road test represented
by the euro-area’s response to the post-2001 world downturn, with two
“virtuous” members like France and Germany being unable to meet the SGP
requirements, does not seem encouraging.
A natural further question arises, however: Why does the EMU apparatus
inhibit and constrain discretionary national fiscal policies if these are the sole
consistent solution to optimal stabilization? The strong preference for automatic
stabilizers versus discretionary fiscal policies, and the imposition of deficit
ceilings, only rely on the presumption that governments typically have objective
functions inconsistent with monetary stability and fiscal discipline. The model
has shown that it is necessary to consider what this alleged inconsistency is all
about. If national governments attach, say, more weight to output variability
than does the ECB, but if they all still share with the ECB the same targets of
core inflation and potential output, no distortion arises in the determination of
the long-run levels of inflation and otuput in EMU as a whole. Eventually,
there only remains the case that governments are indeed not well-behaved in
that they endemically aim at output target(s) inconsistent with the ECB core-
inflation target in the long run. In other words, the EMU system has not been
designed to host well-behaved national governments, and the sole serious
argument for preserving it in its present form is that the architecture of the
system provides the best shield against bad fiscal behaviour. My aim here has
not been to tackle this view. Though still controversial both theoretically and
empirically, it has to be taken seriously and may prove to be right. My only
final contention is that the EMU institutions have the duty to be more explicit
about i) the existence of a trade-off between “rigour and flexibility” in EMU,
and ii) the actual exchange of flexibility for rigour of which member countries
should be aware and ready to accept.
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Appendix
A1. List of variables
All variables are log-linear stochastic deviations from long-run
equilibrium values. All shocks are i.i.d. with zero mean. Countries are indexed
with  i = 1, 2:
πi inflation rate
yi aggregate demand
gi government budget imbalances
δi demand shock
zi output
mdi money demand
mi money stock
λi money demand shock
µi money supply shock
qi terms of trade (effective real exchange rate)
EMU:
r interest rate
π, πe inflation and expected inflation
z output
m money supply
x, xe    change, and expected change, in the euro exchange rate
(euro price foreign currency)
ROW:
r
w
  interest rate
π
w
, πe
w  
inflation and expected inflation
A2. The model
The core of the model consists of the following stochastic-deviation
equations  for each country i = 1, 2, i ≠ j
Aggregate demand
(A1.) yi = - yqqi + yzzj- yr(ri - πe) - gi +  δi
which depends on terms of trade qi, foreign output gaps zj, real interest
rate (ri - πe), government imbalances gi, exogenous shocks δi.
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Terms of trade (effective real exchange rate)
(A2.) qi = α(πi- πj) + (1 - α)(πi - (x + πw))
which is calculated as the weighted average of the terms of intra-EMU
trade, πi - πj, and extra-EMU trade,  πi - (x + πw), where α is the weight of intra-
EMU trade. Fluctuations in the euro exchange rate x are ruled by uncovered
interest parity with the ROW, x = r
w
 - r + xe. Expected fluctuations are driven
by deviations from PPP, xe = πe - πe
w
. Letting r
w
 and πe
w
 be at their steady-state
level (r
w
 = πe
w
 = 0), the result is that x = -r.
Output
(A3.) zi = zπ(πi - πe) + εi
which responds to unexpected domestic inflation (deflation), and
exogenous shocks εi. Without loss of generality we set zπ = 1.
Money demand
(A4.) mdi = πi + mzzi - mrr + λi
which depends on domestic inflation πi, domestic output gap zi, the rate
of interest r, and exogenous shocks λi .
Domestic money stock
(A5.) mi = - yqα(πi- πj) + yz(zj- zi) + µi
which reflects the only two channels of money creation for a country in
a monetary union: its balance of payments - yqα(πi- πj) + yz(zj- zi))22,  and the
banking channel, i.e. financing of the domestic banks by the ECB, which is
here treated as exogenous shocks µi .
Domestic output market equilibrium in each country yields the output
and inflation gaps equations:
(A6.) zi = -Θ1g’i - Θ2g’j  - Θ3 r +  Θ1δi + Θ2δj + Θ4εi + Θ6εj
(A7.) pi = -Θ1g’i - Θ2g’j  + Θ3 r +  Θ1di + Θ2δj - Θ5εi  + Θ6εj
where
Θ1 ≡ Λ1[Λ12 - Λ22]-1
Θ2 ≡ Λ2[Λ12 - Λ22]-1
Θ3 ≡ yrq[Λ1 - Λ2]-1
Θ4 ≡ yq[Λ1 - αΛ2][Λ12 - Λ22]-1
Θ5 ≡ [(1+ gz)Λ1 - αΛ2][Λ12 - Λ22]-1
Θ6 ≡ yq[α(1 + gz) - yz][Λ12 - Λ22]-1 ?
Λ1 ≡ 1 + yq+ gz
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Λ2 ≡ αyq + yz
y
rq ≡ yr + yq(1 - α)
The parameter Θ6 rules the cross-country supply spillovers. These result
from the impact of the supply shock in country j on  exports of country i via i)
the change in foreign output, ii) the change in the foreign inflation rate. Since
output and inflation move in opposite directions exerting countervailing effects
on exports,  the  net  outcome  is  undetermined.   To  simplify  an  inessential
part of the model, it assumed that the income and price effects are balanced,
i.e. α(1 + g
z
) = y
z
1
 See e.g. Buti and Sapir (1998) for detailed treatment of each of these points. Further relevant references
will be given in the course of the paper.
2
 This class of models has been  widely used by current research on stabilization policies in exchange-rate
systems and currency unions. See in particular Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993), Allsopp and Vines (1996,
1998), Allsopp et al. (1999), De Grauwe (2000b), Dixit and Lambertini (2001) to mention only a few. An
earlier version of the present model has appeared in Farina and Tamborini (2002).
3
 That is, x ≡ log(X/X*), where X* is the log-run equilibrium value. For details on this technique see also
Allsopp and Vines (1996).
4
 Given a single currency and perfect capital mobility, a single money market exists where the money stock
determined by the ECB is distributed among all countries through their balance of payments. Hence payments
imbalances determine changes in domestic money stocks that must be in line with domestic changes in
money demand.
5
 Dixit (2001) and Dixit and Lambertini (2001) provide one of the most up-to-date treatments of the
consequences of various combinations of preferences/targets conflicts among policy makers in EMU.
6
 Recent empirical studies on the so-called “monetary-fiscal policy mix” in Europe over recent decades also
suggest that the theoretical concentration on targets/preferences conflicts between MAs and FAs may be due
to the particular historical experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s. More generally, Buti et al. (2001)
suggest that whether the monetary and fiscal instrument are used in a complementary or conflicting way
depends not so much on the underlying preferences as on the nature of shocks. Muscatelli et al. (2003) find
evidence in support of this view by way of econometric estimation and simulation of structural macro-policy
models. The evidence examined by Mélitz (1997), Wyplosz (1999), Hughes Hallet et al. (2000) supports the
view that the two policy arms have mostly been used complementarily. Farina and Tamborini (2002) have
computed a measure of structural changes in the fiscal stance of the EU countries and have shown that a
conflict of policy stance with the MAs probably arose between the second oil shock and the advent of the
EMS, whereas the FAs returned to fiscal discipline as early as the mid-1980s.
7
 Cross-country supply spillover effects, Θ6εj, could also be added to each equation (see Farina and Tamborini
(2004)). For simplicity, these effects are sterilized here (see Appendix).
8
 This part of the paper draws on Farina and Tamborini (2004).
9
 I will not examine here arguments based on long-run structural considerations according to which the
process itself of European integration will reduce exposure to external shocks, and will foster a harmonized
EU-wide business cycle with negligible local asymmetries. At any rate, this prediction is far from being
uncontroversial: see e.g. Weber (1991), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), Obstfeld and Peri (1998).
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10
 This goal may not be strictly necessary in theory, although it is in practice pursued in all federal systems,
mostly by means of inter-regional insurance and redistribution schemes, and it is in fact on the EU agenda
under the heading of “social and economic cohesion” (see e.g. McDougal Report (1977), Graham and Smith
(1993), Abraham et al. (1991).
11
 The second aspect is no less important than the former (and to some authors it may well be more important
in EMU, especially in connection with monetary policy: see e.g. Dornbusch et al. (1998)). However, my
choice is mainly dictated by the consideration that most of the curency-areas literature has concentrated on
asymmetric shocks, and by the fact that, owing to the log-linear specification of the model, the difference
between asymmetric shocks transmitted through symmetric structures and symmetric (policy) shocks
transmitted through asymmetric structures is mainly quantitative with no major theoretical implications. For
an extension of the present model to asymmetric transmission mechanisms see Farina and Tamborini (2004).
12
 For analytical tractability, demand and supply shocks are treated as uncorrelated both within each country
and across countries. Hence, one single type of shock at a time will be examined.
13
 In this respect, this model differs from the otherwise similar (but single-country) one employed by Brunila
et al. (2002). They do not include the endogenous component of the budget, but relate budgetary changes
directly to observed shocks. Thus, technically, they call “automatic” what is indeed a “discretionary” variable.
See also paragraph 4.3 below.
14
 There is one single case in which the EMU-wide impact is zero: ρ = -1. This is an interesting case, almost
unnoticed in the literature, where aggregate demand or supply shift from one country to the other. A typical
example on the demand side is bilateral trade (e.g. domestic demand is substituted with imports), whereas
on the supply side one may think of factors movements (e.g. capital is relocated from one country to the
other). For discussion of the former case see Tamborini (2001).
15
 See also Tamborini (2002).
16
 This is a more general tendency in the literature: see Taylor (2000).
17
 The output elasticity of the budget can be changed quite easily after a particular shock has been observed,
for instance by raising the unemployment grant mechanisms or lowering marginal tax rates.
18
 The financial effect entails that a deficit in one country has a contractionary effect both domestically and
abroad. This effect, which figures prominently in the pro-SGP arguments, is a traditional Mundell-Fleming
open-economy crowding out. A fiscal deficit in one country raises the common interest rate and appreciates
the euro rate thereby displacing domestic and foreign demand in all countries. It should be noted that there
are two factors that may limit the crowding out effect in a currency union. The first is that the marginal
impact of a single country’s deficit on the coomon interest rate may be small. The second is that a share of
the exports of each country remains within the union and is therefore unaffected by the common exchange
rate (see e.g. Buiter et al., 1993, Masson and Taylor, 1993).
19
 See also Tamborini (2002), sec. 3.3.
20
 In fact, let ei follow a normal distribution N(0, σ2ei). Then, equations (4.7)  imply the following standard
deviations for output and inflation
Analogously, equations (3.16) yield the the standard deviations for output and inflation under monetary
stabilization. The four statistics are equal only if φ = β.
21
 Taylor argues that no long-run trade-off, and possibly synergy, exists between these two targets. The issue
is notoriously controversial and falls outside the scope of this paper.
22
 The above expression is the intra-EMU trade balance. In general, the overall balance of payments should
be considered. However, in order to make the model more compact and manageable, we assume that the
reserves in extra-EMU currency are entirely centralized at the ECB, so that imbalances in a country’s extra-
EMU payments do not have effects on the domestic money stock. As far as capital movements are concerned,
we assume complete financial integration, so that all EMU bonds are perfect substitutes and in equilibrium
pay the same interest. Consequently, only intra-EMU trade imbalances matter for domestic money creation.
, σ
ρ φ
φ σπ ε
F
= −
+
+
( )
( )
1
2 1
σ
ρ
φ σε
F
z =
+
+
( )
( )
1
2 1
176
177
THE ECB BETWEEN GROWTH AND STABILITY
CHAPTER 8
STABILITY AND GROWTH: THE ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY AND OTHER
POLICY ACTORS IN EMU *
BY
BERNHARD WINKLER
Abstract: This paper reviews some of the key principles of macroeconomic
governance underlying the policy framework established under Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). This framework is based on the notion that stability
is a prerequisite for sustainable growth and that both goals are best served by a
clear assignment of responsibilities across different policy actors. Its conceptual
underpinnings reflect both the revival of new classical ideas in the theoretical
literature since the 1970s and the lessons drawn from the policy experience
over recent decades. Against this background, the paper dismisses calls for a
more activist approach to macroeconomic management and greater policy co-
ordination.
Keywords: Macroeconomic Governance, Economic and Monetary Union,
Stability and Growth Pact, monetary policy
1. Introduction
The Maastricht Treaty (and subsequent Treaty amendments and
regulations) have laid down sound institutional foundations for economic policy-
making in Europe. These have been essentially confirmed in the draft
constitution produced by the European Convention. The competence for
monetary policy is allocated to the Union level and delegated to an independent
institution, the European Central Bank (ECB), which has been assigned the
primary objective of maintaining price stability. Responsibilities for fiscal
policies, labour market policies and structural policies – which primarily affect
the determinants of output, growth and employment – largely remain rooted at
the national level. At the same time, the Treaty – in conjunction with the Stability
ß
 The views expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
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and Growth Pact – subjects national fiscal policies to a set of common rules
and surveillance procedures. This reflects the need for a common framework
for sound public finances inside the currency union as an essential complement
to lasting monetary stability.
Over recent years a number of observers have explicitly or implicitly
challenged this basic allocation of responsibilities and objectives to different
policy actors in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Critics of the current
framework often put forth three strands of proposals. First, there are calls for
monetary policy to redirect priorities to pursuing growth rather than focusing
on the objective of price stability. In a similar vein it is suggested to relax the
constraints of the Stability of Growth Pact in order to liberate fiscal policy to
boost output. A second route to softening the clear separation of roles under
the “Maastricht assignment” takes the form of calls for closer co-ordination
across different policy-makers in order to achieve a balanced “policy-mix”.
Underlying both lines of reasoning is the notion of a trade-off between stability
and growth, which would need to be taken into account either by adopting
multiple objectives or via the co-ordination of policies. Finally, some observers
advocate more generally a renaissance of activist stabilisation policies as
opposed to the medium-term oriented rules-based framework in place, which
has been dubbed the “Brussels consensus” (Tamborini, 2004) or the “Brussels-
Frankfurt consensus” (Sapir et al., 2003). My own preference is to denote as
“Maastricht consensus” the intellectual and legal foundations shaping the
framework agreed in the early 1990s.1
The paper reviews the main arguments underlying the “Maastricht
consensus” related to the appropriate assignment of policy objectives as well
as the issues of policy co-ordination and activist macroeconomic stabilisation.
Section two recalls the key issues in the long-standing debate between Keynesian
and new-classical prescriptions for economic policy-making and the experience
of recent decades. Section three examines the relationship between stability
and growth and concludes that any trade-off – to the extent that it exists at all –
cannot be exploited systematically either in the short or the long run. As regards
the role of monetary policy, maintaining price stability is an essential pre-
condition for the efficient allocation of resources, for sustainable growth and
employment creation in the longer run. In firmly pursuing price stability with a
medium-term perspective, monetary policy, at the same time, also makes its
best contribution to the stabilisation of output and employment in the shorter
run. As regards fiscal policy, a credible commitment to sound public finances
promotes confidence, investment and growth and also allows fiscal stabilisers
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to work most effectively over the cycle. Section four looks at how a set-up for
macroeconomic governance reflecting these ideas has been implemented in
the case of European Monetary Union. Section five offers some concluding
remarks.
2. Key issues for macroeconomic governance
In order to make sense of the basic institutional framework for
macroeconomic governance2 established by the Maastricht Treaty and of the
continuing debate about growth vs. stability ever since, it is useful to briefly
revisit some of the underlying economic concepts and implicit assumptions
about the role of economic policy-making.
At the risk of gross oversimplification two main schools of thought can
be distinguished.  Observers steeped in the Keynesian tradition tend to espouse
an “optimistic” view of policy intervention. They emphasise market failures
and thus the need and scope for an activist management of the economy. Price
stability and growth are seen as conflicting objectives at least in the short term
(or even in the long-run) and macroeconomic policies are directed at steering
aggregate demand in order to achieve an optimal trade-off. The focus is on
cyclical stabilisation of the economy. Both monetary policy and fiscal policy
(as well as wage policies) are seen as contributing to this task, which suggests
a need for close co-ordination.
By contrast, the camp of policy “pessimists” highlights the potential for
government failure rather than market failure. Drawing on new-classical
propositions they are more sceptical about the effectiveness of policy
intervention. Moreover, cyclical fluctuations are sometimes regarded as a natural
or even beneficial feature of market economies. The long-run neutrality of money
is stressed. Instead of short-run stabilisation greater emphasis is placed on
appropriate incentives and credible institutional design for long-run stability.
From this perspective a stable economic environment – and price stability in
particular – are regarded as pre-conditions for growth. Any short-run trade-off
that may exist cannot be exploited systematically and the primary responsibilities
for the two objectives are best assigned to different policy makers.
The influence of these two main schools of thought has varied over time
both within the economics profession and in policy circles. The 1960s were no
doubt the heyday of policy optimism. Faith in macroeconomic demand
management – based on the presumption of an exploitable Phillips Curve trade-
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off – was then severely battered in the 1970s and 1980s both by the theoretical
assault of new classical economics and the dismal experience of stagflation.
The Maastricht Treaty and reforms aimed at central bank independence and
better control of public finances in a number of countries around the world in
the 1990s reflect the new consensus and the lessons learned from the earlier
experience.3
2.1 The assignment problem
The first fundamental issue is the assignment of different policy objectives
to different policy-makers. Under the presumption of a long-run trade-off
between inflation and growth, widely held until the 1970s (or if macroeconomic
policies are mainly focussing on the short-run stabilisation of aggregate
demand), it was regarded as natural to see monetary and fiscal policies as
instruments to be used jointly and as serving the same shared macroeconomic
objectives. In addition, the responsibility for keeping inflation in check was
often extended or passed on to wage and income policies, in which governments
were also seeking to be involved in this period. The practical experience with
the Keynesian paradigm of macroeconomic demand management was
disillusioning. Attempts to exploit perceived Philipps curve trade-offs typically
resulted in higher inflation as well as higher unemployment in the longer run.
Wage and incomes policies usually proved ineffective in holding down inflation
in a sustained manner. Short-run concerns over output and employment by
governments tended to crowd out the longer-run requirements for stability in
the absence of strong institutional counter-weights provided by independent
central banks or sufficient discipline imported via exchange rate pegs.
By contrast, the (new) classical assignment that gained currency in the
1980s and 1990s is ultimately based on the long-run neutrality of money and
reflects a conceptual dichotomy between the real and the nominal side of the
economy. The primary objective of price stability is assigned to monetary policy
since it determines the price level but cannot affect real variables in the longer
run. The growth of output is fundamentally determined by technological factors
and the incentives to invest, save and consume by all agents in the economy.
These factors can be influenced by fiscal policies as well as a range of structural
policies. The promotion of conditions for long-term growth is thus the task of
governments. Finally, autonomous wage policies determine the price and
conditions in the labour market and thus the level of employment in the economy.
This classical assignment – with a focus on long-run relationships – suggests a
clear division of responsibilities among independent institutions. A number of
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arguments reviewed in the following support this assignment also as a basis for
a sound medium-term framework for macroeconomic policy, even if Keynesian
features of the economy mean that over shorter horizons macroeconomic
variables are interdependent.
2.2. The role of credibility, rules and expectations
A first set of challenges to the traditional Keynesian paradigm of demand
management – in conjunction with the reaffirmation of the long-run vertical
Phillips curve and the natural rate hypothesis – relates to the role of credibility
and expectations. As stressed in the new-classical models revolutionising
macroeconomics in the 1970s and 1980s forward-looking economic agents
forming rational expectations could in many cases counteract or neutralise the
impact of macroeconomic policies. More generally, as captured in the well-
know Lucas Critique, the effects of specific policy actions on the economy
depend on the nature of the economic policy regime in place. For example,
attempts to exploit a particular pre-existing economic relationship could become
self-defeating if economic agents adapt their expectations and behaviour to
take the policy makers’ actions into account and thus the earlier relationship
can disappear or be substantially altered. In the extreme, only idiosyncratic
unanticipated policy actions have an impact on the economy, but not the
systematic component of stabilisation policy.4
The critical role of expectations in the transmission underlines the
importance of credibility for policy making. Central bank independence, a strict
commitment to policy rules and a clear focus on the single overriding objective
of price stability have been offered as solutions to potential time inconsistency
problems in the field of monetary policy, which could arise if a single authority
pursues multiple objectives in a discretionary manner (Barro and Gordon, 1983).
In a similar vein the effectiveness of fiscal policy also depends on expectations
in the context of intertemporal models with optimising private agents. For
example, in the extreme case of Ricardian equivalence, any intended Keynesian
stimulus by public deficit spending will be offset by increased private saving in
anticipation of higher taxes in the future (Barro, 1974). Both for monetary and
fiscal policies, potential credibility problems of discretionary actions support
policy frameworks designed to discipline and constrain policymakers’ freedom.
2.3. The nature of business cycles
Further doubts on the need for active stabilisation policy have come from
economists emphasising real business cycles drawing on evidence that a
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significant part of cyclical output variability can be attributed to real rather
than nominal or demand shocks (Lucas, 2003). Such real shocks are driven by
innovations in technology and cannot be effectively offset by monetary policy.
From this perspective, business cycle fluctuations are equilibrium phenomena
that do not warrant policy intervention. On the contrary, it could even be argued
that a smoothing of the cycle could be detrimental to innovation and growth if
it contributes to delaying necessary structural adjustments or to the prolonging
of macroeconomic imbalances.
2.4. Short-run stabilisation vs long-run stability
Apart from the advances in economic modelling through the use of
intertemporal optimising models, the greater role of forward-looking financial
markets and asset prices in the economy as well as the experience of accelerating
deficit and debt dynamics in the 1970s and 1980s have also led to increased
attention to the issue of sustainability of macroeconomic developments relative
to the emphasis on cyclical stabilisation. For monetary policy the sensitivity of
forward-looking financial markets underscores the need to maintain confidence
and to focus on providing a reliable anchor for long-run inflation expectations.
This limits the leeway to exploit any short-term trade-offs. Likewise it is
increasingly recognised that sustainable public finances are a precondition of
an effective working of fiscal stabilisers in the economy. If debt or deficit levels
are seen as excessive and unsustainable by markets and the public at large,
negative confidence effects can easily outweigh the traditional Keynesian impact
from counter-cyclical policies. Again, the design of a credible and lasting policy
regime becomes the dominant concern from this perspective.
2.5. Uncertainty and policy activism
In recent times, economists have started to examine more closely the role of
uncertainty for policy making and the substantial informational requirements
needed for a successful implementation of active demand management policies.
Long, variable and uncertain lags in the policy transmission stressed by Milton
Friedman have long been regarded as the key impediment to activist policies
and as reasons to advocate rule-based approaches to macro-economic
governance. The difficulty of “fine-tuning” the timing of economic policy
measures with respect to the business cycle is also confirmed by the practical
experience from the 1960s and 1970s. Recent work has focused in particular
on data uncertainty regarding the measurement of key concepts like the output
gap or the Philipps curve relationship as well as more fundamental model
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uncertainty as to the true functioning of the economy. In an environment of
limited knowledge about economic relationships and parameters an activist
approach to policy could easily introduce additional uncertainty into the system
rather than perform a stabilising function.5
2.6. Political economy and institutional design
In addition to advances in the theoretical macroeconomic literature over
recent decades increasing attention has also been paid to institutional details
and to imperfections in the political process. Public choice theorists have long
departed from the traditional assumption of a benign welfare-maximising
government but institutional analysis and a greater focus on incentive structures
and procedures in the policy process has only recently become more common
in mainstream macroeconomic discussions. This has led to a better
understanding of why experiments with text-book cyclical stabilisation have
often not fulfilled expectations in practice, but have usually produced undesirable
long-run effects, such as an inherent deficit bias over the cycle leading to debt
accumulation over time.6
2.7. Accountability, transparency and policy co-ordination
The clear division of responsibilities and primary policy objectives under
the classical rather than the Keynesian policy assignment and a rules-based,
minimalist and medium-term approach to policy-co-ordination can also be seen
as beneficial from the perspective of accountability and transparency. It should
enhance performance incentives and facilitate monitoring by the public. By
contrast, more ambitious attempts to co-ordinate policies in view of shorter-
run interdependencies would suffer from the general shortcomings of demand
management identified before. Activist policy co-ordination exacerbates
information requirements regarding the timely identification of the relevant
spillovers. It also raises the additional issue of credible enforcement of jointly
agreed policies as well as complicating communication and diluting
responsibilities. These problems would seem to be especially severe in the
European context of macroeconomic governance exercised by multiple layers
of responsibilities interacting at European, national and subnational levels.
3.  The relationship between stability and growth: theory and evidence
The choice of the appropriate framework for macroeconomic governance
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depends on the relationship between the main economic variables pursued as
policy objectives and how they are influenced by different policy actors. In
particular, the first question is in which way monetary policy can contribute to
growth as well as price stability. The second question regards the role of fiscal
policy for economic growth and output stabilisation as well as its possible
contribution in sustaining an environment of price stability.
3.1. The role of monetary policy
It is commonly accepted that monetary policy determines the price level
in the long run, but influences both prices and real activity at shorter horizon.
There is a somewhat more limited consensus that inflation affects growth
adversely in the longer run and there are different views on how monetary
policy should take shorter-term trade-offs into account.
As regards the long-run, the theoretical benchmark position is the long-
run, neutrality of money and thus a vertical Phillips curve as posited by Friedman
and Phelps. Some earlier theoretical contributions had argued for a positive
relationship between inflation and long run growth based on increased capital
accumulation due to portfolio shifts out of money into real capital (Tobin, 1965).
In general, the theoretical results crucially depend on the way the functions of
money are introduced. E.g. when the role of money as a transactions medium
is highlighted – such as in cash-in-advance models (e.g. in Cooley and Hansen,
1989) or in models with money as a factor of production (Danthine, 1985) –
higher inflation usually leads to lower output growth in the long run.
Overall, empirical work has not given support to the view of a long-run
trade-off between growth and inflation and most studies, such as Barro (1997)
and Andres and Hernando (1999), find that inflation is detrimental to growth.
Evidence regarding very low rates of inflation, however, is scarce and somewhat
more controversial. An environment of price stability should, in general, be
conducive to growth and employment, since it allows the price mechanism to
operate most efficiently in allocating resources in the economy. Price stability
reduces inflation risk premia incorporated in long-term bond yields and other
contracts, thereby also contributing to lower financing costs for investment
and growth. Maintaining price stability also avoids unwelcome distortions due
to nominal tax systems and arbitrary redistribution between debtors and creditors
as argued in the overview by Issing (2001).
On the basis of the above, maintaining an environment of price stability
– at least over the longer term –  provides the best foundation for lasting growth
and employment creation and is a pre-condition for a well-functioning market
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economy. The recognition of the fundamental common good characteristic of
stable money in the interest of all citizens is the basis for delegating monetary
policy to an independent central bank and assigning it the primary objective of
price stability. If there were a durable trade-off between growth and stability –
possibly associated with partisan interests – it would be harder to justify taking
decisions on such trade-offs outside the regular democratic process.
This leaves the issue of how to best deal with shorter-term trade-offs
between stability and growth. From the arguments reviewed in the previous
section it is doubtful that such trade-offs could be systematically exploited.
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that, first, such trade-offs might in general
be rather limited in scope and, second, that they can well be taken into account
within a framework of monetary policy geared to maintaining price stability
over the medium term.
Conducting monetary policy in order to maintaining price stability over
the medium term will in many cases at the same time contribute to cyclical
output smoothing. In particular, in the case of demand shocks the appropriate
response of monetary policy in order to stabilise price developments will tend
to also stabilise demand and output. Moreover, a credible commitment to
keeping prices stable, i.e. pre-empting inflationary and deflationary departures
from price stability, will stabilise expectations, promote confidence, safeguard
real purchasing power of consumers and promote investment via low and stable
long-term interest rates. Through these channels monetary policy aiming at
price stability can also make a contribution to stabilising economic activity
even in the shorter run. In the case of pure supply shocks a short-term trade-off
could, in principle, appear. However, if monetary policy reacts gradually with
a view to medium term price stability effects on output remain limited. By
contrast, a monetary policy aiming actively at fine-tuning economic activity in
the short-term could often end up becoming itself a destabilising factor.
3.2. The role of fiscal policy
Also with regard to fiscal policy longer-term and shorter-term effects on
growth as well as on price stability can be distinguished. Governments (reflecting
inter alia electorate’s preferences on the provision of public goods and income
distribution) decide on spending and taxation priorities which affect incentives
for innovation and long-run growth in the economy. Fiscal policy can also
perform an important role for cyclical smoothing, partly due to automatic built-
in stabilisers, partly through discretionary decisions.
The effects of fiscal policy on growth operate both via the structure and
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quality of expenditures and revenues as well as through the levels and the
corresponding deficit and debt dynamics. The experience of the 1970s and
1980s has led to a shift of emphasis away from demand management to supply
side considerations and heightened attention to the longer-term costs of deficits
and debt accumulation. There are several arguments for adopting a framework
for sound and sustainable public finances over the medium and longer term.
Sound public finances avoid crowding out of private investment, they limit
uncertainty and risk premia in the long-term planning of private agents and
thereby also promote growth and investment. In addition, longer-run budgetary
discipline avoids passing the tax burden on to future generations and thus
supports confidence in the economy and intergenerational justice.
Such non-Keynesian effects can counteract the conventional impact of
deficit spending in the short-run and even lead to a non-standard negative fiscal
multiplier, which dampens growth and employment. Conversely, credible
consolidation of public finance could be growth-positive. Such effects are most
likely if the initial state of public finances is unhealthy and further deficits raise
doubts on sustainability, thereby increasing risk premia and interest rates,
depressing investment and consumption. There is evidence of significant non-
Keynesian effects in particular episodes of consolidation. Even if fiscal
multipliers are usually still positive in most cases they are quite small, suggesting
a limited effectiveness of fiscal policies or largely offsetting influences from
traditional Keynesian and non-Keynesian channels.7
In conclusion, a medium-term framework for fiscal discipline can be
seen as useful from a Keyensian perspective in order to restore room for
manoeuvre and enhance the effectiveness of counter-cyclical stabilisation. It
can also be championed by those who are sceptical of activist policies given
the lags and uncertainties in the economic transmission as well as in the political
process. From this perspective emphasis would be placed on letting built-in
stabilisers operate effectively instead of pursuing discretionary policy
intervention. In either case, stability and growth are not in conflict but
complementary objectives over the longer term and, in many cases, also in the
shorter term. Sound public finances are a pre-requisite for longer-term growth
as well as contributing to successful cyclical stabilisation. Finally, a credible
medium-term framework for public finances also facilitates the task of monetary
policy of maintaining price stability. Without fiscal constraints doubts over
longer-term fiscal sustainability could spill-over into long-run inflation
expectations. In the extreme, as posited by the controversial fiscal theory of the
price level, the price level could become driven by undisciplined fiscal policy
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rather than being pinned down by monetary policy, as in traditional models
(Woodford, 2001). A rule-based medium-term approach to fiscal policy should
also limit shorter-term price pressures and render fiscal policies more steady
and thus easier to take into account in the conduct of monetary policy.
4. The framework for macroeconomic governance in the euro area
The formation of EMU has created a framework for economic policy-
making in Europe which is unique in history. The single monetary policy
conducted by the European Central Bank is oriented towards a union-wide
objective. Other areas of economic policies largely remain a national
responsibility but, in the case of fiscal policies, are constrained by a set of
common rules and surveillance procedures. Overall the Treaty provides for a
clear allocation of basic policy responsibilities subject to a set of shared
objectives and guiding principles for the conduct of economic policies in Europe.
The framework rests on the recognition that stability – in terms of price stability
and stable public finances – is an essential precondition for sustainable growth
and also the best contribution to dampen cyclical fluctuations as discussed in
section 3. This “Maastricht consensus” thus can be seen to broadly correspond
to the basic “new-classical” solution to the assignment problem and takes into
account many of the issues in macroeconomic governance discussed in section
2. The framework also reflects the practical experience and the disillusionment
with the earlier Keynesian paradigm during the 1970s and 1980s.
4.1. Monetary policy
The cornerstones of the monetary constitution adopted at Maastricht and
confirmed in the draft constitution by the Convention are central bank
independence and the clear focus on price stability. The Treaty has
unambiguously assigned to the ECB and the single monetary policy the
maintenance of price stability in the euro area as its primary objective (Article
105). To fulfil its mandate effectively, the Treaty has granted the ECB and the
national central banks of independence from political interference and foresees
a clear institutional separation from other economic policy actors. Article 101
prohibits the monetary financing of public deficits and Article 108 safeguards
institutional, personal, functional and financial independence of the ECB’s
decision-making bodies. The Treaty stipulates that the ECB and its decision-
making bodies shall not seek or take instructions from Community institutions
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or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body.
Conversely it states that community institutions and governments undertake not
to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB.
The Treaty clearly separates the chapter on monetary policy from the
chapter on economic policies. It does not refer to policy co-ordination between
monetary policy and fiscal policy, in contrast to the co-ordination of economic
policies among Member States under Article 99. At the same time, the Treaty
takes into account interdependencies between policies. Article 105 states that
“the primary objective of the ECB shall be to maintain price stability. Without
prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ECB shall support the general
economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the objectives
of the Community as laid down in Article 2.” These Community objectives
include a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic
activities, a high level of employment, sustainable and non-inflationary growth,
a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance.8
This formulation of the mandate is consistent with the notion that the
ECB’s monetary policy contributes to the wider Community objectives through
the maintenance of price stability and may to some extent take other objectives
into account in the pursuit of its primary objective. It reflects the new-classical
assignment and an explicit rejection of a long-run trade-off between stability
and growth. The formulation of the mandate is in line with most modern central
bank legislation, for example in countries that have adopted a formal inflation
targeting regime in the 1990s. It is different from the multiple goals – including
a high level of employment and stable interest rates in addition to stable prices
– which were assigned to the US Federal Reserve in a much earlier period.
However, in practice the Fed has, at least since the 1970s – in practice also
stressed that price stability is regarded as a precondition for sustainable growth
thereby refuting the notion of rival long-run objectives.
Overall the ECB has been successful in delivering on its primary objective
of price stability during the first five years of its operation. Despite repeated
adverse price shocks longer-term inflation expectations have been firmly
anchored at levels consistent with the definition of price stability announced
by the ECB in 1998. Against this background, the disappointing growth
performance in the euro area has led some observers to call on the ECB to
focus more on growth rather than price stability. This neglects the fact that
monetary policy has only a single policy instrument at its disposal which can
only be directed at a single policy objective in a consistent manner. In addition,
attempting to use monetary policy for active output stabilisation could easily
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become counterproductive if this introduces additional volatility into interest
rates or if credibility is reduced. This could worsen any short-run trade off and
lead to higher long-term interest rates and lower growth.
By contrast a monetary policy, which maintains a clear focus on price
stability over the medium term already takes growth into account in several
ways. First, an environment of price stability is the best precondition for an
effective functioning of the price mechanism, safeguards the purchasing power
of income and the value of savings, promotes confidence and thus consumption
and investment. Second, output developments and other indicators of the real
economy are naturally among the factors influencing future price developments.
Third, a medium-term orientation of monetary policy implies gradual
and measured responses to economic shocks that lead to temporary deviations
from price stability and thus contributes to dampening output fluctuations while
maintaining a clear focus on the primary objective at all times (ECB, 2003).
Fourth, focusing on medium-term price stability underlines the primary
responsibility of other policy makers, namely in the field of structural policies,
to undertake reforms that strengthen the long-run growth potential of the
economy and the capacity to create profitable opportunities for investment and
employment creation. The weak growth and employment performance of many
European countries is largely not of a cyclical nature but reflects structural
deficiencies. These cannot be addressed by monetary policy, but – by affecting
the “speed limit” of non-inflationary growth – are naturally taken into account
in the setting of monetary policy.
4.2. Fiscal policy
Also on the side of fiscal policy the emphasis of the “Maastricht
consensus” is on a medium-term, rules-based framework for stability. The Treaty
reflects the experience that budgetary constraints may be needed as a disciplinary
device in order to safeguard sound public finances within single countries and
also to limit negative externalities for the euro area as a whole (Beetsma and
Uhlig, 1999). In particular, excessive budget deficits are to be avoided according
to Article 104 of the Treaty and the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact.
In addition, a ‘non bail-out clause’ rules out that either the Community or
governments can take on liabilities for the debts incurred by an individual
Member State (Article 103). This should help to limit the risk that governments
accumulate excessive debt and shift part of the burden of debt and deficits to
their partners in the euro area or that unsound fiscal policies in one country
lead to higher risk premia and interest rates in the area as a whole.9
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The framework for fiscal policy stresses a medium-term orientation and
also directs attention to long-term objectives and sustainability. Article 104 of
the Treaty assesses the soundness of public finance positions against the
benchmark of two numerical criteria: the 3% deficit ceiling and a 60% reference
value for the debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio. The Stability and
Growth Pact requires that countries aim at a ‘medium-term objective for the
budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus’. This medium-term objective
should allow for sufficient breathing room to allow Member States to deal with
normal cyclical fluctuations without breaching the 3% of GDP reference value.
The Pact also specifies circumstances in which an excess over the 3% of GDP
deficit limit can be considered ‘exceptional’. It backs up the obligations already
contained in the Treaty. On the one hand it contains preventive measures of
soft co-ordination and multilateral surveillance, in particular by requiring that
the euro area countries submit stability programmes on a yearly basis. On the
other hand, it provides for deterrence by foreseeing sanctions to be imposed in
case of continued breaches of the deficit ceiling. The fiscal rules, in this way,
intend to combine medium-term discipline with a degree of flexibility. They
incorporate a soft from of a balanced-budget constraint with significant room
for manoeuvre within agreed limits. Like the monetary policy framework the
fiscal set-up reflects the key feature of the “Maastricht consensus” that stability
is regarded as a precondition for sustainable growth.
From a longer-term historical perspective the Maastricht criteria on public
finance have been instrumental in spurring remarkable progress in consolidation
in the run-up to Monetary Union. A large majority of – mainly smaller – Member
States in the euro area has, until recently, been able to reach or maintain budget
positions with a sufficient safety margin to cope with cyclical fluctuations.
However, a number of countries has not undertaken sufficient adjustment in
the transition to the new regime. In these cases the 3% limit has been breached
repeatedly in the downturn as structural balances and medium-term balances
had not improved enough during the preceding period of higher growth (Issing,
2004). Clearly, ex post this can pose a dilemma, where in the short-run the
requirements for stability and growth point in different directions. However,
calls for relaxing the constraints just when they are starting to bite neglect
longer-term costs for both stability and growth that could arise if the credibility
of the overall framework is put into doubt.
In this vein, the decision by Finance Ministers on 25 November 2003
not to implement the sanctions procedure foreseen by the Stability and Growth
Pact in the cases of France and Germany has underlined the political
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vulnerability of the enforcement of the rules and has prompted a discussion of
possible reforms of the Pact. At the same time it is noteworthy that,
notwithstanding the procedural dispute with the Commission, both countries
concerned committed themselves to reduce their deficits below the three percent
threshold within the timeframe envisaged in the Commission recommendations.
In this way the Pact continues to exert influence, even in a situation where its
legal application is in doubt. A simple set of fiscal rules is an indispensable
safeguard for stability in the Monetary Union and preserving sound public
finances also fundamentally remains in the longer-term interest of Member
States. If anything this suggests a strengthening of implementation rather than
an overhaul of the rules themselves.
4.3.  Policy-mix and policy co-ordination
Both the monetary policy framework and the fiscal set of rules reflecting
the “Maastricht consensus” have been criticised by proponents of a more activist
management of the macroeconomy as excessively rigid. A further, more subtle,
avenue to re-introduce scope for Keynesian demand management comes in the
form of calls for closer co-ordination between the single monetary policy and
fiscal policy actors for the euro area as a whole. In this way, it is argued, a
better combination of stability and growth can be obtained via a more balanced
macro-economic policy-mix or by promoting structural reforms (Sapir at al.,
2003). If such co-ordination is to be understood as some form of ex ante joint
agreement to undertake policy actions aimed at a particular combination of
growth and stability it would clearly undermine the clear division of
responsibilities under the Maastricht policy assignment. Moreover, either any
such agreement would be redundant confirming if each policy continues to
fully serve its respective objective, or, it would reflect compromises to the
detriment of the credibility of both sides.
The notion of a balanced policy-mix rests on a Keynesian presumption
that both fiscal and monetary policies should be jointly geared towards the
management of aggregate demand in stabilising exogenous shocks (Dixit and
Lambertini, 2001). This is subject to the limitations and reservations on fine-
tuning interventionism mentioned in earlier sections. Such difficulties would
be compounded by the sheer practical obstacles for organising effective
agreement and implementation among a multitude of national and European
actors. If co-ordination requires following policy courses that would not be
regarded as optimal from the perspective of any individual policy actor, incentive
and enforcement problems come on top of the need to share and agree on
192
underlying information and assessment of the economic situation. Any attempts
at co-ordination that extend beyond the regular informal exchange of views
and information – i.e. explaining policy on the basis of the given respective
mandates – risks confusing the allocation of responsibilities and thus reduce
the transparency and accountability of the overall economic policy framework
for the general public (Alesina et al., 2001).
Moreover, monetary policy and fiscal policies each operating within clear
and transparent medium-term policy frameworks based on well-defined
objectives can take existing interdependencies into account. Monetary policy
geared to price stability will react to changes in fiscal policies to the extent that
they affect the outlook for price stability and – as far as aggregate demand
effects are involved – this will naturally imply a stabilising response for prices
and output. Conversely, if national governments (and also social partners) take
the single monetary policy’s credible commitment to maintain price stability
as given, when deciding upon their own actions, this will also have a stabilising
influence on macroeconomic outcomes. In this way an appropriate underlying
policy assignment together with systematic patterns of medium-term
implementation can contribute to implicitly co-ordinated macroeconomic
outcomes ex post. These are in general superior to any discretionary and explicit
attempts at ad hoc co-ordination, in particular because they avoid introducing
new uncertainties and credibility problems (Winkler, 1999).
One way to think about the implicit co-ordination properties of the
Maastricht assignment of objectives is as a Stackelberg equilibrium in the context
of strategic interaction between monetary and fiscal policy makers. If monetary
authorities can credibly pre-commit to the maintenance of price stability, this
commitment will then be taken as given by other policymakers. Such a set-up,
supported by the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact serves to limit
policy conflicts and uncertainty, avoid “leadership battles” and ensures a
favourable regime characterised by a combination of price stability and fiscal
prudence (Canzoneri and Diba, 1998).
5. Concluding remarks
Five years into the operation of Monetary Union in Europe calls for a re-
orientation of macroeconomic policies – both fiscal and monetary – towards
growth rather than stability have become more widespread in the face of
persistent economic weakness in the euro area over the last years. The very
Bernhard Winkler - Stability and Growth: the Role of Monetary Policy and Other Policy Actors in EMU
193
THE ECB BETWEEN GROWTH AND STABILITY
success in achieving price stability and considerable – if not always sufficient
– improvements in public finances over the 1990s seems to have contributed to
the appetite to re-direct priorities now in a different direction.
This paper has recalled the main rationales of the “Maastricht consensus”
underlying the policy framework in place. Stable money and sound public
finances are seen as a precondition for sustainable growth rather than as
conflicting objectives. Objectives for stability and growth are clearly assigned
to independent actors, policies are rules-oriented and pursued in a medium-
term perspective. The basic consensus underpinning the Maastricht framework
seems to be still in place, as testified by the reluctance of the European
Convention to re-open any issue of substance regarding the monetary and the
fiscal framework agreed in the early 1990s. However, this consensus remains
fragile as shown by the debate on and (lack of) implementation of the Stability
and Growth Pact.
Often the US approach to macroeconomic management is lauded as more
pragmatic and flexible and as an example for Europe to follow. The performance
of the US economy, especially over the latter half of the 1990s, indeed seems
impressive compared to the euro area and the US also appears to rebound more
quickly after adverse economic shocks. However, one should not forget that
the US example also shows that sustained price stability and the successful
consolidation of public finances over the 1990s were important pre-conditions
for the economic success in that period. At the same time, the driving factors
have to be seen in the innovative capacity and flexibility of the US economy in
the context of favourable conditions for entrepreneurial activity, innovation
and technological change. Greater flexibility in wage and price formation as
well as deeper financial markets in the US also plays a role.
Against this background the key for improving Europe’s growth
performance lies with structural reforms as envisaged under the Lisbon Agenda.
There are no easy shortcuts. A return to activist macroeconomic policies would
likely prove a distraction. Higher inflation or higher deficits and debt cannot be
part of a sustainable solution. Otherwise there is a risk that the lessons of the
past will have to be learned all over again.
1
 See Heipertz and Verdun (this volume) for an account of the historical constellation shaping the consensus
behind the Stability and Growth Pact. Most recently, the failure by the ECOFIN Council on 25 November
2003 to implement, in the cases of France and Germany, the sanctions procedure foreseen in the Pact called
the durability of this consensus into question.
NOTES
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2
 The term “macroeconomic governance” is used loosely to denote the formal and informal set of rules
comprising the assignment of policy objectives and responsibilities as well as influencing the behaviour and
interaction among various macroeconomic policy actors within a given allocation of tasks. The concept of
governance thus includes softer forms of co-operation, social norms, conventions and enforcement beyond
the official formal system (see Dixit, 2003, for a theoretical approach). The notion of “governance”, while
not well-defined, has in recent times been widely used in the fields of development policies (e.g. in the
publications of the World Bank), “corporate governance” in the wake of business accounting scandals and as
“economic governance” been employed to capture the multi-faceted policy framework in the European
Union (e.g. the “Working Group on Economic Governance” of the European Convention, the use of the term
by the European Commission and the discussion in Torres, this volume).
3
 See the collection of papers discussed at the 2002 edition of the Jackson Hole Symposium (Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, 2002) for a good overview of the current mainstream consensus in the economics
profession and in the central bank community, which continues to hold despite some signs of a revival of a
more active role of stabilisation policies.
4
 Early seminal contributions came from Lucas (1972) and Sargent and Wallace (1973).
5
 See Orphanides (2002, 2003) and Ehrmann and Smets (2001) for research on the impact of data or parameter
uncertainty.
6
 Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Roubini and Sachs (1989) were among the first to highlight political economy
factors for fiscal policy.
7
 See Briotti (2004) for a recent overview, Hemming, Mahfouz and Schimmelpfennig (2002) and the early
case studies in Giavazzi and Pagano (1990).
8
 The draft constitution submitted by the European Convention contains a reformulated, but similar list of
Union objectives in Art. 3 in part I. However, in the draft the previous reference to “non-inflationary” growth
has been replaced by “balanced growth”. The descriptions of the ECB’s mandate and independence remain
unchanged in substance.
9
 See Artis and Winkler (1998) Buti and Sapir (1998) and Ongena and Winkler (2001) for more detailed
discussions of the fiscal framework in EMU.
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CHAPTER 9
THE NEW ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE EURO-ZONE
BY
TEODORO DARIO TOGATI
Abstract: In an attempt to explain the present crisis in Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) macroeconomic policymaking, this paper identifies two key
problems in the design of current policy guidelines. The first is that official
EMU prescriptions lack ‘internal consistency’, and thus credibility, as they do
not follow from any specific macroeconomic theory. The second problem is
that EMU policy prescriptions lack ‘external consistency’ as they are not in
tune with the New Economy (NE). Current EMU prescriptions would be
adequate only if the NE consisted in solely a positive supply-side shock causing
increased stability of the system. This chapter holds, instead, that the NE also
has negative effects on the demand side and that these may give rise to
endogenous instability and major deviation from satisfactory levels of income
growth. These shortcomings explain why the actual policies implemented in
the EMU are forced to depart from official policy rules and become more
pragmatic. This chapter argues, however, that pragmatic policy moves are not
enough. New policy guidelines reflecting the complexities of the NE are called
for if the current crisis is to be overcome.
Keywords: New economy, euro-zone, new-classical macroeconomics,
Keynesian model, internal and external consistency, policy guidelines
1. Introduction
The New Economy (NE) poses fresh challenges to policymakers in
advanced countries. In March 2000, these challenges were taken up by the
European Summit which set the following strategic goal for the Union over the
next decade: ‘to become the most competitive knowledge-based economy of the
world, capable of sustaining economic growth with more and better jobs and
greater social cohesion’ (European Council 2000). In what follows, I suggest that
current Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) macroeconomic policies are not
adequate for such a task. As clearly testified by recent debates over the Stability
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and Growth Pact (SGP), the entire EMU project is facing a serious crisis.
The aim of this paper is to try and explain such a crisis. For this purpose,
it is useful to make a distinction between the official policy prescriptions, which,
together with the theoretical framework constitute the so-called ‘Brussels
consensus’ (see e.g. Tamborini, 2004), and the actual policies implemented by
governments and the ECB. In my view, two main problems undermine EMU
policies. The first is that the official prescriptions are not credible because they
lack ‘internal consistency’; in particular, they do not seem to follow from any
specific macroeconomic theory. On close scrutiny, they appear to combine
contrasting aspects of two alternative approaches to demand management in
an uneasy coexistence. It can be noted, for example, that the SGP implies a
tighter fiscal stance than the Maastricht Treaty (MT). Moreover, the ECB relies
on a mixed strategy based on two different policy rules, (e.g. monetary and
inflation targeting).
The second problem is that EMU policy prescriptions lack ‘external
consistency’ in that they are not consonant with the NE. In particular, I suggest
that when the Euro was launched, European policy-makers misinterpreted the
nature of the NE.  Current EMU prescriptions involving strict inflationary and
budgetary rules would be appropriate only if the NE consisted in merely a
positive supply side shock making the system more stable, as maintained by
New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM). In line with a broad Keynesian view,
I believe, instead, that the NE involves not only improvements in the supply-
side but also negative effects on the demand side, and that these may give rise
to endogenous instability an In this view, EMU prescriptions appear to be sorely
lacking: their reliance on such strict rules within the context of the NE can only
make the problem worse.
The Keynesian perspective seems to be justified by current European
events today. The actual policies implemented in the EMU must necessarily
depart from official policy rules to become more pragmatic. This can be seen
in the failure of several countries to comply with the SGP as well as in their
attenpt to seek inspiration from the US, which is certainly more highly aware
of the fragile nature of the NE.
This chapter argues, however, that pragmatic moves alone cannot resolve
the current crisis. While certainly useful, pragmatism is more of a short-run
defensive strategy than an alternative approach. A successful solution will require
the design of new policy guidelines that are better equipped to deal with the NE.
What follows is an analysis of these problems which I hope will shed
new light on the issues at stake. In section 1, I propose a broad definition of the
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NE. In sections 2 and 3, I focus on the two major interpretations of the NE,
which can be used as benchmarks for the assessment of EMU policies. In section
4, I show that EMU policies do not follow clearly from existing theoretical
frameworks and are not in tune with the NE. In section 5, I analyze the pragmatic
moves adopted by European policy-makers to remedy these flaws. In sections
6 and 7, I argue that simple pragmatic solutions may be inadequate and suggest
alternative policy strategies.
1. Key features of the NE
The NE is a complex phenomenon.1 In my view it is not just Internet
plus the old economy, it also includes many other features which have dual
effects (positive and negative), on both the aggregate supply and demand sides
of the economy.
One such feature is ‘multiplicity’, which refers to the large number of
competitors, relations and opportunities for individuals and countries created
by globalization.2 The NE implies a strong acceleration of this relatively old
phenomenon, resulting in some positive effects on the stability of the world
economy. It brings about a higher degree of market unification greater integration
among its key participants, leading to benefits for productivity and potential
income in all countries. However, ‘multiplicity’ also leads to higher instability
of the world economy: For example, it can generate greater fragmentation of
society, promote  growing inequality across regions and nations or increase the
likelihood for mutual reinforcement of  downturns and financial crises in
different countries. Thus, for example, a demand shock in one country will
have a wider international impact than in the past (The Economist, 28–9-2002:
31).
Another feature of the NE is ‘rapidity’, i.e. the increased speed of
technological innovation with respect to the past, as can be seen in the
exponential growth of the power and diffusion of Information and
Communications Technologies (ICT). It is bound to have positive effects on
stability because of its effects on the supply side. By allowing faster transmission
of information and greater rapidity of decisions, ICT improves the efficiency
of markets and the functioning of the price mechanism, induces a smoother
production system and stimulates a more flexible use of labour. This, in turn
reduces the natural rate of unemployment and inflation, raises real wages and
grants swift adjustments of economies to external shocks.
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However, ‘rapidity’ also makes the system more unstable, by increasing
the vulnerability of aggregate demand. Insofar as ‘rapidity’ shortens agents’
horizons (as a result of faster product cycles, for example), investment is less
responsive to interest rate changes, and consumption tends to become more
volatile and vulnerable to sophisticated marketing strategies and the ‘state of
confidence’. Moreover, consumption is negatively influenced by the greater
income inequality stemming from changes in the job composition of jobs related
to the diffusion of ICT.
Finally, a third characteristic of the NE is its ‘lightness’, i.e. ‘weightless’
factors, such as intangibles (knowledge and human capital, R&D and public
infrastructure) and financial assets, play a greater role  in the NE than in the
past (see e.g. Stiroh 2000: 43). This feature, too, tends to have dual effects on
stability. On the one hand, it implies the extension of the market logic to new
sectors, such as culture or entertainment, and the expansion of old ones, such
as financial markets. This has positive effects on employment, on the ability of
consumers to smooth out their spending over time in the face of variations of
income (Blanchard and Simon 2001: 163), on the financing of investment (see
e.g. Baily 2001: 215, D’Avolio, Gildor and Shleifer 2001: 125, The Economist,
28-9-2002: 29, Woodford 2001: 297) and on sustainability (the reduction in
use of raw materials).
On the other hand, like ‘rapidity’, ‘lightness’ also increases the fragility
of aggregate demand. Intangibles are more difficult to price than standard
physical goods and give rise to higher volatility in financial markets, with adverse
effects on investment. Moreover, the new financial instruments increase the
instability of the demand for money and induce agents to acquire too much
debt during periods of boom (Godley and Izurieta (2002: 41). They also promote
diminishing accounting standards and fraudulent practice (see e.g. Stiglitz 2002;
Financial Times, 18-5-2002).
2. The New Classical Macroeconomics and the NE
a) General remarks on stability
Proponents of the New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM) maintain that
the NE is more stable than the old economy. While this view is clearly based
on assumptions about the intrinsic stability of a market economy, it is also
supported by more specific analyses of the NE. In particular, NCM economists
claim that NE markets are more efficient and that the system more closely
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approaches the perfect competition model because of the more efficient use of
information made by agents (e.g. The Economist 1-4-2000).4 Consequently,
the various types of information imperfections (which for many Keynesians
justify long adjustment lags for wages and prices) are drastically reduced in
the NE so that the key assumption underlying NCM models –that of a continuous
market clearing equilibrium— becomes much more plausible.
On these grounds, NCM theorists tend to focus only on the beneficial
effects of the NE. Let us examine these in turn, starting from ‘rapidity’. As
emphasized by Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory, the NE provides a favourable
technological shock which increases the current productivity of both labour
and capital and thus leads to a production rise and to lower prices. Increased
productivity also gives rise to wage increases which provide incentive for
working more. A rise in productivity rises thus increases both production and
employment in the same period, while lower prices increase consumers’ welfare.
This approach allows no room for the negative effects of ‘rapidity’ on aggregate
demand. So long as markets work and prices are flexible, no aggregate demand
problem can ever arise (Say’s Law holds).
As for ‘lightness’, NCM naturally regards the new technologies as capable
of improving the financial markets’ ability to process information efficiently
and of allowing further financial innovation which in turn helps agents make
transactions in an intertemporal perspective. As for the negative implications
of ‘lightness’, NMC does not completely rule out negative  phenomena,  such
as firms going bust or recessions in general, but regards them as a natural part
of the process. Structural adjustment induced by market forces is necessary for
the selection of the ‘winners’ and for imbalances to be overcome. One could
note, for example, that a fall in prices induced by technological innovation
automatically rules out inefficient players.
Finally, NCM also stresses the beneficial effects of ‘multiplicity’,
maintaining that the unifying effects of global competition fostered by ICT
may pave the way to a single world market.
b) Policy implications
On the grounds that the NE is more stable than the old economy, the
NCM grants even less scope to the role of active or discretionary demand policies
in stabilizing the economy. Strictly speaking, for NCM granted very limited
scope to such policies even before the advent of the NE. If the economy is
always in equilibrium, as implied by NMC models, and actual income is always
at its potential or natural level, no improvements can be obtained by
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implementing a systematic stabilization policy, and no short-run trade-off can
be exploited. In principle, if agents’ expectations are rational, only unanticipated
changes in this policy would have any effects. However, the NMC predicts that
even this limited effect may to some extent vanish in the NE, due to
improvements in the agents’ ability to anticipate the effects of policy changes.
Not only do agents process information more efficiently, but they also operate
in a context dominated by forward-looking financial markets which are
increasingly concerned with the sustainability of stabilization policies. (Markets
may react badly, for example, if these policies imply excessive deficits or debt
– see e.g. Winkler, 2004, this volume).
More specific NCM policy conclusions can be derived by considering
fluctuations in the natural levels of income induced by shocks. If the business
cycle is induced by real shocks, as implied by RBC models, it can be argued
that the best response is to let the market process carry out its purging role.
Policies designed to stabilize the economy would be counterproductive, as
they would induce inefficiencies. Indeed, as noted by Winkler (2004), any
attempt to smooth the cycle could be detrimental to innovation and growth,
as it could contribute to delays in the necessary structural adjustments or to
the prolonging of structural macro imbalances. On the other hand, if the
business cycle is induced by monetary shocks giving rise to inflation,
efficiency gains could be possible through policies stabilizing the money
supply. As Lucas puts is: ’Insofar as fluctuations are induced by gratuitous
monetary instability, serving no social purpose, then increased monetary
stability promises to reduce aggregate, real variability and increase welfare’
(1981, p.234). In either case, the only kind of active policies the NCM
recommends are structural or supply-side policies aimed at improving factor
productivity, increasing competition in the markets for goods and labour or
capital and lowering the natural rate of unemployment.
3. The New economy and the Keynesian model
a) General remarks on stability
The Keynesian interpretation gives rise to less clear-cut conclusions about
the NE. While NCM rests on the assumption of stability and captures only the
positive aspects of the NE, Keynesians in principle seek instead to account for
both positive and negative aspects and make no assumptions about which will
prevail. They do not deny, for example, that the NE may benefit the world
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economy by raising competitiveness, productivity, market flexibility and by
easing investment financing. They point out, however, that this rosy scenario
should not be taken for granted. In particular, there are reasons to believe that
the NE brings with it potential new sources of instability, in the form of  relatively
major departures from potential income.
Two points are worth emphasizing. In the first place, the NE increases
the frequency and intensity of external shocks that shift the economy away
from potential equilibrium. Secondly, it makes the endogenous adjustment
mechanism based on price flexibility much more costly and inefficient.  The
system is thus more likely to get stuck in a particular underemployment
equilibrium state once it shifts out of potential equilibrium. In fact, this is bound
to occur, because the NE affects not only potential income (i.e. the supply side
of the economy) but also aggregate demand, which is the key autonomous
factor capable of determining the equilibrium level of income both in the short
and the long-run.
In particular, the NE affects both terms of the aggregate demand function,
i.e. price flexibility and aggregate demand. On the one hand, the NE favours
greater price flexibility. It has the potential for producing not just lower inflation
but even falling prices, i.e. deflation, due to a variety of factors, such as greater
competitiveness and productivity, less intensive use of raw materials and reduced
wage pressure. It is important to note at this point that in the Keynesian
perspective I am defending here,, deflation undermines stability. This is in net
contrast with standard textbook analysis. Indeed, as clearly noted by Keynes
himself, the flexibility of wages and prices does not guarantee market clearing;
on the contrary, it could make matters even worse. For example, it can trigger
pessimistic expectations and can increase the real burden of debt (Fisher’s effect),
which may outweigh the positive effects of price flexibility on consumption
and investment (e.g. through Pigou’s effect and Keynes’ effect) and thus
undermine aggregate demand. It can be argued that in the NE the aggregate
demand function is more likely to react adversely to deflation. In particular,
the negative effects of pessimistic expectations are amplified, while the positive
effects of price flexibility tend to be reduced (for example, investments become
less responsive to interest rate cuts). If a deflationary spiral fails to fully
materialize - we now observe in fact a context of moderate inflation in most
OECD countries – it is because the key factor of money wage rigidity keeps it
in check. 7
On the other hand, the NE increases the vulnerability of aggregate demand
by affecting factors that shift the curve. It may cause rich countries to reduce
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exports due to increasing competition from developing countries, increase the
likelihood of shocks in a context of highly integrated world markets, cause
increased dependency of consumption and investment on the state of confidence
and increase the fragility of agents’ balance sheets.
b)  Policy implications
For Keynesians, as opposed to NCM, the NE increases the scope for
discretionary demand policy, as it increases endogenous instability and the
likelihood of exogenous shocks. More specific policy conclusions follow from
this general view. First, structural policies aimed at increasing factor productivity
and flexibility in key markets do not provide a universal panacea. While not
completely ineffectual, they may well fail to improve growth prospects in the
absence of a sufficient rise in aggregate demand. They are not a substitute for
but a complement of demand policies.
Second, monetary policy should not be unduly concerned with inflation.
Keynes suggested that, within limits, inflation is not an evil. The NE provides
further evidence in support of this view. In fact, inflation is not the most
important danger in the NE,  which generates deflationary tendencies instead,
and whose other important weaknesses, such as the greater volatility of output,
exchange rates and asset prices, should be more openly addressed by monetary
policy.
Another recommendation for monetary policy in the NE deriving from
the Keynesian model is that central banks should manipulate interest rates rather
than seeking to control the money supply. The NE also implies greater instability
in the demand for money and more uncertain causal links between money and
inflation than stressed by Monetarists.
Ultimately, fiscal policy should be aimed at balancing budgets in indirect
ways, i.e. by favouring growth rather than by seeking to cut public expenditure,
which instead may prove to be a self-defeating tactic (e.g. such cuts imply
lower growth, lower taxes and ever higher deficits). Several factors justify a
more active use of fiscal policy. First, the NE calls for increasing public
expenditure due to the greater heterogeneity of society, uneven income
distribution and the need to support R&D. Second, the NE provides a wider
scope for fiscal policy because of low inflation. Third, the NE increases the
effectiveness of fiscal policy as agents have a shorter planning horizon. In
contrast with the Ricardian equivalence view, consumers are more likely not to
consider future tax hikes, and will react positively to tax cuts. Fourth, the
increasing stock of financial assets in the NE makes a direct link between deficits
Teodoro Dario Togati - The New Economy and Economic Policy in the Euro-Zone
203
THE ECB BETWEEN GROWTH AND STABILITY
and interest rates less plausible and thus crowding-out effects less likely. On
these grounds, concerns about the sustainability of public deficit and debt seem
to lose some of their relevance in the NE. There is no compelling reason for
which public debt must be fixed at zero or at any other specific value.
4. The shortcomings of the EMU policy framework
In the light of the two benchmarks just described, we can now turn to an
assessment of EMU policies, focussing on the two major problems of internal
and external consistency which seem to impair them and to lie at the root of the
current crisis. As already noted, the first problem is that these policies do not
seem to follow from a specific macroeconomic theory. Moreover, they even
seem to involve contrasting principles of demand management.
To make this point clear, let us start by considering the theoretical
framework from which the policy recommendations and prescriptions for EMU
member countries, such as the Maastricht Treaty (MT) and the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP), apparently follow. As noted by Tamborini (this volume)
the theoretical framework and the policy prescriptions constitute the so-called
‘Brussels Consensus’ (BC). The theoretical background underlying the BC is
similar to what has been called the ‘new consensus’ macro paradigm (see e.g.
Arestis and Sawyer 2003:2-5) or ‘core of modern macroeconomics’ (e.g.
Blanchard 2003) and can be summarised as follows:
1) output and employment fluctuate in response to unexpected shocks…2)
fluctuations take place around a long-period value of …potential output’…3)
The economic system responds to shocks with variations in quantities and not
solely in prices because of imperfections in the organisation of markets, in the
transmission of information or of disincentives by economic agents against price
changes. 4) Neither fiscal nor monetary interventions on aggregate demand are
able to alter the level of potential output … permanently, their only effect would
be to raise the average level of inflation above ‘core inflation’.
(Tamborini , this volume)
It is now possible to focus on the relation between the BC and the two
theoretical paradigms described in the previous sections.
a) The ‘Brussels consensus’ and NCM
There are many reasons to believe that the BC is in line with NCM (see
e.g. Winkler 2004). First of all, one can note important links between the
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‘consensus macro’ underlying the BC and the NCM, such as the following
claims:
a) the market economy is stable;
b) the supply side plays a key role in the determination of employment  and
output (as shown by the concepts of natural rate of unemployment, neutrality
of money property, absence of path-dependency and a vertical Phillips curve);
c) even low inflation entails significant costs;
c) macro policies may well destabilise the economy;
d) rules are preferable to ad hoc discretionary co-ordination of day-to day policy
in the face of shocks;
e) there is a strong link between the money stock and inflation (quantity theory
of money); monetary policy can thus be used to pursue low inflation;
Secondly, there is no doubting that some EMU policy prescriptions too
are in tune with NCM.  We can mention the following points:
a) the assignment problem: Europe relies on a rigid mix of tight demand policy
and structural reforms to increase competitiveness and raise the level of
potential income;
b) the role of the money  stock as the first pillar of ECB’s strategy;
c) the SGP does not allow discretionary demand policy even in the short-run
as it implies a commitment to zero deficit and the reliance on automatic
stabilizers to face asymmetric shocks (Heipertz and Verdun 2004, Tamborini
2004).
However, the BC is to some extent also openly in contrast with NCM.
Here is a list of some of the main points where the ‘consensus macro’ departs
from it:
1- emphasis on price rigidities and imperfections, which imply a sluggish
adjustment of nominal and real variables;
2- in the short-run, changes in aggregate demand influence income;
3- in the short-run, production may not be at its natural level;
4- in the short-run, monetary policy may influence income and increases in
the quantity of money may fail to increase  inflation;
5- budget deficits boost economic activity in the short-run, but reduce capital
accumulation and production in the long-run.
As for the policy prescriptions, the BC departs from NCM in other
important ways:
a) in principle, the MT allows discretionary fiscal policy, as it only implies a
maximum of 3% deficit over GDP and of 60% public debt over GDP;
b) the BC places strong emphasis on public deficit, debt and crowding out
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effects. This implies the rejection of the Ricardian equivalence view held
by NCM, according to which when the government’s budget constraint is
taken into account, neither deficit nor debt have effects on economic activity,
and the method of government financing of public expenditure is neutral
(deficits are equivalent to taxes because agents discount future taxes and
save more in the current period). This means, for example, that deficit should
not lead to interest rate increases nor harm capital accumulation;
c) the Maastricht regime is not designed along Monetarist lines. The ECB
pursues a monetary strategy not unlike inflation targeting  (IT) (see e.g.
Blanchard 2003)8 which for a number of reasons implies a departure from
the Monetarist analysis of money and inflation, i.e. the quantity theory of
money:
• IT implies that the quantity of money is no longer exogenous but endogenous,
and is determined by the demand for money. Monetary injections thus play
no causal role in the analysis of inflation. Rather, the quantity of money
adjusts to the price level as determined by other factors. As shown by the
second pillar of the ECB’s strategy, for IT even information concerning
cost factors, such as oil prices and wage settlements or productivity, matter
in the assessment of inflationary tendencies. This means that IT is consistent
with many explanations for inflation.
• IT allows discretion in reaction to changed economic conditions. In contrast
with Friedman’s k percent regime where the central bank has no hand in
manipulating interest rates, according to IT, the ECB sets interest rates and
may thus engage in the fine-tuning of aggregate demand (Bibow 2003: 6).
Strictly speaking, IT is not entirely a rule, but nor does it provide for full
discretion. The rule is to adopt an inflation target and to vary interest rates
in pursuit of that target.  However attaining a low inflation rate ‘becomes
the target and the goal at the same time. The absence of an intermediate
target provides the central bank with the discretion to react to changed
economic conditions without abandoning the commitment to reduce
inflation.’ (Arestis and Sawyer 2003: 3). This means that only degrees of
discretion prevail with IT; this has been referred to as ‘enlightened discretion’.
b) The ‘Brussels consensus’ and Keynes
Only a few significant links can be detected between the BC and Keynes.
In particular, the ‘consensus macro’ underlying the BC emphasizes the role of
aggregate demand and the possibility for the economy to depart from full
employment equilibrium.
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As for policy prescriptions, both the MT and the ECB’ s official strategy
inspired in part by IT allow a degree of discretion the ECB’s strategy implies
several Keynesian elements, such as the role of interest rate setting, the analysis
of  multiple factors of inflation and the view of the transmission mechanism as
complex and uncertain.
On the other hand, there are also many non-Keynesian elements in the
‘consensus macro’, such as the assumption of long-term stability,  the principle
of effective demand as applying only in the short-run and the corresponding
emphasis on supply side factors in the long-run. Among the most significant
non-Keynesian policy prescriptions is the first pillar of the ECB’s strategy and
the SGP, which both rule out discretion.
c) The BC and the ‘consensus macro’
The assessment of the BC does not end here. Problems of ‘internal
consistency’ also arise within the BC itself. In particular, it is doubtful whether
the EMU policy prescriptions actually follow from the ‘consensus macro’ they
are supposed to be based upon. It should now be clear that while the ‘consensus
macro’ allows for discretion, this several components  of EMU policy, such as
the SGP and the first pillar of the ECB’s strategy deny such discretion. Apart
from legitimate doubts about the validity of the ‘consensus macro’ itself, it is
important to emphasize that widely varying policy conclusions could have been
drawn based on the same theoretical premises underlying the BC. In particular,
the MT could have given rise to a very different SGP, and the first pillar of
monetary policy could have been dropped in favour of full-blown IT.
d) The BC and the NE
After examining the ‘internal consistency’ problem of EMU policies,
we now turn to the ‘external consistency’ problem, i.e. their inadequacy to deal
with the NE. One can note, for example, that the ECB’s focus on price stability
as the exclusive goal of monetary policy, coupled with the adoption of monetary
targeting as the first pillar of its strategy, is not consistent with the NE for at
least three reasons.
First, the NE spontaneously generates low inflation or even deflationary
tendencies, even in the face of demand pressures. Therefore, inflation that is
temporarily higher than expected should not be a matter of concern, as it could
be the result of exceptional circumstances, such as oil shocks or exchange rate
depreciation.  A strategy such as the ECB’s,  which tries to curb all inflationary
tendencies as such without making a distinction between the different causes
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of inflation, is a mistake, for it could trigger deflationary effects. Indeed as
many economists suggest, the ECB runs this risk because it has too  low an
inflation target (see e.g. The Economist 28-9-2002: 11; Arestis and Sawyer
2003:21).
 Second, choosing to target the money supply is a hopeless task in the
NE. Indeed as noted by many (see e.g. Kuttner and Mosser 2002, Arestis and
Sawyer 2002: 4-5), financial innovation in the NE has created a more unstable
demand for money and has altered the channels through which monetary policy
affects the economy.9 This explains why most central banks have shifted from
monetary to inflation targeting.
Third, focusing on inflation means neglecting the real danger in the NE,
i.e. the greater volatility of real and financial variables due to more frequent
shocks and endogenous instability. If low inflation is the exclusive goal of the
central bank, even the discretionary approach implied by IT versus monetary
targeting may not be enough to face real instability.
Similar remarks apply to the SGP, which is inadequate given that the
cause of instability in the NE is not excessive public expenditure or deficit. On
the contrary, the European experience clearly shows that governments tend to
run deficits because of insufficient economic growth due to the combination of
endogenous mechanisms and external shocks. In this context, insisting on the
SGP implies a deflationary stance. As pointed out by many, the SGP is pro-
cyclical, as it induces policies of cutting investment expenditure and increasing
tax revenues even in times of stagnation, such as these (see e.g. Arestis and
Sawyer 2003: 41; Blanchard 2003, Stiglitz 2003; and, in this volume, Talani,
2004, and Heipertz and Verdun 2004).
5. Actual EMU policies
In the light of such serious shortcomings of the BC, it is not surprising
that European policymakers find it difficult to comply with official EMU policy
prescriptions or that their actual policy practices often significantly diverge
from them, in what can be considered a ‘pragmatic’ move.10
Let us start from monetary policy. As already noted, a certain degree of
pragmatism is built into the design of the ECB’s two-pillar strategy. In principle,
this mixed strategy can be justified in response to increased uncertainty
concerning the transmission mechanism of monetary policy following the advent
of the NE and the launch of the Euro (see e.g. Blanchard 2003; Arestis and
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Sawyer 2003: 23). Moreover, some flexibility is implicit in the definition of
the two pillars.11 In the first pillar, the ECB defines a reference value for money
growth. Unlike monetary targeting, this is not a binding target; there is no
commitment to correction of deviations from the reference value. As for the
second pillar, the ECB makes a broad evaluation of the prospects of price stability
on the grounds of a large number of indicators (e.g. various measures of real
economic  activity, labour costs, exchange rates, financial asset prices,
consumers’ and firms’ expectations based on interviews etc.). There is no
doubting that this plethora of indicators requires a certain degree of discretionary
assessment.
Now it can be argued that the ECB has used this discretionary power in
actual policy-making in such a way as to violate its own official guidelines.
Therefore, as noted by Blanchard (2003), analysis of the ECB’s actual behaviour
can be more revealing than analysis of its words. One could note, for example,
that the ECB has engaged in some efforts towards output stabilisation,
notwithstanding its official neglect of short-run output developments (see e.g.
Blanchard 2003, Talani 2004). As shown by the experience of the last two
years, when some other risks beyond inflation (i.e. various kinds of shocks,
such as terrorism and war) have materialized and given rise to market instability,
the ECB has not focused simply on inflation but has also taken growth into
account. Indeed, the ECB has changed interest rates in response to risks of
deflation and recession (see e.g. Arestis and Sawyer 2003:28; The Economist
28-9-02, Talani 2004). Moreover, it has done so even at the risk of missing the
other official targets. In particular, it has failed to raise interest rates
systematically when actual inflation was higher than target or actual M3 growth
was higher than target.12 It must be noted that this failure to act in line with
official principles has led some economists (e.g. Blanchard 2003) to describe
the ECB’s strategy not simply as pragmatic but as consistent with quite a
different policy rule, such as Taylor’s rule, which holds that central banks
determine interest rates in response to both output and inflation gaps.13
Also in the case of fiscal policy, the official EMU stance based on the
SGP fails to correspond to the policy actually pursued by governments. This is
not surprising, as experience generally shows that the attempt to balance the
budget cannot be maintained as a permanent policy rule, especially in the face
of shocks (Arestis and Sawyer 2003: 37). Faced with the greater variability of
parameters and of the persistence of business cycles, many European
governments have taken steps to relaxtheir official strict fiscal stances and adopt
expansionary measures to support demand and output in the short-run.
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A rather dramatic instance of this kind of pragmatism is revealed by the
current debate concerning the SGP. In particular, as Heipertz and Verdun note,
it has now become quite clear that ‘a number of countries no longer act as if the
SGP budgetary ceilings are to be taken seriously’ (2003: 10).14 Indeed such
countries now realise that to compliance with the SGP would be very costly in
terms of short-run output in a context characterised by basic uncertainty and
sluggish growth. They thus seek to slacken the SGP restraint (e.g., to relax the
3% limit to permit borrowing for capital investment and/or allow more time to
meet the balanced budget requirements) (Arestis and Sawyer 2003: 37).
6. The limits of pragmatism
Based on the preceding remarks, it would be nonetheless misleading to
conclude that pragmatism is the best solution to the current crisis. The move
towards pragmatism is indeed an indicator of the intrinsic limits of the BC, but
it is more of a defense or survival strategy than an effective remedy. Overriding
the main orientation and effects of official EMU policy prescriptions in order
to gain some degrees of freedom within the existing policy rules it is not enough,
as it does not force critical evaluation of the rules themselves. In particular,
despite their pragmatic moves, European policy-makers still remain committed
to the basic principle of rigour or stability as a prerequisite for growth on which
the SPG and the ECB’s strict definition of price stability are based.
This principle itself is likely to reduce the positive impact of pragmatic
policy moves in the NE. Thus, these moves continue to increase costs stemming
from misguided official policy orientation Pragmatism may be an effective
remedy when systemic failures are relatively rare; but it loses its efficacy when
these failures occur more frequently, as in the NE. At least three types of
problems undermine pragmatic moves in this context.
First, these moves may not be of the required scope. Due to the more
frequent systemic failures it involves, the NE calls for relatively wide swings
in the policy stance. These swings are quite difficult to carry out when policy is
constrained by rigid rules. As pointed out by Arestis and Sawyer (2003: 30-
31), for example, the relaxation of tight fiscal stance that has been recently
implemented in Europe is too small to speedily lead to a real recovery.
Second, pragmatic moves may be too slow. In the NE where swift
financial markets dominate slow production processes, pragmatism may fail
simply because appropriate policy responses may take too long to materialize
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when policy-makers are constrained by policy rules which cannot be readily
dismissed. Thus, for example, if policy rules focus on inflation, central banks
may only realize that deflation is the real problem instead after a dangerous
delay.  Moreover, while the NE implies faster convergence to equilibrium, as
Keynes pointed out equilibrium can be either good or bad. Slow policy-making
may condemn a country or region to stagnation for a long period of time, as has
recently been the case in Japan.
This problem is particularly serious in Europe, where pragmatic decisions
have been made only following a long and painful period of dissatisfaction
with the official policy and involving a lot of misjudgement. As emphasised for
example by Arestis and Sawyer (2003: 18-20; 25), the ECB’s response to
evolving events has been remarkably slow. In particular, the ECB has been
insisting for a long time that the existing level of interest rates was appropriate,
despite the fact that several countries appeared to be on the brink of recession.
Similarly, it may be some time before the ECB decides to cut interest rates in
the face of a strong euro and much lower interest rates in the US. But this is
also true for fiscal policy. Although strict application of the SGP has already
been avoided in practice (e.g. Germany and France have both managed to avoid
sanctions), European governments will probably only eventually agree to replace
the SGP with more flexible prescriptions only after a long and harrowing
decision-making  process.
Third, pragmatic moves may lack credibility. In the NE where
expectations and confidence are more influential than in the past and where
policymakers must adopt a clear strategy to maintain credibility, pragmatism
may fail because it creates a tension between two alternative views, and thus
causes confusion in the markets. So, for example, while in the current official
EMU ‘stick-and-carrot’ pedagogy 15 – for which the SGP is a condition for
growth and thus even cutting spending in a downturn is necessary – continues
to apply, pragmatism instead amounts to recognizing that the fiscal rules of the
SGP are counterproductive especially during a slowdown and that cutting
spending in this context would be destabilizing (see e.g. Stiglitz, 2003, and
Arestis and Sawyer, 2003: 41).16
7. Some alternative policy suggestions
In the light of the impasse reached by EMU policies two major alternative
solutions seem to arise. The first is to look to the US, where awareness of the
fragile nature of the NE is more acute, as evinced by the following points.
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First, unlike the EMU, the US seems to conceive of stability as the result,
rather than a condition, of growth.  In the US a virtuous circle has been triggered
by the gearing of monetary policy towards GDP growth. Rising employment
and a shrinking interest burden have delivered fiscal consolidation (see Bibow
2003: 6).
Second, the FED’s strategy is formally much wider-reaching than the
ECB’s. It is intended to pursue not just monetary but also economic stability in
terms of income and employment, exchange rate and financial stability.
Although the ECB also takes growth into account, the FED certainly does so in
more explicit terms. As emphasised by Arestis and Sawyer, ‘while the FED
kept lowering interest rates aggressively on a number of occasions (no less
than thirteen times between January 3, 2001 and June 25, 2003), the ECB cut
interest rates to a minor extent and with a delay causing sharp appreciation of
the euro’ (2003: 19).
Third, even in terms of inflation alone, the FED seems to prefer
discretionary behaviour over ECB- style commitment to a precise definition of
price stability. As noted by Blanchard (2003), the FED has neither an explicit
inflation target nor an interest rate rule. Moreover, its actual behaviour suggests
that it has an implicit inflation target of around 3%.
Fourth,  the (current) absence in the US of a specific fiscal rule, analogous
to the SGP, makes it is easier to adopt a flexible stance under adverse conditions,
as can be seen by the rapid swings from surplus to deficit carried out in recent
months. Indeed, while Europe is caught up  in endless quarrels over the SGP,
in the US tax cuts and military expenditure aimed at avoiding recession since
the terrorist attacks of September 11 have rapidly transformed the budget from
a surplus to a deficit with relatively little debate (see e.g. Godley and Izurieta
2002: 48-9).
Fifth, unlike Europe, the US has implemented the kind of policy which
has greatly contributed to the rise of the NE: namely a shift towards quality, if
not the absolute size, of expenditure. In particular, the US has allocated huge
resources to military high tech and research in large institutions and universities
that have positive externalities.17
Despite its positive aspects, the US policy stance is not without its
limitations. In particular, it is still ruled by pragmatism.  Although more effective
than the EMU’s policy, US pragmatism is flawed in two related issues. First, it
seems far too dependent upon the intuition of individuals Informal comments
to the media made by leaders such as Alan Greenspan often manage to persuade
or reassure the markets that the FED will grant prosperity, for example by
ensuring that financial markets remain liquid in the face of confidence crises.18
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Second, it does not seem to rely on adequate theoretical foundations or on
analysis of the NE. In particular, it appears vulnerable in its reliance on the
‘consensus macro’ that limits the validity of a full-blown discretionary policy
approach to the short-run, and is too subject to sudden swings in public opinion
about policy.
The other solution to the EMU impasse is to adopt a policy stance based
on a theoretical framework capturing the essence of the NE, such as Keynes’.
This does not imply rejecting pragmatism and discretionary behaviour in general
but intends instead to place it on more solid ground. In particular, our Keynesian
interpretation of the NE implies that discretion should be elevated to the status
of a permanent policy option rather than a temporary remedy.
In order to acheive this goal, the drastic dichotomy between short and
long-run on which many major policy guidelines are based, must be overcome
as it leaves too little room for discretionary action. This dichotomy should be
replaced with a ‘threshold logic’ which is more in tune with the NE.
To make this point clear, it is important to note that an alternative policy
framework would first of all have to reject the stability/growth trade off set out
in the standard literature. This gives rise to two key issues. First, the causality
issue. As already noted, while standard theory suggests that stability (financial
consolidation and very low inflation) is the precondition for growth, an
alternative policy view based on Keynesian analysis should stress that, on the
contrary, growth is a condition for stability (see e.g. Bibow 2002 and 2003).
Second, the definition of stability itself. In contrast with what is generally
inferred from standard theory, stability does not necessarily imply a zero deficit
and 2% inflation. Critics of the current EMU policy framework are not
necessarily in favour of unlimited deficit and ever-increasing inflation. In line
with the threshold logic, they could argue that within limits, perhaps 3 or 4
percent, both inflation and budget deficits are positive for the economy and can
be sustained indefinitely; they become pathological phenomena only when these
limits have been exceeded (see e.g. Arestis and Sawyer, 2003).19
8. Concluding remarks
Four main conclusions follow from the analysis developed in this paper.
First, the interpretation given to the NE has very important practical implications
due to its general impact on overall policy-orientation. Two major viewpoints
have been distinguished. For the NCM, the NE is more stable than the old
economy. The only risks for instability arise either from exogenous shocks or
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from state interference with markets. As a consequence, it is best to implement
structural reforms and set a priori limitations on traditional demand policy.
Instead, Keynesians hold that the NE generates greater potential instability.
This implies that stability is not a spontaneous product of the market process
but a possible outcome of careful discretionary policy-making.
Second, the current crisis within EMU policy-making indicates that the
Keynesian interpretation is more plausible. EMU policy is loosely based on a
rather eclectic combination of theoretical elements. Among these elements,
the NCM’s emphasis on a tight, non discretionary demand policy as a condition
for growth plays a major role. This kind of policy is proving inadequate within
the context of the NE. Indeed, pursuing it to accompany the launch of the euro
has quite simply failed to grant growth.
Third, pragmatic moves made by EMU policymakers to remedy the
shortcomings of the official stance have not proven sufficient to resolve the
current impasse. While certainly preferable to dogmatic rule application,
pragmatism is not an optimal solution. On the contrary, pragmatism in the NE
is an increasingly costly policy option mainly because it lacks credibility and
rapidity.
Finally, a few alternative policy solutions for the EMU (with different
degrees of appeal) have been singled out. The first is to adhere more closely to
the ‘consensus macro’ which at least allows for some kind of discretionary
demand management. Indeed, if the official EMU policies were actually based
on it, a rather different SGP could be devised. The second alternative is to look
to the US policy stance, which proves to be a more effective form of pragmatism.
The third, and in my view, the best, move forward is to define a new policy
strategy based on a Keynesian theoretical framework. Among the key ingredients
of such a strategy considered here are the views that discretion is a permanent
policy option, growth is a condition for macro stability and threshold effects
concerning inflation and budget deficits must be duly taken into account.
1
 I discuss these issues in greater detail in my forthcoming book on the New Economy. See Togati (2004).
2
 The labels I employed here to summarise the features of the NE were  first suggested by the Italian writer
Italo Calvino to characterise the 20th century in general (see Calvino 1988).
3
 Indeed ‘it is, of course, no accident that rational expectations have thrived in the age of information technology.
The existence of powerful computers and software has enabled us to simulate models in which the agents are
using information efficiently’ (Minford 1997: 110).
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4
 See e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982); Winkler (2004).
5
 In contrast with the Neoclassical Synthesis or New Keynesian theory, I consider the principle of effective
demand to be valid also in the long-run and thus reject the Neoclassical long-run equilibrium concept. For a
similar view see e.g. Setterfield (2002). As a consequence, structural factors such as productivity and flexibility
cannot be analysed separately from aggregate demand. A rise in productivity might not grant a rise in
employment because firms demand labour and invest only if also aggregate demand increases adequately.
6
 That deflation is also a modern phenomenon rather than merely a relic of the past has been is confirmed by
the Japanese experience of the 1990s. Moreover, after the stock crashes in 2001 there were fears that deflation
could also spread to other countries, including Germany and the US.
7
 While standard theory considers money wage rigidity as a cause of unemployment, for Keynes instead it is
a factor granting stability.
8
 In Blanchard’s view, the ECB behaves as a de facto inflation targeter. The point is that although the ECB
does not formally pursue an IT policy, it does pursue a monetary strategy with a clear commitment to price
stability over the medium term (see also Arestis and Sawyer 2003: 7, 14).
10
 On the interpretation of the ECB’s strategy as a pragmatic one, see e.g. Issing, Gaspar, Angeloni and
Tristani (2001).
11
 As Talani (this volume) clearly emphasised, this flexibility is bought by the ECB at the expense of a certain
(often-critisised) lack of transparency in decision making. For this reason it is possible to speak of a
transparency/flexibility trade-off in the strategy of the ECB.
12
 Indeed as Talani (this volume) notes, while officially important, monetary targets are often neglected by
ECB. In particular, M3 changes and interest rate changes tend to go in opposite direction. Moreover, another
element of pragmatism is the loose definition of the period (the medium run) over which the ECB controls
inflation (see e.g. Arestis and Sawyer (2003)).
13
 Taylor’s rule coincides with neither monetary targeting (there is no money stock in the rule) nor inflation
targeting (central banks care also about income).
14
 More in general, as Heipertz and Verdun emphasise in this volume, that ‘consensus among policymakers
about the importance of fiscal discipline is seemingly fading away’.
15 See e.g. Tamborini (this volume).
16 Similarly, many commentators (see e.g. Fitoussi and Creel 2002: 67; Talani this volume) have criticised
the ECB’s policy for being confusing especially to the financial markets. In particular, the M3 target has
rarely been met, and yet this does not seem to have an impact on official strategy, the ECB often appears to
downplay the importance of the money stock and yet it reaffirms its long-run importance.
17
 As noted for instance by Cohen,  De Long, and Zysman (2000: 1), this kind of intervention has always
been at the top of the US policy agenda since the World War II.
18
 It must be noted however that the FED’s pragmatism is not always a matter of rational choice or ‘formal’
decisions, i.e. it is not a fully-conscious ex-post demand management. Sometimes it is due to simple errors.
Stiglitz (2002), for example, talks about ‘lucky’ errors made by the FED in the late 1990s; its mistaken
estimates of GDP growth and Nairu (the actual unemployment rate fell below 6% but inflation did not rise)
and failure to raise interest rates actually favoured the boom.
19
 This view is justified by evidence provided by Ghosh and Philips (1998: 674) stressing two important
nonlinearities in the inflation-growth relationship: at low inflation rates inflation and growth are positively
correlated. Otherwise there is a negative correlation (see also Arestis and Sawyer 2003: 3).
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COMMENT
 BY
MARTIN RHODES
Both the chapter by Talani and the chapter by Heipertz and Verdun seek
to penetrate behind the scenes and detect the underlying forces determining
the form taken European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) and the conduct of European monetary policy under
the European Central Bank (ECB).  The Talani chapter develops a rather specific
argument that the powers of export-oriented countries exerts influence over the
policies of the supposedly politically independent ECB, promoting a position
of ‘benign neglect’ regarding the depreciation of the European currency in its
first two years of life. The methodology is explicitly intergovernmentalist. The
Heipertz-Verdun paper is wider ranging, searching for an explanation of the
recent crisis of the SGP in its origins in the 1990s, and seeks deeper insights
than might otherwise be available, the authors argue, by combining an ideational
with a ‘power-politics’ approach.
The Talani paper is based on a simple premise. If we wish to understand
why the euro was allowed to depreciate vis-à-vis the US dollar in 2000-2001,
then we need look no further than the influence of Europe’s major exporters to
the US, namely Germany, Italy and France. Loosely employing Jeffry Frieden’s
sectoral preference model, Talani argues that these country’s national politicians
expressed the preferences of their powerful exporting industries that would
naturally stand to benefit from a euro depreciation. Talani also appears to argue
that it is such inter-governmental influence more generally (regardless of the
absence of channels for the open expression of such preferences in the monetary
policy making process) that explains the ECB’s pragmatism in giving less
attention to prices and monetary targets that its rhetoric would suggest than to
stabilising output.
This is a seductive argument, but there are serious problems in sustaining
it. First, the author provides no evidence that in any of the countries concerned
did their export sectors mobilise politically to achieve the goal of currency
depreciation, or, indeed, that their national political representatives were
receptive to such a message. It is not sufficient to quote businessmen and
politicians views that a weak euro was a boon rather than a cause for concern to
establish a connection between imputed country preferences and the ECB’s
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exchange rate position. Nor does the analysis allow the author to answer her
own question “Do considerations about single member states matter, or is it
the outlook of the euro-zone as a whole that defines the Bank’s choices?”.
Given that 90 per cent of trade by EU countries is within the euro-zone itself
(Germany, France and Italy are each other’s most important export markets), it
may well be the case that the ECB’s policy ‘benign neglect’ – of both euro
depreciation in the early 2000s and the strong appreciation against the dollar
that quickly followed from 2002 - is due to the fact that intervention would
only serve the special interests of particular export sectors, rather than being in
the interest of producers and consumers, and growth, more generally. This point
leads naturally to a third problem with Talani’s argument. Although the author
mentions in passing the more recent appreciation of the euro against the dollar,
there is no discussion of what this implies for the author’s sectoral preferences
argument. If there were anything to that argument, one would expect the business
communities of France, Germany and Italy to be up in arms about the strong
euro, and their national representatives to be pushing the ECB in favour of
intervention.
This requires some consideration to the difficulties of deriving preferences
from objective economic positions, and real-world nature of business responses
to exchange rate fluctuations. There has, it is true, been much criticism of US
policy from EU central bankers, as well as guarded suggestions that the ECB
would intervene if the euro rose much above $1.30-1.40. But whether strong
pressure is coming from European business lobbies for such intervention is a
moot point. In reality, most of Europe’s export sectors, and in particular those
of Germany, have continued to perform well, despite the dollar’s strength, due
to rising global demand. And although some exporters have been hurting
(especially in the luxury goods markets dependent on US consumers), the most
powerful potential lobbyists for ECB intervention, such as the large German
carmakers, have suffered little, using financial derivatives for currency hedging,
or moving more production to their US plants, in some instances exporting
their cars back to Europe, thereby benefiting from the dollars decline. All of
this suggests first, that within certain margins, the exchange rate is not the
critical issue for these businesses that Talani assumes it to be; and second, that
Frieden’s sectoral preference model would have to be rendered much more
complex in its application to be of utility in this particular case.
Heipertz and Verdun have a more complex argument about the behaviour
of policy makers and officials in the run up to EMU and the design of the SGP
and their conclusions are much less controversial than those of Talani. If the
Discussion by Martin Rhodes
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growth of a “permissive consensus” amongst politicians and experts on the
desirability of central bank independence and the need for a mechanism to
enforce fiscal discipline among euro-zone members created the context for the
SGP, the precise form taken by SGP rules and the sanctions mechanism was
determined by ‘power politics: the ‘asymmetric bargaining power’ of the German
government, domestic German pressure from the Bundesbank (which
constituted an ‘informal veto’), and the influence of the financial markets which
pushed governments forward by pushing up the DM against other currencies
whenever deadlock threatened during the EMU stage 3 negotiations. Thus,
ideas shaped the context, and power politics decided the detail. In presenting
their arguments, the authors provide us with a complete analysis of the
bargaining behind the SGP and of the influence of the respective actors. The
authors also claim that understanding these origins of the SGP provide insights
into its recent crisis, with France and Germany effectively abandoning the SGP
by refusing to conform with its budget deficit limits. Thus, if ideas and power
politics underpinned the creation of the SGP, shifts in both can also help explain
its effective demise. As for bargaining power, Heipertz and Verdun argue that
Germany is no longer the force it once was in insisting on a highly disciplinary
SGP, and in any case it would be hypocritical for it to adopt such a position,
given that it is itself in breach of SGP rules and is no longer an exemplary state.
They also argue that the previous consensus on fiscal discipline is now fading
away.
How convincing is this argument? Methodologically, the authors adopt
an increasingly common combination of constructivist and rational approaches,
the first to explain the emergence of a consensus around the idea of EMU and
the price stability orientation of the new ECB’s monetary policy, the second to
account for the SGP itself. This is quite acceptable. But the sceptic might well
ask why the constructivist approach is needed at all to understand the shift in
opinion in favour of a certain style form of central bank independence, when a
power politics argument alone might serve that purpose just as well and provide
a more parsimonious account. Of course, an ideational (though not fully
constructivist) argument has a long pedigree in the work of Verdun, McNamara
et al. But an alternative argument might suggest the following. Not only was
German/Bundesbank power likely to lobby for a model for Europe very much
along in line with its own preferences, but that in the 1980s, the fiscally-
conservative Bundesbank model of central bank independence was the only
game in town, given that most of Europe had long-pegged its currencies to the
DM to secure an external constraint on domestically-generated inflation. The
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authors should also think a little more critically about how powerful the ideas
they refer to were in practice once the ECB was up and running and pay some
attention to one of the points made by Talani. As we know, the ECB has assigned
its priorities between the twin ‘policy pillars’ of money supply growth and
price stability, but in it effect disregarded strong money supply growth for a
considerable period in the early days of the euro, without ever providing an
adequate explanation. This degree of pragmatism in monetary policy practice
makes one wonder exactly how powerful the monetarist ideas referred to by
Heipertz and Verdun actually were.
Personally, I do think there is something in the ideational argument,
especially when applied to the Monetary Committee which Heipertz and Verdun
present as an ‘epistemic community’ wielding a particularly consistent expert
view on the appropriate rules for monetary policy making under EMU.
Nevertheless, in order to strengthen their point, the authors’ ideational account
should be backed up by a consideration of the rational alternatives and
demonstrate why they are lacking in explanatory power.
The authors might also refine their analysis of the recent demise of the
SGP and consideration of what will matter in its reconstitution.  It may be that
certain member states are less enamoured of the idea of fiscal discipline than
they were in the past, but the ECB itself has certainly not changed its tune. But
there is another issue here in the ‘post-SGP’ period that the authors do not refer
to. Defections from the rules of the club do not seem to be provoking the non-
institutional sanctions that might in different circumstances have backed up or
substituted for formal sources of discipline. The issue of ECB credibility and
the strength of the single currency in a ‘non-optimal’ currency area have been
debated since well before the euro came into existence. Paradoxically, the fact
that the ECB, for all its problems, now seems to have achieved credibility as a
central bank, and that the euro has become a respectable currency for constituting
reserves and attracting investment, the markets are no longer so concerned
about the behaviour of governments within the euro-zone. The effective demise
of the SGP did not provoke a reaction from the bond markets, for example,
suggesting that one of the main reasons for having the hard SGP rules in the
first place – guaranteeing the external credibility of the euro – no longer apply.
But that of course provides a major challenge to the authority of the monetary
authorities in the euro zone; and new ideas of how structural reforms are now
to be encouraged in the larger member states are now certainly required.
Discussion by Martin Rhodes
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COMMENT
 BY
 ELISABETTA CROCI ANGELINI
The long process which has led to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
was an attempt to promote monetary and fiscal policy convergence across the
European countries in order to better pursue the objective of low inflation and
to restore the stable and high growth rates of the “golden age”. The chapters by
Bernhard Winkler and Roberto Tamborini give us the opportunity to compare
two different views on the capacity of the present EMU institutional setting to
keep the success of low inflation and deliver the missing objective of moving
to a more sustained growth path. Let us start by giving a glance to the theoretical
model by which both the functioning of the European Monetary System (EMS)
and macroeconomic equilibrium under the EMU are studied.
Two analytical frameworks have been used in the literature to explain
two decades of “high inflation” in Europe, the subsequent slow disinflation
process, and the rationale for monetary and fiscal management under the EMU.
The first draws on the Barro-Gordon “time inconsistency” model of monetary
policy. The assumption is that the macroeconomic equilibrium depends on the
fundamentals underlying the Phillips curve, on inflation expectations related
to the monetary authorities’ reputation, and on the inflation-unemployment
trade-off pursued by national monetary authorities. The “new classical”
interpretation is based on the a priori assumption that “high inflation” has to be
traced back to the government authorities’ tenet that the “natural” unemployment
rate (Un) corresponding to the vertical long-term Phillips curve is stuck at too
high a level due to a series of labour market distortions. Therefore, the
government authorities are willing to bring the “natural” unemployment back
to its previous lower level, as expressed by the following equation:
(1) U* = ( 1 – δ ) Un
where U* is the target for the unemployment rate and δ (where 0 < δ < 1) is the
intensity of the desire of lower unemployment by manipulating the
macroeconomy by means of monetary policy. More precisely, a value different
from one of the parameter δ reflects the monetary authorities’ expectation the
“natural” unemployment rate has to be decreased to the level corresponding to
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the efficient resources’ allocation by means of “active” policies. Let us now
introduce a Phillips Curve:
(2) U = Un – α ( π – π e)
 where parameter α represents the unemployment responsiveness to a
divergence between actual and expected inflation. The parameter ? then
expresses the incentive to make a “surprise inflation” in order to raise the output
and employment levels above their “natural” levels. In the “staggered contracts”
model, the “time inconsistency” problem applies because the central bank is
assumed to act after wage contracts have been signed. The equation indicates
that – following a “non-announced” monetary expansion - the higher is α, the
flatter the curve and the wider the decrease in the unemployment rate.
Let us assume that a loss function in quadratic form has been chosen by
the authorities:
(3) L = [ β (π – π *)2 + (U – U*)2 ]
where π* is the target for the inflation rate and β is the parameter
indicating the “inflation aversion”, on which the credibility of monetary policy
depends. By substituting equations (1) and (2) in equation (3), and putting the
target for the inflation rate equal to zero, the social loss function becomes:
(4) L =  β π 2  + [ δ U
n
 α ( π – πe) 2 ]
Under the constraint that agents have a perfect foresight of the inflation
rate (π = πe), the monetary authorities’ minimisation of the social loss function
(equation 4), after some rearrangements, yields the following rational
expectation solution:
(5) π = α ( δ U
n
 ) / β
Therefore, the equilibrium inflation rate positively depends on both
parameters α (the higher α, that is the unemployment reducing responsiveness
to monetary expansions, the flatter the Phillips curve and the greater the incentive
for a “surprise” inflation) and δ (the higher the divergence of the unemployment
target from its “natural level”, the higher the equilibrium inflation rate) and
negatively depends on parameter  β (the degree of “inflation aversion”, fostering
the decrease in the inflation rate).
Discussion by Elisabetta Croci Angelini
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The second analytical framework draws on the famous “unpleasant
mathematics” put forward Sargent and Wallace, dealing with the incentive to
“monetisation” stemming from a high level of public debt. Since the monetary
financing of deficits is excluded due to the anti-inflationary commitment, the
government budget constraint is as follows: G – T + rB = dB / dt , where (G - T)
is the “primary deficit” and rB the “secondary deficit” (the amount of the interest
(r) payments times the stock of public debt (B)). The overall public deficit is
then matched by bond-issuing (dB / dt). It can be easily shown that the
accumulation of high public debts positively depends on the level of the public
deficit and on the difference between the real interest rate and the growth rate
of the economy, as a proportion of the public debt over the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). The stock of debt as a ratio of GDP is b = B/Y, where Y is the
GDP. Given that B’ = b’ Y + b Y’ (denoting derivatives with the apostrophe),
and with ε as the GDP growth rate, after some algebraic computations, we
obtain:
(6) b’ = (G/Y – T/Y) + (r – ε) b
If we focus only on the inflation component of the GDP growth rate, we
can write:
(7) b’ = G/Y – T/Y + (r – π) b
This equation is very telling. It says that, whenever the real interest rate
exceeds the growth rate of the economy, in order to stabilize the public debt /
GDP ratio the budget has to be in surplus (G/Y < T/Y) in the measure required
by the value of b.
Let us now analyse the EMS rationale for achieving the public good of
monetary stability in Europe as a fixed exchange rates accord between a low-
inflation country, say Germany, and a high-inflation country, say Italy. Germany,
the Central Bank of which deserves the highest reputation for being committed
to low inflation (“high inflation aversion”, that is “high” β), has values for
parameters αG = 0,6, but  δG=1. This last assumption means that there is no
attempt to raise income above its natural level, so that no inflation bias is
transmitted by the Bundesbank to the economy. Italy has instead a tradition of
competitive devaluations (“low inflation aversion”, that is “low” βI) and values
for parameters αI = 0,5 (in the past decades, the labour market in Italy has been
even more rigid than in Germany) and δI = 1.4,  due to the tendency of the Bank
of Italy to improve on the “high” Italian natural unemployment level by
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“monetary surprises”.
Therefore, by substituting the above numerical values attributed to
Germany and Italy in equation 5, from the two inflation rates:
(5*) πI = α1 ( δI Un ) / βI
(5**) πG = αG ( δG Un ) / βG
we obtain πI   > πG
The simple exercise carried out above shows how the “time-
inconsistency” model has been applied to the inflation differentials of Italy
with respect to Germany and, more generally, as the rationale for the different
inflation paths of Core and Peripehery countries during the EMS period.  Despite
the lowest employment responsiveness to monetary expansions in the Italian
vis-à-vis the German labour market (αI < αG), the incentive for a surprise
inflation was present not in Germany but in Italy (δ > 1), due to the political
pressure on the Bank of Italy to come to issue with the socially unbearable
natural unemployment rate.
Let us now consider the impact of fiscal policy on macroeconomic
stability. By substituting in equation 7 the Fisher equation: r =  γ + πe, where γ
is the real interest rate, we have:
(8) b’ = G/Y – T/Y + (g + πe - π) b
The usual way to rationalize the fiscal authorities’ task to abide by to the
commitment to preserve the sustainability of public accounts is the strategy to
keep under control public expenditures and follow the “tax smoothing” principle.
Sticking to the Italian example, the low credibility of the Bank of Italy for running
an anti-inflationary monetary policy was causing inflation expectations in financial
markets higher than the ex post inflation rate was showing : πe – π > 0. As a
consequence, on the left side of equation 8 Italy has been experiencing during
the 80s high values for b’. The more agents were expecting a surprise inflation,
the more the Bank of Italy had to raise interest rates in order to accommodate
the request by financial agents of both a devaluation and a default risk premium,
thus fuelling a self-sustaining process of increasing public debt. Even when
the public deficits turned to become public surpluses starting from 1991, the
situation of public accounts in Italy kept being appalling due to large interest
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payments. The decrease in public deficit and debt ratios required by the
Maastricht criteria was impeded at the numerator by the high debt service and
at the denominator by the depressed GDP expansion after the low investment
levels at least in part provoked by long period of high interest rates in Italy.
Differently from the advocates of the orthodox view, I believe that the
rationale for macroeconomic instability across European countries stemming
from the two analytical frameworks discussed above is no longer in place.  The
launch of the Euro has definitively eradicated the tendency to excessive monetary
and fiscal stabilization which has been provoking macroeconomic instability
across European countries. However, it is worth stressing that the EMU monetary
and fiscal authorities are still dealing with the problem to choose the most
appropriate monetary-fiscal policy mix. The main questions are the following:
1) There is no fear that the European Central Bank (ECB) might be tempted to
engineer a “surprise inflation”. On the contrary, the fear is that the “one size
fits all” strategy pointing to the average EMU-wide inflation and output gap
makes the ECB monetary stance deflationary for some countries; 2) The SGP
is founded on the presumption that one country’s expansionary fiscal policy
conveys a deflationary effect on the other EMU countries (after the negative
effect on aggregate demand due to the increase in the Euro interest rate larger
than the positive trade effect) but no account appears to have been taken of
possible under-stabilisation stemming from the overlapping of a “one size fits
all” deflation and the SGP constraint on discretionary fiscal manouvres. In my
opinion, these two open questions demonstrate that how the interplay between
the “time inconsistency” model and the “unpleasant arithmetic” of the public
debt does work inside the EMU has not been clearly set. Therefore, it can be
doubted that monetary and fiscal authorities in Europe are really endowed with
the right tool-box to implement stabilization policies. To this regard, what are the
opinions of the two authors?
According to the Winkler paper, the “time inconsistency” and the
“unpleasant arithmetics” models are a comprehensive guide to understand the
threats to the EMU macroeconomic equilibrium and to fully agree on the EMU
institutional setting. A merit of the paper is to assess very clearly the point of
view of mainstream economics on the role of monetary and fiscal policy, both
with respect to short run stabilisation and long run growth. The EMU institutional
setting follows from the fact that the theoretical consensus reached on money
neutrality in the long run, and sound fiscal policies as a necessary condition for
low inflation expectations, was not thoroughly accepted by monetary and fiscal
authorities during the EMS period. Once “monetary discipline” has been gained
with the single currency and a single central bank inheriting the same
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Bundesbank’s high preference for monetary stability, the fear of “fiscal
indiscipline” has pushed the implementation of the SGP towards enforcing
“close to balance” public accounts. The motivation for sticking to the separate
assignment of monetary policy to symmetric shocks and fiscal policy to
asymmetric shocks under the SGP constraint, emerges exactly from the paper
as the objective to avoid that the ECB monetary stances could be jeopardised
by too expansionary stabilisation policies at the national level. Winkler endorses
the orthodox view whereby the EMU countries should refrain from improving
on the natural income level by monetary and fiscal expansions. Instead, the
EMU governments should come to terms with the excessive rigidity of the
labour markets. The insistence on labour market reforms, aimed at reducing
job protection and decentralising wage contracts, is also the reason for the
ECB tight monetary stance, which is formally based on the well-known “two
pillars” but de facto pointing to a rigorous application of the monetary strategy
advocated by the “inflation targeting” view.
In the light of the Tamborini’s analysis, the EMU institutional setting is
far from being the most appropriate for a sound macroeconomic management.
A great merit of the paper is in the method. Tamborini is sympathetic with the
Keynesian approach. Yet, in order to be able to carry out a rigorous evaluation
of the EMU monetary-fiscal policy mix, he accepts the macroeconomic model
of the mainstream approach to which the whole EMU construction is inspired.
The bulk of the Tamborini paper is the critique of the complete overlapping -
which Winkler instead applauds - between the theoretical tenets and policy
prescriptions of the mainstream approach and the Brussels consensus. He
convincingly argues that the presumption of optimality of the present EMU
monetary-fiscal policy mix is flawed. It leads governments to underestimate
costs and risks of insufficient stabilization stemming from the “monetary
dominance” of the ECB acting as a Stackelberg leader, and national governments
coping with asymmetric shocks by running “close to balance” budgets and just
“letting automatic stabilisers work”. I think that the main critiques put forward
by Tamborini are worth to be carefully pondered.
Due to the loss of national monetary policy instrument, whatever the
degree of correlation of asymmetric shocks, as for both demand and supply
shocks, in the absence of a monetary intervention by the ECB, automatic
stabilisers prove to be insufficient to optimally stabilise either output or inflation.
Yet, apart from the case of perfectly symmetric shocks (which do not affect the
EMU-wide output and inflation values), it is likely that symmetric but unevenly
distributed symmetric shocks materialize. The ECB is then obliged to intervene,
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and spillovers across EMU countries in terms of output effects and financial
effects - via the interest rate - ensue. While sticking to the functioning of the
orthodox macroeconomic framework, Tamborini demonstrates that the joint
operation of the ECB monetary policy and the national automatic stabilisers
proves again to be insufficient. Moreover, the more asymmetric is the shock,
the less the ECB is required to intervene. In view of possible reliance on
discretionary fiscal impulses, Tamborini also argues that the counterfactual
assessment of compliance with SGP by national fiscal authorities, conducted
on the European data of past decades, does not show – contrary to the opinion
of the economists at the European Commission - systematic pro-cyclical
mismanagement of public budgets. I would also add that the evidence of non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policies - often mentioned in the literature which is
sympathetic with the orthodox model - is scant and may in fact conceal reverse
causation. It is very likely that the deflationary tendency of the macroeconomy
has been causing automatic stabilisers to increase public deficits, not the other
way round.
Two other Tamborini results are worth mentioning: i) Contrary to the
SGP rationale (above mentioned in question 2), a possible increase in the EMU-
wide interest rate as an effect of a national stabilisation policy, is likely to be
overrunned – due to the high share of the intra-EMU exchange - by the positive
spillovers spread over the other EMU countries’ income level. In general, each
government operating its optimal fiscal policy is a Nash equilibrium which
trumps SGP policy prescriptions, thus putting in doubts the recourse to the
SGP; ii) In case of negative supply shocks, the question has to be posed “whether
the aggregate outcome of optimal discretionary fiscal policies is also optimal
for the central monetary authority”. First, contrary to the Dixit and Lambertini
paper, the same relative weights for output and inflation in the loss function
have to be considered by the ECB and the national fiscal authority. Second,
even if the weights are different, in the long run no disturbing effect will affect
the core inflation and potential output levels jointly decided by the ECB and
national fiscal authorities, so that no distortion is caused by discretionary national
fiscal polices. However, as far as the short run is concerned, in case of a possible
disagreement between them about the relative variability of output and inflation
an important warning is conveyed by the paper. The ECB might not be content
with the fiscal stabilisation of expansionary public deficit and then react. Hence,
the risk that conflicting interventions could jeopardize the EMU macroeconomic
environment are severe. Yet, the solution is by no means the SGP, as a fiscal
policy central authority appears to be the sensible choice.
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In conclusion, the Tamborini’s analysis of the present guidelines for EMU
macroeconomic policy shows that the “Brussels consensus” is not such a solid
and reliable construction. The reader gets the impression that the Winkler’s
satisfaction with the orthodox approach to the EMU macroeconomic
management is beyond the point. Quite on the contrary, our attention is drawn
to consider the possibility that - as an effect of both the ECB behavioural function
and the SGP constraint on national fiscal policies - a deflationary bias is
hampering in Europe the determinants of long-run growth.
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COMMENT
BY
ANNETTE BONGARDT
Dario Togati’s paper shares with other contributions to this volume
(Winkler and Tamborini) a common theme, the discussion of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) and of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) from an
economic perspective, but adds a different perspective: the New Economy (NE).
The author’s focus and contribution resides in his analysis as to whether and to
what extent the advent of the NE has changed economic and thus policy
conditions and whether the existing macroeconomic policy prescriptions in the
eurozone can be considered adequate in the light of the objective to transform
the EU in the world’s most competitive knowledge-based economy (Lisbon
strategy).
His paper explores two lines of thought. First, and more generally, he
defends that EMU policy prescriptions following from the Maastricht Treaty,
the SGP and the Brussels Consensus, lack “internal consistency” or credibility,
meaning that they do not follow from any specific macroeconomic theory –
new classical or Keynesian. Secondly, he argues that EMU prescriptions lack
“external consistency” on the grounds that they are out of tune with the NE that
increases demand instability. Lastly, he makes the case for new Keynesian policy
guidelines featuring more flexibility within thresholds, claiming that the present
ones with too tight fiscal and monetary policies, albeit with a pragmatic
enforcement, lack credibility and have contributed to the present economic
difficulties.
The first and the last issue – an evaluation of the existing macroeconomic
toolbox in the light of symmetric (dealt with by ECB monetary policy) and
asymmetric (dealt with by national fiscal policies in the absence of EU fiscal
federalism) shocks, or indeed of permanent or temporary ones - shall not be
focused here. They are also addressed in this volume by Winkler and by
Tamborini and by Croce Angelini in her comment on the two authors.
The second issue begs an analysis as to what is so new about the NE as
to require new economic policies. To start with, it might be useful to define
what exactly is meant by the NE, given that this term might be interpreted
differently, and distinguish it from another frequently used term, information
economy. Drawing on Bryson (2003), the NE is generally considered to
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comprise the following elements:
• A productivity revival (verified in the US in the second half of the 1990s,
after the slow-down noted from the 1973 oil crisis onwards)
• Elevation of knowledge to a quasi-production factor and information and
communications technologies (ICT) raising the productivity of third sectors;
• The need for multi-dimensional changes – e.g. firm organisation, institutions,
competition patterns;
• The belief in the end of the business cycle, with recessions overcome and
stock prices representing the actual present value of firms.
Evidence (i.e. the 2001-2003 recession and the end of the bubble in the
US, the pioneer in the NE) has in the meantime dismissed the proposition that
the NE would spell the end of the business cycle. The first three items now tend
to be referred to as information economy. It should be noted that they are
microeconomic in nature, highlighting not only knowledge and ICT but as
well changes, for instance in firms, institutions and governance, necessary to
realise their full benefits, notably in terms of efficiency gains.
In this context it might be useful to recall that the productivity slow-
down in Europe and in the US has its roots in the exhaustion of the old mass
production paradigm in terms of base technology, working practices / skill
profiles inspired by Taylorism and organisation; a fact to which management
science has long called attention. The acceleration of technological advance
and the advent of new, more flexible production technologies with the then
available ICT highlighted flexibility at the firm level (i.e. production equipment,
working practices, less hierarchical organization, inter-firm cooperation) and
the market-driven faster and more flexible reaction to clients’ needs. This
production paradigm shift for which ICT created the preconditions, referred to
as lean production or flexible mass production, pioneered by the Japanese firm
Toyota (and also denominated as Toyotism), is centred on different organisation
and is market- rather than production-technology driven. It was implementing
flexible mass production with different firm and work organization in its
industrial organization settings that European and US firms regained
competitiveness. At the European level, the European Community addressed
the ”productivity paradox” to overcome “Eurosclerosis” in the first half of the
1980s by putting in practice the four freedoms and liberalizing internally (Single
European Act and the Single Market) and externally (Uruguay Round).
Focusing on the information economy of which the United States are
the pioneer, with the proliferation of ICT and the US productivity revival in the
second half of the 1990s, it is noteworthy that the very existence of a productivity
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gap between Europe and the US is not uncontested (I should like to thank Paul
de Grauwe for having reminded me that productivity per hour is not much
different between Europe and the US, considering factors such as differences
in terms of longer working hours and lifetime work in the US). Another issue is
whether firm structures, governance and institutions are adequate for realising
the full benefits from knowledge and ICT in a knowledge-based economy. Could
the fact that Europe fails to deliver growth in the information economy not
rather be related to the fact that Europe has not managed to create a favourable
environment for the information economy to work and produce growth? The
European Council recognised in 2003 that the potential of the Lisbon strategy
rests on global and coordinated reforms, notably in terms of structural reforms,
employment policies and social protection, apart from macroeconomic
coordination.
The possible linkages between the microeconomic sphere and
macroeconomic stability were brought back to general attention by the reality
of the persistence of business cycles. It is generally held that the information
economy enhances the functioning of markets and supply-side conditions
(corroborated by the information economy literature reviewed in Bryson (2003)).
Togati argues that the NE does not resume to a mere positive supply shock in
line with the New Classical Macroeconomics view, but that it also increases
endogenous demand instability. On the basis of the fact that the information
economy augments speed and functions within a context of market liberalisation
/ globalisation as well in sectors long closed to competition (notably financial
services), the question is whether many of the problems in the microeconomic
sphere that allegedly enhance demand instability would really be best addressed
by macroeconomic demand management.
Rather, it might be useful to take a step back and give some thought to
the micro foundations of the information economy and how to avoid some of
the potential sources of demand shocks in the first place. This would include
for instance better accounting standards (e.g. avoiding another Emron case)
and banking regulation to prevent crises of consumer and investor confidence
such in Japan (where demand stimulation did not prove successful for many
years), employment formation and re-qualification policies as a response to
structural change and to prevent structural unemployment, or regional policies
to improve regional competitiveness and social policies of various kinds, or
reinforcing consumer information and protection.
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CHAPTER 10
EVER CHALLENGING THE BUCK? THE EURO AND THE QUESTION OF
POWER IN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY GOVERNANCE
BY
HUBERT ZIMMERMANN
Abstract: Monetary Power matters – this has been the firm conviction of many
proponents of European monetary integration which saw the Euro as a political
project to liberate Europe from its dependence on the American dollar. This
article discusses how the trajectory towards a common currency was affected
by this idea, whether it is embedded in the actual form of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), and how it is reflected in current debates about the
external management of the common currency. It argues that the current
institutional set-up of the Euro-zone is not conducive to an active monetary
policy. This lack of acting capability might become a serious problem as the
Euro moves towards an increasingly important role in the international monetary
system.
Keywords: Bretton Woods, monetary power, Germany, France, United States,
Maastricht, ECB
This chapter deals with the past and future of an idea which sparked the
imagination of many European politicians and analysts (and does so still): the
idea of creating a so-called European monetary personality and in the process
a currency which is able to rival the dollar on world monetary markets. Behind
that idea lays the assumption that monetary power matters. This fundamentally
political interpretation of the necessity of European monetary integration played
an important role in the debate about Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
since the 1960s. I will discuss how this idea affected the trajectory towards a
common currency, whether it is embedded in the actual form of EMU, and
how it is reflected in the debates about the external management of the common
currency. Finally, the progress and prospects for an enhanced international role
of the euro and the implications of such a development for global economic
governance will be assessed.
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1. Some Recent Developments
Over the last two years, the euro has appreciated to an extent which
surprised many observers (see also Pompeo della Posta’s chapter in this volume).
Even the end of the war in Iraq has not resulted in a reversal of this trend,
contrary to past military conflicts with United States (US) participation which,
on termination, led to a strong upward movement of the American currency. Of
course, the unstable situation in Iraq suggests that the US will be engaged there
for the foreseeable future and that there will be no quick easing of the military
burden, let alone a peace dividend in the form of petroleum exports leading to
lower energy prices. Analysts and markets, however, seem less worried about
the direct cost of the war; they rather point to the huge budgetary deficits resulting
from the economic policy of the Bush administration and to the traditionally
high American current account deficit (Calleo 2003). These are no results of
the Iraq war. The International Herald Tribune warned already in December
2002 that America’s “current account deficit is running at record levels, requiring
as much as $2bn. a day in inflows from foreign investors to finance it” (Pfanner
2002). Whereas in the second half of the 20th century the persistent deficits of
the United States were offset by massive capital inflows mostly from European
and Asian countries, it appears now as if the situation has changed. The
Economist Intelligence Unit noted in its country report on the US that it is
“increasingly difficult to attract these funds – a key reason why the dollar fell
during 2002. Foreign governments and central banks are now providing a
significant minority of all capital flows into the US, suggesting that the private
sector’s appetite for US dollar assets has waned.”1 In late 2003, this trend was
continuing. It eroded increasingly the major privilege associated with the dollar’s
role as the world’s leading currency; the ability to react with benign neglect to
persistent current account deficits. The Financial Times reported in December
2003 that the American deficit required a net inflow into dollar assets of about
$46bn a month, but the actual amount had fallen in September 2003 to $4.2bn
(Hughes/Swann 2003). To attract investors, the US will in the long run have to
raise interest rates or find other means to get foreigners to invest in dollar assets.
However, these potential investors appear to have found an alternative:
the euro. Reports in the international press have multiplied, indicating that
more and more countries plan to diversify some of their reserves in euro. In
March 2003, Russia “imported” for the first time more euros ($1.6bn) than
dollars ($1.2bn). That is a more than three-fold increase compared to the year
before (Neue Zuericher Zeitung, 2003). Reportedly, the share of euro-based
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deposits quadrupled in some Moscow banks in this year, suggesting that the
gigantic estimated $50bn in dollars which are hoarded by Russians might be
converted increasingly to euros (Wines 2003). The Russian central bank has
lowered the share of dollars in its reserves from 90% to 75%, augmented its
holdings of euros. This trend might continue since almost half of Russia’s
imports come from Europe.
At the 2002 ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) summit, China, Japan and
eight other Asian countries stated their intention to use the euro as reserve
currency along with the dollar (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2002). After 9/11, reports
circulated that Arab countries were withdrawing massive amounts of capital
from American accounts because of preoccupations that these funds might
eventually get vested in the campaign against the financial sources of terrorism.
The German finance Minister Hans Eichel reported after a trip to Latin America,
“Everybody is interested in a strong euro, since they do not want to depend on
the dollar” (Herz 2002). In November 2003, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)  published figures which showed that the Euro’s share in world monetary
reserves had unexpectedly risen from 14.6 to 18.7% (IMF 2003).
The old dream of enthusiasts of European cooperation appears as if it
might come true: a common currency as a cornerstone of Europe’s rise to
equality with the US on a global scale. Such visions, however, have regularly
received sobering comments from the guardians of the euro. In its last report
on the international role of the euro, the European Central Bank (ECB) has
stated that it “does not pursue the internationalisation of the euro as an
independent policy goal, which implies that it neither fosters nor hinders this
process” (ECB 2002). This statement is similar to the position the Bundesbank
took in the 1960s and 1970s when the Deutschmark (DM) became a safe haven
for funds moving away from dollars. It is a deeply engrained conviction of
most European central bankers that a more assertive role of the eurozone in the
international monetary system would have to be based on far-reaching internal
market reforms, in particular labour market liberalization, so as to gradually
reduce the competitive advantage of the US as optimum currency area. For the
bankers, the economic fundamentals determine the international use of a
currency. Probably even more important is that the ECB and the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) want to be free to target monetary policy to
the internal objective of price stability.2
However, the ECB is not the only institution shaping the international
monetary policy of EMU. The member states and the euro-12 are responsible
for exchange rate management and the external representation of the eurozone.
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Different traditions have shaped their perspective on the international role of
the euro, as will be shown in this chapter. The disjunction between the massive
amount of speculation about the international role of the euro and the relative
silence of European authorities is conspicuous. Assessments as regards future
developments on monetary markets are notoriously difficult. A glimpse back
into history and an analysis of the question whether a European currency was
also perceived as a potential rival to the dollar may help to clarify long-lasting
political trends. These trends might shed light on a question which, especially
given current transatlantic discords will certainly attract enormous attention in
the coming years. What does the possession of a hegemonic international
currency mean in terms of monetary power and is it desirable that European
monetary authorities pursue an active policy in this in this respect? This question
is notoriously hard to grasp since research has not yet managed to agree on
precise definitions of the effects of monetary power.
A historical overview can provide some evidence in this respect. It will
be shown that the idea of an active European monetary policy vis-à-vis the US
was a driving force in decisive moments of the history of European monetary
integration. However, in the blueprint for the eurozone this consideration played
hardly any role. Similarly to the situation in the US after World War II, the
eurozone has no specific institutional structure and policy to deal with the
consequences of a development which seems to become increasingly a reality:
the rise of the euro to the status of an international currency comparable to the
dollar. This could result in the incapacity on part of the eurozone to formulate
a coherent response to major monetary crises, for example in the event of massive
changes in the value of the dollar.
2. Dollar Hegemony and Monetary Power3
It had not been foreseen after 1945 (particularly not by the British) that
the pound would soon lose its role as the world’s major international currency
to the dollar. At the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the US and the United
Kingdom had envisioned a world in which several currencies played a leading
role. In the end, however, the features of the monetary system as it emerged
after 1945 differed in important aspects from what had been planned. Soon, all
major industrial countries linked the value of their currencies to the dollar. The
dollar’s value was expressed in a fixed ratio to gold ($35 an ounce), and
guaranteed by an American promise to exchange at this rate dollars to gold
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from the abundant reserves at Fort Knox. This gold exchange guarantee provided
the dollar as reserve currency with credibility. The strength of the US economy
seemed beyond doubt; however, the main condition on which the stability of
the whole system rested was that the US managed its domestic economy and
the effects of its external commitments in ways that were not detrimental to
dollar stability.
Monetary relations in the Western World became part of an overall
strategy which was to shield Western democracies through economic stability
and growth from the perceived threat from abroad and from within, especially
in countries with strong Communist parties such as France and Italy. The United
States became economically (and militarily) much more entangled in Europe
and Asia than it had planned. This caused an unprecedented outflow of dollars
and would have not been possible if the US had not been the centre of the
world economy and, at the same time, the linchpin of the Western security
system. Thus, it had not to worry about the balance of payments deficits resulting
from its enormous political and economic commitments as long the bills were
not presented at the US treasury for gold all at once. The role of the dollar as
the linchpin of the system spared the US also the need to pursue potentially
costly adjustment policies, which is one of the main benefits of monetary power
(Kirshner 2003: 22). As lender of last resort, it also cast the decisive vote in the
emerging post-war monetary governance structure. And finally, it also reaped
the benefits of seigniorage and profited from the fact trade in currencies and
major international commodities was done in dollars.4 Domestic autonomy,
external leverage and economic benefits are core attributes of monetary power
and they certainly contributed to the lasting super-power status of the US (though
research at present is unable to give and estimate of the exact weight of those
different elements).
Against simplistic zero-sum game arguments of power, however, this
did not mean that the Europeans did not profit from the post-war monetary
system. An informal bargain emerged. The US had the privileges of monetary
hegemony, and the Europeans profited from US capital outflows for investments.
Furthermore, they acquired security against the East through the American
military commitment. Political and economic aspects were very closely
intertwined in this construction: the transatlantic monetary order was not only
a set of economic arrangements. It was a highly political enterprise, based on a
common outlook and language in economic and political affairs. As long as
the larger political and economic objectives of Europe and the US were in
accordance, the Europeans would be content to allow the US call the tune in
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international monetary relations. However, as important and welcome the
support of the United States for the reconstruction and integration of European
economies was, a certain uneasiness always existed, even outside leftist and
nationalist circles, regarding the dependence of Europe on American economic
and military support.5
Despite this uneasiness, alternative conceptions of monetary order were
rather marginalized in Europe. The European Payments Union, which could
have been the core of a distinctly European monetary order, was dissolved
without discussion in 1959 when it had fulfilled its immediate task of regulating
intra-European payments balances. Although this was regretted by many
participants, there was no sustained advocacy for an initiative which would
deepen and institutionalize European monetary cooperation. Early proposals
for a European currency policy, such as a resolution by the European parliament
in 1959, were not taken serious by the transatlantic elite managing international
monetary policy (Tsoukalis, 1977: 53-4).
However, as early as the late 1950s, cracks in the Bretton Woods system
appeared. Robert Triffin formulated the famous dilemma of the dollar-gold
standard: the growing world economy necessitated a continuing supply of the
reserve currency. However, as soon as the dollars accumulating in the system
approached the value of the American gold reserves, doubts in the dollar-gold
exchange pledge inevitably arose (Triffin 1960). Curbing the dollar outflow
would result in a shortage of liquidity. To continue pumping dollars abroad,
however, would cause increasing exchanges of dollars to gold, thereby
undermining the base of the dollar even more. The American government felt
particularly threatened by the possibility of a run on its gold reserves in case
nervous holders began to cash in their dollars. In fact, from 1958 to 1961, the
American gold stock declined from $20.6bn to $16.9bn.  However, a devaluation
of the dollar against gold was ruled out, partly for prestige reasons, partly because
it would have made US investments and commitments abroad vastly more
expensive. When President Kennedy asked his Secretary of Treasury to educate
him on the actual advantages of a reserve currency, Douglas Dillon answered:
“To date, foreign countries and their nationals have acquired nearly $20 billion
in dollar accounts. This, in effect, is a demand loan to us of $20 billion which
has allowed us to pursue policies over the years that would have been utterly
impossible had not the dollar been a key currency6”.
Fearing the unknown consequences of a radical policy change, the US
took a strong lead in forging a reaffirmation of the transatlantic bargain.
Eisenhower and Kennedy called on the Europeans to help shore up the system.
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In the following years the leading industrial states devised an elaborate system
of new rules and regimes which were to stabilize the monetary order (Goldpool,
General Agreements to Borrow, Roosa-Bonds, etc.). Germany (later joined by
other countries such as Italy and Japan) agreed to transfer back the dollars it
acquired from the huge American military machinery on its territory by buying
American weapons – a clear sign for the close link between security and
monetary system (Zimmermann 1999). Although the dollar gold link turned
out to be a potential constraint on the US, it had enough leverage to get other
countries to play by the rules and actively support the dollar. The American-led
effort to stabilize the system glaringly exposed its political background. The
European willingness to go along rested upon the US promise to put their balance
of payments in order and even more on the still intact common outlook regarding
the political and economic bases of the transatlantic system.
Despite the re-enforcement of international cooperation, the American
deficits did not disappear during the 1960s. It was clear that the monetary system
was in need of reform. Voices calling for a radical reform of the system became
more influential among academic economists. Even more ominous was that
alternative political conceptions of monetary order became increasingly popular.
The core figure in this context is the French President Charles de Gaulle. As
soon as he assumed his post in 1958, he embarked on a mission of regaining
national autonomy for France in what he considered one of essential domains
of state power: autonomy in the pursuit of monetary policies. To the Gaullists,
the Bretton Woods system symbolized a “Yalta monetaire fait à deux7”,
paralleling in importance the famous wartime conference of 1945 during which
the Big Three allegedly had divided up Europe without regard to the concerns
of smaller countries. The Gaullist critique of the dollar centred on two points:
that an overvalued dollar (with respect to gold) helped the US to buy up European
industries with cheap money, and that the key currency role of the dollar allowed
the Americans to finance their expansive foreign policies by printing money
(Bordo/Simard/White 1995). In February 1965, the French President threw
down the gauntlet. He announced that France from now on would exchange
every dollar it earned immediately for gold in order to force the US to a radical
change of the monetary system. However, the Gaullist idea of national monetary
autonomy was not uncontested in France. Many officials in French monetary
institutions remained transatlantic in their outlook. Another solution was
represented by Finance Minister, Giscard d’Estaing, and pronounced by his
deputy, Andrè de Lattre, in January 1965: the idea of a European currency.8
The major intention behind this step “was the creation of a currency to rival the
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US dollar and the pound sterling” (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 100-1).
Giscard’s supranational initiative was greeted with silence in the European
Economic Community (EEC) countries. De Gaulle did not like the ideas of his
minister either, and in January 1966 Giscard d’Estaing left the government. De
Gaulle’s intention of bringing down the transatlantic system failed too, however,
although the US gold reserves in Fort Knox shrank considerably. No other
monetary power supported France. Germany immediately declared its solidarity
with the US. To be sure, it shared with the rest of Europe some of the critique
de Gaulle uttered against lax American monetary policies. The Germans
complained that the system forced them to import inflation and thus undermined
the domestic priority of price stability (Emminger 1976). But the primacy of
transatlantic cooperation in solving the monetary distortions remained dominant,
not only in the Federal Republic but also in countries such as Britain, Italy or
the Netherlands (as mentioned earlier, an important factor was the security
partnership linking these states to the US).
However, within a few years, this allegiance was shattered sufficiently
to lead to a major rethinking among America’s allies. The most important reason
was the Vietnam War. It resulted in a much more assertive and confrontational
American policy towards its allies, and it provoked grave apprehensions in
Europe whether the US would honour its side of the bargain and keep the
dollar stable while preserving its security commitments in Europe. The war
also led to fundamental doubts in the general thrust of American policies and
thus undermined the political rationales for supporting the dollar. Many critics
suspected that Europe was financing the Vietnam War by holding dollars.
Increasingly, American pressure to induce European countries to hold dollars
(and thus extend credit to policies they would underwrite no more) was deeply
resented.9
The US also moved away from the transatlantic bargain. Those in the
US which since the early 1960s had seen the international role of the dollar
rather as a burden became increasingly vocal (Nau 1990: 152).  When Richard
Nixon became president in 1969, the de-legitimization of the transatlantic order
in the US accelerated. Nixon had no attachment to the institutionalized
cooperation established by the Bretton Woods framework – particularly since
the public debate suggested that its effects were damaging to American national
interests. The Nixon administration was not willing to agree to European
demands for a domestic economic policy which would stabilize the external
value of the dollar. It saw its domestic autonomy threatened by these demands
which were interpreted as European attempt to free-ride on a monetary system
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resting on America’s already over-burdened shoulders. In economic issues,
Europe was increasingly seen as rival not as partner. Nixon’s Secretary of
Treasury, John Connally, wrote, “I believe we must realize there is a strong
element of thinking within Europe that would take advantage of weakness or
clumsiness on our part to promote the Common Market not as a partner but as
a rival economic bloc, competing vigorously with the dollar and reducing or
shutting out, as best as it can, US economic influence from a considerable
portion of the world.10”
For these reasons, the new government took no initiative to do anything
about the monetary turmoil as long as it did not see its domestic priorities
endangered by the “market”. The rise of neo-liberal thought in those years had
the welcome function of legitimizing this policy. As a result of the policy of
‘benign neglect’, however, American balance of payments deficits rose out of
all proportion. When dollar-holders desperately tried to cash in their reserves,
Nixon acted and in August 1971 closed the gold window. As there was no
alternative to the dollar, the world was set on a virtual dollar standard. Thus,
the burden of adjustment was shifted abroad, and America’s autonomy regarding
its domestic policies and the size of its external commitments was preserved.
The Europeans, however, were left with two unpleasant options concerning the
resulting dollar glut: either to revalue their currencies against the dollar or to
try and neutralize the capital inflow by restrictive measures on the domestic
market. The idea of “liberating” Europe from that ties that bound it to an erratic
American monetary policy received a strong push by these events.
3. Dollar ‘Decline’ and European Monetary Integration in the 1970s
The decisive change in this respect occurred in Germany.
Unprecedented speculative funds streaming to the Federal Republic became
a regular feature, undermining the domestic autonomy granted until then by
the Bretton Woods system. The 1968 Bonn monetary conference, during which
Germany resisted the urgent calls by the US, the UK and France to revalue
the DM, was a sign that the disillusionment of German politicians in currency
matters was prevailing over its continued allegiance of the financial elite to
the transatlantic system. The time was ripe for alternative conceptions and in
early 1969 there was already one on the desks in European capitals: EC
Commissioner Raymond Barre’s report on European monetary integration
(Memorandum der Kommission 1969). The Barre report was a reaction to
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the Bonn conference and it reflected the deep concern of the Commission
regarding the effects of monetary disunity on the project of European
integration. The reaction of the member countries during prior consultations
ranged from mildly positive to indifferent.11 Italy and the Netherlands still
had reservations and warned of a duplication of transatlantic mechanisms by
European structures.
The French finance minister, however, welcomed the plan. His name
was Giscard d’Estaing who had reassumed his post after de Gaulle was replaced
by Georges Pompidou in April 1969. Giscard wasted no time to communicate
to the German government that he still considered a European solution the best
way to confront the monetary crisis, despite the silence which had greeted his
earlier proposals.12 The huge speculative movements from franc to DM in 1969
convinced the non-Gaullist and non-Communist part of the French establishment
that a strategy of national autonomy was illusory and that a European solution
was the only possibility to avoid that the franc, if ever free from dependence on
the dollar, was subjugated to German monetary policy. To the long-term concern
of avoiding monetary dependence on Germany came the urgent short-term
business of saving the CAP which was thrown into havoc when France and the
Federal Republic finally realigned their currencies (in August and October 1969
respectively).13 Thus, the de-legitimization of Gaullist ideology and a mix of
short- and long-term concerns opened the path for the French government’s
embracement of a European solution. However, this opening was fragile:
Pompidou, for example, was not convinced that a European solution was
preferable to the Gaullist conception (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 290-1).
Giscard’s hints and the Commission proposals surprisingly struck a
receptive chord in Germany, the country which had been the core supporter of
the transatlantic system on the European side. The major reason is that the
previous consensus in Germany on the priority of pursuing international
monetary policy in a transatlantic framework was rapidly dissolving. Although
important actors, such as the Bundesbank, remained wedded to the Bretton
Woods system, and although some politicians flirted with a Gaullist conception
of national autonomy, based on the success of Germany’s anti-inflationary
policies, it was the European option which ultimately prevailed at the EC Hague
summit of December 1969. The central role in this decision fell to Willy Brandt
who was elected Chancellor in September 1969. Brandt was acutely aware of
the problem that his new Ostpolitik might provoke apprehensions from countries
wary of greater German independence. Additionally, he was sympathetic to
the critique levelled towards US policies by the European left and thus not
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particularly disposed to make a strong effort in order to save the transatlantic
bargain.
During the heads of government meeting in The Hague, Brandt surprised
the assembled group by endorsing the idea of a European reserve fund and
calling for the accomplishment of an economic and monetary union in stages
(based on a plan from the Economics Ministry). Like the agreement between
Mitterrand and Kohl prior to the Intergovernmental Conference in Maastricht,
Brandt’s decision to table a plan for monetary union was taken in an extremely
volatile international situation and in very short-term and unpremeditated way.
Retrospectively, Brandt wrote that he intended to give Europe renewed impetus
with the reserve fund idea (Brandt 1976: 322). At a time when the security
relationship to the United States weakened, suggesting less dependence, the
German government also took a step towards liberating itself from the
straightjacket of the dollar. The parallels to Maastricht are striking. The EMU
proposal was supported by the smaller countries; even Italy now emphasized
the necessity of a European counterbalance to the US (Tsoukalis 1977: 89). A
working group, chaired by Luxemburg’s Prime Minister, Pierre Werner, was
charged with presenting a plan in respect of Economic and Monetary Union.
However, although after 1969 the final objective of European monetary
policy had become consensus and slowly replaced the old transatlantic outlook,
there was no agreement on the way to achieve it. The Werner plan was never
implemented, and the early 1970s became a period of ideological ferment with
many different conceptions competing in Europe. The US, perceiving itself in
a defensive position, agreed only to a limited extent of international cooperation,
abandoning even this whenever opportune. In February 1973, US Secretary of
Treasury, George Shultz, remarked that “American policy for interest rates and
domestic liquidity will only be determined in accordance with the needs of the
United States economy, excluding other international concerns (quoted in:
Tsoukalis, 1977: 127). The ups and downs of the dollar during the 1970s were
major factors in repeated European attempts at closer cooperation despite strong
cleavages in monetary philosophy among EC members. European governments
and central banks became less and less willing to make any sacrifices for the
sake of transatlantic cooperation - in contrast with an increasing willingness to
coordinate their monetary policies in the European context (Loedel 1999). The
dollar problem was seen as the main source of intra-European currency
instability, forcing Germany, and, consequently, other European countries to
incessant adjustment measures (Kaelberer 2001: 130-1). This provided ample
opportunities for French proponents of a European monetary identity. When
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Giscard d’Estaing, in 1978, called for a “new Bretton Woods for Europe”, he
found a receptive listener in Germany’s chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In his
writings, Schmidt emphasizes his disillusionment with American monetary
policies (terming them repeatedly ‘ruthless’) and his conviction that monetary
union in Europe was the only way to solve this problem (Schmidt 1990: 221,
231). Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok called the EMU “the foundation for
Europe’s increased power in the world.” (Quoted in Rodman 2003: 74). The
idea of a European currency as means to enhance European bargaining power
became a constant element of statements on this issue.
4. Maastricht and the External Role of the euro
The theme of EMU as an instrument of independence, of course, remained
a staple of French monetary policy. Mitterrand’s belief in the EC as means to
enhance European autonomy, for example, underpinned his attitude to EMU
(Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 126). This argument, in combination with the fear
of German monetary dominance, kept monetary union alive in France despite
the formidable heritage of Gaullism. It was clearly visible in the Dumas
memorandum of June 1984 which called for a European currency as medium
of defence against the dollar and as possible second reserve currency (ibid:
153). A cultural conception of monetary union as building block for a European
unity pervaded also the ideas of lower rank officials, such as Jean-Claude Trichet
(ibid.: 177).
In the run-up to the Maastricht conference, however, this goal was
subjugated to other objectives, above all the binding of a reunited Germany
which had become a major preoccupation of Mitterrand (Baun 1996). This
strong interest gave the Germans the bargaining power to push through their
own vision of a future institutional framework for EMU (Kaelberer 2001: 171).
An emphasis on the external role of the European currency was not part of
their ideas at this time, particularly given the vital role of the United States in
the process of German reunification. Thus, monetary union was created above
all with a view to the internal goals of price stability and central bank
independence, not the external objective which had so strongly inspired it
throughout its history. The French, careful not to stir up more domestic
opposition in Germany as already existed, gave up their idea of a strong
“gouvernement economique”. The question of the external representation of
the euro remained unresolved in Maastricht. The conspicuous silence of
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European authorities regarding the much-debated rise of the euro to a rival of
the dollar might be due to the interest in avoiding internal conflicts which had
been covered up in the Maastricht compromise.
One major result is that the present EMU faces a series of institutional
limitations for a more assertive and coherent international role. Predictions
that the US would have to “confront a larger, more cohesive, and more self-
confident and powerful partner” (Henning 1997: 94) have not yet come true.
The dollar remains the global vehicle currency and, despite recent trends cited
above, the euro’s share in international foreign exchange reserves does not yet
come close to suggest a displcement of the dollar (ECB 2002: 10-11). In a
recent analysis, Benjamin Cohen sums up the reasons for the failure of the
euro to surpass the dollar: 1) inertia. Looking back at the history of the decline
of the pound it is clear that major changes in the composition of the world’s
most important currencies take many years. 2) The higher cost of transactions
in euros; 3) the anti-growth bias built into the eurozone; and 4) EMU’s
ambiguous governance structure (Cohen 2003: 56). He might have added the
fact that with the UK the country with the most important European financial
centre is not part of the eurozone.
The fourth point cited by Cohen seems particularly relevant for the future
of international monetary governance. The representation of EMU in
international fora, such as the IMF or G-7, is as yet unclear. McNamara and
Meunier have argued that as long as there will be no single voice for the euro,
there is no way the euro will achieve a role comparable to the dollar (2003:
850). An unresolved tension exists between the euro-12 and the ECB on this
issue with the latter claiming that the external value of the euro should be
solely a result of the ECB’s monetary policy. Former ECB President Duisenberg
stated: “Generally speaking, the commitment of the ECB to successfully
fulfilling the mandate of the Treaty, that is, to maintain price stability in the
euro area, will also shape the ECB’s international role. This is, without doubt,
the best contribution the ECB can make to a stable monetary system”.14
However, it might be expected that in high-level diplomacy the finance ministers
will keep the last word, potentially undermining positions taken the ECB. What
is therefore needed is a “clear system of political representation in the area of
monetary and financial governance in the EU that allows for effective partnership
with the other major economic powers in the international system” (McNamara/
Meunier 2003: 858). One solution for this problem might be the installation of
a “Mr EMU”, modelled after the successful experiment with Javier Solana in
the realm of external foreign policy.
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Despite this uncertainty regarding the euro’s external representation, the
signs for its continuing rise are very apparent and have been mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter. The euro is thus the first international currency which
is not backed by a centralized political authority. What does this mean in terms
of European monetary power? The well-known distinction between structural
and relational power introduced by the late Susan Strange might be useful to
answer this question. Undoubtedly, the eurozone alone by virtue of its size has
enormous structural power, that is, the power to shape the environment in which
others have to operate (Strange 1988: 26). However, when it comes to the use
of relational power (getting others to do what you want), which is needed in
case global monetary governance structures are re-negotiated, it might lack the
necessary institutional clout.  This scenario is not far-fetched.
The still growing interdependence between Europe and the United States
suggests that the common interest in stabilizing mutual economic relations
will exert immense pressure for a concertation of monetary policies. Conflicts
will inevitably arise. The history of Bretton Woods shows that so-called
economic rationality is usually subjugated to political imperatives. Whereas in
the United States pressure by the Congress might lead to an uncooperative
monetary policy, the EU has still to deal with member states which are
autonomous in much of their domestic economic policy. Diverging priorities
in domestic markets and the resulting pressure on political leaders might easily
lead to a situation which intensifies rather than prevents international monetary
crises. The intentional institutional distance of European monetary decision
makers from the vagaries of domestic political battles can diminish quite rapidly.
Thus, in the US as well as in Europe domestic developments can quickly
undermine the present loose governance structure in the internaional monetary
system. It is in particular the scenario of major turmoil resulting from US current
account deficits and indebtedness which might lead to major monetary conflicts.
The eurozone is also not immune against external shocks. In this case, rapid
transatlantic consultation might be necessary and an international bargaining
process will determine which actor would have to bear the costs of adjustment.
Currently the eurozone is ill-equipped for such a negotiating process. The key
issue for the international role of the euro in the next years will be therefore
whether the structural power of the eurozone can be transformed in relational
power required to bargain with other monetary actors.
If that happens, a co-leadership will emerge in the international monetary
system which is divided between two currency areas. There are hardly any
analogies for such a situation, apart from the interwar period in the 1920s and
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1930s when the dollar and the pound were the leading currencies. Historians
and political scientists might take a closer look at this period for lessons
regarding the future of governance in the international monetary system.
1
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CHAPTER 11
THE DOLLAR/EURO EXCHANGE RATE AND EMU ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS *
BY
POMPEO DELLA POSTA
Abstract: The predictions made by economists of the value of the euro prior to
its introduction were essentially based on the expected portfolio adjustment
resulting from the role that it might play as an international currency. As a
result, most analysts agreed that the euro would be a strong currency,
appreciating against the US dollar. The first years of life of the ‘virtual’ euro
contradicted such a forecast. Economists therefore abandoned predictions based
on the euro as a ‘global’ money and directed their focus almost exclusively
towards traditional, ‘fundamentals-based’ explanations. Among these
explanations, several authors mentioned the unsatisfactory structural and
institutional set up of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Nevertheless,
later on, when the euro started appreciating, a different set of fundamentals
had to be isolated in order to account for such behaviour. It is possible to argue,
then, that the EMU economic structure and institutions are, or at least are
currently perceived as, capable of supporting a strong euro, which plays the
role of international money. ‘Framing’ of expectations, however, still keeps
driving the behaviour of the exchange rate, so that the same structural and
institutional set up may be subject to different evaluations, depending on the
particular state of expectations of the international currency markets. Finally,
since the available evidence suggests that the euro is starting to play an
international role, I argue that the ‘international money’ and the ‘framing’ of
expectations approaches explain the behaviour of the dollar/euro exchange rate
better than the ‘fundamentals’ one.
Keywords: Euro, dollar, fundamentals, international currency, portfolio
adjustment
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1. Introduction
“An economist is an expert who will know tomorrow why the things he
predicted yesterday didn’t happen today” (Laurence J. Peter)1. In the case of
the recent behaviour  of the euro, this famous aphorism would seem to be apt.
As a matter of fact, before the introduction of the euro most analysts agreed
that it would be a strong currency, appreciating against the US dollar. The first
years of life of the ‘virtual’ euro contradicted such a forecast. Economists
therefore abandoned predictions based on the euro as a ‘global’ money and
directed their focus almost exclusively towards traditional, ‘fundamentals-based’
explanations. Among these explanations, several authors mentioned the
unsatisfactory structural and institutional set up of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). Nevertheless, later on when the euro started appreciating, a
different set of fundamentals had to be isolated in order to account for such
behaviour. It is possible to argue, then, that the EMU economic structure and
institutions are, or at least are currently perceived as, capable of supporting a
strong euro, which plays the role of international money. ‘Framing’ of
expectations, however, still keeps driving the behaviour of the exchange rate,
so that the same structural and institutional set up may be subject to different
evaluations, depending on the particular state of expectations of the international
currency markets. Finally, since the available evidence suggests that the euro is
starting to play an international role, I argue that the ‘international money’ and
the ‘framing’ of expectations approaches explain the behaviour of the dollar/
euro exchange rate better than the ‘fundamentals’ one.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the recent
behaviour of the dollar/euro exchange rate and defines the three possible
categories that explain it. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 summarise the reasons why
economists expected respectively a strong and a weak euro. In section 4, I
survey the explanations provided in the literature for the initial weakness of the
euro, while in section 5, I consider the arguments advanced to account for its
current strength, thereby implicitly evaluating the robustness of the explanations
previously provided for its weakness. When considering both the predictions
and the ex-post analyses, I stress in particular the role of the EMU institutional
set up, so as to evaluate the role that it plays in determining the behaviour of
the dollar/euro exchange rate. Section 6 concludes.
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2. What determines the behaviour of the dollar/euro exchange rate?
Fundamentals, portfolio adjustments and ‘framing’ of expectations
The international use of a currency assures several benefits to the country
issuing it, in particular seigniorage, lower interest rates and a significant
economic and political role on the international arena.2  After World War II, the
US have benefited of such a position, but the advent of the euro might challenge
the role of the dollar. As a matter of fact, Mundell (1998) and Salvatore (2002),
among others, suggest that the US and the European Union might be involved
in a struggle for supremacy.3  Feldstein (2000) takes a stronger position, by
arguing that the US might become “a politically convenient adversary” capable
of unifying the otherwise divergent European countries. Portes and Rey (1998)
even quantified in a reduction in growth of up to half percentage point the loss
for the US resulting from the introduction of the new currency.
Other authors, however, express a different opinion. According to
Bergsten (2002) and Johnson (1994), quoted in Kaikati (1999), the international
role of the dollar would not be challenged by the euro, as long as the former
assures price stability in the US. Mussa (2000) maintains that while the success
of the euro might reduce the role of the dollar, higher European growth would
certainly benefit also the US, so as to create an overall positive balance. As a
matter of fact, according to Krugman (1998), the euro would imply at most a
loss of 0.1 percentage points in the US rate of growth. Reflecting the declarations
made by the former US President Bill Clinton (and also the reassuring voices
coming from Europe), Larry Summers, former Deputy Secretary of the US
Treasury, did not foresee in the advent of the euro any threat to the leadership
of the dollar, so as to rule out any struggle for supremacy. The same cautious
approach, probably determined by political reasons, seems to be followed by
the Maastricht Treaty in designing the international role of the euro.
Zimmermann, in this book, analyses in detail the evolution of the European
approach towards the euro as an international currency.
Having defined the scenario within which the conduct of the dollar/euro
exchange rate can be analysed, let us describe the different phases that have
characterised its recent behaviour.
Before the creation of EMU, the ECU started depreciating against the
US dollar in 1995: from a value of 1.3456 on 28 July 1995, it fell to a value of
1.0785 by 6 April 1998. Only after the formal admission of participating
countries to EMU, the dollar/European Currency Unit (ECU) exchange rate
started increasing and reached the value of 1.2262 on 6 October 1998.
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During the first two and half years of its ‘virtual’ life, however, contrary
to most predictions, the euro followed the previous depreciation of the ECU
against the US dollar and reached its lowest value of 0.8422 on 5 July 2001.
Finally, at the beginning of 2002, in coincidence with its physical
introduction the euro started appreciating against the US dollar and it reached
the value of 1.2615 on 31 December 2003, the last date that I consider in this
article (see figure 16).
Figure 16: The dollar/euro exchange rate
Source: 1995 -1998, FED (US$/ECU);
1999 - 2003, ECB, Monthly Bulletin (various issues)
Many economists and commentators have provided various explanations
for the different phases described above. Those explanations refer to three
separate categories, a) fundamentals, b) portfolio adjustments and c) ‘framing’
of expectations, as I illustrate below.
a) Both the neo-classical synthesis and the monetary approach to the
determination of exchange rates agree that the strength or weakness of a
currency depends on the ‘fundamental’ variables of its underlying economy
(Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, money growth, interest rates, the
inflation rate, the balance of payments, the public deficit, the public debt).
Several authors interpret extensively such ‘fundamental’ variables and
include among them, as I will do, also the economic structure and institutions.
b) In predicting the value of the euro prior to its introduction, however, most
economists followed a different approach: by referring implicitly to the
potential struggle for supremacy between the euro and the US dollar
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mentioned above, they recognised that the expected ability of the European
currency to fulfil at the international level the functions of means of payment,
unit of account and store of value would have caused a high demand for it,
so as to induce its appreciation.4
This observation suggests that ‘fundamentals-based’ models might well
represent the working of a relatively ‘small’ currency, but they might be
unsuitable for the analysis of the behaviour of a ‘large’, potentially
international currency like the euro, calling instead also for a portfolio
approach to the exchange rate determination.
c) As I will argue more extensively below, however, the behaviour of a currency
can also be affected by ‘framing’ of expectations and by unstable perceptions.
In this paper I will try to verify which of these exchange rate driving forces
is better capable to account for the behaviour of the dollar/euro exchange
rate during the first five years of life of the euro. As I will show in section 5,
the explanations based on fundamentals are inconsistent over time (sections
5.1 and 5.1.1), so as to lead to the conclusion that portfolio adjustments
(section 5.2) and ‘framing’ of expectations (section 5.3) prove more
satisfactory in explaining the strength of the European currency with respect
to the US dollar.
3. The predictions of the future value of the euro before the launch of the
EMU
Let us report, in the next two paragraphs, the reasons why economists
expected the euro to become respectively a strong and a weak currency. In
doing so I will distinguish between explanations based on expected portfolio
adjustments and explanations based on the expected state of fundamentals.
3.1. The reasons why economists expected the euro to be a strong currency
3.1.1. Expected portfolio adjustments in favour of the euro
The predictions made by economists of the euro’s future value were
based essentially on the expected portfolio adjustment resulting from its role
as an international currency. As a result, the majority of them anticipated that
the European currency would appreciate over time (Bergsten, 1997, Portes and
Rey, 1998, Mundell, 1998, Kaikati, 1999, Frenkel and Sondengard, 1998). In
particular, Bergsten (1997), among others, believed that the euro would satisfy
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the pre-conditions, identified by Kenen (1983) and listed below, for a currency
to be used, by both the private and the official sector, as an international means
of payment, unit of account and store of value:
a) a large sized economy, with substantial global trade;
b) a relatively closed geographical area;
c) lack of exchange controls;
d) broad, deep and liquid capital markets;
e) sound macroeconomic policies.
This analysis was substantially correct although, as we will see in section
4.2, it ignored the role played by history and inertia.
3.1.2 Expected good state of European fundamentals and expected bad state of
US ones
Given the focus on portfolio adjustments, traditional ‘fundamental’
variables received little attention. Nevertheless, some authors concurred that
the rather persistent current account deficit experienced by the United States,
coupled with the European surpluses, suggested a weakening dollar
(Alogoskoufis and Portes, 1997, Bergsten, 1997 and Kaikati, 1999).
An additional reason for predicting a strong euro derived from the
expected EMU sound economic institutions. In particular, Bergsten (1997)
argued that the ECB would guarantee internal stability, by establishing early
on its anti-inflationary credibility. He believed that the European Central Bank
(ECB) would act in a tougher way than the Bundesbank, precisely in order to
show its commitment to price stability at the earliest opportunity. He also
anticipated the possibility that fiscal authorities would ‘fudge’ the Maastricht
criteria. However, contrary to the arguments of some commentators later on,
he posited that such a weakening of the fiscal position would not affect negatively
the euro, since the ECB would respond in an even tougher way.
His prediction of a strong euro, therefore, was based on the opinion that:
“markets prize stability more than growth, as indicated by the continued
dominance of the dollar through extended periods of sluggish US economic
performance. Hence the euro should qualify on these grounds as well.”
(Bergsten, 1997, p. 91).
As we will see respectively in sections 4.1 and 5.1, while these
‘fundamentals-based’ arguments had to be overlooked during the initial period
of life of EMU, characterised by a weak euro, some of them (in particular the
US external deficit) have been readily resurrected in order to account for the
current strength of the European currency.
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3.2 The reasons why economists expected the euro to be a weak currency
3.2.1 Expected lack of portfolio adjustments in favour of the euro
In considering the possibility for the euro to act as an ‘international
money’, Fratianni et al. (1998) performed a lucid analyses and reached opposing
conclusions by considering the following aspects: inertia of the dollar in keeping
its international monetary leadership; European financial market segmentation;
possibility of an excess of euro denominated bond supply; and loss of the reserve
status for European currencies (Masson and Turtelboom, 1997 also made this
point). As I will argue in section 4.2, these reasons proved correct in explaining
the initial weakness of the euro.
3.2.2. Expected bad state of European fundamentals
In considering instead the ‘fundamental’ variables pointing towards a
depreciated euro, some authors stressed what they believed to be serious
European structural and institutional weaknesses. Since the ECB was a new
institution, for example, it might have lacked credibility with regard to its
commitment to price stability, thereby affecting negatively the euro. Moreover,
structural rigidities (high social security payments, stringent employment
protection and restrictions on working and opening hours), institutional
weakness (to be described in more detail below in section 4.1.1), and the fact
that the euro zone was not believed to represent an optimum currency area,
were the basis on which Feldstein (1997a, 2000) grounded his prediction of a
weak euro.
Since Europe is a relatively closed economy, the exchange rate does not
affect its economy in a significant way, so that some observers expected the
ECB to conduct a policy of ‘benign neglect’ towards the dollar (Eichengreen,
1997), a strategy that might have ended up producing a weak euro.6
While these arguments found many supporters during the period of euro
weakness (see section 4.1.1), they proved incorrect in the light of the current
phase of the euro strength (see section 5.1.1).
4. 1999-2001: The weakness of the ‘virtual’ euro. Expost explanations
After having presented the reasons why economists expected the euro to be
respectively a strong and a weak currency, let us consider the explanations provided
expost in order to account for its weakness during the period 1999-2001.
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4.1 ‘Fundamental’ weaknesses of the euro area
In Buiter’s view, (1999) the initial weakness of the euro reflected closely
the state of fundamentals.7
Eichengreen (2000) and, with different accents, Bibow (2002a), Salvatore
(2002) and Begg (2002b), argue that the weakness of the euro was a mere
adjustment to the rise that characterised the final months of 1998, when the
final stage of the monetary unification process drove the exchange rate to too
high a level.
The role of the actual growth differential between the US and Europe is
underlined by Buiter (1999), Neaime and Paschakis (2002), Eichengreen (2000),
Corsetti (2000), and even Bergsten (2002). According to this last author, the
weakness of the euro was due to the fact that although Europe had achieved
price stability, it needed to improve its performance on the growth side. It should
be noted that such a statement contradicts his previous position, reported at the
end of section 3.1.2, in which he stressed the role of stability as opposed to
growth.8
Corsetti (2002) focuses instead on the role played by the expected rate
of growth differential9 and shows that the series produced by the “Consensus
Forecast” follow closely the behaviour of the dollar/euro exchange rate.
Neaime and Paschakis (2002), Sylos Labini (2000) and Vlaar (2002)
point out the role played by the strong rise in oil prices from the Summer of
1999, implying a higher transfer of euro currency to oil exporting countries.
In section 5.1, when considering the ‘fundamental’ reasons advanced in
order to account for the current strength of the euro, I will go back to these
explanations and I will show their inconsistency.
4.1.1 European structural and institutional weaknesses
Among the ‘fundamental’ explanations for the low value of the euro,
particular attention has been reserved to the European structural and institutional
weaknesses.
In agreement with Feldstein (1997a and 2000) and Eichengreen (2000),
Arestis et al. (2002a) point out that the euro area is not an optimal currency
area and that the presence of asymmetries and divergences, first of all relative
to the unemployment rate, creates the potential for political and economic
conflicts among the euro area countries, thereby depreciating the euro. They
also underline the presence of labour market rigidities.10
According to Salvatore (2002) and to Alphandéry (2002), the fact that
Europe lacks political unity might have been interpreted as a sign of weakness.11
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Uncertainties may have arisen also because of some institutional conflicts
between politicians (in particular, the former German finance minister, Mr.
Oskar Lafontaine) and the ECB and because of some actions undertaken by
the German government to support with public funds some private firms under
financial difficulties (Eichengreen, 2000).
Arestis et al. (2002a) believe that the accounting tricks that have
accompanied the adhesion of some European countries to EMU reduced the
credibility of the Eurosystem. At the same time the safeguards contained in the
Stability and Growth Pact have proved unnecessary and above all non credible,
as the example of Ireland flouting them, shows.
Buiter (1999) stresses, among others, the lack of clarity in exchange rate
orientation, resulting from the fact that the Maastricht Treaty (art. 109) assigns
to Finance Ministers the right to determine the exchange rate policy.
In line with this criticism, Mundell (1998) argues that in order to show
coherence between internal and external objectives of monetary policy, the
ECB should target exchange rates explicitly.
Buiter (1999) also mentions the lack of accountability, openness and
transparency of the ECB as a problem to be solved. Uncertainty arises not only
from the lack of clarity as to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy,
but also from the inconsistent behaviour shown by the ECB Board members
with regard to the exchange rate.
According to Talani (in this book), the initial weakness of the euro and
the apparent lack of concern of the ECB with regard to the external value of its
currency, would suggest that the European monetary authority followed a
‘benign neglect’ policy towards the exchange rate. In her view, such a strategy
might find a rationale in the economic interests of the large European exporting
countries (Germany, Italy and France).
ECB communication problems are identified, among others, by Feldstein
(2000), Arestis et al. (2002a), Bibow (2002a) and Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2001). The first three contributions
find that the ‘two pillars’ strategy generated confusion in the markets. First of
all, money growth (the ‘first pillar’), overshot systematically the reference value
that the ECB had established.13  Second, it was not clear what was the role of
the exchange rate in determining the union’s monetary policy. Furthermore,
the initial moves of the ECB seemed to show a dependence on the Fed,
something that proved that the euro was still dominated by the US dollar.14
In Bibow’s view, the contractionary policy followed systematically by
the ECB (“price-stability above all else”) is harmful to the exchange rate since
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it suggests that growth will be penalised. By acting in an excessively restrictive
way, then, in his view the ECB would have caused a weak euro (given the
assumed link between the rate of growth and the exchange rate).15
Other authors judge the behaviour of the ECB in rather different terms,
but still they find it responsible for the weakness of the euro. Favero et al.
(2000b), for example, believe that the ECB has followed a rather expansionary
stance, especially if compared to the policy that would have been followed by
the Bundesbank or by the Fed. In particular, in their view the ECB has followed
closely the needs of large countries like Germany or Italy, rather than of the
whole union, thereby losing credibility with the private sector and causing the
weakness of the euro.16
Hartmann and Issing (2002) find this explanation unconvincing, and I
agree with them. After all, the ECB has proved successful in guaranteeing a
stable environment: during the initial period of life of the euro, the US inflation
rate has been systematically higher than the European one. It is not clear, then,
why (unless we accept Altavilla and Marani, 2000 or Bibow’s, 2002
explanation), the ECB would have proved successful in guaranteeing internal
stability, while it should be blamed for the external instability.17  Recent monetary
theory has stressed the role of expectations in determining inflation, so that the
latter results from the central bank’s lack of credibility and the absence of an
anti-inflationary reputation. If expectations have been such as to guarantee low
inflation in the euro area, it is difficult then to understand how the same set of
expectations may be held responsible for a depreciated exchange rate.
An overall positive interpretation of the behaviour of the ECB is provided
by only a few authors. Begg (2002) argues that “the ECB has not only operated
by consensus rather than majority voting, but also shown no evidence of dissent”
and that “this is not a suprising outcome given that central bankers tend to have
a common outlook” (Begg, 2002, p. 27). He points out the success in the launch
of the euro, which would be due to the fact that the ECB has been following a
rather transparent approach (contrary to the position expressed among others,
by Bibow, 2002 or Buiter, 1999).
Hartmann and Issing (2002), stress the fact that the European Central
Bank is neutral on the euro’s role in the international markets, so that the dollar/
euro exchange rate is mainly determined by developments in financial markets.
In their view, the reason why the ECB does not target explicitly the exchange
rate has to do with the recognition that currency markets are extremely volatile
and might therefore undermine internal stability.18
Kenen (2002) also criticises the ECB for its behaviour: “I do not want it
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[the ECB] to practice the art perfected by Chairman Greenspan - saying nothing
at lenght. There is, however, a danger in saying too much too often” (Kenen,
2002, p. 354).19  Contrary to many analysts, however, he does not find it
responsible for the depreciation of the euro since, in his view, such a weakness
was due to the inertia of the dollar in playing its global role, as I will explain in
the next section.
Given that the institutional and structural set up of the euro area has not
changed over the last five years, it is easy to conclude, as I will argue in section
5.1.1, that even this ‘fundamental’ variable cannot account for the current phase
of euro appreciation. As a result, it cannot be a reliable explanation for its
previous weakness either.
4.2. Lack of success of the euro as an international currency
A different set of explanations for the weakness of the euro focuses on
its lack of success as an international means of payment, unit of account and
store of value, as Fratianni et al. (1998) had predicted correctly (see section
3.2.1).
Kenen (2002), Frisch (2003), McKinnon (2002), Bergsten (2002),
Eichengreen (2000) and Neaime and Paschakis (2002) underline the role played
by inertia, so that once a particular currency has taken on the role of global
money, “it cannot be readily dislodged, even if another currency could do just
as well” (Kenen, 2002, p. 348).
Pollard (2001), Alphandery (2002) and Hartmann and Issing (2002) stress
instead the negative effect of the high European financial markets segmentation
on the use of the euro as a medium of exchange and as a store of value.
McKinnon (2002), De Grauwe (2002a) and Meredith (2001) find that
the excess of euro-denominated bonds issued by Extra-European borrowers
brought about massive capital outflows, ultimately responsible for the
depreciation of the euro.
The most important factor, however, according to Sinn and Westermann
(2001a and b), has been the behaviour of criminals and tax evaders, who feared
that the conversion to euros of their liquid holdings would have been subject to
rigid rules and scrutiny that might have threatened their secrecy. As a result,
they decided to move out of the currencies that they held (especially German
marks) and to buy US dollars, so as to convert them to euros later on, in the
absence of any stringent regulation. Bergsten (2002) gives credit to this
explanation.
Contrary to the explanations for the euro weakness based on
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fundamentals, those based on its lack of success as an international currency
are perfectly consistent, as I will discuss in section 5.2, with the explanations
for the euro strength based on portfolio adjustments.
4.3. ‘Framing’ of expectations, pessimism and misperceptions about European
fundamentals
The initial weakness of the euro can also be attributed to erratic behaviour,
pessimism and misperceptions regarding European fundamentals. This view
implies that markets on the one hand were excessively optimistic about the US
economy, and on the other hand overemphasised European structural
weaknesses (for example the need for fiscal, social security and labour market
reforms).
Referring to some theoretical contributions by, among others, Tverski
and Kahneman (1981) and Kahneman and Tverski (1984), De Grauwe (2000a)
argues that since markets are uncertain about the ‘fundamental’ value of the
exchange rate, they refer to the value taken by the exchange rate in order to
infer the specific fundamentals on which to focus. As he points out, then, the
order of causation gets reversed: it is not the fundamental that affects the
exchange rate but rather the latter that indicates what are the fundamentals to
be considered in order to justify its value.
De Grauwe’s position is further justified by observing that some well-
behaving European fundamentals, like the current account or the inflation rate
differential, did not receive any attention during the period in which the euro
was depreciating. As a matter of fact, Goldberg and Frydman (2001), quoted in
Frisch (2003) show that different sets of fundamentals explain the exchange
rate behaviour in different time periods.20
The role of confidence and of market sentiment is stressed by Altavilla
and Marani (2000) too. They show that the dollar/euro exchange rate follows
closely some measures of market sentiment rather than the usual fundamentals.
In particular, the weakness of the euro would result from the negative effects
on market sentiment produced by the excessively tight monetary stance followed
by the ECB. As a matter of fact, too high interest rates would make clear to the
private sector that the ECB, rather than following a counter-cyclical Taylor’s
rule, takes price stability as its first and exclusive objective. Such a lack of
attention towards the economic conditions of the euro area, would be responsible
for the depreciation of the currency.21
Salvatore (2002), while providing a whole set of possible explanations
based on fundamentals for the weakness of the euro, subscribes to the hypothesis
according to which the exchange rate has no connections with fundamentals,
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but only follows a random walk, “There is no shortage of explanations for the
current strength of the dollar and, as some older explanations are contradicted
by emerging facts and evidence, new ones are confidently introduced. Of course,
should the dollar begin to depreciate heavily with respect to the euro, all sorts
of reasons will be advanced for that. In short, no economic model or theory can
consistently and accurately predict exchange rate movements in the short run
because fundamental forces at work are easily and frequently overwhelmed by
transitory ones and ‘news’. (Salvatore, 2002, p. 133).
I find the above arguments particularly convincing. I also believe that
‘framing’ of expectations explains satisfactorily both the initial weakness of
the euro, and the current behaviour of the dollar/euro exchange rate, as I will
discuss in section 5.3.
5. 2002-2003: the strength of the ‘tangible’ euro: were the expost
explanations for the weakness of the euro correct?
By mid 2001 the euro stopped depreciating against the US dollar and
from the beginning of 2002 it has been appreciating against it. This turnaround
of the European currency offers a nice opportunity to check the robustness of
the explanations listed above, and in particular to verify whether the asserted
European structural and institutional weaknesses could really be blamed for its
previous low value.
Since several analyses found the euro undervalued during its first years
of life (thereby recognising implicitly that the exchange rate had lost connection
with the fundamentals of the economy), it would be possible to argue that the
current value of the euro is finally in line with economic fundamentals.
Such an interpretation, however, conflicts with the fact that other analyses,
as we have seen, found that some of the fundamentals of the European economy
could well account for the weakness of the euro. If this was true, its current
appreciation should be accompanied by an opposite change of those variables.
Since this has not always occurred, as I will show in the next section, it can
certainly be said that most of the ‘fundamentals-based’ arguments advanced to
explain the weakness of the euro proved inappropriate when the latter started
strengthening.
5.1 ‘Fundamental’ strength of the euro area (and weakness of the US)
Let us go back now to the ‘fundamental’ variables considered in section
4.1 in order to account for the weakness of the euro. In doing so, it will be easy
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to verify that those variables are not capable to explain its current strength.
Since there is still a positive rate of growth differential between the US
and the euro area, such a variable cannot any longer explain the behaviour of
the dollar/euro exchange rate (see figure 17).
As for the expected rate of growth differential, the European Commission
(2003), updating the ‘Consensus Forecast’ series utilised by Corsetti (2002) to
explain the appreciation of the dollar vis à vis the euro, shows clearly that the
effect of the expected rate of growth differential on the dollar/euro exchange
rate has vanished. This contradicts previous findings and interpretations provided
by Corsetti (2002).
Even if the expected growth differential is still in favour of the US, markets
seem to point their attention toward the uncertainties surrounding the huge
current account deficit (encountered already in section 3.1.2 when listing the
‘fundamental’ reasons for expecting a strong euro) and the growing external
indebtedness of the US (European Central Bank, 2003a, European Commission,
2003, and Monacelli, 2003) (see figure 18). The Economist also underlines
such a switch of attention: “Over the years, currency theories move in and out
of fashion. Growth differentials are, it seems, no longer relevant; currencies
are being driven instead by trade imbalances and differences in interest rates.
Investors have become less willing to finance America’s huge current account
deficit and are taking advantage of higher European interest rates.” (The
Economist, 10 May 2003).
Figure 17: Real GDP growth (percentage change from previous period)
Source: OECD, 2003
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Figure 18: US and Euro area current account ($ billions)
Source: IMF, Annual Report, 2002
*Forecast
The current depreciation of the dollar is accompanied not only by a
worsening in the current account but also by a worsening in the financial account
of the balance of payments. More precisely, it turns out that while net portfolio
flows are still positive, foreign direct investment has turned negative in 2002
(see figure 19), reflecting the doubts and uncertainties surrounding US growth,
but also, and more importantly in my view, signalling an end of a process of
mergers and acquisitions that began at the end of last century and continued for
just a few years (European Commission, 2003).
Figure 19: US and Euro area direct investment ($ billions, net flows)
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After a short period during which the dollar kept appreciating even if
European interest rates were higher than US ones, the euro area-US interest
rate differential seems to have restored its prominent role in explaining exchange
rate behaviour (European Commission, 2003) (see figure 20). Such an
interpretation, however, should be taken cautiously, since uncovered interest
rate parity suggests that a positive interest rate differential can only attract
foreign capital if markets do not expect any significant depreciation of the
domestic currency.
Contrary to previous findings by Neaime and Paschakis (2000), Sylos
Labini (2002) and Vlaar (2002) (see section 4.1), the recent appreciation of the
euro has been accompanied by rising oil prices, leading to the conclusion that
there is no longer negative correlation among the two variables (see figure 21).
Figure 20: Euro area - US 3-month interest rates
(Percentage per annum, monthly data, period averages)
Source: ECB, Monthly Bulletin (various issues)
Having concluded that the ‘fundamental’ variables considered in section
4.1 cannot explain the current strength of the euro, let us verify in the next
section whether the European structure and institutions, blamed by some authors
for being responsible for its previous weakness, can do that.
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Figure 21: Crude oil spot price (dollars per barrel) and $/s exchange rate
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2003
5.1.1. How about the European structural and institutional weaknesses?
As we have seen in section 4.1.1, among the different explanations for
the weakness of the euro, several authors referred particularly to the fragility
of the structural and institutional aspects of the EMU (Arestis et al., 2002a,
Feldstein, 1997a and 2000, and Favero et al., 2000b, among others). If that
explanation was correct, the current strengthening of the European currency
should result from the solution of at least some of the structural and institutional
problems characterising the euro zone. The environment described by the authors
mentioned above, however, has not changed in a significant way (although the
initial success of the EMU might have led those who feared its failure to revise
their point of view). As CER (2002) reports, for example, the ECB has not
stopped targeting the needs of a core Europe (notably Germany and France)
rather than of the whole monetary union. Such an observation, then, contradicts
the conclusion, reached by Favero et al. (2000b) (see section 4.1.1), that the
weakness of the euro was caused by a lack of credibility of the ECB.
Also the effects of the recent violation of the Excessive Deficit procedure
defined in the Stability and Growth Pact seems to confirm my conclusion: the
day after the European Council of Finance Ministers (Ecofin) expressed its
unwillingness to proceed against Germany and France (contrary to the
recommendation of the European Commission), surprisingly the dollar/euro
exchange rate reached the value of 1.2017, above the psychological threshold
of 1.20.
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5.2 Portfolio adjustments resulting from the international role of the euro
Having observed that the current appreciation of the euro is not explained
by significant changes in the fundamentals of the economy, in this section I
argue that it might be due to the growing role of the euro as an international
currency.
In particular, I believe that the inertia characterising the first years of life
of the euro is gradually giving way to portfolio diversification. As a matter of
fact, the European Central Bank (2003d) shows some evidence of the growing
role of the euro as an international currency.
Two other facts however, point to this direction: the composition of
Chinese foreign reserves has been re-balanced by increasing the weight assigned
to the euro as opposed to the US dollar; and Russia, the second world oil exporter,
has declared recently that oil will also be quoted in euros. The euro, then, is
increasing its international role both as a reserve currency and as a unit of
account. Inevitably, this will also imply a higher role for it as a medium of
exchange.
As we have seen in section 4.2, one of the explanations for the weakness
of the euro was based on the excess of supply of bonds, so that the current
phase of appreciation should be accompanied by a significant slow down in
their issuance. Since this does not seem to be the case (see figure 22), the
current strength of the euro can only be justified by the fact that both the domestic
and the international demand for euro-denominated bonds has increased, so as
to match or even exceed the supply.
Figure 22: Net issuance of international debt securities by currency (percentage)
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, June 2003 and Kenen (2002)
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Furthermore, the currency in circulation, after the fall occurred between
November 2000 and January 2002 (and ended exactly after the physical
introduction of the euro), is now above its initial level. The fact that the phase
of euro depreciation was accompanied by a drop of the currency in circulation,
as pointed out by Sinn and Westermann (2001a and 2001b) (see section 4.2),
while its current appreciation is associated with a rise of the latter (see figure
23), lends further credit to the hypothesis that the weakness of the euro was
due to a low demand for euros, while its current appreciation is driven by a
high demand for them, most likely caused by portfolio adjustments.
Figure 23: Currency in circulation in the Euro area (k billions, ECU billions until 12/
1998) and $/k exchange rate
Source: ECB, Monthly Bulletin (various issues)
5.3. ‘Framing’ of expectations, optimism and overvaluation of European
fundamentals
The worsening of the US balance of payments described in section 5.1,
together with some official declarations calling for “more exchange rate
flexibility”, like the G7 Statement issued on September 20, 2003 in Dubai,
might have determined the market expectation of a weak dollar, an event
favoured by the American government. As a matter of fact, the economic
relationship among the US dollar, the euro, the Chinese Yuan and the Japanese
Yen, suggests that the value of the dollar is a “hot political issue” (The Economist,
27 September 2003).
Nevertheless, I also believe that since portfolio adjustments have started
to occur as a result of the growing international role of the euro, attention might
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have directed towards both the fundamentals and the pre-conditions validating
this fact, as predicted by De Grauwe (2000a).
Whatever rational explanation we embrace (either the one based on
fundamentals or the one based on portfolio adjustments), then, it is difficult to
deny the role of (not necessarily rational) expectations and of elements of short
run unpredictability in the behaviour of the exchange rate.
The fact that the same institutional set-up or the same level of financial
markets segmentation has seen both a weak and a strong euro, suggests that
even the institutional aspects might be subject to ‘framing’ of expectations: the
same institution may receive a different evaluation, depending on the mood of
the markets. In making forecasts of the strength or weakness of the euro and
above all of the timing of such evolution, for example, nobody seemed to
consider the distinction between the ‘virtual’ and the ‘tangible’ new currency,
although the current appreciation might well result from its physical
introduction:22  only the presence of actual euro coins and bills would have
removed the doubts and uncertainties surrounding the new currency and might
have really spurred the adjustment process envisaged by economists before the
creation of the EMU.
6. Concluding remarks
Prior to its introduction, the predictions made by economists as to the
future value of the euro were based essentially on the portfolio adjustment
resulting from the role that it might play as an international currency. As a
result, most analysts agreed that the euro would be a strong currency,
appreciating against the dollar. The first three years of life of the ‘virtual’ euro
contradicted such a forecast. Economists, which with a few exceptions had
ignored since then the role played by inertia in the use of an international
currency, therefore abandoned the ‘international currency’ view and directed
their focus towards traditional, ‘fundamentals-based’ explanations, on which
most exchange rate models concentrate. The initial weakness of the euro vis à
vis the US dollar, then, was explained mainly by considering the actual and
expected positive rate of growth differential between the US and the euro area,
and by considering as unsatisfactory and inadequate the European structural
and institutional set up. Later on, when the dollar started weakening, though,
different ‘fundamental’ variables, like for example the euro area - US interest
rate differential and the US current account deficit, had to be identified as
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responsible for the exchange rate behaviour.
While the explanations based on fundamentals prove inconsistent, then,
in my view the available evidence suggests that during the initial period of the
euro, portfolio adjustments might have affected the dollar/euro exchange rate
more than is generally believed (although in the opposite than expected
direction), and that they have now started to operate in the expected direction,
leading to an appreciated euro. Such a conclusion is reached by considering, in
particular, the still high emission of euro-denominated bonds, the close
relationship between the euro currency in circulation and the dollar/euro
exchange rate, and various pieces of evidence suggesting a higher presence of
the euro in both private and public portfolios, pointing towards an overall
growing international role for it.
If the euro is really starting to play an international role, then, it is possible
to conclude that the markets are not interpreting (at least currently) the approach
of ‘benign neglect’ followed by the European institutions with regard to the
external value of its currency, as a sign of ‘fundamental’ weakness and that
they also believe that the European institutions are assuring the satisfaction of
the pre-condition of sound macroeconomic policies required for playing such
an international role.
It should be kept in mind, however, that institutional arrangements are
subject to market evaluation: ‘framing’ of expectations keeps affecting the
behaviour of the exchange rate, and might play a crucial role in the current
phase of euro appreciation.
1
 From JokEc, Jokes about economists and economics available at the internet address: http://www.etla.fi/
pkm/JokEc.html.
2
 The benefits, however, will have to be weighted against the costs incurred by a country issuing a reserve
currency, especially the risk of losing control of money supply (Demertzis and Hughes Hallet, 1999).
Alphandéry (2002) also warns against the fact that holdings of euros by non residents may be subject to
sudden reversals that might cause treasury problems. In his view, this is the reason why both Japan and
Germany avoided playing a more central role in the international arena.
3
 The title of the special issue of the Journal of Policy Modeling, vol. 24, 2002, gives a clear demonstration
of such a possibility: “The euro versus the dollar: will there be a struggle for dominance?”
4
 De Grauwe (2002) argues instead that the strength or weakness of a currency does not depend on its
international role, as the experience of the dollar would suggest. While in a well established situation a
currency playing a global role may appreciate or depreciate for various reasons, I believe instead that when
such an international position is in the process of formation, the resulting demand for the currency will
certainly cause its appreciation.
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5 Fratianni et al. (1998) acknowledge that this position was first taken by McCauley (1997) and by Bank for
International Settlements (1997). This point is also made by European Commission (1997).
6
 It should be noted, however, that such a feature characterises the US dollar too, so that it is not clear why a
‘benign neglect’ policy of the Fed should produce a strong dollar, while the opposite should occur in the case
of the ECB. According to the European Commission (1997), however, the ECB does not follow a ‘benign
neglect’ policy, since it wants to avoid both the risk of excessive fluctuations and misalignments and the
negative effects that an over depreciated euro would have on price stability.
7
 But, according to Corsetti (2000): “To be honest, it is hard to provide a convincing interpretation of the
recent evolution of the euro” (p. 2). The same position is taken by Sartore and Esposito (2002) and McKinnon
(2002).
8
  Alquist and Chinn (2001) and Vlaar (2002) quoted in Frisch (2003) consider a longer time period, respectively
1985-2001 the former and 1973-2001 the latter, and also find a positive correlation between respectively the
difference in productivity and in growth and the dollar/euro exchange rate. Corsetti et al. (2003), obtain
similar conclusions by estimating a structural VAR model over the period 1970-2001. In particular, they
show that a permanent positive shock to US labour productivity in manufacturing causes both an increase in
output and consumption and a real exchange rate appreciation.
9
 If the expected rather than actual growth differential is considered, an explanation can be found for the
appreciation of the yen against the euro in the second half of 1999 (Eichengreen, 2000).
10
 As observed also by De Grauwe (2000), however, they argue that those rigidities have characterised Europe
for quite long time. It would not be clear, then, why the euro, the ECU, or an artificial measure of it, in some
instances appreciates and in others depreciates.
11
 Corsetti (2000) also indicates several uncertainties about the evolution of the European institutional and
political setting. However, he finds this conclusion incompatible with the observation that the market in
euro-denominated bonds has experienced a massive growth.
12
 In his view, however, the weakness of the euro is a ‘non-issue’ since the euro area is relatively closed.
13
 Arestis et al. (2002a) observe that M3 has been growing at rates higher than 4.5 percent, while inflation has
been higher than 2 percent, the reference values indicated by the ECB respectively for money growth and
inflation rate.
14
 See Hartmann and Issing (2002) for an alternative definition of international money, based on the leadership
role played in the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy.
15
 As we will see, Altavilla and Marani (2000) also underline the possible negative effect of a restrictive
monetary policy on exchange rates.
16
 Bergsten (1997), Portes and Rey (1998) and Neaime and Paschakis (2002) also agree that the strength or
weakness of the euro depends on the reputation of the ECB.
17
 With internal (external) stability I refer to the ability of a currency to preserve its purchasing power with
respect to internally (externally) produced goods and services. Internal stability is a necessary but by no
means sufficient condition for external stability, as demonstrated by the first years of life of the euro.
Alphandéry (2002) observes that while the ECB concentrates exclusively on the objective of internal stability
– price stability – paradoxically the media (and therefore the broad public) focus on its external value.
18
 It should be noted that such a proposition implies the belief that exchange rates are driven by ‘news’ and
(not necessarily rational) expectations rather than by fundamentals.
19
 As a matter of fact, Mr Duisenberg, the former President of the ECB, has often been blamed for his
untimely declarations as to the external value of the euro. The credibility of the ECB might also have suffered
from the substantial violation of the prescriptions of the Maastricht Treaty relative to the period of appointment
of its President: at the time of his election, Mr. Duisenberg agreed to resign after only four years of mandate
rather than the eight years indicated in the Maastricht Treaty. As of 1 November 2003, Mr Trichet is the new
President of the ECB.
20
 Some of the current analyses on the temporary failure of the euro to play an international role implicitly
support this position: “the gradual depreciation of the euro during the first two years was of course not
Pompeo Della Posta - The Dollar/Euro Exchange Rate and EMU Economic Institutions
271
THE EURO AS A WORLD CURRENCY AND AS A EUROPEAN ANCHOR
fostering its international use for investment purposes” (Hartmann and Issing, 2002, p. 324). In other words,
financial markets looked at the actual behaviour of the euro, rather than at fundamentals (including the
creation of a monetary entity that might rival with the dollar), in order to decide the appropriate portfolio
composition.
21
 Bibow (2002a), as we have seen above, makes the same point.
22
 Only after the passage from the virtual to the real euro, Neaime and Paschakis (2002) recognised that
credibility might have been negatively affected by the absence of tangible euros, and Bergsten (2002) wondered
what the effects of its physical introduction would have been.
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CHAPTER 12
CEART GO LEOR – IRELAND, THE UK, THE STERLING AREA AND EMU*
BY
MAURICE FITZGERALD
Abstract. Although they acceded simultaneously, Ireland and the United
Kingdom have often reached very different decisions when it comes to European
Union policies that lend themselves towards deeper integration. This has never
been more evident than with Economic and Monetary Union: one state has
fully signed up to this process, while the other has elected to see how it develops.
After entering the 20th century in a monetary union – i.e. sterling – they left it,
having determined that their futures lay in different directions. Ireland has
swapped economic dependence on its neighbour, and membership of the sterling
area, for interdependence with all member states, and has willingly joined the
euro zone; at the same time, the United Kingdom has decided upon a strategy
of waiting in the wings on the single currency, which is entirely consistent with
its general attitude regarding European integration. The former has become
increasingly integrated, usually seeing the benefits of membership, while the
latter invariably remains detached, typically counting the costs. This chapter
argues that before, during and after the accession negotiations of the early 1970s,
one country sought to maximise its return from Europe, while the other appears
to be more concerned with wishing its membership away.
Keywords: Ireland, United Kingdom, punt, sterling, euro, economic and
monetary union, European integration, enlargement
Introduction
To the more dispassionate observer, the reluctance shown by the United
Kingdom (UK) towards the European single currency is as predictable as it is
questionable. Just weeks before its launch, UK prime minister Tony Blair
declared: “we said that it wouldn’t happen. Then we said it wouldn’t work.
* I wish to thank the editors for their kind invitation to contribute, their helpful comments thereafter and,
most importantly, their patience. I would also like to thank the other conference participants for their feedback,
especially the contributions from my co-panelists, and in particular the insightful views of our discussant.
This contribution was completed with the financial assistance of the Nuffield Foundation.
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Then we said we didn’t need it. But it did happen. And Britain was left behind”
(Blair, 2001). His words would not seem so prescient, nor would they resonate
so loudly, but for the fact that he was referring in this speech to the views of
successive UK governments regarding the European Economic Community
(EEC) back in the 1950s, and not to the prospect of his country joining the euro
at the beginning of the 21st century. There are, of course, none so blind as those
who will not see.
History has a nasty habit of repeating itself, especially when the lessons
of the past are forgotten or ignored, and certainly when they are not applied to
the present or, in truth, when they are not sufficiently factored into planning for
the future. This chapter argues that, even during their negotiations across the
1960s and early 1970s for entry into the then European Communities (EC) –
subsequently the European Union (EU) – Ireland and the UK demonstrated
rather different attitudes towards European integration, its implications and
opportunities, the price that would have to be paid, and the impact that
membership would have upon them. It surveys the century and a half of Anglo-
Irish monetary integration, concentrating on Ireland’s development as a
sovereign state, and shows how this may help to explain their different paths.
This is not to say that either country has been unstinting in its approach
and support for or worries regarding the project. For the UK, the endeavours of
Edward Heath as prime minister at the beginning of the 1970s were proof
positive that the British do not necessarily have to be classed as reluctant
Europeans, as some sort of eternally awkward partner; many of Blair’s earlier
efforts might be seen in the same light, even if subsequently overtaken by
hesitation and a lack of vision. In Ireland’s case, ratification of the Treaty of
Nice, and especially poor handling of the first referendum by the taoiseach
(Irish prime minister), Bertie Ahern, is enough evidence of a possibly exceptional
event that proves the general rule; the Irish are – relatively – good Europeans,
both in the sense that they are fairly committed to the project but also because
they are strategically astute in negotiating the best terms available.
Within the context of Anglo-Irish relations, this chapter investigates
advances in their bilateral ties and their respective decisions regarding Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU). It is divided into three main parts: ranging in
time from Ireland’s participation as an independent state in the sterling area –
thus with a focus across the second and third quarters of the 20th century – and
then making specific reference to the EU accession negotiations of 1970-72,
before concluding with a brief examination of subsequent economic and
monetary developments, specifically Irish membership of the European
Monetary System (EMS) and, in turn, EMU.
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Once EU entry was achieved, the next question requiring an answer as
the 1970s progressed was simple, even if T.K.Whitaker, then Central Bank of
Ireland governor, posed it in Gaelic: “an ceangal le sterling – ar cheart é a
bhriseadh?”, he asked (Whitaker, 1976, p.82). Translatable as ‘Ireland’s link
with sterling, is it right to break it?’, this was the major economic and monetary
issue that Dublin then faced. At least initially, the conclusion reached was to
wait a little longer (Kelly, 2003, p.96). But, when it finally came to making a
decision regarding the future of its currency, the Irish government gave a resonant
ceart go leor – declaring ‘fair enough’ – to EC proposals on the table. At long
last the time had arrived to move from being a supplicant to being an equal.
With the decade coming to a conclusion, and in the express context of European
developments, the Irish pound’s links with sterling ultimately needed to be
broken, and the punt thus became a currency that helped to make up the European
Currency Unit (ECU).
The Saorstát pound’s ties to the sterling area
It has been argued that, in order to “understand events and trends in
Ireland, one must keep in mind what was going on at the same time in the
world outside, particularly, of course, in Britain” (Whitaker, 1976, p.91). This
is as true today as it was for yesteryear. Ireland entered the 20th century as an
integral, if troublesome, component of the UK. An Act of Union between the
two countries in 1800 led, in part, to the amalgamation of their currencies in
1826; indeed, their economies became increasingly integrated as the century,
especially the second half, progressed. In many ways, particularly in economic
terms, and despite gaining independence in the early 1920s, the newly
established Saorstát Éireann (Irish Free State) remained firmly within the UK’s
ambit. It had established itself as a sovereign state, yet was very slow to develop
an independent monetary policy.
In fact, a conscious decision was taken in 1927 for the Irish pound to
remain inside the sterling area, though this policy would be run by an Irish
Currency Commission. This was a practical choice, with 98% of exports (mostly
agricultural) going to the UK in 1924 and 80% of imports originating there
(Kelly, 2003, p.90). Any link with a different currency – such as the dollar –
was only ever a theoretical alternative (Whitaker, 1976, pp.94-5). Sterling
appeared to offer stability, which is what a new state emerging from a civil war
required above all else. Indeed, notwithstanding the various calamities which
befell Ireland, the UK and sterling across the next two decades – for instance,
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the currency crisis of 1931, an economic battle which raged between them
from 1932 to 1938, the Second World War, the declaration of an Irish republic
in 1948, or indeed a further currency crisis in 1949 – the Irish pound stayed
firmly put. It is therefore worth examining some of these events in detail in
order to demonstrate why the break with sterling – and in particular the decision
regarding EC entry and an acceptance of all that membership entailed – was
such a significant move when it eventually came.
The Irish Free State actually issued its own currency after 1927, but the
Saorstát pound was in effect operating at parity with sterling whilst maintaining
“100 per cent backing in gold, sterling, or British securities” (Connolly, 1998,
p.526). However, just four years after the Irish decided that their future remained
within the sterling area, the UK government suspended the gold standard –
some six years after restoring it – because of the global, and in turn domestic,
pressures facing their economy. The Irish had serious doubts regarding the
UK’s preparedness to consider economic circumstances beyond their own. It
has been argued that (Moynihan, 1975, p.167):
For some time there had been reason to view the position of sterling with disquiet,
and in the Saorstát there were ample reasons for special interest and concern –
the statutory link between the two currencies, the very large Irish holdings of
sterling assets and the preponderance of transactions with the United Kingdom
in the Saorstát’s external trade and payments.
This sterling crisis was not a singular event, there was another soon
after the war. In the meantime, a serious Anglo-Irish dispute broke out in
1932 – involving intense trade disagreements, a major constitutional
realignment, and protracted negotiations – it was only resolved in 1938.
Euphemistically termed the Emergency by the Irish, the Second World War
quickly followed, and unsurprisingly impacted seriously upon relations,
mainly because of Ireland’s neutral status. But, even in the face of major
global, bilateral and national developments, it still remained within the sterling
area. Indeed, the Irish pound had become “fully acceptable in Northern Ireland
by the late 1930s” – thereby lessening the import of the island’s partitioning,
at least to a minor extent – and “British coins continued to circulate” in Ireland
(Connolly, 1998, p.367). In essence, these two countries were operating a
lop-sided monetary union, the UK deciding and Ireland following. And
throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the small – if open – Irish economy that
existed up to 1932 was supplanted by a more insular economic vision which
saw the “accumulated capital” it had previously held being expended with
little to show in return (Girvin, 2002, p.202). Even a Central Bank Act, 1942,
which renamed the Currency Commission as the Central Bank of Ireland,
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only meant relatively superficial change and, despite Ireland having the
possibility of operating an independent monetary policy, it chose not to
do so.
Not even the surprise decision taken in 1948 for the Saorstát to become
a republic shattered these ties. Ireland “had beyond all question ceased to be
either a colony or a dominion”, but it was also readily apparent that the pertaining
monetary situation suited both countries: “neither Government was desirous of
change in the currency arrangements or in Ireland’s position as a member of
the sterling area” (Moynihan, 1975, p.349). Unsurprisingly, the matter of
Ireland’s new status as a republic raged in Dáil Éireann (Irish lower
parliamentary house), and an obvious question was put forward (Moynihan,
1975, pp.349-50):
… whether it was proposed to make any alteration or adjustment in the existing
relation between Irish currency and sterling or in the existing Irish financial
arrangements and whether there had been any negotiations on such matters
with other States … On 2nd December [1948] the Taoiseach replied … that no
such change was contemplated and that there had been no negotiations of the
kind …
This was the position taken in London too. Indeed, according to one UK
government minister, “there was no reason to expect any change in the existing
arrangements” regarding sterling, as it remained “very convenient, especially
in Northern Ireland. It was in the interests of both countries that the arrangements
should be maintained, and there was no reason why the entry into force of the
Republic of Ireland Act should affect this position in any way” (Moynihan,
1975, p.350). Thus, when sterling devalued against the dollar the following
year, the Irish pound quickly followed suit. In the lead-up to this decision, the
Irish were kept completely in the dark regarding UK intentions (Fanning, 1978,
p.445). This was to be a familiar story during their participation in the sterling
area, but a price that they were prepared to pay.
When the currency crisis had occurred two decades earlier, it was felt
both in Irish banking and government circles that (Moynihan, 1975, p.354):
… the reasons which were accepted in 1927 as justifying the link with sterling
still remained valid … In the Central Bank and the Department of Finance the
view prevailed in 1949, as in 1931, that the parity between Irish currency and
sterling should be maintained.
Of course, it is very unlikely that the then Dublin government (a five-
party coalition) was totally united on this issue. After all, this latest monetary
crisis offered a distinct opportunity “to loosen, if not to break, the link between
Irish currency and sterling”; even still, Irish finance minister Patrick McGilligan
278
announced on 19 September 1949 that to follow sterling in devaluing was “the
course of least disadvantage” (Moynihan, 1975, pp.355 & 358). A cabinet
colleague, Irish foreign minister Seán MacBride, had campaigned for office on
a republican ticket, but even he stated that his “[economic] policy would not …
necessarily involve a break with the sterling area or a change in the existing
parity with sterling” (Moynihan, 1975, p.361). This particular devaluation –
sterling would face further crises during the early 1950s (Fanning, 1978, pp.473-
82) and again in 1967 (Kelly, 2003, p.94) – increased costs, as Irish imports
were being sourced more widely, but they did not see corresponding increases
in export returns because the UK market remained dominant (Whitaker, 1976,
p.97). What chance was there that a situation which by this point had existed
for nearly a quarter of a century would ever change?
When the occasion did arise to take an active role in their economic
future, the Irish, following some initial hesitation, had made as much use as
possible of the post-war Marshall Plan. However, when the Bretton Woods
system instituted during the war led to the creation of the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development soon
afterwards, Ireland demonstrated its usual laggard approach. Despite a
recommendation in 1947 by the then Irish finance minister Frank Aiken that it
should join, a decade would pass before it did so. As one historian has written:
“the matter appears to have been left in abeyance”; in truth, “it was not until
1957 … that the necessary legislation was passed and Ireland became a member
of the two institutions” (Moynihan, 1975, pp.18 & 332). Any estimation of
Ireland’s monetary autonomy and how it pertained to national decision-making
would have led to serious questions being asked regarding the propensity and
desire for independent action. It has been argued that “despite its sovereign
status, Ireland appeared to have lost the ability to direct its own future” (Girvin,
2002, p.202). This was unmistakably the case in monetary affairs.
Major evidence of a transformation in the economic direction pursued
by the Irish government would only come in the late 1950s, with the publication
of Economic Development by Whitaker, then the Irish finance ministry’s most
senior civil servant. Its promulgation and espousal through the Programme for
Economic Expansion was led by Seán Lemass, taoiseach from 1959 to 1966, a
process continued by his successor, Jack Lynch, from 1966 to 1973 and taoiseach
again from 1977 to 1979. Recurring applications – to the EEC in 1961 and the
EC in 1967 and again in 1970 – were proof positive of the economy’s radical
reorientation, even if this liberalisation would not necessarily be matched as
rapidly by social change. The far-sightedness and innovation shown by Whitaker
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was matched by the flexibility and pragmatism of Lemass. But this was only
the beginning of a process of economic change, a course of action to a large
extent spurred by decisions taken in London regarding European integration,
at the same time as being financed by foreign direct investment. In the interim
between applying for membership of, and entering, the EC, the Irish were fully
prepared to become even more economically dependent on the UK through the
Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area (AIFTA) agreement of the mid-1960s, going one
step backwards in order to go two forward. But, as the 1960s came to a
conclusion, there was some good news: the value of Ireland’s exported
manufactured goods belatedly surpassed that of agricultural products. Indeed,
by that stage less than 70% of Irish exports were going to the UK, with 50% of
imports originating there. The economy was finally maturing (FitzGerald, 2001).
This chapter is not necessarily the place to examine in detail the efforts
made during the 1960s by Ireland and the UK to adhere to the EC, but this
section gives a very strong indication of the monetary ties that existed between
them, and an awareness that EC membership had increasingly become a foreign
economic policy priority. The next section therefore examines what one analyst
sees as the two strategic decisions which have “been made by the Irish authorities
since the foundation of the State. The shift in the late 1950s and early ’60s
from protection to free trade, culminating in EEC membership … [and] entry
to the EMS and the consequential break in the link with sterling” (McCormack,
1979, p.111).
EC entry and the origins of EMU
The archival evidence regarding the Irish 1970-72 entry negotiations –
certainly from the material available in Ireland and the United States – shows
that, as far as Dublin was concerned, plans for Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) hardly featured; it was not really a problematic issue, just very low
down a long list of other priorities. Clearly, EMU was an “important
[consideration] ... bearing on the future development and strengthening of the
[European] Communities” (Maher, 1986, p.278). But, a small semi-peripheral
and economically retarded – if newly dynamic and vibrant – country had more
pertinent concerns than the possibly long-term prospects for economic, monetary
and/or even political union. At the beginning of the 1970s, the Irish government
was, for instance, more concerned about protecting the economic benefits of
the AIFTA than it was in shedding membership of the sterling area; it was
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certainly not planning years ahead for something that might not necessarily
happen, that is when the negotiations for access to Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) funds and the creation of a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) were still
being concluded.
The policy of Irish neutrality is a decent parallel experience to EMU,
and in fact the former remains negotiable to this day. For over forty years,
Dublin governments have held a consistent line on this issue and remain prepared
to face and shape the consequences of any agreements made, that is once a
concrete alternative to their original policy path becomes both self-evident and,
just as importantly, sustainable. In the meantime, that is in the period between
an issue being raised and subsequent negotiations being concluded, the ability
to compromise and discuss will always allow for a reasonably acceptable
alternative to the optimal position. Problems arise when each issue becomes so
singular, and each position becomes so entrenched, that a decision – a stark yes
or no – appears to be the only choice left available. Strategically, such a situation
demonstrates ineptitude and a lack of understanding. Unfortunately for the UK
– in terms of its appreciation of the thinking behind, and possibilities inherent
in, the European project – it is often as diametrically opposed to the common
EU position as it is possible to be. At other times, it allows the Irish, and other
member states, the opportunity to hide behind its intractability.
Ireland was a part of the sterling area mainly because of its colonial
history, but also as a result of the lack of alternatives. Remaining there for most
of the 20th century reflected the economic realities it faced. In truth, Ireland
was dependent upon the UK in many areas, none more so than in terms of trade
patterns. This is why its decision in July 1961 to apply for EEC membership
was not only evidence of this unhealthy economic relationship – Ireland applied
because it knew the UK was about to do the same – it also marked one of the
first steps it took in seeking relationships beyond the British Isles and the
Anglophone world. Along with its western European neighbours – once the
UK also joined – a new set of relations and opportunities saw it exchange an
inflexible economic and monetary policy, as well as a minor and unappreciated
voice, for a seat at the larger table. As the 1960s progressed, the logic of the
Irish position stiffened in favour of even deeper integration, partly as an escape-
route from isolation – and dependence – to choosing a common purpose – and
interdependence. The rewards would be extraordinary with, for example, the
CAP “removing pressure from [farmers on] the government and transferring
the subsidisation of agriculture from the Irish state to Brussels” (Girvin, 2002,
p.209).
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Twice unsuccessful in even reaching the negotiating table, in 1961-63
and 1967, it was a matter of third time lucky during the 1970-72 talks. At the
first full ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 21 September 1970, Ireland’s
list of priorities – detailed in Table 2: the Dublin government’s view of the
issues necessitating negotiation (D/T-S18523B) – were rather transparent; they
read as follows:
Table 2: The Dublin government’s view of the issues necessitating negotiation
Transitional period
Customs Union
Common Agricultural Policy
Ireland’s trading arrangements with the UK during the transitional period
safeguard measures for Irish industry
dumping
industrial incentives
rights of establishment in agricultural land
Common Commercial Policy
association agreements
non-applicant European Free Trade Association countries
free movement of workers
free movement of capital
tax provisions
general aspect of the approximation of laws
equal pay
European Coal and Steel Community
European Atomic Energy Community
financing of the Communities
institutions
other matters
Striking for a number of reasons, not least the preponderance of economic
subjects, it is possible to infer much about Ireland’s attitude to EMU from this
negotiations agenda. It was, simply put, not a major consideration. When Jean
Rey, as European Commission president, helped to open the substantive
negotiations at this autumn meeting, he specifically made reference to “the
creation in stages of the economic and monetary union” (Maher, 1986, pp.268-
9). Irish foreign minister Patrick Hillery did not demur from this line of
argument, unequivocally declaring that “the Irish Government accept the
Treaties of Rome and Paris, their political objectives and the decisions taken in
their implementation”, before adding that it was “also willing to participate in
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the further development and strengthening of the Communities” (D/T-S18523B).
It was making all the right noises.
Ireland and the other accession countries already knew from 30 June
1970, with the formal opening of negotiations – and indeed from The Hague
summit the year before (Verdun, 2003a, p.316) – that proposals had been tabled
for an EMU to be achieved through a multi-stage strategy. The Werner report
that came out in October 1970, and its suggested three part plan for
implementation by the end of the decade, meant that the Irish had to confront
the issue during their accession negotiations. In all, there would be ten meetings
at ministerial level – detailed in figure 2: Ireland’s negotiations timetable, June
1970 to January 1972 (EEC6IRE10/1/70) – as well as nearly twice as many
meetings again at deputy level. The problems which would be created for a
semi-peripheral and relatively underdeveloped economy led the Irish to request
that EMU be put on the agenda for the second ministerial meeting set to be
held on 15 December 1970. The Irish were refused on the grounds that the Six
did not themselves have a fixed position, and indeed they were still arguing
amongst themselves, but it was clear that the matter would return within months.
Indeed, it played a relatively prominent role in the early part of Ireland’s
negotiations timetable; the progress made can be summarised as follows:
Table 3: Ireland’s negotiations timetable, June 1970 to January 1972
DATE OF MEETING FORM OF MEETING FOCUS OF MEETING
30 June 1970 formal opening meeting
21 September 1970 1st ministerial meeting general airing of views
15 December 1970 2nd ministerial meeting transitional periods
2 March 1971 3rd ministerial meeting quotas; fisheries
7 June 1971 4th ministerial meeting fisheries; dumping
12 July 1971 5th ministerial meeting regional policy; cars
19 October 1971 6th ministerial meeting fisheries; tax reliefs and incentives;
animal and plant health
9 November 1971 7th ministerial meeting fisheries; animal health
29-30 November 1971 8th ministerial meeting fisheries; animal health
11-12 December 1971 9th ministerial meeting fisheries; animal health
10-11 January 1972 10th ministerial meeting sugar
22 January 1972 accession treaty signing
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EMU was quickly linked by the Irish to regional policy, but other issues
overtook the former consideration, and it never really emerged as a crucial
negotiating question beyond the initial attention it received. Despite not being
on the formal agenda for the ministerial meeting of 15 December 1971, the
issue was however raised: “Hillery said that Ireland ... [was] particularly
interested in plans for economic and monetary union, and in regional policy”,
that Ireland would provide more information on both subjects at subsequent
meetings (EEC6IRE10/1/70).
The Irish decided upon a twin-pronged approach, firstly pushing for
progress on a regional policy to take account of outlying and backward regions,
while secondly pushing for a protocol to be annexed to any accession treaty
along the lines of that accorded to Italy when it helped to inaugurate the EEC.
Such a protocol would seek to protect Irish development efforts within the
context of membership. The EMU issue made it on to subsequent ministerial
meetings in the form of an agenda item termed internal developments.
Nonetheless, no matter how important this issue appeared, especially in the
medium-term, and even with the adoption of a definitive position by the Six in
the spring of 1971, the Irish government was more interested in defining concrete
negotiating positions and outcomes that it could sign up to rather than putting
any store in dreaming up arrangements for an EMU timetable. Thus, at the
third ministerial meeting at which they participated, held on 2 March 1971, the
Irish foreign minister showed that it was possible to agree a position favouring
future developments in exchange for the institution of a regional policy. In fact,
when Hillery referred to successful efforts by the Six to reach agreement on
EMU at this meeting, he then affirmed Ireland’s readiness to co-operate fully
when it became a member too, before consciously linking the whole issue to
“an aspect of particular interest to Ireland: namely, regional policy”
(EEC6IRE10/1/70). Hand in hand with efforts to create this policy at the
European level, the Irish negotiating team emphasised at further meetings, such
as the one held on 7 June 1971, that part of its economic strategy was “to retain
its present system of fiscal incentives to industry (such as tax relief on export
profits) after it joins the Community” (EEC6IRE10/1/70). This tactic paid off
when, at the ministerial meeting on 12 July 1971, “the two sides [Ireland and
the EC] settled two of the main issues in the EC-Irish negotiations: regional
policy and motor vehicle assembly” (EEC6IRE10/1/70).
Within a year of EMU being raised in earnest, and following a series of
ministerial meetings that concentrated on more intractable issues that troubled
the Irish – such as agreeing to a CFP, veterinarian concerns, and questions
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regarding the free movement of workers, issues which would remain open almost
to the last minute – they signed their Accession Treaty on 22 January 1972. In
truth, the Irish had cleared most of their major negotiating questions by the
autumn of 1971, and were waiting on the UK to conclude negotiations long
after they had dealt with most of their remaining concerns. At the end of the
negotiation process, the Irish had even gotten their special protocol “noting the
aims of Irish development policies and pledging community support of these
aims” (OECD, 1972). They had also secured an embryonic EC regional policy
as their price for economic and monetary union.
From the punt Éireannach to the euro
It was as a candidate, though not one waiting in the wings but directly
participating in determining the future of Ten, that the Irish took part in the
meeting of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of March 1972. This
meeting was meant to determine the approach to EMU. Because of fixed parity
existing between the punt and sterling, the Irish participated briefly and indirectly
in the new monetary system from May 1972 when the latter joined. The Irish
were meant to join formally in July 1972, but by then the UK had already
exited the system. The ‘snake in the tunnel’ continued to exist without its
membership and, in truth, never suggested that it was the solution to the
reestablishment of stable exchange rates following the breakdown of Bretton
Woods. The difficulties that the Ten had in setting up a stable monetary policy
meant that EMU was one of the main items up for discussion when the Paris
heads of state/government summit took place in October 1972. Given this forum,
Lynch used the occasion, not surprisingly, to reinforce his country’s European
credentials. In pressing for the summit to come up with “concrete decisions ...
[and] not merely general declarations of goodwill”, he gave his backing to
measures that would ensure economic and social progress, especially in relation
to living and working conditions, and any measures which would promote a
more equitable regional policy (D/T-S18523B). But there was nothing here
that went beyond reaffirming Ireland’s desire to find a resolution to the impasse
that had stalled economic and monetary union, while making quite sure that
regional policy was implemented, a position that the Irish remained committed
to after accession. The Irish had clearly determined that EMU would have serious
implications if an EC regional policy was not available to counterbalance adverse
effects (Maher, 1986, pp.287-8).
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There were other monetary developments. Both Ireland and the UK had
already taken steps to modernise their currencies as the 1960s came to a close,
with the former following the latter when decimalisation was introduced on 15
February 1971. But even this rejuvenation was not seen as the opportunity to
break a link freely forged decades before. The Central Bank Act, 1971, specified
that the “practice of referring, in the English language, to the currency of Ireland
as ‘the Irish pound’ … ‘an punt Éireannach’ in the Irish language” would
continue (Central Bank of Ireland, 1979, pp.41-2). And, of course, the punt
remained firmly attached to sterling.
Nevertheless, official entry into the EC on 1 January 1973 meant that
Ireland would take part in the establishment of EMU as soon as circumstances
– both internal and external to the Nine – allowed. As a member state, Ireland
would be in a position to ensure that an EC regional policy would counteract
any negative effects of EMU. Thus, when the question to break with sterling
was posed in earnest from the mid-1970s, the decision to say yes – or even fair
enough – was not fundamentally doctrinaire. It was certainly time for an
independent and fully functioning economy to have a currency which traded as
an equal and not as an adjunct. There was no sense that it would allow the
symbolism inherent in developing its own monetary policy, that is away from
the shackles of sterling, to stop it from changing course again in the future if
needs must. In truth, the break with sterling would not hinder it from participating
in any eventual solution at the European level, in fact the latter proved to be the
means employed. Although it could not be said that the Dublin government
was particularly active in promoting a European solution to the broader
economic and monetary problems that the EC faced, they were prepared to
come on board any viable project when the opportunity presented itself. But,
in terms of policy contribution, it should be added that (McAleese, 2000, p.103):
Ireland appears to have made little original contribution to strategic policy
formulation in Europe. Our forte has been in the management and adaptation of
policy. One major thrust among Irish efforts was the Community’s regional
policy. This may have been to some extent self-serving …
So why did the break with sterling come when it finally did? The answer
is partly for political reasons: it was hard to justify or sustain any argument that
the punt should stay attached to it for ever, particularly as sterling was performing
so poorly on international exchanges. It was economic too: the sterling link
was being blamed for imported inflationary pressures on the Irish economy,
even if these pressures were also being created domestically (Whitaker, 1976,
p.101). To be frank, it was also psychological: because in assuming control,
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Ireland was severing one of its last colonial ties with the UK, though it would
also have the effect of reinforcing partition with Northern Ireland. Therefore, it
was very important that there was a sound basis for this revolution in monetary
policy. Another basis had emerged, as the EC was developing its own proposals,
with France and Germany at the heart of the initiative taken at the European
Council meetings of March 1978 in Copenhagen and July 1978 in Bremen
(Central Bank & Financial Services Authority of Ireland, 2004, p.19). A new
monetary anchor was in the offing (McAleese, 2000, p.98), but it was a decision
which would clearly have profound implications
On 15 December 1978, the taoiseach announced that Ireland would
participate in the EMS, while continuing to sustain parity with sterling for as
long as possible. It was recognised in Dublin that this move – tying Ireland’s
fortunes to those of the other EMS members – would probably necessitate
breaking with sterling at some future point as the UK had indicated that it
would not be participating fully, at least not initially. According to the Irish
government, the EMS created “a zone of monetary stability [which] would …
facilitate the attainment of the Government’s aims of faster economic growth,
lower inflation and full employment … failure to participate in the new system,
which was a step in the direction of monetary union in Europe, could lead to
the creation of divisions within the Community”; it thus began operating on 13
March 1979 (Central Bank of Ireland, 1979, p.40). By the end of the month,
with the UK ultimately deciding not to participate, and sterling appreciating in
value due in part to rising oil prices, the punt’s break with the past was
unavoidable: “Just over fifty years after its formal adoption, the link between
the Irish pound and sterling was broken” (Kelly, 2003, p.98). On 30 March
1979, parity between the punt and sterling ceased in order for Ireland to comply
with its EMS obligations (Central Bank of Ireland, 1979, p.41). The value of
the Irish pound against sterling subsequently fell.
As the 1980s progressed, with the punt – and the ECU – struggling against
sterling, the Irish had real fears regarding the creation of the Single Market,
partly due to the sense that a geographically peripheral country might not be
able to take advantage of the larger – core – marketplace (McGowan, 2002,
pp.59-60). Ireland also had, what might generously be termed, an erratic
experience while operating as an independent currency within the EMS, with
devaluations of 8% in August 1986 and, in many ways more significantly, 10%
in January 1993 (McGowan, 2002, pp.60-1). In addition, it has been pointed
out that, while this system operated (Honohan, 2001):
… the Irish pound fluctuated widely against sterling … going below 74 pence
(February 1981) and as high as 110 pence (November 1992). Nor was it stable
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against EMS partner currencies. Realignments in the EMS were fairly frequent,
averaging about one a year in the 1980s, and the Irish pound depreciated steadily
against the Deutsche mark (DM), anchor of the system, reaching a cumulative
depreciation of 34 per cent by its low point in 1993.
It has though also been argued that, on the whole, the credibility of the
Irish pound as a member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was
maintained (Ledesma-Rodríguez, 2000, p.170). The punt was clearly weak,
but it was not alone in suffering the vagaries of the policies pursued by other
countries or by currency speculators. “Lacking a home-grown currency is
nothing new for Ireland” (Honohan, 2001) but, if nothing else, EMS allowed
Ireland to contemplate monetary life beyond sterling. Thus, when the
opportunity to participate in a fully functioning EMU began to emerge during
the early 1990s – and the vagaries of autonomous action and subsequent
devaluations by states were put into perspective by shared experiences, especially
in the economic backlash following German reunification – it was decided in
Dublin that there was safety in numbers. Therefore, it should have come as no
real surprise to any seasoned observer that Ireland would choose to participate
fully in the implementation of EMU, particularly in the light of its strong
economic performance as the decade progressed. Indeed, it adopted the euro at
its launch on 1 January 1999, and saw notes and coins being transacted three
years later, because that is where the “balance of advantage” now lay (Kelly,
2003, p.90).
In contrast, as a shadow from 1988 and as a member from 1990, the UK
briefly flirted with the ERM, in retrospect seeing its entry as occurring too late,
at the wrong rate, and not for the right reasons. Its departure from the ERM on
16 September 1992 was both costly and embarrassing. Even signing up to the
Treaty of European Union (TEU or Maastricht Treaty) in 1991 meant negotiating
an opt-out from the latter stages of EMU; what is perhaps forgotten is that the
UK also missed the opportunity to argue that London should be the site for the
European Central Bank (ECB) and, of course, how the Maastricht convergence
criteria should be interpreted. The UK’s difficulties with the Social Charter
was further evidence of its fundamental problem with deeper European
integration.
It was different for Ireland. It managed to negotiate substantial structural
funds in return for facilitating the negotiation of TEU. A decade later, the
introduction of the euro still allowed some individuality, though less
manoeuvrability, with the Irish facing rebuke for not reigning in control over
the economy at the height of the Celtic tiger years. At the same time as being
288
one of the first countries to be castigated for breaking the Growth and Stability
Pact rules, EMU has offered discipline and has allowed Ireland the comfort of
being part of a larger whole, while casting sideward glances at its neighbour.
By 2002, Irish exports to the UK accounted for 24% of its total, while 36% of
its imports originate there; the rest of the EU accounts for 40% of Irish exports
and 23% of imports (Central Statistics Office, 2004). Since it achieved
membership, the EU has increased exponentially in value as an export
destination (McGowan, 2002, p.58). It is readily apparent where its interests
now lie. Having decided that the country’s future was in supporting, rather
than hindering, European integration in general – and policies such as EMU in
particular – a certain logic, perhaps even maturity and perspective, has been
demonstrated by successive Irish governments. Staying outside these
developments only shows that lessons remain unlearned as far as London is
concerned – delaying decisions or shirking them does not exhibit the leadership
required, or expected, from a larger member state.
Conclusions
Under Blair, the UK appears to be no nearer joining the euro than when
the single currency was first proposed; this maintains the British approach:
“with, but not really of, Europe” (Carter, 2003, pp.1 & 9). In contrast to this
reticence, the UK’s nearest neighbour – Ireland – is one of the original members
of the euro. As this chapter has argued, taking this position was fairly predictable
enough, anything to be different, certainly to the country with which it shares a
border. But, as a monetary policy, was its adoption questionable? As far as
Dublin was concerned, not really. Always assert your individuality from a safe
position, this time from within the euro zone pack, and argue your corner at
ECOFIN and European Council meetings while being prepared to seek and
reach consensus.
In some respects, it suits Ireland to be within while the UK remains
without. Irish adherence was certainly expected, and readily accepted by the
other prospective euro zone countries, once the EMU project actually reached
the stage of issuing a single currency. It must also be said that the absence of a
strictly Irish exchange rate removes some of the economy’s flexibility and
vulnerability, but instead brings more monetary certainty. What is of particular
interest in the context of this chapter is that the constituent parts of the British
Isles had of course entered the 20th century with a single currency – sterling.
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But, at its conclusion and the beginning of a new century, one country stands
alone, wallowing in the past while forlornly wishing that the future will not
happen; meanwhile, the other has swapped the pound for the punt for the euro,
dependence for interdependence, with hardly a glance back at yesteryear.
In truth, Ireland and the UK had signalled their intentions back in the
early 1960s. But these issues were faced squarely during the 1970-72 EU
accession negotiations – the main hinge of this chapter – and in choices that
both countries made as they tried to enter the European economic mainstream
at the third time of asking. In fact, it is back in this period that the motivations
– the fears and the attractions – behind subsequent policy can be seen; decisions
were reached at that time which impact increasingly into the present day and
beyond. This chapter has used those entry negotiations as one way of examining
the current situation, particularly where the pound has everything to do with
emotion and national identity, and little to do with economics or the merits of
Europeanisation, while the punt was recognised some time ago as the means to
an end and, even if its consignment to history did not necessarily go unremarked,
there were few regrets (McAleese, 2000, p.98). The punt finally disappeared
on 9 February 2002, with one commentator noting: “Here, a banknote is a
banknote, what it buys is what’s important to people in Ireland” (Williams,
2002). Such subtleties appear lost on London, and prove that it still does not
completely understand or fully appreciate the pliable or progressive nature of
the European integration project.
Culturally, an interesting point worth reemphasising was that UK currency
flowed fairly freely in Ireland throughout the 20th century, even beyond 1979
when coins of different shapes and sizes began circulating (Connolly, 1998,
p.367). Bearing the head of Victoria, and subsequently Edward VII and George
V – and in fact George VI and Elizabeth II – UK coins did turn up and were
used in Ireland, but for the most part were far outnumbered by Brian Boru’s
harp. To the latter symbol has now been added representations of Juan Carlos,
Beatrix and John Paul II, and sterling is a much less common sight in Ireland as
a result. This has not stopped the euro from entering the UK, in some respects
by stealth and in others by design; euro cash machines operate in Belfast and
the currency is welcome across Northern Ireland – thus contributing, even in
this rather minor way, to the normalisation of relations between the two parts
of the island – while Irish race-goers continue to turn up in their droves at
Cheltenham with their new currency as equally acceptable as their punts were
previously.
In truth, the adoption of the euro is an extension of a conscious decision
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taken over four decades ago by Irish politicians to see their future in Europe. In
an increasingly globalised world, those asserting sovereignty and independence
are being forced to recognise that, now more than ever, absolute control over
monetary policy is an aspiration that cannot be fulfilled. Most EU countries
recognised these realities some considerable time ago, and indeed are well
acquainted with the benefits – as well as the costs – which are inherent in
pooling sovereignty; meanwhile, other states have yet to learn this important
lesson and have apparently decided, once again, not to be more directly involved
in the shaping of their own futures.
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CHAPTER 13
CURRENCIES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
ON THEIR WAY TOWARDS EMU
BY
RENZO DAVIDDI AND MILICA UVALIC *
Abstract: The paper discusses present exchange rate regimes in the Western
Balkan countries (WB) - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM,
Serbia and Montenegro - to which in mid-1999 the EU has offered concrete
prospects of EU membership. Yet membership will also depend on
macroeconomic stabilisation, where the exchange rate plays a crucial role. The
large variety of currency regimes in the WB is analysed in order to evaluate their
contribution to macroeconomic stabilisation in recent years, as well as the key
longer-term issues linked to  the requirements of joining Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU).
Keywords: Exchange rate policies, currency regimes, macroeconomic
stabilisation, Western Balkans, transition economies
1. Introduction
The Western Balkans (WB) - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H),
Croatia, FYR Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia and Montenegro (until February
4, 2003, FR Yugoslavia) - is a region of growing  interest for the European
Union (EU). Due to continuous political instability during the 1990s, the EU
has intensified its relations with these countries only after the war in Kosovo.
The launch of the Stabilisation and Association Process in mid-1999 specifically
for these five countries has opened concrete prospects of EU membership. Yet,
such prospects will depend crucially on the achievement and maintenance of
macroeconomic stability, and accelerated progress in implementing structural
economic reforms (in addition to political criteria).
°
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During the 1990s, all countries in the region have gone through various
episodes of major monetary instability, even hyperinflations among the highest
recorded in economic history. Most countries have also experienced reversals
in macroeconomic stabilisation, due to major economic/political crises or other
reasons. Despite variable results, the exchange rate has in all cases played a
fundamental role in stabilisation efforts. Presently, the WB countries are
characterised by a large variety of exchange rate regimes.
The paper presents a comparative analysis of these various exchange
rate regimes, in order to evaluate their contribution, in recent years, to
macroeconomic stabilisation. After a cursory description of the different
currency regimes (section 2), the main achievements and failures of
macroeconomic stabilisation programmes are briefly discussed (section 3). The
role of the various currency regimes in transition economies, particularly in the
WB, is then considered (section 4), as well as the key longer-term issues related
to the option of joining Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (section 5).
Some final remarks summarise the main conclusions.
2. Exchange rate regimes in the Western Balkans
Presently, the WB countries are characterised by a large variety of
exchange rate regimes, even within countries (see table below).
Table 4: Exchange rate regimes in the Western Balkans
Country Exchange Date of Currency
 Arrangement Adoption
Albania Pegged 1990-91 Aug. Lek, linked to the US$
Independently floating 1992 Lek
Bosnia and No unique regime 1992-96 BiH dinar, new BiH dinar,
Herzegovina BiH dinar pegged Aug. 1994 Croatian dinar (later kuna),
RS dinar, YU dinar
Currency board 1997 Convertible marka
 Arrangement linked to the euro
Croatia Pegged 1992 Croatian dinar, in 1993
Managed float Oct. 1993 replaced by the kuna
FYROM Pegged 1992 Coupons, later replaced by
the Macedonian denar
Conventional peg 1995
FR Yugoslavia Pegged 1992 Yugoslav dinar
-Serbia Pegged 1992 Yugoslav dinar
Managed float Dec. 2000
-Montenegro Euroisation (euro 1998 Euro
De jure  legal tender)1
-Kosovo Euroisation Mid-1999 Euro
(euro De facto legal tender)
Renzo Daviddi and Milica Uvalic - Currencies in the western balkans On their way towards emu
293
THE EURO AS A WORLD CURRENCY AND AS A EUROPEAN ANCHOR
Montenegro and Kosovo have recently adopted the euro, though under
very different legal backgrounds. FYROM has opted for a conventional peg,
with the Macedonian denar linked to the Deutschmark (DM) (today the euro).
B&H has a currency board arrangement (CBA, or ‘irrevocable peg’) with the
Convertible marka pegged to the euro. The remaining three countries/entities -
Albania, Croatia, and Serbia - today have some form of a flexible regime, but
with different degrees of flexibility, though in the past all three had also pegged
their national currencies - to the DM (Serbia and Croatia), or the United States
dollar (US$) (Albania). These variegated choices seem to correspond to the
general trend observed world-wide: the WB seem to conform to the ‘new
orthodoxy’ of the 1990s, characterised by the move away from fixed rates
towards either floating or ‘hyper-fixed’ rates (Nuti, 2001, p. 3).2
These different currency regimes will now be examined in greater detail,
together with the principal results regarding macroeconomic stabilisation.
(1) Albania
Albania in 1991 adopted a fixed exchange rate regime with the lek pegged
to the US$. A flexible exchange rate was introduced in August 1992, as part of
an International Monetary Fund (IMF)-supported stabilisation program. This
choice found support in the literature, in the context of a small open economy
in transition, when the level of international reserves is below a minimum
threshold (Muço et al., 1999, p. 536). Today, the country has an independent
float: the exchange rate is formed on the basis of supply and demand for foreign
currency. The Bank of Albania calculates and announces the daily exchange
rates for the US$ and other currencies. Since exchange rate stability has been a
primary goal of the central bank, effectively the lek has been informally pegged
to the US$, despite the EU being its most important trading partner. Until
recently, 60% of foreign reserves and domestic deposits in foreign currency
were held in US$, but the euro has quickly been replacing the US$ after 2002.
Regarding macroeconomic stabilisation, inflation decreased to a one-
digit figure only after 1995.3 In 1996-97 there was a major economic crisis,
following the collapse of a number of fraudulent pyramid schemes. This led to
a dramatic depreciation of the lek in early 1997, but by mid-1997 the exchange
rate returned to relative stability of around 150 lek per US$ (Muço et al., 1999,
p. 541). Since then, inflation has been maintained low (usually well below
5%), though the public deficit remains the highest in the region (8% of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002).
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(2) B&H
Bosnian independence in  mid-1992 was followed by the creation of a
national bank and introduction of the Bosnian dinar as legal tender, but the
four-year war postponed effective monetary reforms until much later. A new
Bosnian dinar was introduced in mid-1994 pegged to the DM, but it was not
accepted in the whole country. During this period, various currencies were in
use - the new Bosnian dinar; the Republika Srpska dinar and the Yugoslav
dinar; the Croatian dinar/kuna - in the areas populated by the Bosniacs, Serbs,
and Croats respectively. In mid-1997, a CBA was introduced which pegged the
new currency, the Convertible marka (KM) to the DM (KM1=DM1) and from
January 2002, to the Euro  (KM1 = a 0.51129). An independent Central Bank
was established in August 1997, under the guidance of an internationally
appointed governor.
The 1997 currency reform provided a strong nominal anchor and
successfully drove down average inflation to one of the lowest rates in the
region - by 2002, to 2% in the Federation and 5% in the Republika Srpska.
Foreign currency reserves have continuously increased, from KM 144 million
(end 1997) to over KM 2.2 billion (July 2003). Achievements in fiscal policies
have been much less remarkable, primarily regarding the level and composition
of public expenditure, which is still above 60% of GDP (the highest in the
region). Such high public expenditure calls for major structural consolidation;
if enduring, it could clearly represent a threat to medium-term growth and
macroeconomic stability.
(3) Croatia
Croatia established an independent central bank in 1991 and for a short
period relied on a fixed exchange rate, with the Croatian dinar pegged to the
DM. Despite stabilisation attempts in 1992-3, there were rising inflationary
pressures. A new programme was implemented in October 1993, which was
rather successful. Annual average inflation by 1995 fell below 5% and since
then has been maintained low, while the exchange rate stabilised after a brief
appreciation. In May 1994 the Croatian dinar was replaced by a new currency,
the kuna. Thereafter, the regime has been a managed float, with no pre-
announced path for the exchange rate which is determined on the foreign
exchange market. The national bank may, however, set intervention exchange
rates which it applies in transactions with banks outside the inter-bank market.
Croatia achieved a high level of price stability using the exchange rate
as nominal anchor. The national bank law defines exchange rate stability as the
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primary objective of monetary policy, but the effectiveness of monetary policy
may be limited. Similarly to the other countries, the past structural excess
liquidity, coupled with a weak payments system and liquidity management
practices of banks, seem to have hampered the proper development of the money
market. Currency substitution persists and confidence in the domestic currency
has not been restored: three quarters of bank deposits and almost half of bank
domestic placements are either in a foreign currency or indexed to one (European
Commission, 2002, p. 32).
(4) FYROM
FYROM established an independent central bank in April 1992 and issued
the Macedonian denar (MKD), initially in the form of coupons, which was not
backed by gold or foreign exchange reserves; notes and coins were introduced
in April 1993. The MKD was pegged to the DM and subsequently re-pegged to
a basket of seven currencies. After 1995, the exchange rate regime has been a
conventional peg. The exchange market operates at two levels: wholesale and
retail. The National Bank participates in the wholesale market to maintain the
value of the MKD against the DM (today a) at the level that meets balance of
payments objectives. The MKD exchange rate is established freely on the basis
of demand and supply of foreign currency, based on the reports from the banks
participating at the foreign exchange market. The MKD/a exchange rate serves
as the intermediate target of monetary policy; money supply and interest rates
are dictated by the exchange rate target, which since mid-1997 has been set at
MKD61 = a1 (Bisev and Petkovski, 2003, pp. 12-3), and has been kept at that
level (except in 2001, see below). Effectively, the central bank has been
maintaining a stable MKD/a nominal exchange rate.
After extreme macroeconomic instability in 1991-94 (as elsewhere in
the region), a heterodox adjustment program brought about a significant and
enduring reduction of average inflation: in 1996-98, it declined to 2.5%, 1.5%
and 0.6% respectively, while in 1999 it was even negative. The military conflict
in 2001 caused a major turbulence on the foreign exchange market, when the
MKD nominal exchange rate reached its highest value against the euro
(MKD66=a1). The National Bank defended the parity and tightened monetary
policy, increasing interest rates and reserve requirement rates. The policy was
successful: in the second half of 2001 the exchange rate returned towards its
long-run trend of MKD61=a1 (Bisev and Petkovski, 2003, p. 12). By mid-
2002 the foreign exchange reserves reached a 884 million.
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(5) Serbia and Montenegro (formerly FRY)
In April 1992, FRY was created as a federation of two republics, Serbia
and Montenegro. Until 1998-99, the NBY was in charge of monetary and
exchange rate policies throughout the country. After 1998, Montenegro decided
to distance itself from Serbia in practically all economic areas, whereas Kosovo
abandoned the monetary union after the 1999 war, when it was put under the
UNMIK administration. In what follows, therefore, until 1998-99 the policies
will be considered for the country as a whole, and thereafter for the three entities
separately.
In 1992, FRY opted for a fixed exchange rate regime, with the Yugoslav
dinar (YUD) pegged to the DM, and this arrangement prevailed throughout the
1990s. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies brought about a virtual
collapse of the economy by late 1993 - a 50% drop in output and one of the
highest and longest hyperinflations ever recorded in world history (annual
average inflation rate of 116.5 billion). A heterodox stabilisation programme
implemented in early 1994, based on a monetary reform, the exchange rate as
nominal anchor, internal convertibility, successfully halted hyperinflation,
reversed the trend of declining output and increased foreign exchange reserves.
But by the end of 1994, inflation was again fuelled through credit expansion,
convertibility was abandoned and the black foreign exchange market re-
flourished. The YUD was officially devalued in late 1995 and in April 1998,
but durable macroeconomic stabilisation had not been achieved. Though average
inflation dropped from 94% in 1996 to 21% in 1997 and 29% in 1998, it again
increased to 37% in 1999.
Major distortions have also been introduced by the extensive use of
multiple exchange rates, applied on a completely discretionary, non-transparent
and ad hoc basis. From April 1998 onwards, the official exchange rate was for
over two years  fixed at DM1 = YUD6, despite the black market exchange rate
continuously increasing (by October 2000, it was five times the official rate,
DM1 = YUD 30). Given the substantial foreign currency shortages, only the
most privileged - the political and economic élite close to president Milosevic
- had access to foreign currency at the official exchange rate, which was misused
in various ways (e.g. only the “well connected” directors could buy foreign
currency needed for imports at the official exchange rate).
Post-2000 Serbia
A major change in macroeconomic policies took place after the political
changes in October 2000. The exchange rate was unified, the currency was
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devalued vis-à-vis the DM, internal convertibility and a flexible exchange rate
(managed float) were introduced. Monetary policy has since been geared towards
reigning on inflation, which was rather high following price liberalisation and
major fiscal reforms. Average inflation fell from 91% in 2001 to 21% in 2002,
reaching a single-digit figure (8%) by the end of 2003. The nominal exchange
rate has been maintained stable for over two years, close to YUD 30 = DM1
(later YUD 60 = a1). The Central Bank governor Dinkic also introduced specific
measures to reduce currency substitution (e.g. prohibiting payments in shops
and restaurants in foreign currencies). Official reserves have continuously
increased, to US$ 3.3 billion by September 2003. Due to the restored demand
for dinars, purchases by the authorities of foreign exchange accounted for
roughly half of the foreign reserves accumulated during 2001, while the other
half derived from official aid (OECD, 2002, p. 57).
The nominal exchange rate has remained stable despite relatively high
inflation, which brought about a substantial real appreciation of the YUD. It
has been sustained that this has significantly decreased the competitiveness of
the economy, given the continuous increase in the foreign trade deficit (see
Popovic, 2001, p. 6; Kekic, 2002). Since mid-2002, the National Bank has
allowed a slight nominal depreciation to around YUD 6.5 = a1  by mid-2003.
Post-1998 Montenegro
Although Montenegro was for years in a monetary union with Serbia, in
1997 it decided to gradually establish independence in practically all economic
fields. In the monetary sphere, the first step was to legalise, in 1998,  the use of
the DM, which in November 1999 officially became the legal tender, while in
November 2000, the sole means of payment (although de facto parallel
circulation took place unhindered until March 2002). In January 2002, the a
was introduced as the legal tender; although Montenegro had no official reserves,
its introduction was backed by international donations. The authorities justified
these drastic measures by the need to insulate the economy from the negative
effects of expansionary monetary policies in Belgrade. However, the overall
results have been less successful than expected.
The replacement of the YUD by the DM (today a) did not lead to an
immediate and drastic reduction of inflation, which in 2000-1 remained rather
high (24.8% and 28% respectively) and was reduced to 9.4% only in 2002. The
introduction of a strong and convertible currency as legal tender has not returned
citizens’ confidence in domestic financial institutions; some estimates indicate
that in 2002, two thirds of money in circulation remained under mattresses,
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while half of all economic transactions were in cash, avoiding the mediation of
official financial institutions. In the fiscal area, the separation from the federal
state has enabled faster implementation of certain fiscal reforms, but the core
structural problems remain, judging from the very high fiscal deficit (16% of
GDP in 2000) and non-fulfilment of the targeted decrease in 2001.
Post-1999 Kosovo
The UNMIK administration in autumn 1999 immediately legalised the
circulation of currencies other than the YUD (Regulation 9/1999), though it
fell short of declaring the DM the sole legal tender. As a result of rapid currency
substitution, soon the DM (later a) became de facto the only currency in
circulation. Kosovo has not formally established a central bank, although the
Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo was given the responsibility for
bank licensing, supervision and prudential regulation. Since today its de facto
currency is the a, it does not carry out any monetary or exchange rate policy. It
remains heavily reliant on private and public transfers: expatriates have
traditionally made significant remittances from abroad, which in 2001 amounted
to a400 million (25% of Kosovo’s estimated GDP; see OECD, 2002, p. 35).
On the basis of the above, we can conclude that the following elements
have heavily influenced the choice of the exchange rate regimes in the WB.
(1) Considerations related to the soundness of the fiscal stance and capacity
to control inflation, which have been instrumental in suggesting a hyper-
fixed option in those countries where the capacity of the authorities to
impose a certain degree of fiscal and monetary discipline was perceived as
being weak (e.g. in B&H).
(2) The wide circulation of the DM in the whole region has constrained the
choice of the peg. Given the wide acceptance and use, throughout the 1990s,
of the DM as the traditional reserve currency, it was indeed chosen as the
main point of reference.
(3) The lack of foreign exchange reserves at the outset of transition also
determined the chosen options. In the case of the successor states of
Yugoslavia, foreign exchange reserves were blocked in Belgrade, so the
newly established central banks had no or very limited reserves.
(4) Historical and political factors have also crucially influenced the choice of
the regime. Political factors underline the introduction of the euro in both
Montenegro and Kosovo, whereas unsuccessful experiences with
stabilisation programmes based on a fixed exchange rate in the 1990s have
influenced the choice of a flexible regime in Serbia in late 2000.
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3. Macroeconomic stabilisation: achievements and failures
We have illustrated how the WB countries have relied on very different
exchange rate regimes in recent years. Despite such variety, however, the overall
results have actually been rather similar, both regarding the main achievements
of macroeconomic stabilisation programmes and their major failures.
In practically all countries, price stability and defence of the exchange
rate have been the central objectives of economic policy in recent years. Indeed,
the declining trend in average inflation in the WB countries has arguably been
the main achievement of macroeconomic policies. Following the hyperinflation
of the early 1990s, average inflation gradually decreased and stabilised,
converging by 2002 to a single-digit figure. Serbia is the only exception, as it
embarked on radical economic reforms (including price liberalisation) only in
late 2000, but even here average inflation in 2003 has fallen below 10%. Still,
the achievement of monetary stability clearly cannot be taken for granted; the
possibility of reversals is always possible if the authorities depart from sound
policy principles.
Another positive result is the maintenance of relative stability of the
nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro. Although we have witnessed short-
term crises which have provoked major disturbances on the foreign exchange
market in several countries, the central banks have been able to re-establish
stability. Such exchange rate stability has been a fundamental element for
restoring confidence in the national currencies and gradually reducing currency
substitution.
The coexistence of a fixed nominal exchange rate and some, albeit modest,
inflation has led to a certain degree of real appreciation of the national currencies.
It is difficult to draw conclusions about the precise effect of such real appreciation
on competitiveness, without a more thorough analysis of the evolution of
nominal and real effective exchange rates. However, at least in the case of
Serbia, there seems to be a strong positive correlation between the real
appreciation of the exchange rate and the growing trade deficit.
There have also been some major failures of macroeconomic stabilisation
programmes, which could undermine the stability of the  macroeconomic
environment in the medium term. In several areas of economic reform, the WB
have clearly lagged behind the more advanced transition economies (see
Transition Indicators, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), 2003, p. 16). We will recall only those elements which are most relevant
for our present analysis.
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(1) The relative stability of the fiscal stance has been achieved without major
reforms in the fiscal area. Generally, all countries are characterised by an
oversized public sector, a high level and  ‘erroneous’ composition of public
expenditure, and weak tax collection capacity. These problems, if not
addressed in a coherent and comprehensive way, could endanger long-
term stability.
(2) Currency substitution remains widespread in all countries, though less than
a few years ago. In the presence of currency substitution, the central banks
are less able to control the quantity of money in circulation and monetary
growth targets are inefficient methods for controlling inflation (Bisev, 2000,
p.14).
(3) Delays in financial and banking reforms have led to weak banking and
payments systems, which have hampered the development of money
markets and interest-sensitive monetary instruments, thus heavily
constraining the conduct of an independent monetary policy. Central banks
in the WB have relied on very few financial instruments and have not
engaged in more active monetary policies.
(4) Indicators of the real sector are rather discouraging. All WB countries
have experienced rather slow recovery of output, and all of them, except
Albania, are today well below their 1989 GDP level. All countries except
B&H have experienced between 1999 and 2002 one or more years of
negative economic growth, and all have also very high official
unemployment rates (14% to 41% of the labour force).
These elements seem to suggest the presence, in the WB, of a trade-off
between growth and price stability. The policy mix which has been so successful
in delivering price stability has obviously failed to produce high and sustained
growth rates. This obviously does not mean that achieving macroeconomic
stability was not a primary objective for the countries under review. It does
mean, however, that the lack or slow progress in structural reform (including
the failure to establish an appropriate institutional, regulatory and legal
framework) has failed to generate the supply response that is necessary for
reducing unemployment and generating sustained economic development.
4. The role of exchange rate regimes in macroeconomic stabilisation
More than a decade of experience of transition indicates unequivocally
that the exchange rate regime has played a crucial role in macroeconomic
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stabilisation in the short term. In the medium-term, policy makers need to address
the challenging issue of implementing a policy mix which is consistent with
the chosen regime. In particular, it is necessary to find a balance between the
necessity to continue using the exchange rate as an anchor in the stabilisation
process, while limiting the impact of possible real appreciation.
(1) Pegging the exchange rate
Generally, the choice of a fixed exchange rate at the initial stage of
transition in the WB has probably been unavoidable. Beyond political
considerations, other factors may suggest that it is optimal to fix the exchange
rate: the size of an economy, its degree of openness, the need to reduce the
costs of the monetary overhang. Yet, two more general considerations are in
order.
First, the choice of the currency regime is by far less important than the
policy mix that should sustain it. Although at a price, even a CBA can rapidly
become unsustainable, unless the overall policy framework is adequate. Such a
policy framework must include appropriate fiscal and structural policies,
including those concerning the financial sector. Similarly, the benefits of
euroisation crucially depend on the credibility of the commitment, which is in
no way automatic and is fundamentally linked to the type of government policies.
Second, the choice of the exchange regime is also heavily dependent on
the country’s policy priorities. Let us assume that the authorities give priority
to catching up, while trying to avoid policy profligacy and minimising falls in
output and employment. In this context, the choice of the exchange rate regime
depends on the relative weight of the tradable and non-tradable sector in the
economy. In the case of small open economies (like most WB countries), it
may be optimal to fix the exchange rate, but this is not necessarily so in a
medium-sized country, where it might be better to allow more exchange rate
flexibility and target prices instead.
On this ground, none of the Balkan countries is big enough to justify
alternative choices. Yet, in some cases, pressures deriving from the transition
can jeopardise the sustainability of the chosen regime. It could be argued that
real appreciation of the currency does not necessarily have an immediate negative
impact on competitiveness. However, this could only be so if the country
manages to benefit from economy-wide productivity gains, that in a transition
economy are possible if appropriate structural policies are implemented. Yet,
in most WB countries, the incapacity or the unwillingness of the policy makers
to design and implement appropriate structural policies represents a major
302
challenge for macroeconomic stability and exchange rate sustainability.
An extensive literature has analysed the rationale for pegging the
exchange rate (Sachs, 1995, Bruno, 1995), offering three main reasons for
introducing it at the outset of stabilisation. A pegged rate (Sachs, 1995, p. 149):
(1) boosts the government’s commitment to stabilisation by establishing clear
targets and by tying the government’s own hands; (2) helps price and wage
setters coordinate their actions and expectations around a new low-inflation
equilibrium; and (3) provides a convenient way for households and enterprises
to rebuild their real money balances after a period of high inflation. At the start
of stabilisation, economic agents desire to hold higher real money balances
which, under pegged exchange rates, are satisfied automatically through the
balance of payments, as agents repatriate their offshore capital or, in the case
of the WB, dishoard foreign currency and convert it into domestic currency.
Under a floating exchange regime, there is no automatic mechanism for
households to rebuild their real money balances.
The central bank could support remonetization of the banking system
by expanding domestic credit, but this would undermine the credibility of the
stabilisation programme. Therefore, many central banks refrain from domestic
credit expansion and the economy remains undermonetized, suffering from
excessively high real interest rates and an overvalued currency. The result is
that successful anti-inflation programmes under floating rates tend to be more
contractionary than those carried out under pegged exchange rates and many
attempts at stabilisation under flexible rates have simply failed (Sachs, 1995,
p. 149). In the case of the accession countries, empirical evidence suggests that
the early peggers outperformed the floaters both in terms of the success and
costs of disinflation; even when stabilisation under floating rates was achieved,
the costs seem to have been higher (Sachs, 1995, p. 149).
The experience of the WB clearly indicates that neither type of currency
regime can compensate for the lack of structural reforms. In FYROM, the
strategy of exchange rate targeting under a pegged regime seems to have had a
number of disadvantages (Bisev and Petkovski, 2003, p.12). The exchange rate
was not an outcome of the market forces, but was determined by the Central
Bank’s assessment of the equilibrium exchange rate; since the assessment for
1997 – 2002 was that the fundamentals did not change, the exchange rate
remained fixed. Second, in order to secure the stability on the foreign exchange
market, high instability was created on the money market; the volatility of the
interest rates was very high, which adversely affected economic activity. Third,
the exchange rate anchor should have coordinated the behaviour of all economic
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agents, including the government’s fiscal policy; otherwise, low inflation is
maintained through economic growth lower than potential (even recession)
and balance of payment disequilibrium, or both.
In Croatia where, on the contrary, a managed float was adopted, the
economy has similarly been suffering from excessively high real interest rates
and an overvalued currency, which discouraged investment and growth.
Although the National Bank had reduced its discount rate, this had little impact
on interest rates charged on bank loans to individuals and businesses, so
economic recovery came to an end in mid-1998 and was followed by a banking
crisis. The growth of the economy was being held back by a structural balance
of payments constraint, imports being far higher than exports (Bartlett, 2003,
pp. 96-7).
As to longer-term policies, a policy regime appropriate for halting
inflation may be inappropriate for longer-run economic management. In
transition economies, there is a strong case for moving to a more flexible
exchange rate once high inflation has been eliminated and the economy has
been substantially remonetised. These economies suffer from chronic structural
weaknesses that limit the flexibility of the domestic economy - a high degree
of state ownership, wage-setting strongly influenced by insiders, inherited
rigidities in wage-setting, moderate rather than high openness to international
markets, chronic fiscal problems, including very high rates of taxation (Sachs,
1995, pp. 150-1). As a result, monetary and fiscal policies are likely to remain
too expansionary in the medium term to underpin a permanently pegged rate
and the economy is unlikely to possess the degree of flexibility needed to absorb
adverse shocks.  What is therefore suggested is the adoption, at a later stage, of
a more flexible currency regime.
The most difficult practical problem is to evaluate the appropriateness
of the nominal exchange rate target from the point of view of long-term
international competitiveness (Sachs, 1995, p. 151). The policy challenge is to
distinguish between the dollar-wage increases justified by rising tradables
productivity, and the dollar-wage increases that result from internal inflationary
pressure. Under conditions of major structural transformation, the policy of
simply maintaining the nominal exchange rate unchanged is likely to provoke
growing real appreciation.
Capital inflows are another source of pressure towards currency
appreciation. If the peg is perceived as unsustainable, a pegged regime can
precipitate major financial crises. There is still no consensus on the appropriate
policy response to a sharp increase in short-term capital inflows. The recent
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financial crises in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela demonstrate that
undercapitalised banking sectors may exacerbate macroeconomic instabilities
by engaging in large-scale foreign borrowing at the time of capital-market
liberalisation.
(2) The case of the hyper-fixed regimes
Euroisation
Kosovo and Montenegro have pushed the concept of a pegged rate to the
extreme, by adopting the euro as legal tender (referred to as ‘unilateral
euroisation’). Euroisation is a rather encompassing concept which extends the
concept of currency substitution, a well-known phenomenon in many transition
and developing countries. Currency substitution is clearly ‘market driven’: it
cannot be influenced directly through government administrative measures,
but depends on citizens’ decision whether to hold savings in domestic or foreign
currency. But insofar as the degree of currency substitution is inversely correlated
with macroeconomic stability, economic policy matters and should be geared
to sustaining macroeconomic stability.
The most powerful argument in favour of euroisation is related to the
signalling properties of a ‘hyper-fixed’ exchange rate regime (Daviddi, 1999,
pp. 3-4). The severe financial crises of recent years, from Asia to Russia to
Argentina, seem to suggest that the mechanisms of forming expectations are
rather rudimentary. Detailed knowledge of small and often distant countries is
difficult and costly to acquire. This facilitates the development of “clusters of
knowledge”, which end up having a heavy influence on investors’ choices.
“Herd behaviour” tends to amplify the negative consequences of shocks and
spreads panic. By committing themselves to what is hoped will be perceived
by the market as an irreversibly fixed exchange rate, the authorities send a very
strong signal to the market itself. They enhance their credibility and their
reputation and ‘borrow’ at least part of the stability of the foreign currency. By
eliminating devaluation risk, they can enjoy interest rates which are lower and
less sensitive to ‘contagion’ from other countries than under a more flexible
exchange regime. Other benefits include access to deeper financial markets,
capital inflow, etc.
However, the option of euroisation means accepting the loss of domestic
monetary independence. If an asymmetric shock hits the economy, EU monetary
policy will not accommodate. In the event of a shock that calls for a devaluation,
the adjustment will have to come from a reduction of domestic prices. If prices
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(and wages) are sticky, adjustment will take the form of reduced growth and
higher unemployment. This could have been avoided if the country could have
conducted its own monetary policy and could have relied on nominal
devaluation.
It has been argued (e.g. Calvo, 1999) that the possible use of a devaluation
is constrained by the pre-existing partial dollarisation. Admittedly, liabilities
denominated in foreign currency are highly vulnerable to devaluation. If the
banking sector has borrowed heavily in foreign currencies, a major devaluation
can have disastrous consequences for the financial system and the whole
economy. However, the degree of exposure of financial institutions to borrowing
in foreign currencies in the Balkan countries is not as high as in some Latin
American, or even transition, economies.
Beyond asymmetric shocks, the call for greater flexibility may derive
from the undergoing process of deep structural transformation. In such an
environment, inflation might have “real” origins, generated by the well-known
Balassa-Samuelson effect. When a small economy opens up to international
trade, the export sector’s prices are set at the world level. If the country is on its
production possibility frontier, every increase in productivity in the traded goods
sector will also lead to an increase in wages. But if wages are equalised through
the traded and non-traded sector, and if the non-traded sector has a slower
dynamics of productivity, this increases domestic inflation. In this case, inflation
is a “real” phenomenon due to the catching up process. Coricelli and Jazbec
(2002, p. 135) argue that real appreciation of currencies observed in transition
countries can be interpreted as a “qualified” equilibrium process, because it is
only after 5-6 years into transition that the Balassa-Samuelson effect tends to
dominate the real exchange rate dynamics; but, based on evidence for Slovenia,
a de jure flexible nominal exchange rate is not an insurance for low inflation.
The literature identifies two further arguments against euroisation. The
lack of a lender of last resort may prevent the timely provision of extra credit in
case of a bank run. This problem seems surmountable (Calvo, 1999), insofar as
a stabilisation fund, or a contingent pool of resources, can be provided on a
standby arrangement by private banks. However, similar arrangements attempted
in the case of Argentina have not been particularly successful. In addition, a
country which opts for full euroisation will have to accept losing its seigniorage
revenue. Given the transition economies difficulties to raise revenue, this seems
to be a more relevant issue. The loss of seigniorage can be seen as the counterpart
for the benefits of stability and enhanced credibility accruing to the country
that adopts the euro.
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Euroisation or a CBA were advocated also for Serbia in late 2000,
especially given that  the euro was already in use in Montenegro and Kosovo
(Gros, 2001). In addition to the traditional arguments against hyper-fixed
exchange rates (Nuti, 2001, pp. 7-9), several other reasons led to the refusal of
euroisation (Popovic, 2000, pp.2-3). Throughout the 1990s, the country has
experienced continuous monetary instability, as all stabilisation programmes
had always failed. The loss of enormous amounts of citizens savings through
pyramid schemes and other channels had additionally contributed to the loss of
confidence in the national currency (see Dinkic, 1995, Chapters 3 and 4). An
arrangement more flexible than a CBA was necessary in Serbia, together with
the reaffirmation of the dinar as a national symbol (Dinkic, 1998, pp. 13-18).
Currency board
It could be argued that a CBA can better serve the purpose of an economy
than euroisation. A CBA should not be considered a second best, but a policy
choice to be preferred to the alternative (although there may be cases, as in
Kosovo, where for political reasons the choice between the two was not
available). However, the temporary nature of this option should be clear in the
minds of policy-makers from the outset.
A CBA presents most of the advantages of enhanced credibility and
reputation of  euroisation, especially if the commitment is perceived as being
sufficiently strong and if it is supported by an appropriate policy mix (arguably
the case for all exchange rate regimes). However, contrary to euroisation, a
CBA has the advantage of making an orderly exit strategy possible. Even in the
case, like e.g. in Estonia, in which modifications of constitutional laws are
necessary to change the way the CBA functions, it is still possible to envisage
that it can be discontinued once its sustainability is put into question by the
appearance of major economic disequilibria. Clearly, the willingness to
contemplate an orderly exit strategy should not be pre-announced, as it would
weaken the commitment and therefore would require a higher risk premium.
In B&H the CBA, together with the establishment of an independent
and reputed central bank, helped significantly the stabilisation process, if simply
judged in these terms. Shortly after its introduction, Warren Coats noted that
“The ultimate test of the CBA in B&H will consist of the extent to which the
public shifts over time from the DM … to the KM, which will shift the
seigniorage now earned abroad to the CBBH and lower the cost of transacting”
(Coats, 1998, p. 31). Currency substitution has undoubtedly taken place, as the
KM is widely accepted, is circulating in the country, and is even exchanged in
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neighbouring countries.
However, monetary stabilisation has not been paralleled by a revival of
economic growth. Decreasing growth rates, high unemployment and poverty
are still characteristic features of the Bosnian economy seven years after the
end of war. Exports and new investment are low, the current account deficit
very high. Somehow paradoxically, the lack of sustained response on the real
side has alleviated pressure on the CBA, which could endanger its sustainability.
In practice, the marked tendency to real appreciation deriving from fast
productivity growth in the tradable sector experienced in most transition
countries does not apply to B&H. The main parameters of current economic
policy are still determined by the CBA. There is still no unique institution in
charge of the fiscal deficit, though the Governing Board of the Indirect Tax
Authority could be considered its first embrion.
As in other transition economies with a CBA (Estonia, Bulgaria), the
choice of the euro as an anchor for the CBA also in B&H was the most
appropriate, insofar as it reflects the economic and trade relations of the country
and the composition of its external debt, as well as the degree of confidence of
the markets in the anchor currency.
(3) Flexible exchange rate regimes
The experience of Albania, Croatia, and Serbia seems prima facie to
militate in favour of a more flexible exchange rate regime since an early phase
of transition. In reality, however, the degree of freedom in such a choice is
much more limited if one looks at the way in which these supposedly flexible
arrangements have been working in practice.
Albania has de facto been pegging its currency, though officially it has
an independent float. Since the Bank of Albania calculates and announces the
daily exchange rates for major currencies, effectively the lek has been informally
pegged to the US$ (more recently, the euro).  In Croatia, the nominal exchange
rate of the kuna/euro has also been maintained relatively stable. Thus the lack
of competitiveness of Croatian exports has become a key problem (Bartlett,
2003, pp. 118-9).  Some have argued in favour of a devaluation to promote
development and stimulate exports; but as stressed by others, without
accompanying measures to control inflation, this would lead to higher prices
and wage costs, so the key is to cut public expenditure. In Serbia, although the
post-2000 regime is officially a managed float, it has also been referred to as a
“near-pegged exchange rate” (EBRD, 2002, p. 146) since for two years the
National Bank has kept nominal exchange rate stability vis-à-vis the euro. The
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main cost of such a policy, as stressed earlier, has been a substantial increase in
the trade deficit.
It follows that not even those countries that have rejected a fixed or hyper-
fixed option actually use the advantages of a more flexible exchange rate regime.
Policy objectives and actual outcomes have been so similar across WB countries,
that the variety in currency regimes has not really made a big difference.
5. Medium-term perspectives
Since in 1999-2000, the EU Stabilisation and Association Process has
offered WB countries prospects of EU membership, it is also of interest to
consider the medium-term perspectives related to EMU membership.
Although some WB countries have since then signed Stabilisation and
Association Agreements with the EU, obviously they will not be able to become
EU members for some time to come. Moreover, they will not be expected to
join the EMU immediately. As for other countries, in order to qualify for the
EMU, the WB countries will also need to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. Here it
is worth stressing that convergence is expected to be sustained, implying that
the institutional, legal and policy framework should be such as to guarantee the
fulfilment of the convergence criteria on a permanent basis. Still, in the same
way that the convergence criteria have not been the accession criteria for the
candidate countries, they will not be in the event of future EU enlargements.
This does not mean that the convergence criteria are of no significance
for potential future members. In due time, their participation in the euro area
will be judged on the basis of these criteria, as the Treaty makes no distinction
between initial and later participants in EMU. In this respect, the convergence
criteria should be viewed as medium-term points of reference for stability-
oriented macroeconomic policies, also in the WB.
It is by far premature, and also quite difficult, to evaluate the performance
of many Balkan countries with respect to the Maastricht criteria. In particular,
their fiscal position and long-term interest rates (when they exist) are not
comparable to the definitions adopted by the Treaty. Still, it is clear that a
premature and excessive focus of the policy mix on the fulfilment of the
Maastricht criteria could represent an excessive constraint for countries just
starting to implement deep structural transformation.
Particular cases in point are the regimes in areas which have already
euroised or have adopted a CBA. In the former case, the adoption of the euro as
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legal tender is obviously totally unrelated to the country’s ability to take part in
the definition of the eurozone’s monetary policy. As for the CBA, the choice
between its maintenance, or the introduction at some stage of an alternative
regime, should depend primarily on a careful assessment of the appropriateness
and sustainability of the currency board itself, more than its being aligned to
the acquis in the area of exchange rate policy.
6. Conclusions
The analysis of exchange rate regimes and policies in the WB permits
the following conclusions.
First, all WB countries seem to have very limited room for manoeuvre
in actual macroeconomic policies. Despite the variety of exchange rate regimes,
the actual policies applied have been strikingly similar, implying that the choice
of the currency regime has been far less important than would seem at first
sight. The success or the failure in terms of economic growth, increase in
employment, or fight against poverty, has been determined primarily by the
governments’ fiscal policy and implementation (or lack) of appropriate structural
policies. The conduct of monetary policy has, in any case, been heavily
constrained by the requirements of macroeconomic stabilisation, in almost all
cases codified in conditionality, negotiated and agreed with the IMF through
various assistance programmes. Even in countries which have opted for a more
flexible regime, the conduct of an active monetary policy has not been exploited.
The policy mix has remained restrictive and bears close similarities with policies
followed by countries under a more rigid regime, like a CBA.
Second, the choice of a fixed, or hyper-fixed regime, is not sufficient,
per se, to guarantee the resumption of sustained economic growth. The
commitment to a fixed or hyper-fixed exchange rate has helped reach a fair
degree of monetary stability, but economic recovery and growth depend crucially
on the design and coherent implementation of an appropriate policy mix, which
needs to foster inter alia substantial structural and institutional changes.
Third, as in other transition countries, also in the WB different exchange
rate regimes may better serve different phases of transition. At an early stage, a
fixed exchange rate can play a key role as the nominal anchor in the stabilisation
process. Later, it becomes necessary to introduce more flexibility to adjust for
the trend towards real appreciation. In this context, the stronger the exchange
rate commitment, the more costly and more difficult to exit and to make room
for such flexibility.
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Fourth, recommendations cannot be generalised. Solutions chosen by
governments need to take into account the specific conditions prevailing in
each country, as there is no one single model of foreign exchange rate policy in
transition. An unconditional support for a fixed or hyper-fixed regime at all
costs seems unwarranted. The case of Serbia supports this view very strongly;
past failed attempts to attain stabilisation through a hard peg have recommended
a more cautious approach in late 2000, so far with acceptable results.
Finally, it is still too early to focus the policy mix in the WB on the
fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria. Stability-oriented policies are clearly
essential, but considering that WB prospects of joining the EU are medium to
long-term, there is no need to impose excessive constrains on the policy mix at
a still relatively early stage of transition.
1
 Euroisation is clearly a neologism derived from the more widely used term dollarisation. Currency substitution
(or dollarisation/euroisation) refers to the holding of a significant share of cash and assets by residents
denominated in foreign currency.
2 A “hyper-fixed exchange rate” refers to the adoption of an irreversibly fixed exchange rate regime, sometimes
(e.g. in Estonia) requiring constitutional amendments to exit the regime. Such a regime can take the form of
a currency board and/or the adoption of  the euro as the sole legal tender.
3
 The source of all macroeconomic statistics reported throughout the paper are from EBRD (2002).
4
 Public expenditure is to a very large extent confined to wages and social transfers, with negligible capital
investment.
NOTES
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COMMENT
BY
DAVID ANDREWS
These chapters address a range of issues concerning the sources and
implications of Europe’s changing monetary configuration. To begin with,
Zimmermann provides an overview of the political debates that have
accompanied the evolution of Europe’s monetary affairs of the past half century,
and Fitzgerald supplements this analysis nicely with more focused attention to
the evolving positions of Ireland and the United Kingdom with respect to EMU.
Both papers provide useful insights into present political problems, with
Zimmermann attending more to the transatlantic dimension of these questions.
This might be a useful point of departure for my comments.
Zimmermann argues convincingly that EMU has consistently been
advocated as a means of increasing Europe’s global influence, and specifically
to reduce its reliance on the US.  Having achieved monetary union, he wonders
whether these goals will actually be realized.  He expresses concern that, absent
the participation of the UK, EMU lacks its full financial potential; and similarly
he wonders whether the euro-zone’s complicated governance arrangements will
permit Europe to punch its weight in global monetary negotiations.  To get at
these questions, he recommends attention to Susan Strange’s distinction between
structural and relational power.
I think that this indeed is a useful suggestion. Relational power refers to
the ability of actors (is this case governments, at least for the most part) to
persuade their counterparts to accept their point of view and to adapt their
policies accordingly. Structural power, on the other hand, tends to operate in
ways that are both indirect and, at least occasionally, even unintentional. By
shaping the environment in which others act, outcomes can reflect the interests
of the powerful without ever requiring their direct or conscious intervention.
To profit from Strange’s formulation we would therefore need to address
ourselves to the implications of the structural-relational distinction for a whole
range of issues related to monetary relations, including seignorage, differential
borrowing costs, and above all the distribution of adjustment costs.
These matters have, I think, far more important consequences for
international power than does the issue of currency valuation at any given
moment.  Changes in currency values do undoubtedly create winners and losers,
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but they do so at least as much within states (or, in the case of the euro, economic
zones) as they do between them. With an appreciating currency, like the euro in
recent months, consumers are benefited and exporters hurt, at least as a first
approximation; in the case of a depreciating currency, the opposite results can
be expected.  It is altogether unclear, however, what the consequences of these
developments are for interstate power relations; to evaluate this would require
taking into account a whole range of additional considerations.
This brings us to the Della Posta paper on the euro-USD exchange rate.
Exchange-rate forecasting, rather like weather forecasting, is an inexact science
even under the best of circumstances. With the introduction of the euro – a
currency without a history, without a fully transparent governance structure,
and corresponding to an economic area for which there was little pre-existing
composite data (and no functioning econometric model) – it is little wonder
that forecasters have run into heavy weather.  Given the failure of models based
on either economic fundamentals or anticipated portfolio adjustments to predict,
even broadly, movements in the euro-USD rate, Della Posta suggests attention
to psychological issues and specifically the “framing” of investor expectations.
This seems plausible, although probably better as an explanation of residuals
than as a leading indicator.
My larger point is that if the behaviour of exchange rates is complex and
sometimes mysterious, the analysis of international monetary power is
necessarily even more complex. Thus de Gaulle’s monetary offensive of the
1960s, described by Zimmermann, was not only unsuccessful, it was almost
certainly unwise. By that I mean it was undertaken without a correct
understanding of what its implications would have been had the United States
proved unable to resist France’s revolutionary tactics. After all, Washington
did ultimately threw in the towel with respect to a continuing defence of the
dollar’s gold parity just a few years later; but the result – the Nixon shocks of
1971 – was entirely at odds with what de Gaulle had hoped to achieve. Like the
economic forecasters described by Della Posta, de Gaulle had the wrong model
in mind.  Contrary to his analysis, it was not America’s desire to maintain an
overvalued currency (far from it!), nor was that overvaluation either the source
or even a manifestation of American strength. The dollar may well have
conferred an exorbitant privilege on the US, but the General failed to understand
what the nature of that privilege was.
Thus Zimmermann is doubtless correct to assert that the eurozone has
developed a considerable and growing reservoir of structural power, quite apart
from whether that influence is ever translated into effective relational power—
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that is, power at the bargaining table.  But this increased structural influence
for the most part assumes the form of “non-events” or, in the words of Sherlock
Holmes, dogs that fail to bark. What are those non-events? Certainly among
them must be listed the fact that a major swing in the euro-dollar exchange rate
has so far not resulted in any demonstrable pressures for European states to
engage in significant adjustment measures.
In times past, such a massive decline in the value of the dollar would
almost surely have resulted in extraordinary pressures on intra-European
exchange rates, and would probably have required Europe’s non-German states
to tighten policy significantly in order to maintain any semblance of parity
with the D-mark (which, as the dollar’s pre-EMU counterpole, would have
been the chief recipient of funds seeking to escape denomination in the American
currency). Nothing like that has occurred.  Instead, there have been tortuous
negotiations within the EU regarding the Stability and Growth Pact, and
especially its non-observance by Germany and France. These discussions are
significant, and are indicative of the governance problems raised by
Zimmermann. But it bears noting that these discussions are taking place in a
purely European context, with the participants insulated, to an unprecedented
degree, from the effects of a colossal shift in transatlantic currency values.
Regardless of EMU’s defects, and they are many, the single currency
has thus already achieved a major ambition of its founders. The problem is that
this fact is not widely recognized, and hence not widely appreciated.  Monetary
power is complex, and now Europe has a great deal more of it than it did
previously.  For the most part, though, Europeans have no more appreciation of
their enviable position than did Americans during the dollar’s heyday.
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A COMMENT
BY
JÜRGEN KRÖGER
Some challenges of integrating the accession countries into EMU
1. Introduction
The question of how soon the candidate countries should adopt the euro
mirrors the debate in the pre-history of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
between “Economists” and “Monetarists” about the degree of real (& structural)
convergence necessary for the construction of Monetary Union.  On the one
side there are the advocates of a rapid adoption (CESifo summer 2000, Daniel
Gros, CEPS), who give prominence to the (supposed) advantages of early EMU
entry and consider the possible (unfavourable) effects on the euro area negligible
– the main argument is that the accession countries have little economic weight
(less than ten percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the euro area).
On the other side are those who warn against illusions (CESifo summer
2001, Kröger/Redonnet). They argue that there is no simple path to monetary
integration: early entry into EMU would disguise the adjustments that are
needed, and the effect of failure would be too great a political and economic
risk, both for the monetary union and – above all – for the countries concerned
themselves. The financial crises in south-east Asia and Argentina, and the crisis
of the EMS in the early 1990s, clearly indicate the need for a cautious approach,
and demonstrate that the exchange rate as an instrument of economic policy
should not be given up too soon.
Although my contribution is mainly concerned with the implications of
an early EMU entry for the accession countries, it is often argued that EMU
itself – i.e. its credibility and attractiveness – would be rather unaffected by
EMU membership of other countries mainly because the small economic weight
of the accession countries. But even barring their likely greater voice within
the European Central Bank (ECB) compared to the GDP weight, the common
currency might still suffer from a reputational damage on foreign exchange
markets and on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), should the situation in some
even small countries deteriorate. This is in essence a moral hazard problem.
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At a highly aggregated level a national economy has three important
prices at its disposal: the prices of labour and capital as factors of production,
namely the (real) level of wages and the (real) interest rate, and the (real)
exchange rate, which determines an economy’s competitiveness in relation to
other national economies. Successful economies revalue, less successful ones
devalue. A real-economy catching-up process should be linked to a revaluation
of the currency relative to other countries. This interdependence of real exchange
rate flexibility and successful integration carries with it considerable dangers
for the accession countries if they were to adopt the euro too soon.
Giving up national monetary policy, including the exchange rate as an
instrument for adjustment, has serious consequences for other national economic
policy instruments too. Fiscal policy can no longer confine itself to pursuing
medium-term, allocative goals (investment in infrastructure), but would also
have to compensate for an inadequate monetary policy situation at the national
level. The one-size-fits-all problem is clearly much more serious for the
accession countries than for the current members of EMU, because a far smaller
degree of real convergence has been achieved.
Fixing the exchange rate would require a high degree of flexibility in
wage levels (if unemployment is not to increase) which does not exist in the
candidate countries. There is a serious danger of inflated wage expectations,
especially as the geographical proximity of high-wage (high-productivity)
countries increases the pressure for alignment. Any downward adjustment of
wage levels, however necessary, is highly unlikely.
Reducing the number of economic policy instruments will presumably
make the process of structural adjustment more difficult, since economic policy
should actively assist a real catching-up process. During the investment phase,
based on positive expectations, a relatively restrictive monetary policy should
prevent overheating. Fiscal policy should, on the one hand, give positive support
for the catching-up process in the form of infrastructure measures and, on the
other, cushion the social impact of rapid structural change. The resulting real
revaluation and current account deficit should be accepted because they
demonstrate high investment.
If high levels of investment now lead to high productive potential, the
resulting gap in demand must be filled. Monetary policy must become more
accommodating in this phase, in order to stimulate foreign demand in particular
(i.e. the nominal exchange rate must depreciate).  This would correct the real
overvaluation and reduce the current account deficit. Clearly, with fixed
exchange rates, an interest rate set from outside the country and a fiscal policy
General discussion by Jürgen Kröger
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aimed at strictly balancing the budget, the catching-up process will be diverted
down.
These considerations suggest that an assessment of the nature of the
current account deficit is essential. Here we see a difference of current account
deficits in a true monetary union where regional current account differences do
not matter and the EMU case where current account imbalances between
participating countries matter more. This might look puzzling because also in
EMU, the financing constraint is removed in principle.  However, a deficit
leads to growing external liabilities and debt service requirements or in other
words there will be a growing gap between output (GDP) and national income
Gross National Product (GNP) available for spending of domestic residents.
Therefore, an analytical distinction is necessary between a current account
deficit that reflects catching-up, FDI and high investment and one that would
reflect over-consumption and a lack of competitiveness. Countries may be
tempted to argue that a current account deficit is due to catch-up, ignoring
signals on structural problems.
2. Historical background
The process of integration in the European Union (EU), which ultimately
led to EMU, was conceived as a long-term process. It reflects forty years of
integration of the real economy, sectoral adjustment and the harmonisation of
institutional and economic policy targets. Only at a relatively late stage, in the
mid-1980s, was financial integration pushed forward by the internal and external
liberalisation of financial markets. In this respect, the Maastricht Treaty on
economic and monetary union is the conclusion of this process of integration.
It takes the integration of the real economy – the internal market – as a given
and builds on it. It starts from the assumption that all countries have liberalised
their capital movements and that their national financial systems are stable. It
lays down the nominal aims of economic policy that countries must follow if
they wish to participate in EMU, i.e. the convergence criteria, and introduces
co-ordination mechanisms, such as the stability pact, intended to prevent nations
from following a path which could harm the monetary union.
Meeting the nominal convergence criteria was the priority in the 1990s.
However, it still took seven years for a majority of the member countries to
achieve them. The emphasis on the nominal convergence criteria is a handicap
in weighing up the accession of the new member countries to EMU in the
sense that the other criteria – internal market, sound financial system – were
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peripheral to the economic policy debate, yet decisive in sustaining the
achievement of the nominal criteria. But reaching a high level of integration
was an implicit and fundamental precondition for participation in EMU.
The challenges for the accession countries are far greater than in previous
enlargements. They will join an economic area, which is much more integrated
than previously in the EU’s history, and they will do so much faster. It should
also be borne in mind that in earlier enlargements the acceding countries were
organised predominantly on market economy lines. This is not generally the
rule with today’s candidate countries.
The accession countries have committed themselves to comprehensive
internal and external liberalisation of their domestic capital markets. France
achieved this only in the mid-1980s; before then it also used the financial sector
as an instrument for steering economic policy. In the case of the candidate
countries, it is a problem that they do not yet have fully functioning national
financial markets and also that they are not fully integrated in global financial
markets. This could change with integration, and the role of the financial sector
will grow.
In the current environment, foreign banks would clearly benefit more
than existing domestic banks from the construction of a financially efficient
sector. Their expertise in banking, attractiveness for savers and their ability to
choose the most attractive borrowers puts the existing banks at a disadvantage,
especially when they are still facing a bad loan problem. A different question
in this context then is of how to get rid of these bad loans. Obviously, the
options of a proper sequencing of taking bad loans off the balance sheets is
very limited in view of the opening up of financial and capital markets.
3. Catching up and nominal convergence
Early adoption of the euro would require the countries in question to
adopt the Maastricht criteria as economic policy targets to work towards right
from today. However, this would clash with the goal of a rapid catching-up
process in their real economy.
A successful catching-up process, in other words an adjustment of real
productive capacity measured by per-capita income in the candidate countries,
would require rapid growth in productivity, particularly in industry. This would
bring a real revaluation in its wake, which could be brought about either by a
revaluation of the nominal rate of exchange or through a higher rate of inflation
with fixed exchange rates. But in EMU, the exchange rate would be fixed, and
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the result would indeed be a higher rate of inflation. In other words, a successful
catching-up process stands in contradiction to the simultaneous achievement
of a stable rate of exchange and a low rate of inflation.
In addition, there will be price level adjustment. This means that in some
sectors the inflation rate would be high. If monetary policy now wanted to
achieve an inflation rate of under two percent for the economy as a whole, it
would have to push the other sectors that are sensitive to monetary policy – a
small but important part of the national economy, organised on market economy
lines – into deflation. This would certainly not help the investment climate.
Some observers conclude from this that a looser interpretation of the
criteria – particularly the inflation criterion – would be appropriate for these
countries.  But this itself would jeopardise the catching-up process. A higher
inflation rate, which, where exchange rates are fixed, can be attributed to a
higher rate of productivity growth, would push real interest rates
disproportionately downwards and create serious economic management
problems for the national economy.
Given the unavailability of monetary policy (interest rates and the
exchange rates) and the obvious distortionary character of monetary conditions
– too low real interest rates – the burden on the policy-mix to address imbalances
would get strained. A very high degree of labour market (wage) flexibility and
the use of fiscal policy to stabilise private sector demand relative to supply
would be necessary.
Thus, there might be a second trade-off between the Maastricht goal of
sound public finances, defined as a balanced budget in economically normal
times, and pursuing a successful catching-up process. If a country has created
the conditions for rapid structural change, and, in real terms, is aiming for high
growth rates (e.g. around four percent per annum) while maintaining moderate
inflation (4%), nominal growth might be eight percent. This kind of structural
adjustment process should be accompanied not only by public structural
investment but also by social protection, since it is essential, for example, to
reduce the agricultural sector in many countries (such as Poland). Otherwise
there would be a social backlash which, in turn, would have a negative effect
on the real adjustment process.
4. Supposed advantages of early entry
Generally, two advantages of early entry are mentioned. First of all, it is
argued the country would import the low interest rates of the euro area through
322
the credible fixing of the exchange rate and thus reduce the risk premium for
capital imports. The lower interest would then encourage investment and
consequently accelerate the catching-up process. Of course, the argument to
anchor expectations and to reduce uncertainty and risk premia has its merits,
up to some point.
However, if the conditions for a successful catching-up process exist,
then the expected real rate of return on investments should be high. Investors
would invest in spite of high (real) interest rates. An artificial reduction in the
interest rate, on the other hand, would, at a microeconomic level, lead to a
misallocation of capital. Investment would not be made where expected returns
were highest, for example in manufacturing, but where the supposed risk was
most limited, such as buying and building houses or financing of consumer
durable.  Since the interest rate would in nominal terms be pushed down to that
of the euro area, but would in real terms lie far below, there would be serious
distortions in behaviour at a microeconomic level. Too many investment plans
would be profitable, too much consumer spending would be brought forward.
The financial markets, being completely liberalised, would not be in a position
to help allocate capital efficiently.
The macroeconomic effects are clear. The national economy would
overheat, wages would rise faster than productivity, and this would boost
consumer spending. Inflation would rise and would lead to a further drop in
real interest rates in the currency union. Both developments would increase the
number of wrong microeconomic decisions, since real interest rates would
continue to be negative and revenue expectations would be too high. Overall it
would be an unstable process, which of course is also a serious challenge in the
euro area today.
In time, the country would become less competitive as it overheated;
one indicator would be a growing current account deficit, no longer accounted
for by investment. Declining exports, investment without profits, rising
unemployment and pressure on government budgets would ensue. Bad loan
problems in the banking sector would then make it clear where things had gone
wrong, generally too late for a correction, as the case of Argentina has shown.
There could then be a credit crunch, since the banks – foreign banks – would
react much more quickly to the growing risk than they would if a domestic
banking system could be propped up by the national central bank acting as
lender of last resort.
It would then be necessary to rebuild competitiveness, but within
monetary union this would be very difficult and costly because it would mean
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undershooting the inflation rate. Nominal wage cuts deflation and then, in this
phase, very high real interest rates would be too much to ask for the country –
economically, politically and socially. The way out could be a bail-out by the
EU, with high political costs in terms of the country’s independence.
5. Conclusion: a step-by-step accession scenario
The Treaty lays down a clear path to accession for the candidate countries.
They will join the EU as countries with a “derogation” from the adoption of the
euro. This status is preserved in the accession treaties. The new member countries
must regard their exchange rate policy as “a matter of common concern”, and
it is expected that they will join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II.
Accession to EMU presupposes that the convergence criteria are fulfilled, and
sustainably so. The Treaty presupposes that these countries can withstand the
competitive pressure of the internal market; this can also be seen as an element
of sustainable fulfilment of the nominal convergence criteria. This path precludes
the possibility of the euro being introduced directly upon accession to the EU.
It should also have become clear that a strengthened real and structural
convergence should have priority over a complete nominal convergence.
Furthermore, the Maastricht criteria are supposed to be applied to comparable
economies, which in this case means that the countries in question are
competitive in the internal market. Any transitional rules with a macroeconomic
impact – for example in capital movements, or important sectoral exceptions –
should have some bearing on an assessment of nominal convergence. Therefore,
no new convergence criteria are necessary.
Membership of ERM II offers the accession countries enough flexibility
to accommodate a variety of exchange rate policies, although not all are
compatible with an eventual euro adoption e.g. fully flexible exchange rate
system. Indeed, the Treaty requires that exchange rate policy is a matter of
common concern. Nevertheless, in principle, a “currency board” could even be
kept until the eventual introduction of the euro, albeit only as a unilateral
obligation of the country in question and not under the responsibility of the
ECB. However, any country that joins the ERM II would have to accept that
the decision on the central exchange rate with the euro is a decision for all
those involved.
To sum up, it should be borne in mind that there is no simple path to
integration of the real economy. Too early an adoption of the euro would
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dramatically restrict the policy options. Although there is no doubt that an
independent monetary and exchange rate policy is not easy, the dangers of
joining the euro area too early for the country in question are serious.
General discussion by Jürgen Kröger
325
THE ROLE OF STANDARDS AND LEGAL TENDER IN EMU
THE ROLE OF STANDARDS AND LEGAL TENDER IN EMU
326
327
THE ROLE OF STANDARDS AND LEGAL TENDER IN EMU
CHAPTER 14
THE ROLE OF STANDARDS IN GOVERNING FINANCIAL MARKETS’
STABILITY:
A GLANCE THROUGHOUT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND EMU
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
BY
MARIA CHIARA MALAGUTI
Abstract: The use of standards in governing financial stability represents a
specific instrument of governance deserving careful legal analysis, as standards
are not compulsory but represent a typical example of soft law. In addition,
they are elaborated through long negotiations between government
representatives, central banks, independent supervisory authorities, the market
and possibly relevant international organizations, such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Within the European Community,
the European Central Bank (ECB) has produced standards as preconditions for
securities settlement systems to be used for central bank credit operations, that
present the same features as international standards, also in terms of their
assessment. In addition, following the recommendation and within the
institutional and legal framework proposed by the Lamfalussy Report, the
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was recently established,
also in charge of elaboration of standards not only for coordination of practices
between regulatory authorities but also to implement Community measures. It
is frequently believed that the described qualities of standards limit their
efficiency. This article tries to prove that on the opposite these may be considered
as expressions of a “new legal order” based on persuasion rather than prescription
and on mutual cooperation to reach commonly agreed objectives
Keywords: Financial markets’ stability, international cooperation, standards,
soft law, Community acts, ECB Standards, Lamfalussy Report, Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR)
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1. International cooperation and financial markets’ stability
1.1. Regulators and oversight
Scope and nature of international monetary and financial cooperation
have changed significantly over the last two decades in response to new policy
challenges, due in particular to rapidly increasing cross-border private capital
flows and the emergence of new economies participating in the globalisation
process. As a result, international cooperation has mainly shifted from a
predominant focus on exchange rate matters to the design of optimal policy
frameworks to foster global financial stability. The ultimate objective shall be
to prevent currency, external debt and banking crises by reaching a consensus
on best practices in policy formulation and improving the transparency and
accountability of policy making, and this mainly by increasingly relying on a
set of internationally agreed standards and codes.1
This is also the inherent consequence of the shift from the traditional
tools employed by central banks to conduct monetary policy to a wider range
of measures, nowadays commonly employed to implement monetary policy
and ensure financial stability. In particular, cooperation to foster global financial
stability is centered in oversight, i.e. the monitoring of systems, arrangements
and financial instruments mainly to prevent systemic risk:2 if the primary task
of central banking is the “protection of money”, this should include not only
the conduct of monetary policy but also the protection of the overall stability of
the economic system. As commonly known, central banks have traditionally
pursued this goal by means of direct control over money production and
circulation, as well as by supervising the banking system.3 This second role is
more widely geared towards the preemptive control of the well-being of the
financial system by way of control over individual operators. Oversight is
connected and interferes with both supervision and monetary policy functions,
as aimed at the inherent stability of the financial system and consequently at
the “protection of money” (as a “macro-concept”) by means of control over
“systems” acting within financial markets somehow mirroring supervision
(“micro-context”).4 Yet, oversight implies a series of different considerations:
in the first place, in addiction to the fact that oversight addresses any
circumstances which might infer systemic risk (systems, arrangements,
instruments) rather than soundness of individual operators as an insulated
phenomenon, it is usually operated by means of a combination of suasion and
regulatory pressure.5 In the second place, this function is often shared between
central banks and financial authorities, being the former usually competent for
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the stability of the banking sector and of the financial markets as far as this
latter interferes with monetary stability, and the latter usually competent for
stability of the financial markets as such. Finally, oversight often involves an
active role of the market itself in both the production of rules, their
implementation and their control.
1.2. From the “international monetary system” to the “international financial
system”?
The above considerations bear an influence in primis in international
law. More specifically, while it seems undisputed that a set of rules of
international origin exist in relation to monetary matters, in relation to what is
usually referred to as “the international monetary system”, no binding regime
exists for financial markets’ stability as such. Yet, a number of G7 Reports
clearly indicate States commitment to cooperate in the matter,6 to the point that
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was established in 1999 to play as catalyst
of various instances.7  According to such Reports, also endorsed by the G10
and by international financial institutions, cooperation relates to various policy
matters for both the prevention and the management of financial crises and
simultaneously involves, although to different extents, the national public sector,
international financial institutions and the market itself.8
One of the main instruments of cooperation to prevent financial crisis is
the implementation of common standards elaborated by international
committees, alternatively or simultaneously formed by government
representatives and/or national independent authorities, and the market.9  As it
is known, central banks of the G10 have constituted a series of committees and
working groups specifically devoted to stability matters. Already in 1974 the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was established, composed
by around thirty working groups and task forces of central bankers and
representatives of national supervisory authorities, and directly responding to
the Governors of G10. This Committee is aimed at harmonizing prudential
supervision by means of standards and recommendations directly approved by
the G10 Governors. More recently, the Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems (CPSS) and the Committee on the Global Financial Systems (CGFS)
were also established, the one focusing in particular on netting and settlement
procedures (including oversight on systems), the other more generally on policy
guidelines to strengthen financial markets structure. In parallel, Committees
were established among supervisory authorities of both securities and insurance
sectors, such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions
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(IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).
CPSS and IOSCO also work jointly on recommendations for securities
settlement systems. Finally, “mixed groups” (i.e. groups formed by
representatives of the public sector and of the market) have been established,
equally aiming at the drafting of standards and recommendations, such as the
G30.10
A number of these standards have been identified by the FSF as “key
standards”, meaning standards which play a relevant role in the promotion of
financial markets stability and whose implementation is highly recommended
at international level.11 Indeed, the IMF and the World Bank have recently started
to assess the well-being of countries also on the basis of the implementation of
such standards.12 Assessment is also operated by the European Central Bank
(ECB) for its own standards as user of specific systems - as it will be discussed
below -, and national authorities do the same in the field of their competence.
Mechanisms of self-assessment are operated by operators or associations of
operators. The whole of these factors can take to the conclusion that a body of
principles is gradually shaping a framework for a “international financial
system”, presenting specific features in particular in terms of tools for
governance. The Community regulatory framework on this field is generally
consistent with these features.
1.3. Role of standards and their legal qualities
Standards are a typical tool of governance, especially employed by
independent authorities, used to combine regulation, negotiation of rules with
the addresses and moral suasion.13 Although representing “new means of
governance”, standards-setting and their consequent assessment do not
necessarily amount to soft law: in our field, once elaborated by an international
committee the standard can be implemented by national legislation or regulation,
i.e., by a binding instrument usually combined with an express sanction, and
reach such a level of detail to strictly impose a specific behavior. Yet, in the
majority of cases standards only play as benchmarks, that is to say as goals to
be reached by means of behaviors to be adjusted according to the circumstances,
or as guidelines which authorities and the market itself directly apply in the
specific situation, without being filtered by any national legislation or regulation.
In fact, it is not possible to strictly insert standards as elaborated in the
mentioned international committees in clear-cut categories or simply reach
general conclusions as per their legal qualities. To start with, the way these
have been qualified by their own drafters cannot help: some are called
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“recommendations”,14 some “principles” (“principles”,15 “core principles”,16
“objectives and principles”17), some “guidelines»18 and some “standards”,19
without however these representing different kinds of measures.20
Nor additional help is given by the analysis of their specific content or
drafting techniques: if objectives and principles seem to only state the results
to be obtained without usually imposing the means to reach such results, while
standards more specifically identify behaviors to be taken, recommendations
indifferently refer to measures whose main quality seems indeed only to be
their non-binding value. Yet, if a difference can be drawn between
recommendations on the one side and principles and standards on the other,
this might rely in the fact that the former individually address either States,
national authorities or operators, while the latter more generally refer to anyone
who could find itself in the position to implement them, according to the specific
situation.21
Indeed, the only element which seems to qualify these instruments
independently of their name is their opposition to binding and stringent
measures: the final goal of said measures is to provide minimum standards to
which States, national authorities, actors in the market must try to conform
according to their specific circumstances and roles. The common objective
seems to be to permit a gradual progress to raise the level of compliance of
commonly agreed principles permitting a step-by-step process in which
responsibility of the action is transferred on the addressee, who is the real
producer of the “rule” when it applies the commonly agreed standard to the
specific case and circumstances. The sole classification of standards that might
bear a role in this context is probably between standards elaborated by a specific
association for their members (these being States, national authorities or market
operators, according to the case) and standards produced to influence the entire
structure of the market. In this second case the standard acquires a general
value of common understanding of the community as such which justifies its
implementation by each member of such community for the sole fact of its
being part to it.
The fact that standards are the result of a common agreement is in the
first place due to a continuous negotiation with all parties involved. All of the
mentioned standards are drafted by working groups that permanently present
their preliminary results to the general public, and re-draft them in accordance
with such consultations. This emerges also from the language of said standards,
always meant to reflect the common understanding underlying them. Indeed,
sometimes these expressly report of being nothing but the formulation of a
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principle already generally accepted by the community: although this can also
be the result of a rhetorical exercise, more often it represents the true, or at
least a specification of a common understanding.
The fact that standards are based on persuasion rather than prescription
also emerges from the wide use of explanatory notes, where the scope and in
particular the reasons for the specific measure are clarified. This reinforces the
conclusion that standards are specifically meant to provide the addressee with
all necessary information to implement the standard, so “producing” itself the
“rule” on the basis of its understanding of its rationale. This is also reinforced
by the provision of methodologies for assessment, frequently based on self-
assessment: self-assessment confirms not only that standards in principle shift
the responsibility of implementation on the addressee, but also that it is the
addressee that indeed produces the “rule” by testing the reasonableness of the
principle in the specific case and adapting it to the case. In fact, self-assessment
might lead not only to recognition of non-conformity by the addressee, but
also to unreasonableness and need for adaptation of the standard itself.
This also emerges from authorities’ regular practice when performing
their duty to assess standards. Irrespective of the provision of a “sanction” for
non-respect of the standards, it seems that the primary objective of the authority
– especially if considered in its long-term assessment activities – is to take the
operator to apply the standard by lengthy negotiating its implementation on the
basis of the specific circumstances. In the general context of assessment of
standards, the process of negotiating a solution seems more relevant than the
actual sanction eventually inferred.
2. Standards for financial markets’ stability within the EMU
2.1. Role of the ECB Standards
On January 1998, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) issued a set of
Standards for the use of EU securities settlement systems in ESCB credit
operations as preconditions for securities settlement systems (SSSs) to be used
for central bank credit operations. According to Article 18 of the Statute of the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central Bank
(Statute), “the ECB and the national central banks may (…) conduct credit
operations with credit institutions and other market participants, with lending
being based on adequate collateral”. Within this framework, a broad list of
eligible assets for collateralizing central bank operations has been defined and
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the mentioned standards have been drafted, against which SSSs involved in the
ESCB credit operations are regularly assessed.22
These standards have been issued by the ECB [European Monetary
Institute (EMI)] as “user” of systems and not in its oversight capacity.23 In fact,
the debate is still ongoing whether according to the Treaty and the Statute, the
ECB has oversight over SSSs. The analysis of this issue (indeed, of utmost
relevance in the debate of ESCB24 competence and subsequent allocation of
powers within the ESCB between the ECB and National Central Banks (NCBs)
in the regulation of the financial markets) is outside the scope of this contribution.
Yet, some brief considerations need to be exposed for the sake of the reasoning
on ECB Standards: although it is undisputed that these are “user standards”, it
is not possible to automatically exclude any “regulatory” inference solely on
the basis of their language (or of that of the Explanatory Report).25  In the
introductory section of the Report devoted to policy objectives, it is clearly
stated that the objectives of the ECB and the NCBs are threefold, including: (i)
the efficient and safe execution of central bank credit operations, (ii) the smooth
functioning of payment systems and the stability of the financial sector, and
(iii) the smooth functioning of the Single Market.26 In addition, it is clearly
stated that in lack of commonly agreed international standards it is necessary
to refer to specific user requirements for ESCB credit operations,27 thus taking
the reader to the reasonable conclusion that if such standards had been available,
the ECB would most probably not have been in the need for drafting specific
standards for its own credit operations. Finally, it is clearly stated that ECB and
NCBs (some of which are indeed entrusted with the task of the oversight of
SSSs) intend to further elaborate on such standards in order to ensure that there
is an adequate framework for the oversight of SSSs.28
On the other hand, also leaving unprejudiced the above question, it cannot
be denied that these have factually arose in the course of the years to benchmarks
going far beyond the protection of ESCB specific risks, up to a more general
protection of the financial markets as such.29 In addition, the recently started
cooperation between the ECB and NCBs on the one side, and CESR on the
other – as will be discussed below – to elaborate common European standards
for securities clearing and settlement systems leaves the question open whether
once these shall become effective the ECB will withdraw its own standards.
In any event, what is most relevant to the present analysis is that the
ECB assessment of said standards, is characterized by the same features as
other international standards: although the Report concludes with the statement
that all standards (but one) must be fulfilled by the start of Stage Three of
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EMU, and that to the extent that SSSs are not able to implement the standards,
they will not be used by the ESCB, this also contemplates as sufficient to satisfy
the assessment criteria, that SSSs have taken the necessary steps to meet said
standards within a reasonable time-frame, and that when necessary and in
coordination with the EMI/ECB and the NCBs, SSSs will define a development
plan to meet the standards and a timetable for its implementation. Under the
latter circumstances, with the agreement of the ESCB, the NCB of the country
where the SSS is located, instead of not using it for ESCB operations, may opt
for agreeing a development plan with the SSS with a defined timetable for
meeting the standards and using the SSS, possibly on a limited basis and on
condition that adequate measures against risk are adopted. Indeed, looking at
ECB behavior in assessing SSSs against these standards in the course of the
years, it can be concluded that the ECB has never excluded a SSS from its
credit operation; on the opposite, long negotiations have been undertaken to
find commonly agreed solutions between the ECB and NCBs on the one side,
and the relevant SSS on the other. This has always taken to flexible solutions,
specifically construed to adapt to the specific circumstances, being the
production of the relevant “rule” a long-lasting and gradual process of continuous
adaptation.
2.2. Lamfalussy Report and the role of CESR
The use of standards in EMU economic governance is not the sole
prerogative of the ECB. Indeed, a number of standards have been elaborated
by the recently established Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR), which takes the place of the previous Forum of European Securities
Commissions (FESCO).
CESR was established by EC Decision30 following the recommendation
of the Lamfalussy Report31 as endorsed by the European Council at its
Stockholm conference.32  According to the European Council Recommendation,
CESR’s tasks are twofold: this should serve as an independent body for advice
to the Commission, and contribute to the consistent and timely implementation
of Community legislation in the Member States by securing more effective
cooperation between national supervisory authorities, carrying out peer reviews
and promoting best practice.33 Although the Commission Decision establishing
the Committee only provides for its institutional role to advise the Commission,
either at the Commission request or on the Committee’s own initiative, in
particular for the preparation of draft implementing measures in the field of
securities (Article 2),34 CESR recognizes as its tasks a wider range of actions,
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including to (i) improve coordination among European securities regulators,
(ii) act as an advisory group to assist the European Commission, (iii) work to
ensure more consistent and timely day to day implementation of Community
legislation in the Member States.35
Of particular interest is that CESR Charter provides that “the Committee
will foster and review common and uniform day to day implementation and
application of Community legislation. It will issue guidelines, recommendations
and standards that the members will introduce in their regulatory practice on a
voluntary basis” (Article 4.3). This additional task relating to implementation
of Community legislation, further to that of advising the Commission, is
inherently linked to CESR role in coordinating European securities regulators’
oversight activities. Indeed, the Stockholm Recommendation seems to compact
these two tasks when stating that CESR should “contribute to the consistent
and timely implementation of Community legislation in the Member States by
securing more effective cooperation between national supervisory authorities”.
In the same line, CESR Charter combines oversight activities and the
implementation of a common conceptual framework of principles for the
regulation of European financial markets.36
This seems to be the exact implementation of what was recommended
in the Lamfalussy Report, founding regulatory reform – as well known – on a
four-levels legislative structure: whilst “level 1-measures”, consisting in EC
regulations or directives, should only contain framework and implementing
principles, it is for “level 2-measures”, i.e., Commission measures only adopted
after consultation with the European Securities Committee and advice of CESR
(where CESR is expected to prepare measures in consultation with market
participants, end-users and consumers), to provide for implementing details.37
In addition, “level 3-measures” have the scope of strengthening cooperation by
way of consistent guidelines for administrative regulations, joint interpretative
recommendations and common standards.38 In particular, CERS is expected to
work on joint interpretation recommendations, consistent guidelines and
common standards in areas not covered by EU legislation, peer review and
compare regulatory practice to ensure consistent implementation and
application.39 As stated by the Lamfalussy Report, “the outcome of this work
would be non-binding although clearly it would carry considerable authority”
(p. 38).40
Both these functions are thus carried out by means of standards: while
the use of such measures in oversight can be reconnected to the above general
discussion on tools for governance, here a new element emerge. Standards
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seem now to be recognized as also being a viable instrument to ensure both
implementation of EC legislation where this exists, and harmonization in
domains where this does not.
2.3. Place of standards in the framework of Community acts
One of the main open issues on ECB competences and decision-making
relies on legal instruments at its disposal. Briefly, these are usually divided into
two categories: ECB legislation intended to produce external effects, and ECB
legislation intended to produce legal effects among the component parts of the
ESCB.41 As per Article 110.1 of the Treaty and Article 34.1 of the Statute, the
first (and general) category includes regulations, decisions, recommendations,
and opinions. Articles 12.1 and 14.3 of the Statute provide for two further legal
instruments, which can be used to primarily address the legal relationships
inside the system, qualified as “guidelines” and “instructions”. Yet, standards
cannot be included in any of such acts,42 with probably the only exception of
standards being included in ECB guidelines (possibly instructions?) addressed
to NCBs: in case for instance of common standards on regulation by national
central banks (in sectors of their competence within EMU), these could be
inserted in guidelines pursuant to Article 12.1 of the Statute, addressed to
national central banks and implemented by means of administrative measures.43
However, this would simply be a case in which standards or codes are
incorporated into a specific binding act and consequently transformed in their
legal nature. Indeed, this would not conceptually differ from the mentioned
case in which standards or codes are incorporated into a binding national legal
instrument, transforming such instrument from a soft law measure into a binding
national law or regulation. In addition, it cannot be forgotten that ECB guidelines
and instructions are specific legal instruments (new to the general Community
legislative framework) particularly designed to cope with the special features
of the ESCB and consequently functional to its structure and organization (its
peculiarities), while standards as are intended in this paper include a very fluid
category of instruments potentially addressed to all subjects involved in or
affecting in some way the market, thus eventually pertaining more to the category
of acts “intended to produce legal effects outside the ESCB”, if this distinction
makes any sense in relation to this kind of instruments.44
In the field of markets stability, these considerations need also to be
confronted with Article 22 of the Statute, reading that the ESCB “may provide
facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound
clearing and payment systems within the Community and with other countries”.
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The ECB competence under this Article to take legislative measures is highly
controversial as per its scope (both ratione personae and ratione materiae),
this in particular being one the main fields of discussion in the above mentioned
debate on the competence of ECB/ESCB in oversight of SSSs. According to
some scholars, ECB competence to issue regulations under Article 22 would
inter alia be limited in scope ratione personae, to only include payment systems
and consequently exclude securities systems. This on the basis of the letter of
Article 22, which with “clearing and payment systems” would not make
reference to SSSs.45  The theories refusing competence to the ECB in this field
reconnect the elaboration of ECB standards to Article 18 of the Statute, so
confirming the view of the ECB acting in its “user” capacity.
Yet, once again leaving aside considerations on oversight of SSSs, it
should be commonly agreed that in those cases in which ESCB/ECB have
regulatory competence, these can act also by means of standards-setting,
although these are not expressly included in the Treaty or in the Statute. The
ECB will thus use a regulation when it believes that a binding measure is more
appropriate under the circumstances, but this would not be preclusive of power
to issue standards, as a governance tool commonly recognized as legitimate on
the basis of practice. Indeed, in June 2000 the ECB Governing Council adopted
a “Statement on the role of the Eurosystem in the field of payment systems
oversight” where it stated that “the enforcement of the common oversight policy
stance can be ensured by ECB regulations – in accordance with Article 22 of
the Statute – or guidelines. Where applicable, enforcement can be effected by
legal instruments available to an NCB. More traditional, informal tools (e.g.
moral suasion) can also be used” (p 3).46
On the other hand, it should not be underestimated that CESR and the
ESCB have initiated cooperation to draft common standards for securities
clearing and settlement systems in the European Union.47 The nineteen standards
which are currently under study are based on the CPSS/IOSCO
recommendations for securities settlement systems of November 2001 and
follow the same regulatory paths. ESCB thus concretely participate into
standards-setting under the same circumstances as CESR and in this respect
the two bodies could be considered in parallel.
Incidentally, it should however be noted that the Committee of Wise
Men, while publishing the Lamfalussy Report, indicated its intention to revise
and reconsider its four-levels scheme in 2004 in the light of both the
Intergovernmental Conference announced in Nice, and the evolution of market
conditions. The Committee will indeed have to reconsider the whole of the
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framework in the light of the new rules of the Convention, assuming that they
will stay as currently stated in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe of July 2003,48 on the legal acts of the Union (Articles 32-37),
contemplating inter alia legislative and non-legislative acts (Article 32), and
delegated regulations to the one end (Article 35) and implementing acts (both
regulations and directives as redefined) to the other end (Article 36). In this
context, the ECB’s competence to issue European [instead of ECB] regulations
and decisions, as well as recommendations (Article 34) seems confirmed. It
would also seem that the ESCB Statute will not be substantially amended.49 As
a consequence, the ECB legislative powers should not be modified in their
essence. Yet, the new institutional and legal framework could take to reconsider
the whole general legal context in which these matters are dealt with.
3. As a conclusion: what role for standards?
It is frequently believed that the described qualities of standards, making
these a instrument of soft law, limit their efficiency. Yet, relying on the
background which has been described in the previous pages, it seems possible
to introduce a new line of thinking: it could be argued that these are expression
of a “new legal order” based on persuasion rather than prescription. Indeed,
although the international and the Community’ orders should of course be subject
to autonomous legal analysis, in the specific case of standards-setting, where
both the ECB and CESR directly rely on international standards and – more
relevant – on regulatory competences and tools of governance being the heritage
of a long tradition common to central banking and financial markets regulation
nowadays more and more depending on internationally agreed parameters, these
could be the basis for a general discussion on the role and relevance of this
instrument as expression of a possible different scheme of governance.
This would be mainly founded on persuasion rather than prescription,
and on mutual cooperation to reach commonly agreed objectives rather than
authoritative relationships. Those who are the addressees of measures (meaning
any public or private party resulting interested in the process in a specific
situation) are at the same time also participating into the process of formulating
the general rules founding this common exercise, not only by possibly
participating into the negotiations leading to specific standards, but also by
reporting on inconsistencies or unreasonableness from self-assessment or
negotiating the means of their implementation in each specific case. Severe
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sanction in case of lack of cooperation shall indeed be the lost of trust in the
party, ultimately leading to its exclusion from the community as a whole.
Governance so proceeds by a continuous flow of adaptations towards a shared
solution based on common trust, where the authoritative scheme which usually
founds legal instruments under current legal theory is substituted by an
“isonomic” scheme, i.e., the elaboration of legal rules by the community at
large by means of continuous readjustment of the rule according to the
reasonableness of its implementation in the specific case.
This of course does not mean to ignore that the authorities themselves
often go into a different direction, opting for stricter enforcement measures.
The latest expression of this is CESR Press Release of 7 October 2003, where
it is declared that CESR’s members consider insufficient to adopt an
internationally recognized set of accounting standards without robust and
consistent enforcement.50 Yet, this does not seem inconsistent with what has
been proposed as a new reading of these measures. In fact, what CESR seems
to propose is to better coordinate enforcement procedures and multilaterally
discuss decisions and experiences of enforcement agencies, without proposing
any compulsory system of sanctions. On the contrary, this exchange of reciprocal
experiences favors the creation of a common humus for circulation of common
understandings and the production of rules exactly based on specific decisions
adopted under the circumstances (the “rule” being produced by the
implementation itself, not by a general and authoritative a priori production of
such rule), where each following decision shall have to confront with past
decisions of other authorities also placed under different legal systems.51
1
 For more accurate policy considerations, see ECB, Recent developments in international co-operation, in
Monthly Bulletin, February 2002, p. 53.
2
 “Oversight of payment systems: a central bank task, principally intended to promote the smooth functioning
of payment systems and to protect the financial system from possible ‘domino effects’ which may occur
when one or more participants in the payment system incur credit or liquidity problems. Payment systems
oversight aims at a given system (e.g. a funds transfer system) rather than individual participants”: BIS
Glossary.
3
 “Supervision of financial institutions: the assessment and enforcement of compliance by financial institutions
with laws, regulations or other rules intended to ensure that they operate in a safe and sound manner and that
they hold capital and reserves sufficient to support the risks that arise in their business”: BIS Glossary.
4
 “The oversight of payment systems, which is an essential function for modern central banks, aims at
ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems. Central banks are concerned about the smooth
functioning of payment systems for a number of reasons. First, central banks aim to maintain systemic
stability in payment systems, by containing the exposure to systemic risk. (...) Indeed, a major malfunctioning
of payment systems could, under certain circumstances, undermine the stability of financial institutions and
NOTES
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markets. (...) Second, central banks are concerned with the efficiency of payment systems, which is a
complementary objective to systemic stability. Third, they are concerned with the security of the payment
instruments used by the public. The latter functions are material both to the confidence of the users of the
payment systems and of the users of the payment instruments and, ultimately, to the maintenance of the
public confidence in the currency. Fourth, since payment systems are an essential vehicle for the
implementation of monetary policy, oversight is aimed at safeguarding the transmission channel for monetary
policy. It follows that the oversight of payment systems is an essential function of central banks ... which is
directly linked to their core functions, i.e. the definition and implementation of monetary policy to ensure
price stability and their interest in the stability of the financial system, in the soundness of the currency and
in the public’s confidence in the currency”, ECB, Role of the Eurosystem in the field of payment systems
oversight, (2000).
5
 “Oversight [of payments] ... is different from banking supervision. Banking supervision involves monitoring
individual banks/financial institutions with a view to ensuring their financial stability. It focuses on individual
participants in a payment system, aims at primarily protecting depositors/bank customers, and is based on an
extensive regulatory framework. Payment systems oversight, on the other hand, concerns systems,
arrangements and instruments. Based on a combination of moral suasion and regulatory pressure, its primary
objective is to protect the functioning of the system by examining their design and operation”, ECB, The
Role of the Eurosystem in payment and clearing systems, (2002).
6
 In the Heads of States Conclusions of the Halifax Summit of 1995 it was already stated that “close consultation
and effective cooperation on macroeconomic policies among the G7 are important elements in promoting
sustained non-inflationary growth avoiding the emergence of large external imbalances, and promoting greater
exchange market stability. (13) [...] We have a shared interest in ensuring the international community remains
able to manage the risks inherent in the growth of private capital flows, the increased integration of domestic
capital markets, and the accelerating pace of financial innovation. (14) [...] Closer international cooperation
in the regulation and supervision of financial institutions and markets is essential to safeguard the financial
system and prevent an erosion of prudential standards (22)”.
7
 This was established in the Bonn G7 Conference of 20 February 1999 following a recommendation of the
Tietmeyer Group; Tietmeyer, (1999).
8
 “In this increasingly integrated global economy, in which policy responsibility still lies mainly with sovereign
states, the challenge is to promote global financial stability through national action as well as through enhanced
international cooperation. All countries, together with the international financial institutions and private
sector financial institutions, must share this responsibility (5). This does not require new international
organisations. It requires that all countries assume their responsibility for global stability by pursuing sound
macroeconomic and sustainable exchange rate policies and establishing strong and resilient financial systems.
It requires the adoption and implementation of internationally-agreed standards and rules in these and other
areas. It requires the existing institutions to adapt their roles to meet the demands of today’s global financial
system: in particular to put in place effective mechanisms for devising standards, monitoring their
implementation and making public the results [...]. It also requires the right structure of incentives for all
participants in the international financial system, for national authorities as well as the private sector (6)”,
Heads of States Conclusions in the Halifax Summit, supra.
9
 “Over the past three years the international community has attached increasing importance to the work on
standards and codes as a crucial element of crisis prevention. The interest in standards is not new: for many
years standards have provided a context for discussions between national authorities and the Bank and IMF
staff on specific policy and reform objectives, particularly in technical assistance (TA) activities. However,
what is new – sparked by the crises in emerging market countries in the mid-1990s- is the realization that
standards can serve as a framework to strengthen the functioning of markets and better focus policy discussions.
There is now recognition that the rigor, context, and focus that have been added to the work on standards is
essential to the crisis prevention efforts of the international community and the IMF, as well as efforts to
better inform markets and assist the authorities’ objectives for capacity building”, IMF and World Bank,
Assessing the Implementation of Standards: A Review of Experience and Next Steps, (2001).
10
 As it will be discussed, at European level the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) was
established, now transformed into the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), which also
bears the role of consultative committee of the European Commission.
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11
 See more: FSF, (2001).
12
 “Since the Asian crisis, considerable progress has been made in articulating standards, developing assessment
methodologies, forging agreement that standards should be implemented over time and in light of country
circumstances, and undertaking external assessments of progress in implementing a broad range of standards.
The Bank and the IMF have played a major role in all of these efforts, including by experimenting with
assessing implementation of standards using Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs)
as well as the framework of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), which considers observance
of relevant standards as an input into judgements on financial sector vulnerability and development needs”,
IMF and World Bank, Assessing the Implementation of Standards: A Review of Experience and Next Steps,
supra, p. 3.
13
 See A. La Spina and G. Majone, (2000). Also: “Central banks (and hence also the Eurosystem) perform
payment systems oversight. In many cases, they offer payment and settlement services directly and therefore
have an operational role. In cases where the private sector manages payment and settlement systems, central
banks perform an oversight function on those systems. Accordingly, the central bank’s activity consists of:
a) defining, implementing and ensuring compliance with, principles and standards which are established to
promote safe, sound and efficient payment and settlement systems, whether these are operated by the central
banks themselves or by private operators [...]”,ECB, Role of the Eurosystem in the field of payment systems
oversight, supra, p. 2.
14
 CPSS/IOSCO, Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems, 2001.
15
 OECD, Principles of  Corporate Governance, 1999.
16
 CPSS, Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, 2001; BCBS, Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision, 1997.
17
 IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 1998.
18
 World Bank, Principles and Guidelines on Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, proposal
2001.
19
 IASB, International Accounting Standards, 2001; IFAC, International Standards on Auditing, 2001.
20
 The FSF itself indeed generically refers to standards to include all of the mentioned types of instruments,
after having attempted a very loose classification of no substantial legal value: “Standards set out what are
widely accepted as good principles, practices, or guidelines in a given area. Standards relevant for sound
financial systems cover a broad range of areas. Many of them are functionally overlapping or interdependent.
Standards may be classified by their scope or degree of specificity. The scope of standards may be viewed
from sectoral or functional perspectives: Sectoral: these cover the economic and institutional sectors, for
which many standards have been developed, such as the government and central bank, the banking, securities,
and insurance industries, and the corporate sector. Functional: within each sector, standards have generally
been developed along functional lines, covering areas such as governance, accounting, disclosure and
transparency, capital adequacy, regulation and supervision, information sharing, risk management, payment
and settlement, business ethics, etc. From an implementation perspective, a useful distinction among standards
is in terms of their degree of specificity: Principles: these are fundamental tenets pertaining to a broad policy
area. Principles are usually set out in a general way and therefore offer a degree of flexibility in implementation
to suit country circumstances [...]. Practices: these are more specific and spell out the practical application of
the principles within a more narrowly defined context [...]. Methodologies/guidelines: these provide detailed
guidance on steps to be taken or requirements to be met and are specific enough to allow a relatively objective
assessment of the degree of observance”.
21
 By way of example, this seems to be the conclusion reached by the task force in charge of the CPSS/
IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems when choosing their nomen, although a more
careful reading of some of said recommendations open doubts on the soundness of this classification, in
light of their potential openess to various addresses only identifiable upon circumstances: Recommendation
1 states that “Securities settlement systems should have a well-founded, clear and transparent legal basis in
the relevant jurisdiction”. This would prima facie only refer to States. However, the Explanatory Note to this
Recommendation states that “as a general matter, the laws, regulations, rules and procedures, and contractual
provisions governing the operation of SSSs should be clearly stated, understandable, internally coherent and
unambiguous”, also referring to private agreements.
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 “Within the framework of Article 18 of the Statute of the ESCB/ECB, the EMI and the NCBs, in selecting
instruments and defining procedures for the conduct of the single monetary policy and in seeking to ensure
the smooth functioning of the TARGET system in Stage Three of EMU, have paid special attention to the
settlement procedures of debt instruments which will be eligible for collateralizing the monetary policy and
payment systems operations of the ESCB. The implementation of the single monetary policy and the provision
of intraday credit to participants in payment systems will call for the relevant securities settlement systems
to be capable of ensuring: 1) reliable links between the ESCB and a broad range of counterparties; 2) speedy,
smooth and safe transactions; and 3) safe and reliable procedures for the cross-border use of eligible assets
(e.g. reliable links between SSSs). In particular, the EMI and the NCBs must ensure that central bank credit
is granted through procedures which will: (i) prevent the central banks from assuming inappropriate risks in
conducing monetary policy operations; and (ii) ensure the same level of safety for all central banks’ operations
throughout the European Union, regardless of the settlement method. In this respect, the primary objective
of the EMI/ECB and of the NCBs is the establishment of benchmark criteria for assessing the soundness of
those SSSs wishing to qualify for involvement in collateralized ESCB operations. This is particularly important
with regard to the transfer, settlement and custody of securities, and the legal and technical environment in
which such SSSs operate”, point 1.1. of Section 1 – The efficient and safe execution of central bank credit
operations, first paragraphs of ECB Standards.
23
 “The objective of the standards is to limit the risks to which the ESCB will be exposed in settling its credit
operations, which, according to its Statute, must be based on adequate collateral. The ESCB will thus assess
the securities settlement systems used by the ESCB in that respect, in the light of the standards set out in this
report. The standards are not intended to reflect aspects of the oversight or supervision of SSSs.”, Introduction
to the ECB Standards.
24
 For the sake of precision, it should be distinguished, according to the circumstances,  between ESCB and
the Eurosystem, i.e. those cases in which representatives of NCBs only include countries taking part into the
Monetary Union. The term “Eurosystem” was coined by the ECB and commonly used but is not currently
included in statutory Community legislation.
25
 This is on the contrary the opinion of C. Keller, (2001-2002/3), in particular p. 462.
26
 Section 1 – Policy Objectives, third paragraph.
27
 Point 2.1. of Section 2 – Scope of the application of the standards, first paragraph.
28
 “This chapter elaborates on the three main objectives mentioned above. However, the standards address
the first objective more specifically. Given the time constraints and the long lead times required to make
possible changes to the existing infrastructure, it was important to focus on the requirements of the single
monetary policy and payment systems at the start of Stage Three, the preparation of which will be imperative
before the start of EMU. The other objectives will be considered as part of further work to be carried out by
the EMI and the NCBs in order to ensure that there is an adequate framework for the oversight of SSSs”.
29
 This is partially recognized also by the opponents to this reconstruction: “Of course, any such assessment
under the standards may as a matter of fact serve the overall stability of the financial system. It may in
addition have a “labeling effect”. A signal is given to the markets that a certain settlement infrastructure is
reputed sound by the central banks.”, C. Keller, (2001-2002/03) p. 462. The ECB position, in favor of a
factual regulatory role of its standards, is reflected in ECB, The role of the Eurosystem in payment and
clearing systems, supra: “Although the standards were set by the Eurosystem as a user of securities settlement
systems, securities settlement systems themselves have made considerable efforts to comply with these
standards. This clearly shows that the standards have acquired a de facto regulatory value” (p. 58).
30
 Commission Decision of 6 June 2001, Establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators,
OJEC L 191 of 13 July 2001, p. 43.
31
 Committee of Wise Men, Final Report on the regulation of European securities markets, Brussels 15
February 2201. This calls for the establishment of two committees, the European Securities Committee,
comprising high- level representatives of Member States, and the Committee of European Securities
Regulators, comprising senior representatives from the national public authorities competent in the field of
securities in order, inter alia, to advise the Commission.
32
 European Council resolution of 23 March 2001.
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33
 Sixth paragraph of point 6 of the Stockholm European Council resolution.
34 Yet, the Commission does recognize a wider role of CESR in the whereas of the Decision (see in particular
whereas 8 and 9).
35
 CESR Charter, effective as of 10 September 2001.
36
 “Considering that the objectives of protecting investors, ensuring the integrity and transparency of markets
and securing the proper functioning of the financial system are fundamental to achieving and maintaining
sound and stable financial markets; considering that close co-operation and information exchange between
regulatory authorities are essential for the successful oversight of the European financial markets; having
regard to the importance of greater supervisory and regulatory convergence for the achievement of an integrated
internal capital markets in Europe; having regard to the need to base all its actions around a common conceptual
framework of overarching principles for the regulation of the European securities markets to be established
by the European Union…”.
37
 “Level 2 is composed of an actively functioning network of national securities regulators, the European
Commission and a new European Securities Committee to define, propose and decide on the implementing
details of framework Directives and Regulations, determined by the co-decision procedure in Level 1. It is
therefore proposed that two new Committees are formally established – an EU Securities Committee (ESC)
which will have a primary regulatory function and an EU Securities Regulators Committee (ESRC) with
advisory functions”, p. 28.
38
 “The initial report stated that Level 3 should encompass a “…framework of enhanced and strengthened
cooperation and networking between (national) regulators with a view to ensuring consistent and equivalent
transposition of Level 1 and Level 2 legislation…”. National regulators were also encouraged to agree joint
protocols for improving implementation and a peer review process to ensure consistent enforcement practice
in the ESRC. The Committee confirms this approach”, p. 37.
39
 Indeed, the Report is clear in stating that “the ESRC [CESR] should be a Committee with two hats. In
Level 2 it would act as an advisory committee to the European Commission. In Level 3 it would act alone as
a fully independent committee of national regulators to ensure more consistent implementation of Community
law”, p. 31.
40
 To further confirm the coexistence of coordination of oversight functions and “level 3” role, the CESR
Charter states that all understandings, standards, commitments and work agreed within FESCO will be
taken over by the Committee with the same consequences for the present and future members (Article 9.1).
41
 See ECB, Legal instruments of the European Central Bank, in Monthly Bulletin (1999), p. 53.
42
 For a wider analysis of the scope of each measure, see for all C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, (2001), (in
particular, Chapter 3), also for relevant bibliography.
43
 See C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, (2001), p. 90.
44
 What is of substantial relevance is, that the ECB can impose obligations on particulars only through
regulations and decisions, generating guidelines and instructions obligations exclusively inside the ESCB.
45
 “…pursuant to Article 105(2) of the EC Treaty and Article 3.1 of the Statute, the Eurosystem has the task
of “promot[ing] the smooth operation of payment systems” only and no mention is made of securities
settlement systems. In the same vein, Article 22 of the Statute grants regulatory powers to “ensure efficient
and sound clearing and payment systems”. Again, no mention is made of securities settlement systems. […]
As far as securities settlement systems are concerned, the Statute makes no mention of such systems. Nor is
“clearing” a specific feature of securities transfers systems” C. Keller, (2001-2002/03), at p. 460. Contra,
ECB, The role of the Eurosystem in payment and clearing systems, supra, in particular from p. 51. Beyond
employing other arguments, the ECB states that “Article 22 contains the terms “clearing” as well as “payment”
when referring to “systems”. The text therefore suggests that “clearing” has a meaning on its own, different
from the term “payment”. This textual interpretation may therefore lead to an affirmative answer to the
question as to whether Article 22 encompasses securities clearing and settlement systems” (p. 52).
46
 In the same policy statement it is affirmed that oversight may or may not be based on explicit legal
provision, also developing on a non-statutory basis (p 2). The use of non-statutory regulatory measures
should be consistent with the recognition of such principle.
344
47
 Cooperation was first announced with a joint press release of CESR and the ECB as of 25 October 2001.
On 1 August 2003 a CESR/ESCB Consultative Report on Standards for Securities Clearing and Settlement
Systems in the European Union was divulged (CESR/03-274), leading to a public hearing whose results
have not been made public yet.
48
 As presented to the Italian Presidency on 18 July 2003 (CONV 850/03).
49 See ECB, Opinion of 19 September 2003 at the request of the Council of the European Union on the draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, JOEC C 229 of 25 September 2003, p. 7 (on this point, see in
particular paragraph 6).
50
 CESR, Co-ordinating enforcement of Financial Information, Press Release of 7 October 2003, CESR/03-
362b. This Press Release launches a consultation paper proposing greater co-ordination of enforcement
activities by supervisors of financial information in Europe (see CESR 03/317b “Draft Standard 2 on Financial
Information – Co-ordination of Enforcement Activities”).
51
 Draft Standard 2 builds on CESR’s work in the area of enforcement which began with the adoption in
April 2003 of the CESR Standard 1 on “Financial Information: Enforcement of standards on financial
information in Europe” (CESR/03-074). This previous document had proposed a definition of “enforcement
action” that seems to fully confirm our thesis: “Principle 17: Actions taken by the enforcers should be
distinguished from sanctions imposed by the national legislation. Actions are measures generally aimed at
improving market integrity and confidence”.
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CHAPTER 15
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF THE EURO AND THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL
LEGAL TENDER*
BY
PÉTER MUNKÁCSI
“Moneta debet esse quasi quaedam lex et quaedam ordinatio firma“
(Nicolas Oresme)
Abstract: The main aim of this chapter is to present and to systemise the current
status, or lack of status, of the copyright protection of the euro banknotes and
coins in the context of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) Governance.
Furthermore, I present the thought-provoking findings of the Hungarian Council
of Copyright Experts. This is a unique copyright administrative institution in
international comparison, which for the first time examines in depth copyright
questions concerning the pictures of the banknotes. Finally, I conclude, focusing
on divergences and similarities from a comparative perspective.
Keywords: European Community law, Economic and Monetary Union,
governance, harmonisation, copyright protection, national legal tender, Hungary
1. Introduction
It was in 1950 that Jacques Rueff, one of France’s most influential liberal
thinkers and economists of the 20th century, declared: “Europe will become
united through its money or not at all.” It was not an easy task of the European
Central Bank (ECB) and Member States to introduce euro banknotes and coins
respectively as the prophecy predicted, but this was realized on 1 January 2002.1
“The euro is much more than just a currency,” Willem F. Duisenberg, the former
ECB president said, “It is a symbol of the European integration in every sense
of the word.”2
*
 The author is grateful to Chiara Zilioli, Gábor Faludi and Pedro Machado for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts and to the editors for further suggestions and revision.
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Upon EU accession, Hungary will join the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) with the status of a “Member State with a derogation” which
will be the next major step in the country’s European integration. For Hungary
as a new Member State in the EU, introduction of the euro will not be an option
but an obligation. The foreseeable accession to the Eurosystem by the National
Bank of Hungary on 1 January 2010 will entail abandoning the national currency
and adopting the euro as the domestic legal tender currency. Therefore, it is
useful to analyse the integration process from the perspective of copyright law.
I would like in this regard to draw attention to the Opinion No. SZJSZT 09/01
of the Hungarian Council of Copyright Experts, which for first time examines
in depth some copyright questions on the designs on banknotes.
On a European level, until 2003, the ECB decisions established the rules
on reproduction of euro banknotes on the basis of copyright. From March 2003
onwards, according to the recent ECB Decision of 20 March 2003 on the
denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro
banknotes (ECB/2003/4) which repealed the earlier Decisions ECB/2001/7 and
ECB/2001/143, copyright was left outside the scope of such rules (since there
is no community copyright substantial law as far as the notion of the copyright
work is concerned.) There are clashes between the Member States’ legal orders,
most of which did not grant copyright protection to their national currencies
and the challenge of the EMU to this tradition. To solve the conflict, Röttinger
(2001) argues for the literature, the copyright protection of euro is an ancilliary
material to the penal and/or administrative measures. In addition, following
my view, the copyright protection on euro could be significant only for
permission of secondary uses, for example the use of visual art creations for
the purposes of publicity and advertising. The authorisation of use relates in
general to a single publication, in the form and scope indicated therein. Although
the ECB has an active role in the prevention of the euro banknotes against
counterfeiting and the detection thereof- these are public law institutions - , the
enforcement rules do not form part of my examination.
This section does not deal with the issue of the euro symbol. Although
the ? was inspired by the Greek epsilon pointing back to the cradle of European
civilisation and the first letter of Europe, crossed by two parallel lines to indicate
the stability of the euro, the symbol was not protected by copyright, but by
trade-mark.5 The Commission also registered it with the International
Standardisation Organisation (ISO), which is responsible for the glyphs/fonts,
keyboards, character transmission codes etc., with a view to enabling the
insertion of the symbol into computer systems.6
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2. Copyright protection of banknotes at international level
There are approximately 150 national laws on copyright. They are all
different, the texts and content of the laws not being identical. There are
practically limitless possibilities for countries to provide in their copyright laws
for protection of material which is not specified in the international instruments,
or to grant rights which are not mentioned in such instruments. The copyright
protection of banknotes on a national or European level is a case in point.
Danish banknotes are protected by the Danish Copyright Act No.194 of 11
March 1997, which also offers protection to the design of euro banknotes if the
design is protected under any international convention, whereas only Ireland
and the United Kingdom has express statutory provisions granting express
copyright protection to banknotes.
The protection of copyright on banknotes is a separate question. There
has only been one high court decision at the EU level: pursuant to a ruling of
the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof – OGH) dated 10 June 1975,
banknotes issued by the Österreichische Nationalbank constitute a “Werk der
bildenden Kunst” in the sense of Article 1 of the Austrian Copyright Act, and
therefore enjoy copyright protection.7
However, in some EU Member States (Greece, France) the design of the
banknote, as a form of applied art, is protected by their statutes. These countries
only have administrative provisions on reproductions of banknotes, not on
copyright8. Moreover, many countries (e.g Switzerland) exempt banknotes from
copyright protection. The exemption clause is based on the international
copyright treaties. Article 2 (4) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act 1971) provides that “it shall be a matter
for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the protection to be
granted to official texts of a legislative, administrative and legal nature, and to
official translation of such texts”.
Article 3 (and the agreed statement concerning the article) of the 1996
WIPO Copyright Treaty stresses that Contracting Parties shall apply mutatis
mutandis the provisions of Articles 2 to 6 of the Berne Convention in respect of
the provision provided for in this treaty. Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement
applies the three-step formula of Berne Convention Article 9 (2) for exceptions
to the reproduction right to all exclusive rights in literary and artistic works.
A recent case-law of the Cour de Cassation rejected the copyright
protection for the banknotes.9 The Bank of France brought an infringement
action against a numismatic magazine which had illustrated one of its issues
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with pictures of banknotes. According to the appellant’s plea the protection of
banknotes by the penal provisions dealing with breaches of public trust, i.e.
counterfeiting means of payment, was not incompatible with and did not
preclude the copyright protection to which intellectual works are entitled. The
dismissal of the Bank’s claim was based on the fact that a banknote is a means
of payment the unlawful reproduction of which is punishable only as a criminal
offence under specific provisions. In other words, a banknote cannot be at one
and the same time a means of payment and a work protected by copyright,
otherwise, the reproduction of banknotes may not be regarded as a reproduction
in copyright terms.
In its ruling rejecting the appeal, the French court stated that the
‘incompability between the exercise of the regalian activity of the Bank of
France and the protection of copyright claimed by the appellant’. Hence the
Bank of France could be considered neither an ‘author’, nor an assignee of
rights in the banknotes.10
3. Governance, policy-making and copyright within the European Union
An analysis could be made as to in which sense copyright protection on
banknotes and coins is a tool to exercise governance over the Eurosytem.
Putatively, the ECB legal acts adopted in the domain of copyright protection
on euro banknotes may constitute a good starting point for relating the issue of
copyright to governance, particularly as regards to specific problems of eletronic
reproductions and the print-outs thereof.
The search for a link between the issue of copyright and governance on
European level might lead us down wrong paths. The notion of new governance
is one which has come into prominence in recent decades in Europe. In early
2000 the Commission identified the reform of European governance as one of
its four strategic objectives. The document, so-called ‘Governance - White
Paper’,11 underpinned five principles: openness, participation, accountability,
effectiveness and coherence.12 The result of the wide public consultation on the
White Paper presented by the Commission in 2003.13
Although the term ‘governance’ remains a rather general and hazy
concept, there are a number of dimensions which can be identified and analysed.
It is often used in the context of postnational and international regulation, and
policy-making. In that sense, it is useful to analyse the evolution of intellectual
property, in particular the copyright protection in the EU. The harmonization
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process in this field belongs to the Community’s multi-faceted and ambivalent
policies. Maybe it is because of measures which have already been taken that
the draft EU Constitution states the protection of intellectual property.14
With a European Economic Community (EEC) the framers of the Treaty
of Rome wished to create a vast area comprising their combined territories
within whose boundaries goods, persons, services and capital could move freely.
Barriers to the trading of goods were perhaps the most visible obstacles which
would have dismantled, and the early part of the Treaty is devoted to this task.
But no articles in the Treaty deal with intellectual property or copyright.
Nevertheless, the European Commission has developed this area by means of
the goal of the harmonisation of copyright in order to avoid barriers to the
Internal Market.
Ten years after the publication of a basic and comparative study of
copyright law in the European community, which was prepared by Prof. Dietz
(1978)15, in 1988 the Commission, recognising the importance of the subject,
published a Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology16. The
Green Paper identified six areas where the copyright laws of the EU Member
States should be harmonised so as to foster the functioning of the European
Union Internal Market.
During the 1990s five sectorial Directives were adopted, which
harmonised the national copyright laws of the EU Member States and even
those of all candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe too. The first
generation of harmonisation of the copyright laws covers the legal protection
of computer programs17, rental rights, lending rights and the main neighbouring
rights18, satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission19, the duration of
protection of authors’rights and neighbouring rights20, and the legal protection
of databases21. Five years later the sixth Directive on the artists’ resale right
(“Droit de suite”) of this first generation of copyright harmonisation on a
Community level was adopted. Even the close cooperation between the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission has enabled recently
the swift adoption of the Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property
rights.22
The Directive on copyright and related rights in the Information Society
(“INFOSOC Directive”; ”Copyright Directive”) is slightly different from the
six directives mentioned.23 It harmonises several essential rights of authors and
four groups of neighbouring rightholders, limitations and exceptions thereto,
the protection of technological measures and of rights management information
and an important aspect of injunctive relief, i.e. notice and take down vis-à-vis
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intermediaries. The Directive, as a part of the new generation of copyright
harmonisation, has the most horizontal impact of all acquis communautaire
Directives.24
It should be noted, that a considerable harmonization has already been
carried out. The Commission is not involved in the subject of copyright in the
euro, there has been no case law on it before either the ECJ or the CFI, and
future harmonization steps concerning the copyright protection of banknotes
are not envisaged. Article 5.3.e) of the INFOSOC Directive contains an exception
in the case of the use for the purposes of public security or to ensure the proper
performance or reporting of administrative, parliamentary or judicial
proceedings which could be an European exemption clausel form the copyright
protection of the euro banknotes and coins.
From my point of view, the governance (in particular the EMU
governance) - copyright relationship must be referred in the context of the
better regulation initiative. The Commission proposed in June 2002 a broad
action plan on simplifying and improving the regulatory environment, with the
intended pupose to develop a new common legislative culture within the EU.
The action plan outlines ideas, inter alia, on better policy preparation through
improving the current procedures for consultation and impact assessment,
enlarging the range of the various policy tools, limiting proposals to substantial
elements and launching a programme on simplification of Community
legislation.25 In a framework of the simplifying programme would be useful to
update and consolidate of acquis concerning copyright.
3.1 Legal instruments on copyright protection of euro
As it can be seen, the main legal measure of the copyright harmonisation
within the EU is the directive. “A directive shall be binding, as to the result to
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods” (Article 249 EC
Treaty). A directive is not necessarily binding to all Member States; it may
only apply to one or some Member States. All directives must be notified to the
(relevant) Member States. The countries may choose the form and the methods
of implementing the directive in their national laws. The directives are binding
as far as the result that is to be achieved is concerned.
The EC Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank confer upon ECB the competence to
participate in the legislative process, in particular to adopt legal acts (Regulations,
Decisions, Recommendations, Opinions, Guidelines, Instructions, Circulars).
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The protection of euro banknotes by copyright is ruled by the legal form of
Decision. ECB Decisions are binding in their entirety upon those to whom
they are addressed and take effect upon notification. ECB Decisions may be
addressed to any legal or natural person, including the euro area Member
States.26
Copyright protection of euro coins
Regarding Article 106 (2) of the EC Treaty, Member States issue coins
subject to approval by the ECB of the volume of the issue. Furthermore, the
Council is entitled to adopt measures to harmonise the denominations and the
technical specifications of all coins intended for circulation to the extent
necessary to permit their smooth circulation within the Community.
According to Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 on the introduction of
the euro27, coins denominated in euro, introduced as from 1 January 2002, are
the only coins which have the status of legal tender of all participating Member
States. Another Council Regulation (EC) No 975/9828, amended by Council
Regulation (EC) No 423/1999 of 22 February 199929, on denominations and
technical specifications of euro coins intended for circulation lay down the all
important conditions, inter alia the design of the coins. At the Florence European
Council in June 1996, Member States decided that the euro coins will have a
common face and a national face and gave a mandate to the Commission to
organise a competition at European level to select the design for the common
face of the euro coins. The winning designs of the European coin design
competition were selected by the Amsterdam European Council on June 1997.
As provided in the competition’s terms of references, the copyrights on the
winning designs were assigned to the Commission by the designer, the Belgian
Luc Luycx.
The assignment raises the problem of the different treatment of copyright
transfer between the countries following the droit d’auteur system (continental
law) or common law tradition. In the common law countries the freedom of
contract is the exclusive norm, based on the utilitarian norm. The droit d’auteur
system tradition adopts two approaches to alienability of copyrights. The
“dualist” approach (e.g. in France) treats author’s rights in a work as consisiting
of two separate elements: economic and moral right. The economic right is in
principle, inalienable subject to certain expedient qualifications; under the
French statute the moral right is perpetual. The “monist” approach to author’s
rights, followed in Germany, and Austria predicates that the author’s economic
and moral rights are thoroughly intertwined and that the economic aspect of
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the right inalienably adheres to the author no less than does the moral aspect of
the right.30
From that view, it is open to question what the effects of the assignment
are? Due to the lack of a Federal European Copyright Code, the assignment
could happen under the law of the country of the exploitation of the work, i.e.
the Belgian law. However, the Belgian legislation, following the “dualist”
approach, validates assignments of economic rights in future works, but only
for specified works and for a limited time.31 It follows from that remark that the
assignment would not be valid in other Member States.
However, following a Communication from the Commission32, the
copyright in the design of the common face of the euro coins belongs to the
European Community represented by the Commission. The European
Commission has assigned to each of the Member States participating in the
third stage of EMU all the Community rights as regards the territory of such
Member State. The Commission will assign the copyright to other Member
States as each one moves to the third stage of EMU. The remaining questions
are: Which copyright pertains to the European Community? The non-existent
European Copyright Law or the different copyrights under the different national
laws?  Do these different laws constitute a bundle of laws? Certainly not, since
all copyright has a territorial effect.
From the point of view of new Member States it could be remarked that
only the Member States appear on the coins, and not the Map of the common
Europe. On the common face of the one cent, two cent, and five cent coins the
globe is superimposed, and the European Union (instead of the eurozone) is
highlighted on the globe. On the ten cent, twenty cent and fifty cent coins the
fifteen Member States are shown separately. On the right-hand side of the
common face of the one euro and two euro coins is a representation of the
European Union, where the borders between the Member States are marked
with thin lines. Hungary, the other Central European and Baltic states disappear,
and the North Sea and Mediterranean Sea flow together, and therefore
Scandinavia and Greece look like islands. It would be a polite solution after the
May 2004 accession of the new Member States to make some small
modifications in design on the common face of the euro coins. According to a
Report of the EP Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the European
Parliament calls on the Commission and the ECB to draw up a study into the
feasibility of introducing one and two euro banknotes and to prepare an
information campaign designed to make the general public aware of the thinking
behind such a step.33
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Copyright protection of euro banknotes
In February 1996 the European Monetary Institute (EMI), the forerunner
of the ECB, launched a competition in which banknote designers nominated
by the national central banks of the European Union were asked to sketch a
series of banknotes. In December 1996 the Council of the EMI selected the
winning designs on the basis of a public survey and a recommendation made
by an expert panel. The winning designs were produced by Robert Kalina of
Österreichische Nationalbank. His pictures were inspired by the theme ‘Ages
and styles of Europe’. The seven euro banknotes, ranging from ?5 to ?500,
have their own colours and sizes. The higher the value, the larger the banknote.
On the front of the banknotes, pictures of windows and gateways symbolise a
spirit of openness, and on the verso, pictures of bridges signify co-operation,
not only within Europe, but also with rest of the world.
Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 on the introduction of
the euro34  rules that participating Member States shall ensure adequate sanctions
against counterfeiting and falsification of euro banknotes and coins without
any copyright aspects. As far as copyright protection is concerned, Article 1
paragraph 1 of Decision ECB/2003/435 rules that the copyright symbol © on
euro banknotes indicates that the copyright belongs to the ECB. In accordance
with this, recital (3) states that as successor to the EMI the ECB holds the
copyright in the designs of euro banknotes, which was originally held by the
EMI. The ECB and the national central banks enforce the copyright with regard
to reproductions issued and distributed in breach of it.
This rule means that some elements remain in a state of uncertainty.
With regard to the above-mentioned ’monist-dualist approach’ in the droit
d’auteur system, the authors in dualist countries can exploit their economic
interests in a work through the transfer of economic rights; authors in monist
countries, barred from assigning any of their rights, can achieve the approximate
economic equivalent only through the grant of privileges to use the work that is
approximate to but not identical to non-exclusive and exclusive licences in
common law pratice.36 More clarification would be useful on the notion of the
term ’copyright belongs to the ECB’.
The primary aim of the recent ECB Decision, as stated in recital (4), is
that the ECB should take measures to provide for a minimum level of protection
in all participating Member States in order to ensure that the general public can
distinguish genuine euro banknotes from reproductions. For that purpose it is
necessary to establish common rules according to which the reproduction of
euro banknotes will be permitted. However, the reproduction rules for euro
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banknotes in Article 2 of the ECB Decision, even in the two first ECB Decisions
(ECB/1998/637 and ECB/2001/738), do not refer to the copyright system; they
have a more technical and administrative form, based solely on the Eurosystem’s
competence to issue euro banknotes and, following that competence, to ensure
the integrity of euro banknotes (rights and titles under public law not under
private law).
4. Copyright protection of the Hungarian national legal tender
An impressive development of the post-socialist laws of Central and
Eastern European countries can be seen in the field of copyright as in many
other fields inside and outside the broad concept of intellectual property. One
of the tasks and challenges for the copyright legislators and enforcement
institutions in the last decade was to find answers to the modern issues raised
by technical and economical developments.39 The Hungarian Act on Copyright
No. LXXVI. of 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “CA”) which entered into force
on 1 September 1999, fullfiled these criteria.
The question of copyright protection of the Hungarian national currency
(the Hungarian forint – HUF) banknotes was ambiguous until 2001. The
Hungarian Banknote Printing Corporation requested an expert opinion from
the Hungarian Council of Copyright Experts (hereinafter referred to as “Council
of Experts”)40 indicating that there is no copyright protection on banknotes. In
their opinion, the Council for first time clarified the relations concerning
copyright protection.41 The Hungarian Banknote Printing Corporation raised
the following questions before the Council of Experts:
1. Is the application of Article 1 paragraph (4) of the CA concerning copyright
in the HUF banknotes lawful?
2. If the above-mentioned provision is not applicable, what is the lawful
process?12
Article 1 paragraph (4) of the CA: The protection provided by this Act
shall not cover legal provisions, other means of state direction, court and official
resolutions, announcements and documents issued by an authority or other
official organ, or standards made obligatory by law and other similar regulations.
The Council of Experts took the facts of the case as a starting point for
the opinion that the pictures (graphics) on the banknotes are drafted by a designer
who is an employee of the Hungarian Banknote Printing Corporation, under
predetermined conceptions. From the facts of the case, the Council of Experts
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infers that:
- Pictures on the banknotes are creations of visual art according to Article 1
paragraph (2) subparagraph h) of the CA,43 which have an individual and
original nature, therefore the banknotes concern subject-matter of copyright
protection;
- Creation of the banknotes is the designer’s responsibility;
- The facts are extended to the creations fixed and reproduced on coins.
As a first step towards examining the answer to question no. 1, the Council
of Experts decided to formalise the relationship between the issuing process of
banknotes and coins, and copyright exploitation. This problem receives great
importance due to the so-called “twin-nature of the official documents” in
Hungarian copyright law.
As has already been mentioned, Article 1 paragraph (4) of the CA
excludes some elements from copyright protection on condition that, during
their exploitation, they must be freely available to the public. Laws, regulations,
and legal enactments are withheld from copyright protection. Nevertheless,
they should have an individual and original nature. However, if the work
excluded from the copyright protection can be used as “a document having an
external effect”, copyright protection exists. There is an illustration from judicial
practice: a thesis for a scientific degree is an official document during the
granting process (annex of the application). In that sense, a thesis is not
considered a work protected by copyright.44 Notwithstanding, should the author
of the thesis publishes his/her work without any modification, it qualifies as a
scientific work following Article 1 paragraph (1) of the CA.
The Council of Experts applied the “twin-nature”principle in their opinion
mutatis mutandis. It has been established that the NBH shall have the exclusive
right to issue banknotes and coins.45 According to Article 31 paragraph (1) of
the NBH Act [Article 37 paragraph (1) of former NBH Act] the NBH shall
announce the issue of banknotes and coins, their denominations and
distinguishing, features and the withdrawal of banknotes and coins from
circulation in a public notice in the Official Gazette (‘Magyar Közlöny’). The
Council of Experts pointed out that the public notice in the Official Gazzette
and its contents are an official document, which qualified as ‘other similar
regulations’ with regard to Article 1 paragraph (4) of the CA. Furthermore, the
public notice of the NBH in full accordance with the above-mentioned rule
concerning banknotes and coins must be freely available to the public. Therefore,
in this case the pictures (graphics) on the banknotes (or works reproduced on
coins) are not under copyright protection.
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A question also raised was that the other acts of the issue of legal tender
constitute copyright exploitation of the work on banknotes. It is indisputable
that first the work must be reproduced for issue by the Hungarian Banknote
Printing Corporation, which is under Article 16 paragraph (1) and Article 17
subparagraph (a) of the CA exploitation.46 The manner and the degree of
reproduction is not based on the user’s business decision it is rather a result of
the state ownership within the monetary policy which is behind the emission.
The State as owner, which is responsible for the stability of the market economy,
transferred the part-competence of its right to ownership, and right to issue of
the legal tender by law, to the NBH47. The position of the Hungarian Banknote
Printing Corporation in this issue process is that of assistant to fulfilment. This
kind of reproduction is a differentia specifica regarding reproduction in a
copyright manner or all usual copyright exploitation.
The second step in the supplying of money is the distribution of
reproduced banknotes as legal tender. In the copyright sense, making accessible
to the public the original copy or the reproduced copies of the work through
putting them into circulation or offering to put them into circulation shall be
taken to mean distribution. According to Article 23 paragraph (2) of the CA,
distribution shall in particular imply the transfer of the title of ownership of the
copy of the work and the rental of the copy of the work as well as the importation
into the country of the copy of the work with the aim of putting it into circulation.
This cannot be applied to the notion for distribution in the case of the distribution
of banknotes (and coins), because it is not a question of an equivalent, for value
received, civil law contract; but rather an administrative act. The following are
examples from the NBH Act: all persons shall accept banknotes and coins
issued by the NBH at their face value in transactions which are conducted in
the legal tender of Hungary. In respect of cash payment transactions, up to fifty
coins of each denomination issued by the NBH must be accepted. This restriction
shall not apply to credit institutions, tax offices and post office cash desks,
which are required to accept any amount of coins as payment.
Counterfeit, forged or mutilated (punctured) coins shall not be accepted
as payment. Coins which have lost a significant proportion of their weight or
are difficult to recognise need not be accepted as payment. Coins which have
lost a significant portion of their weight as a result of normal use or have become
difficult to recognise shall be accepted as payment or exchanged at credit
institutions, tax offices and post office cash desks, which shall exchange such
at the NBH. Counterfeit banknotes and coins shall be submitted to the NBH
without compensation.
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The NBH shall pay compensation for the value of damaged (mutilated)
HUF banknotes, if more than half of the banknote is submitted. Credit
institutions shall accept damaged (mutilated) banknotes for replacement by
the NBH. Damaged banknotes shall be replaced by the NBH free of charge.
Compensation for the value of damaged HUF coins shall not be paid by the
NBH, unless the coins contain precious metals. The NBH shall not pay
compensation for the value of banknotes or coins which have been destroyed.
Processes for destruction of banknotes or coins may not be initiated.48
The Council of Experts also examined the case of how to grant license
to exploitation which is not related to the money supply. According to Article
34 paragraphs (1) and (2) of the NBH Act [Article 40 paragraphs (1) and (2) of
former NBH Act] imitations of banknotes or coins in circulation for any purpose
(use in theatre performances, television or film productions, education, etc.)
may only be produced with the permission of the NBH. The regulations of the
NBH shall be complied with in respect of the production, registration,
safekeeping and destruction of imitations.
This provision provides the NBH with an exclusive licensing right for
the reproduction. However, this right is not based on the copyright; rather, on
the one hand, on government/owner monopoly of the money supply, and on
the other hand, on taking measures against counterfeiting and for the originality
of the official payment derived from public authority.
Turning to the second question, the Council of Experts clarified how to
grant a license for the exploitation by the rightholder, referring to work created
wthin the author’s responsibility and remuneration. Employers regularly enter
into contracts with their creative employees over the allocation of rights in
works created in the course of employment. Countries of the droit d’auteur
system, as in Hungary too, assumes that copyright in works created in the course
of employment is vested in the employee-author rather than in the employer,
so that a transfer from the employee will be required for the employer to obtain
copyright. Nevertheless, often impied in the employment agreement is an
assignment of copyright from the employed author to his employer.
According to Article 30 paragraph (1) of the CA, the delivery of the
work to the employer shall imply the transfer of the economic rights to the
employer as successor in title to the author, if the creation of the work is the
author’s responsibility, unless otherwise agreed. Article 30 paragraph (3) of
the CA provides that the author shall be entitled to an appropriate remuneration
if the employer authorises another person to use the work or transfers to another
person the economic rights relating to the work. With regard to the findings of
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the Council of Experts concerning the first question, the lawful process would
be if the Hungarian Banknote Printing Corporation as employer-rightholder of
copyright transferred their economic rights on banknotes and coins to the NBH
by gratuitous contract, and free of charge. The purpose of the money supply,
which is a special kind of exploitation, can offer grounds for gratuitousness.
Concerning the transfer, the NBH would permit the production of imitations of
banknotes or coins in circulation for any purpose (use in theatre performances,
television or film productions, education, etc.) or other exploitation on a
copyright basis, too. If the NBH and the Hungarian Banknote Printing
Corporation agree that the central bank grants a license to produce imitations
of banknotes or coins, or to exploit any other copyright economic rights, the
Corporation can exclude without misgivings the remuneration of the employee-
author in a retroactive contract. If the NBH grants a license for these copyright
exploitations for a consideration then, concerning the transfer, the employed
author has more competence to claim remuneration. However, in that case the
CA does not prohibit expressis verbis the contractual exclusion of the
remuneration. If the employee-author(s) does (do) not agree with this, the court
specifies the rate of the remuneration in dispute.
5. Conclusion
Through designs, engravings and images, a banknote or a coin may be
considered an original work for the purposes of copyright. However, their normal
exploitations does not fall within the scope of use in copyright terms. Exclusivity
in a copyright sense is of no importance in either the supplying money or the
putting it into circulation, because it is rather a monopoly derived from the
public law.
The prohibition of the reproduction, imitation etc. of the euro on a
Community level is not an copyright prohibition, and does not depend on who
has a right to use the copyright symbol. But, on the other hand, as was remarked
following the conference held at the EUI, the copyright law should be serve the
purpose of the Eurosystem guaranteeing the integrity of the euro banknotes
and thus as an appropriate legal instrument to act against all reproductions. In
this case a legal tender is a work under copyright exclusivity in which the
appropriate Community entity, the ECB, sets forth rules on the basis of which
reproductions are deemed lawful if complying with the criteria therein laid
down. After the ’first sale’ the exhaustion right and the right to private copy
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would come into the account. The latter can be not permitted in case of a legal
tender. Therefore, in my view copyright protection on euro could be significance
only for permission of secondary uses, for example the use of visual art creations
for the purposes of publicity and advertising. The authorisation of use relates
in general to a single publication, in the form and scope indicated therein.
As it was already mentioned, the assignment of the copyright of the euro
coins and the notion ‘copyright on the banknotes belongs to the ECB’ occurs
considerable uncertainty and coincidency between two legal traditions.
Notwithstanding United Kingdom is not a member of the Eurosystem, it seems,
that on the stage of EMU follows the common law traditions where the
legislation makes copyright fully transmissible by assignment […] as personal
or moveable property.50 Within many of the actions outlined in the White Paper
or its follow-up documents, in particular by the action plan concerning better
regulation, could enhance the legislative quality and effectiveness of European
governance in the monetary sphere.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
BY
PAUL DE GRAUWE
CHALLENGES FOR MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND
1. Introduction
The launch of the euro has been an extraordinarily successful operation.
The most visible sign of this success is the fact that it took only a few weeks for
the euro to become the single European currency used in daily transactions
from Finland to Portugal and from Ireland to Greece. Until recently few people
dreamt that this would be possible in their lifetimes.
The success of the launch of the euro is not only technical and economic,
it is also and foremost political. The euro is now the most visible and practical
symbol of the progress towards a political union in Europe.
And yet despite the magnitude of the success, the challenges ahead are
formidable as well. In this address I analyse some of these challenges. The first
one has to do with the monetary policy strategy of the ECB; the second one
with the enlargement of the monetary union to a group of potentially 27 member
states. There is no doubt that the challenge arising from enlargement is the
more important one, and as will be argued will require important changes in
the operation of the monetary union in Europe.
2. The monetary policy strategy of the ECB
After more than three years of operations, it can be said that the ECB
has done a reasonably good job at maintaining price stability and at dealing
with the business cycle. During 1999-2001 annualised inflation in the Euro-
area amounted to 2.1 % on average, while at the same time the euro-area’ GDP
expanded at a yearly rate of 2.6%. Nevertheless, there is an increasing consensus
in the academic world and among market analysts that the monetary policy
* The editors are very grateful to the Journal of Common Market Studies, where this article is forthcoming,
and to its Editor Jim Rollo, for permission to reproduce the author’s keynote address to our conference in our
proceedings. The author is grateful to Iain Begg and to an anonymous referee for many useful comments and
suggestions.
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strategy of the ECB presents some flaws that can and should be amended. The
criticism focuses on two problems with this strategy. One has to do with the
objectives pursued by the ECB, the other with the instruments.
2.1 The objectives
The Treaty mandates the ECB to pursue price stability as the primary
objective. It should be noted that the Treaty uses the word primary and not sole
objective, as is sometimes erroneously concluded. According to the Treaty the
ECB should also pursue other objectives like sustaining economic activity
provided this does not endanger price stability.
The ECB, however, has given a new twist to this mandate. Its spokesmen
are now claiming that by pursuing price stability it does the best that is possible
to come close to the other objectives (growth, the business cycle). Thus,
according to this view it is all right to pursue price stability as the only objective.
In so doing the ECB also takes care of the other objectives the Treaty has
mandated (see ECB, 1999d).
In reinterpreting its mandate the ECB has been influenced by the theory
of flexible inflation targeting as developed by Svensson (1996, 2000; see also
Alesina et al., 2001; Mishkin and Schmidt Hebbel, 2001). The central claim
made by this theory is that inflation targeting makes it possible for the central
bank not only to stabilise inflation, but also to do the best possible job in
stabilising output around potential output (its “natural” level in long-run
equilibrium).
The claim that flexible inflation targeting also stabilises output is obvious
when shocks originate from the demand side. This is illustrated in Figure 24,
which represents the aggregate demand and supply curves in the inflation-
output space. Suppose there are positive and negative shocks in aggregate
demand, leading respectively to the upper and lower levels of demand shown
by the ADU and ADL curves. Potential output is given, shown by the vertical
line at y*. The central bank cannot and does not try to influence this “natural”
output level, which is determined by non-monetary variables.
Flexible inflation targeting implies that the central bank sets a target
inflation rate, π*. In a boom (ADU), the central bank raises the interest rate,
thus lowering the AD curve. In a recession it does the opposite. Because prices
are sticky the central bank allows for a gradual adjustment of inflation and
output. An attempt to bring back the aggregate demand curve downwards too
quickly could lead to a cycle where output declines from A to B. This is why
this strategy is called “flexible” inflation targeting. Stabilising inflation around
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π* also stabilises output around y*. When a central bank follows a flexible
inflation targeting strategy there is no need to explicitly target the output gap.
Figure 24: Flexible inflation targeting and demand shocks
This conclusion only holds because it is assumed that the supply curve
is linear. Figure 25 shows a non-linear supply curve, which is more realistic
than the linear supply curve of Figure 24. When inflation is low, menu costs
lead people to make infrequent price adjustments. Inflation then exhibits
considerable inertia. When inflation is high, menu costs of price changes become
trivial, and price adjustment are frequent.
The non-linear aggregate supply curve drawn in figure 25 is the
counterpart of the “New Keynesian Philips curve” developed by Akerlof,
Dickens and Perry (2000), Mankiw (2001), and Wyplosz (2001). When inflation
is low, nominal rigidities matter a lot, and inflation is unresponsive to the output
gap. The higher the inflation rate, the less significant are nominal rigidities and
the more vertical the Phillips curve (in inflation-unemployment space) and the
aggregate supply curve (in inflation-output space).
For empirical evidence of a non-linear aggregate supply curve (Phillips
curve) in the US, see  Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000); for several European
countries, see Wyplosz (2001).
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Figure 25:  Flexible inflation targeting when supply is non-linear
The existence of a non-linearity in the supply curve has an important
implication. In a low inflation environment the rate of inflation becomes a less
reliable signal of the strength of deflationary forces. To see this, suppose we do
not observe the supply curve perfectly because of noise. Figure 26 shows a
band around the supply curve, within which the supply curve moves up and
down. We distinguish two cases: a low-inflation country where the supply curve
is relatively flat; and a high-inflation country with a steeper supply curve.
Suppose that an adverse demand shock hits these economies. In the low-
inflation country it is difficult to detect from movements of inflation alone that
an adverse demand shock has occurred. The reason is that the signal to noise
ratio is low. The signal comes from the demand shock, the noise from the random
movements in the supply curve. The flatter is the supply curve the lower is the
signal to noise ratio, and the less informative is the rate of inflation about cyclical
movements in aggregate demand. In the limit, when the supply curve becomes
horizontal, the rate of inflation is not informative about these output movements.
Conversely, when the supply curve is steeper (as is generally the case when
inflation is higher), inflation contains more information about movements in
aggregate demand.
Thus, when inflation becomes very low, as in the euro zone, inflation is
a less reliable signal in stabilising fluctuations in output produced by demand
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shocks. This forces the central bank to attach greater value to other signals (the
output gap and other “real” indicators of the business cycle). Thus, a central
bank like the ECB with a low inflation objective, but a mandate also to maintain
high levels of employment and output, should give more weight to “real” signals
of economic activity than central banks with a higher inflation target. We
conclude that the reinterpretation the ECB has given to its dual mandate is not
only unsound from a legal point of view but also from an economic one.
Figure 26:  Different inflation-targets central banks
A second problem that arises with the objectives pursued by the ECB
has to do with its practical implementation. The ECB has interpreted the
objective of price stability to mean that inflation should be held within a band
of 0% to 2%, over the medium run. It can be argued that this band is too low
and too narrow.
There are several reasons why the maximum inflation of 2% pursued by
the ECB is too low1. First, as economists have argued, some inflation is good
for the economy in that it works as a lubricant and allows for more flexible
adjustments in real wages. This analysis has been popularised recently by
Ackerlof and Perry (2000). More flexible real wages in turn reduce the
equilibrium level of unemployment. This analysis calls for a rate of inflation of
2 to 3% a year. By announcing a maximum of 2% the ECB is targeting a rate of
inflation, which according to this view, is below the optimal level, thereby
  Low-inflation-target central bank    High-inflation-target central bank
inflation inflation
      output           output
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increasing the rigidities in the economy. This view leads to the conclusion that
the pursuit of too low a rate of inflation increases unemployment structurally
(see also Wyplosz, 2001) on this).
It should be stressed that this view is not shared by all economists (see
Issing, 2001). The critics have argued that the money illusion, which underlies
this view, may very well disappear in a new regime of low inflation, thereby
eliminating the need to have positive rates of inflation in order to “lubricate”
the system.
A second reason for arguing that the 0-2% band is too low is that the
ECB is pushing the inflation rate too close to zero, thereby increasing the risk
that inflation may drop below 0% at some point. We know from historical
experience (and also from the recent experience of Japan) that falling prices
are dangerous and that they can push the economy into a deflationary spiral.
Once in such a spiral it is difficult to extricate the economy from it.
A third reason is related to the previous one. If the ECB is successful in
pushing the inflation rate of Euroland within the 0 to 2% band it is almost
inevitable that, since this inflation rate is an average of national inflation rates,
the rate of inflation drops below 0% in some countries. This may then set in
motion deflationary forces in these countries that are difficult to control (see
Sinn and Reuter, 2001). This problem could be exacerbated by the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. This is that less developed countries that experience high
productivity growth in their tradable goods sector find that the resulting (non-
inflationary) wage increases in the tradable sector spread to the non-traded
sector, even though productivity in the latter is not keeping pace. As a result
CPI inflation will tend to be higher in these countries than the CPI inflation in
the more mature member countries. Put differently, the existence of Balassa-
Samuelson effects increases the differences in national inflation rates, thereby
increasing the risk that some countries’ inflation rates are pushed below 0%.
Finally the low inflation target of the ECB produces a bias against acting
quickly to counter recessionary forces. This was made clear in 2001 when the
ECB waited to lower the interest rate because the inflation rate was still above
the 2% limit. The US Fed, which does not have such a low inflation target did
not feel inhibited from acting quickly2.
2.2 Optimal inflation rates
The arguments in favour of some positive inflation are illustrated
graphically in the following figures. In figure 27 we show the costs and benefits
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of inflation.  The cost curve represents the costs resulting from misallocations,
inefficiencies and uncertainties produced by increasing rates of inflation (the
“sand effect” of inflation). The most visible (but not exclusive) way these costs
manifest themselves is by lower rates of investment and lower rates of economic
growth. This cost curve is drawn in a highly non-linear way because the empirical
literature suggests that for high rates of inflation these costs are quite substantial,
whereas for low rates of inflation (say less that 10% per year) researchers have
been unable to detect much. Thus a move from, say, 2% to 4 % inflation will
not lead to increasing costs, but a jump to, say, 20%  results in significant cost
increases.
The benefit curve is the sum of two components, which we represent in
figure 28. One is the credibility bonus, which is at its maximum when inflation
is zero. With increasing inflation this credibility bonus declines exponentially.
The second component is the benefit resulting from the “lubricant effect” of
inflation, i.e. the greater flexibility in real wages provided by inflation. This
effect tends to taper off, and even decline when inflation increases too much
(see Akerlof, Dickens and Perry(2000) and Wyplosz(2001)). The sum of the
two components is the benefit curve that is also used in figure 27.
The confrontation of costs and benefits in figure 27 then leads to the
view that there is an optimum rate of inflation π* greater than zero for which
the difference between benefits and costs is at its maximum.
The view represented in figure 27 is not shared by all economists. There
is an alternative view which can be called the “New Neo-Classical” (NNC)
view which is also the ECB-view (see Goodfriend and King, 2001). We represent
this alternative view, in figure 29. The main difference is that in figure 29 the
existence of a “lubricant” effect is denied (see Issing, 2002). As a result, the
benefit curve declines exponentially, so that the optimal rate of inflation is
zero. One remarkable aspect of this view is that its proponents rarely advocate
a zero inflation target. Not only because there could be a statistical bias in the
measurement of inflation, but also because there is a zone, called “terra
incognita” of deflation about which we know very little except that it is very
unpleasant, possibly catastrophic. For the proponents of the ECB-NNS view
there is some feeling that it is safer to keep some distance from this danger
zone, despite the fact that their analysis calls for targeting a zero rate of inflation.
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Figure 27: Costs and benefits of inflation
Figure 28: Benefits of inflation: lubricant and credibility
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Figure 29: NNC-ECB view
Let me summarise what we know and what we do not know about the
costs and benefits of inflation.
First, we know that very high inflation is very bad, not only for economic
growth but also more generally for social and political stability.
Second, deflation is also very bad, although we understand the
deflationary dynamics less well. But horror stories of the 1930s are strong
enough to make us fear deflation.
Third, we know very little about the intermediate zone of low inflation.
There are conflicting theories about the shape of the benefit curve, and the
empirical evidence if it exists is not very reliable. In addition, although we are
sure that with high inflation the costs become substantial, we know very little
about the question of when these costs start to matter. Do these costs become
visible when inflation exceeds 2%, or 5% or 7%. Nobody knows, because the
empirical evidence for this low inflation range is simply not available.
This uncertainty has a number of implications for monetary policies.
First, it implies that we beware of too much precision in setting the target for
the inflation rate. When knowledge is imprecise it is generally not a good idea
to pretend we possess precise information. Such an attitude can lead to a situation
where systematic errors are made, and we would not even be aware of it.
Second, some flexibility is called for. When we do not know what the
optimal inflation rate is, it is generally a good idea to keep one’s options open
      Costs and benefits
  of inflation
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by being flexible about the target.
Does the ECB asymmetric inflation target (inflation should be at most
2%) correspond to these two principles? My answer is no. The ECB asymmetric
inflation target imposes the wrong type of precision. By restricting the possible
inflation rates to the 0%-2% range it denies that the optimal inflation rate could
be higher, although the scientific evidence about this is unclear. In fact the
range is even smaller since the ECB has acknowledged some statistical bias in
measuring inflation. If this is, say, 0.5% then the target range is even smaller3
i.e. 0.5 to 2%. This is an example of too much precision. We simply do not
know enough to be sure that this is the correct range to aim for.
The 0% to 2% band is too narrow for another reason. The economy is
often subjected to shocks making a precise control of the rate of inflation very
difficult. The narrower the band, the less often the rate of inflation will be
observed within the band. A narrow band therefore creates an issue of credibility.
The ECB may face this problem. The 0% to 2% band makes it quite likely that
the observed inflation will be outside the band much of the time raising questions
about the credibility of the strategy. This may already be a problem. Since the
start of EMU on January 1 the observed monthly rate of inflation has been
outside the target band more than 60% of the time (see figure 30).
This criticism of the inflation target of the ECB calls for the formulation
of a different target. One such new target band policy could be to define the
target of 2% as the midpoint of a band of 3%, i.e. 1.5% below and above the
midpoint4. Such a target comes closer to what is now considered to be the
optimal rate of inflation and the margin is wider allowing the ECB to follow a
more credible strategy.
It should be stressed that this proposed new target range will not
undermine the anti-inflationary credibility of the ECB. Instead of a target range
that the ECB has been unable to keep, the new target range is realistic and
therefore more credible. In fact the formulation of this target would have allowed
the ECB to maintain the inflation rate within the target band most of the time.
It also comes closer to what other major central banks are doing today.
The previous discussion also calls into question the goal independence
of the ECB. The literature on central bank independence has made a distinction
between goal independence and instrument independence. There is a wide
consensus that the central bank should enjoy instrument independence. There
is much less consensus about goal independence. In fact, in several countries
(e.g. the UK) the central bank enjoys instrument independence, but not goal
independence, i.e. the government fixes the target and leaves the central bank
Paul De Grauwe - Conference Keynote address
373
THE ROLE OF STANDARDS AND LEGAL TENDER IN EMU
then free to decide how best to achieve this target.  This is a model towards
which the ECB will probably have to move.
Figure 30: Inflation rate in the euro area
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2.3 The instruments
The ECB has been very much influenced by the Bundesbank legacy
which itself was much influenced by the monetarist analysis made popular by
Milton Friedman, i.e. that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon. This view has led the ECB to give a prominent role to money in
its monetary policy strategy (the so-called first pillar). In particular it has led to
the formulation of a reference value for the growth rate of money (M3) of 4.5%
that should not be exceeded. The ECB is careful in stressing that this reference
value should not be applied mechanically5. Nevertheless it is striking that the
ECB is now the only central bank in the industrial world giving such prominence
to money in the formulation of its monetary policy strategy. All other central
banks have, with good reason, abandoned this approach. There is a great deal
of evidence that in a low inflation environment and in a world of frequent
financial innovations the money supply numbers are very unreliable as signals
of future inflation. Giving prominence to money can lead the central bank to
make the wrong move.
The problem with much of the empirical research about the long run
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relation between money growth and inflation is that it includes a lot of
observations on periods of relatively high inflation (in time series analysis) or
on countries with high rates of inflation. This problem is well illustrated in the
following cross-section evidence (figure 31). It shows a very tight relation
between the 30-year average of inflation and money growth in a sample of
more than one hundred countries. Subjecting this kind of evidence to regression
analysis invariably finds that the hypothesis of strict proportionality between
inflation and money growth cannot be rejected and that most, if not all, of the
differentials in inflation between countries can be explained by differentials in
money growth. This kind of cross-section evidence has now invaded textbooks
to show that the evidence in favour of the quantity theory is overwhelming.
(See for example, Parkin, Powell and Matthews, 2000).
When one looks at a subsample of countries with low inflation, things
get fuzzier. We show this in figure 32 where we present a subsample of countries,
which have experienced an average rate of inflation of 5% or less during 1970-
1999. We observe now that there is very little relation between inflation and
money growth in these ‘low’6 inflation countries. Put differently, long-term
sustained differences in money growth between countries are uninformative
about the differences in their rates of inflation, nor is the finding altered when
one corrects for differences in the growth of output7.
It is not difficult to understand this result. Money supply statistics are
full of noise. In a low inflation environment where inflation is only a few percent
a year, the observed differences in the money supply growth numbers contain
mostly noise, and say little about differences in monetary policies (the signal).
All this confirms what many critics have been saying about the first
pillar of the ECB monetary policy strategy, i.e. that the prominence given to
money in guiding monetary policies is mistaken (see e.g. Svensson, 2001).
Given that it is the ambition of the ECB to keep the rate of inflation below 2%,
success on the inflation front will make the yearly money growth numbers
even less informative about the inflationary potential in the economy than
appears from figure 32, because the noise to signal ratio will be even higher.
In fact the ECB is aware of this problem. Since 1999, the growth rate of
money (M3) has been above the target most of the time. The result has been
that the ECB has had to ignore the money supply numbers most of the time.
This leads to a credibility problem. The ECB announces a target for the money
growth but in fact does not take this target into account in its policy decisions.
In doing so, it gives signals about its intentions, which it then fails to follow.
This is bound to harm the credibility of the ECB.
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Inflation and money growth (1970-1999)
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Figure 31: Inflation and money growth in a sample of more than one hundred countries
Figure 32:  Inflation and money growth in “low” inflation countries
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, CD-Rom, Aug. 2001
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In order to avoid this credibility problem in the future, the ECB will
have to amend its “two-pillar” strategy and to drop the prominence it gives to
the money stock in its monetary policies.  As in the case of the inflation target,
this will allow the ECB to gain in credibility. It will not be put in the
uncomfortable situation anymore in which it has to explain all too often why it
does not want to take the latest money growth numbers seriously.
In contrast to the ECB, the US Fed has learned this lesson. Since the
second half of the 1980s it has systematically downgraded the importance of
money growth numbers. Today, these numbers play almost no role in setting
monetary policies. This has saved Greenspan the trouble of having to explain
with a great degree of frequency why the money growth targets were not met.
3. The challenge of enlargement
The most important challenge facing the European monetary union is
the enlargement with ten countries from Central Europe and with Malta and
Cyprus. This enlargement creates two problems that have to be tackled. The
first problem has to do with the effectiveness of monetary policies in the enlarged
EMU; the second problem relates to the institutional reforms that will have to
be introduced to make the system workable.
 3.1 Is the enlarged EMU an optimal currency area?
With a potential of 27 members of EMU instead of the present 12 the
challenge for the ECB to conduct monetary policy in an effective way will
increase. The reason is that in such a large group the probability of “asymmetric
shocks” will increase significantly. Thus some countries may experience a boom
and inflationary pressures while at the same time others experience deflationary
forces.
It has sometimes been argued that with the intensification of the
integration process the potential for asymmetric shocks will abate. Maybe,
maybe not. An optimistic view is represented graphically in figure 33. On the
vertical axis we set out the degree of asymmetry of shocks between clusters of
countries. We call this divergence. On the horizontal axis we set out the degree
of economic integration among these countries. All the points to the right of
the OCA line are points where clusters of countries form an optimal currency
area, i.e. the benefits exceed the costs. The OCA line is upward sloping for the
following reason. More divergence makes a monetary union more costly.
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Conversely, more integration reduces the costs (increases the benefits) of a
monetary union. As a result an increase in divergence must be compensated by
more integration to make a monetary union worthwhile (in terms of costs and
benefits).
The downward sloping arrows give us the dynamics of the relation
between integration and divergence. In the optimistic view we present here,
when clusters of countries integrate more they face less asymmetric shocks,
and thus less divergence. The negative slope comes from the fact that economic
integration increases intra-industry specialisation, which tends to make the
economic structures of countries more alike.
In figure 33 we represent two clusters of countries. The EU-12 (the present
Euroland) is assumed not to be an optimal currency area as yet8. However, the
dynamics of integration (which is stimulated by the monetary union itself)
moves it down along the arrows so that it will soon reach the OCA-zone. Here,
the costs for individual countries of being subjected to asymmetric shocks and
not being able to use one’s national monetary policies to deal with them are
small compared to the benefits of the union. In this zone the constraints imposed
by a monetary policy that must fit all sizes are not perceived to create
unacceptably high costs.
Figure  33: Degrees of divergence and of economic integration - the optimistic
scenario
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Consider now what happens when other countries join Euroland. We
represent the full cluster of countries (of Euroland and newcomers) by EU-27.
It is reasonable to assume that this cluster of countries will be located higher
up on a downward sloping line, reflecting the fact that EU-27 is less well
integrated than EU-12 and that it faces more asymmetric shocks.
The important insight from this analysis is that the original members of
Euroland (who are also part of EU-27) will now have to wait longer until they
reach the OCA zone9.  Practically this means that since in the enlarged Eurozone
the shocks are more asymmetric than in the original one, some of the original
members will more often than today be outliers (in terms of inflation and output)
compared to the average that the ECB will be focusing on. As a result, these
members will perceive the policies of the ECB to be less receptive to shocks
than it did before the enlargement. Some of the original members of the
Eurozone may then find that the cost-benefit calculus about monetary union
has become less favourable.
This analysis is not very much affected if we assume a pessimistic
scenario about the relation between integration and asymmetric shocks. We
show this case in figure 34. We now assume that the relation between integration
and divergence is positively sloped, i.e. as clusters of countries integrate more,
they become less alike, and therefore they are subjected to more asymmetric
shocks. This scenario may prevail when the integration process leads to
agglomeration effects that are induced by economies of scale (see
Krugman,1993).
In this pessimistic scenario, the major conclusion of the previous sections
still holds: the enlargement sets back the movement towards the OCA zone. As
a result, countries that now consider the cost benefit calculus of monetary union
to be favourable may very well think differently in an enlarged union. While
today most of the members of Euroland probably find that the interest rate
decisions of the ECB are consistent with their national economic conditions
most of the time, this may no longer be the case in an enlarged EMU. It will
happen more frequently that some countries consider the monetary stance taken
by the ECB to be inappropriate to deal with the economic situation of the
moment. As a result, the perceived costs of the union will increase relative to
the perceived benefits of the single currency. Such a situation is bound to produce
tensions both inside the decision making process of the Eurosystem as well as
outside the system when some countries feel that their economic interests are
not well served by the ECB.
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Figure  34: Degrees of divergence and of economic integration - the pessimistic
scenario
There is very little the ECB can do about this. By its very nature a
monetary union implies that the power to set interest rates is transferred to a
common central bank which can only set one interest rate. Fine-tuning of the
interest rate to cater for different national economic conditions is made
impossible. This is the price the members of the union pay for the benefits they
obtain from the existence of one currency.
The only way to deal with these issues is to make sure that individual
member countries have the instruments to deal with these asymmetric
developments. In this context progress towards reform of the labour markets
aiming at making these more flexible is of great importance. Flexibility is one
of the major  instruments available that allow eurozone countries to adjust to
asymmetric shocks. In addition, a move towards budget balance will allow
countries to exploit the margins of flexibility provided by the stability pact so
that the automatic fiscal stabilisers can operate fully.
3.2 Enlargement and institutional reform
Enlargement is bound to have important implications for the decision
making process within the Eurosystem. The present system is characterised by
equal representation of each member country in the Governing Council through
the presidents (governors) of the national central banks. When, like today, the
number of countries is limited to twelve, such a system can work satisfactorily.
If twenty seven countries have a representative on the Governing Council
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achieving a consensus about the stance of monetary policy will be much harder
than today10. This is due not only to the larger numbers of persons involved in
such a system, but also because, as we argued earlier, there will be more
asymmetric developments in an enlarged euro zone. These asymmetries will
necessarily lead to different perceptions among the national governors about
what the most appropriate course of action is for the euro zone as a whole.
The problem can be illustrated using a very simple model in the following
way. In figure 35 we present the interest rates that are desired by the twelve
governors of the Eurosystem. We take the view that there are asymmetric
developments leading each governor to compute an interest rate, which is
optimal for his own country11. Thus each governor desires a different interest
rate to prevail in the Eurosystem and we assume that these desired interest
rates are distributed uniformly between 3% and 4.1%. This is shown by the
horizontal line. Figure 12 also shows the relative size of each country as
measured by GDP. For example, Germany’s GDP represents 30% of the total
and Germany desires an interest rate of 3.4%. We make the further assumption
that the ECB Board (6 members) has the same desired interest rate and that this
is obtained by an analysis of the euro-wide economic conditions. Thus the
ECB-Board computes the optimal interest rate using the Eurosystem wide
average of inflation and output. This implies that the ECB-Board takes a
weighted average of the nationally desired interest rates, where the weights are
the GDP-shares12. This yields the result that the ECB-board desires an interest
rate of 3.5%. Thus, 7 members of the Governing Council (6 Board members
and one governor) desire the same 3.5%. This feature produces a peak in the
distribution of desired interest rates around 3.5%.
It is now obvious that the ECB-Board will have a strategic position in
the decision making process. It will have to find only two extra votes to have a
majority for its interest rate proposal. These can easily be found among the two
governors that are close to the ECB-board’s desired interest rate. Note that it
will be very difficult for other coalitions to beat the ECB-board’s proposal
because such a coalition would have to span both those governors who desire a
higher interest rate and those who desire a lower one. The nice thing about this
result is that the Governing Council will select the interest rate that is optimal
for the system as a whole, even if each national governor is only concerned
about the economic conditions prevailing in his country. It is clear that if the
national governors disregard the national economic conditions and care only
about the Eurosystem’s average economic conditions (as they claim they do)
the result will be the same. Thus whether the national governors care about the
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Euro-wide economic conditions or not does not make a difference.
The previous description is nothing but an application of the median
voter theorem. The ECB-Board which is averaging the desires of national
governors will be close to the desired interest rate of the median governor, (at
least if these desires are symmetrically distributed). In a majority voting system
the median voter’s preferences prevail.
Note that since the strategic position of the ECB-Board is so powerful, it
is unlikely that the members of the Governing Council will come to explicit
voting. Everybody is aware that whatever the Board is proposing will almost
certainly find a majority.
Figure 35: Distribution of desired interest rates in the eurozone (symmetric case)
How is this result affected by other distributions of the desired interest
rates? In order to analyse this question we computed the desired interest rates
using a Taylor rule on real economic data for the year 2002. Thus each central
bank computes its desired interest rate using the following Taylor rule
r*t = ρ + π* + a(πt - π*) + b xt (1)
where r*t is the desired interest rate, r is the long term real interest rate, π* is
the inflation target and xt  is the output gap. We assume that each governor uses
the same Taylor rule (expressing identical preferences). The only difference
between the governors is that their national inflation rates and output gaps
differ. The ECB-Board does the same exercise, using the euro-wide averages
of these two variables. We set ρ = 3%; π* = 2%; a = 1.5 and b = 0.5. The latter
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two coefficients have often been found to have such orders of magnitude. (See
Alesina, et al. (2001)). We applied the exercise to the year 2002 using OECD,
Economic Outlook.
We show the result in figure 36. We now find that the ECB-Board’s
desired interest rate (3.86%)  is different from the median desired interest rate
(which is between 4.45 and 5%). This follows from the fact that the large
countries experienced slow economic activity in the year 2002 compared to
the other, mostly smaller countries, and that the former have a large share in
the averaging procedure applied by the ECB-Board. Thus the ECB-Board
desired interest rate is relatively close to the desires of the large countries which
represent about 70% of the euro area’s GDP.
Figure 36: Distribution of desired interest rates and country size (Taylor rule, 2002)
It can now be seen that despite the fact that the ECB-Board’s desired
interest rate diverges from the median, the ECB-Board should have few
difficulties in forcing its desire to pass in the Governing Council. All the Board
has to do is to find three votes for its proposal. It will likely find it among the
three central banks whose desired interest rate is close to 3.86%. In this example
this is the French and the Finnish governor. In addition, despite the asymmetry
in the distribution there are only 8 governors available for a coalition in favour
of a higher interest rate than 3.86. In order to beat the ECB-Board’s proposal
10 votes are necessary.
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We conclude that in the present situation the ECB-Board has a strategic
position within the Governing Council, which is maintained even when the
distribution of desired interest rates is different among large and small countries,
as happened in 2002. As a result, the decision making process within the
Governing Council ensures that the interest rate that will be decided is the
optimal one from the point of view of the Eurosystem as a whole.
Things will be very different in an enlarged Eurosystem. We first present
figure 37 which is similar to figure 35 and which presents the distribution of
desired interest rates in the enlarged Eurosystem consisting of 27 members.
Thus the Governing Council consists of 33 members, which means that an
interest rate proposal must have 17 votes to obtain a majority. We first assume
that the distribution of the desired interest rates among small and large countries
is approximately symmetric. As before, the ECB-Board computes the desired
interest rate for the Eurosystem as a whole (the weighted average of the
nationally desired interest rates).
A first thing to observe is that the ECB-board’s strategic position is
weakened. It will now have to find 11 governors to back its proposal for its
desired interest rate of 3.8%. Since one governor has the same desired interest
rate of 3.8%, ten governors with different desires must be found to obtain a
majority.
Figure 37:  Distribution of desired interest rates and country size in the euro-27
(symmetric case)
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Despite the fact that the ECB-board must make a greater effort to find
the backing for its proposal, it can also be seen that the ECB-board still has a
strong position. The reason is that its proposal (the mean) is very close to the
median proposal. As a result, coalitions to defeat the ECB’s proposal will be
difficult to find. For example, the number of governors in favour of an interest
rate higher than 3.8 amounts to only 13 (remember that one needs 17 votes to
form a majority). Similarly the governors desiring less than 3.8% can only
muster 13 votes. Thus, the ECB-Board will most likely be able to find a majority.
We construct the asymmetric case in a similar way as in figure 35, i.e.
using the same Taylor rule as in equation (1) using data for 2002. We did this
for the present members of the Eurosystem and for the UK, Denmark and
Sweden. For the accession countries we lacked data on output gaps. We,
therefore, assumed that the desired interest rates of the accession countries
would be distributed uniformly within the same range as the one obtained for
the other countries. We assumed, however, that because of a Balassa-Samuelson
effect, the observed inflation rates in accession countries are 0.5% above the
inflation rates of the other countries.
The result is shown in figure 38. Our results are now very different. The
difference between the ECB-board’s desired interest rate, 4.18%, (the mean) is
now significantly lower than the median desired interest rate, 5%. As a result,
a coalition of mostly small countries desiring a higher interest rate than 4.18%
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Figure 38:  Distribution of desired interest rates in the euro-27 (Taylor rule, 2002)
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can now be found, thereby defeating the ECB board’s proposal13. It is therefore
possible that an interest rate decision is made that suits the interests of a coalition
of small countries that represent a small fraction of the Eurosystems’s GDP. In
the example of figure 38, this coalition represents only 34% of the GDP in the
Eurosystem. This interest rate would not be optimal for the Eurosystem as a
whole. If such a scenario were to materialise it would likely lead to grave
conflicts within the Eurosystem. It is by no means implausible, because the
Taylor rule used for EU15, captures reasonably well what central banks desire
and the Balassa-Samuelson effect we assumed for accession countries is
relatively small.
The problem we have identified can be summarized as follows. In the
present set-up the ECB Board has a strategic position in the decision making
process within the Eurosystem. This ensures that the interest rate decisions are
made on the basis of the needs of Euroland as a whole. This is so even if the
national governors are guided by the economic conditions that prevail in their
own countries. It holds a fortiori if the national governors only take euro-
aggregates into account in their decisions.  Since the large countries (Germany,
France, Italy) represent about 70% of the total, this decision making model
also ensures that the large country’s interests are relatively well served, despite
the overrepresentation of the small countries in the Governing Council. Because
of the strategic position of the ECB-Board a consensus can usually be reached
easily around the interest rate proposals made by the Board. As a result, formal
voting is usually not necessary.
In an enlarged Eurosystem this consensus model is likely to break down.
The reason is that the ECB-Board will loose its strategic position. As a result,
winning coalitions of small countries will become possible and national
governors will face greater temptations to take into account national economic
conditions in the decision making process. It follows that in an enlarged Euro-
system, the Board will be confronted by the possibility that its interest rate
proposals will be overruled by coalitions of small countries who experience
economic conditions different from the average (which is dominated by the
large countries). This will create the possibility that interest rate decisions will
be made on the basis of  economic conditions that prevail in a relatively small
part of Euroland. This is bound to lead to grave conflicts within the Eurosystem.
The essence of the problem is that the small countries are over-represented
in the Governing Council and this over-representation will be aggravated in an
enlarged Eurosystem. To lessen the risk that small countries in the Governing
Council over-ride the Board’s strategic position the over-representation of small
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countries would have to be reduced.  This can be achieved in several ways. We
discuss some possible formulas14.
• The US Fed formula: this consists in allowing all governors to participate in
the deliberations of the Governing Council but to restrict the voting rights
to a limited number of governors (e.g. ten) on a rotating basis.
• The IMF formula: this consists in having small countries group together in
constituencies and be represented by one governor.
• The centralised formula: this consists in restricting the decision making to
the Executive Board of the ECB. Today the Board consists of six members.
In this formula there is some scope for expanding the size of the Board.
The third formula is probably too drastic. The advantage of the first
formula is political. By introducing a system of rotation in the voting, one does
not have to discriminate between small and large countries. The effect on the
outcome will be broadly the same whether it is small or large countries, which
are allowed to vote since this rotation system reinstates the strategic position of
the ECB-Board. Large countries, however, may not like this solution. As a
result, a combination of the first and second formula could be a reasonable
compromise whereby groups of smaller countries delegate one of their governors
on a rotating basis15.
4. Conclusion
The introduction of the euro has been spectacularly successful. This
success should not make us complacent. The challenges ahead are formidable
as well. We have argued that although the record of the ECB is a positive one,
some changes in its monetary policy strategy are required. At present there is
too large a discrepancy between the announced policy strategy and the policy
actions of the ECB. This discrepancy hurts the credibility of the ECB. For
example, in its monetary policy strategy the ECB claims that the growth rate of
M3 (the first pillar) is the most important signal it is looking at, and yet the
facts show that it barely takes money growth into account. In order to gain
credibility, the ECB will have to abandon the importance it gives to money
growth numbers.
A similar credibility arises with the ECB’s inflation target. It has been
set unrealistically low. As a result, the ECB has not been able to keep its promise
of maintaining the rate of inflation below 2%. This hurts the credibility of the
ECB, and may also be damaging to the real economy.
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THE ROLE OF STANDARDS AND LEGAL TENDER IN EMU
We also discussed the major challenge of enlargement. to a zone of
potentially twenty-seven countries which will affect the effectiveness of the
ECB in maintaining monetary and financial stability within the euro zone. This
is so for two reasons. First, the enlargement is likely to change the perceptions
of costs and benefits of the union for the present members of Euroland,
increasing the costs relative to the benefits. Consequently, countries will face
more often than today the possibility that ECB interest rate decisions do not
reflect their national interests. There is very little the ECB can do about this. As
a result, the pressure on countries to increase labour market flexibility will
increase, which for most people in the labour market is not a comfortable
prospect.
Second, enlargement creates the risk that the ECB-Board will loose its
strategic position and that the interest rate decisions will stop representing the
needs of Euroland as a whole. This could create strong conflicts within the
Governing Council, and may necessitate a streamlining of the Governing
Council to reduce the weight of the small countries in the decision making
process. The challenges ahead are serious but can be overcome, provided timely
reforms are undertaken.
1
 Note that since the ECB considers 2% to be a maximum it must be targeting a rate of inflation below 2%.
2
 In Begg et al. (2002), it is argued that although the ECB reacted slowly to the emergence of the recession
of 2001, it did reduce the interest rate in the end in a way that the Fed, had it experienced the same shock as
in Europe would probably also have done.
3
  The Boskin report estimated this bias in the US to be between 0.8 and 1.6 % see Boskin Report (1996).
There are no comparable estimates in Euroland, but it would be surprising if the bias were very different
from the US one.
4
  It should be pointed out that some central banks, e.g. the Bank of England, do not have a formal band. We
do not go into the issue here of the merits of formal versus informal bands.
5 For a thorough analysis and justification of the ECB two-pillar monetary policy strategy see Issing, et al.
(2000).
6
  Many central bankers today would not call a yearly rate of inflation of 4 or 5% maintained during thirty
years a low rate of inflation. If we restrict our subsample of low inflation countries to those countries with
inflation less than 3% a year, the absence of a link between inflation and money growth is even more
striking.
7
 See De Grauwe and Polan (2001), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2001).
8
  As will become clear this assumption does not diminish the power of the arguments we are making here.
9
  If the EU-12 is in the OCA-zone when enlargement occurs, it will no longer be after enlargement.
10
 See Baldwin et al. (2001) for a detailed analysis of the decision-making problems in an enlarged European
Union.
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11
 Officially the governors are not supposed to do this. It is doubtful, however, whether governors do not take
the national economic conditions into account. There is interesting evidence that even in the US Fed, regional
interests play a role in monetary policy decisions. See Meade and Sheets (2002).
12
 See Aksoy, De Grauwe and Dewachter (2002).
13
 This does not mean that such a coalition will necessarily be found. The point is that it is now a serious
possibility.
14
  For a detailed discussion of these various proposals, see Baldwin et al. (2001).
15
  It is unclear, though, whether this solution is consistent with the Nice Treaty which says that the rebalancing
of the votes should not introduce discriminations between countries.
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